口譯材料：外交部例行記者會(huì)-18

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 29, 2016

外交部發(fā)言人華春瑩主持例行記者會(huì)(2016年4月29日)

At the invitation of Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Paolo Gentiloni, Foreign Minister Wang Yi will pay an official visit to Italy and attend the 7th joint meeting of the China-Italy Governmental Committee from May 4 to 5.

應(yīng)意大利外交與國(guó)際合作部長(zhǎng)保羅·真蒂洛尼邀請(qǐng)，外交部長(zhǎng)王毅將于5月4日至5日對(duì)意大利進(jìn)行正式訪問(wèn)并出席中意政府委員會(huì)第七次聯(lián)席會(huì)議。

Q: Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said yesterday that the Japanese side has lodged a protest with Taipei for not recognizing waters off Okinotori as Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). He said that Okinotori's status as an island has been established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Japan cannot accept Taiwan's position. What is China's comment?

問(wèn)：日本外相岸田文雄28日稱，日方已就臺(tái)灣當(dāng)局不承認(rèn)沖之鳥(niǎo)礁海域是日專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)向臺(tái)方提出抗議。根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》，沖之鳥(niǎo)礁的島嶼地位已確立，日無(wú)法接受臺(tái)方主張。中方對(duì)此有何評(píng)論?

A: Okinotori is an isolated rock in the West Pacific far away from the homeland of Japan. As prescribed in the UNCLOS, rocks like Okinotori which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone nor continental shelf. In April, 2012, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf gave its recommendations in regard to the submission made by Japan on the limits of its outer continental shelf,not recognizing Japan's claim of an outer continental shelf based on Okinotori. Japan has violated the UNCLOS by categorizing Okinotori as "island" for the purpose of claiming for EEZ and continental shelf based on that. China does not recognize the illegal assertion by Japan.

答：沖之鳥(niǎo)礁是西太平洋上遠(yuǎn)離日本國(guó)土的孤立巖礁。根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》有關(guān)條款，沖之鳥(niǎo)礁是不能維持人類居住或其本身的經(jīng)濟(jì)生活的巖礁，無(wú)權(quán)主張專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架。2012年4月，大陸架界限委員會(huì)對(duì)日本外大陸架劃界案作出建議，不認(rèn)可日本依據(jù)沖之鳥(niǎo)礁主張外大陸架。日本自行將沖之鳥(niǎo)礁認(rèn)定為“島嶼”，并據(jù)此主張專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，違背《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》。中國(guó)對(duì)日本非法主張不予承認(rèn)。

Q: US Secretary of State John Kerry and White House National Security Council spokesperson Ned Price expressed concerns about the NPC's adoption of the foreign NGO management law. What is China's comment?

問(wèn)：4月28日，美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)卿克里、白宮國(guó)安會(huì)發(fā)言人普萊斯就中國(guó)全國(guó)人大日前審議通過(guò)的《境外非政府組織境內(nèi)活動(dòng)管理法》表達(dá)關(guān)切。中方對(duì)此有何評(píng)論?

A: The NPC Standing Committee deliberated and passed the foreign NGO management law, meeting China's requirement of pursuing law-based state governance and building a country under the rule of law. It is also an important measure which will guide and regulate foreign NGOs in China and safeguard their lawful rights and interests. While making the law, China has solicited opinions from all sectors both in and outside China, and amended some provisions in the law accordingly. Different countries have different practices in managing and serving foreign NGOs, as their national conditions vary. Only when it meets the national conditions and realities in China, can the relevant legislation play its due role. It is hoped that relevant countries would respect China's legislative sovereignty, and view the legislation in a positive and objective manner.

答：中國(guó)全國(guó)人大常委會(huì)審議通過(guò)《境外非政府組織境內(nèi)活動(dòng)管理法》，是中國(guó)全面推進(jìn)依法治國(guó)、建設(shè)法治國(guó)家的客觀要求，也是引導(dǎo)和規(guī)范境外非政府組織在中國(guó)境內(nèi)的活動(dòng)、保障其合法權(quán)益的一項(xiàng)重要舉措。中方在立法過(guò)程中充分征求了國(guó)內(nèi)外各方面意見(jiàn)建議，并對(duì)相關(guān)條款作出了修改。我想強(qiáng)調(diào)，各國(guó)國(guó)情不同，對(duì)境外非政府組織管理和服務(wù)的實(shí)際做法不同。相關(guān)立法必須符合中國(guó)國(guó)情和管理實(shí)際，才能真正發(fā)揮實(shí)效。希望有關(guān)國(guó)家尊重中國(guó)立法主權(quán)，積極、客觀看待中國(guó)相關(guān)立法。

Q: Will Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida jointly meet the press after their talks tomorrow?

問(wèn)：王毅外長(zhǎng)明天與日本外相岸田文雄會(huì)談后是否有共見(jiàn)記者的安排?

A: The two foreign ministers will hold talks tomorrow morning. I have not heard about any arrangement for their joint meeting with the press. We will release the information about their talks in a timely fashion.

答：30日上午，王毅外長(zhǎng)將與岸田文雄外相舉行會(huì)談。據(jù)我了解，目前沒(méi)有共見(jiàn)記者的安排。會(huì)談?dòng)嘘P(guān)消息我們會(huì)及時(shí)發(fā)布。

Q: US Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on April 28 that China cannot have it both ways by being a party to the UNCLOS but rejecting its provisions, including the binding nature of any arbitration decision. What is your response?

問(wèn)：美國(guó)常務(wù)副國(guó)務(wù)卿布林肯28日稱，中國(guó)不能一方面作為《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》締約國(guó)，一方面拒絕公約條款，不承認(rèn)仲裁決定的約束性質(zhì)。你對(duì)此有何評(píng)論?

A: I cannot but say with regret that Mr. Blinken is either knowing nothing about the nature of relevant disputes over the South China Sea and what is said in the UNCLOS or labeling China at will.

答：我不得不遺憾地說(shuō)，布林肯先生要么是真的不了解有關(guān)南海爭(zhēng)議的實(shí)質(zhì)以及《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》的內(nèi)容，要么是故意給中國(guó)亂扣帽子。

China has stated clearly its principled position on the relevant issue on multiple occasions. I would like to reiterate the following points.

中方已多次就有關(guān)問(wèn)題表明有關(guān)原則立場(chǎng)。我愿再重申幾點(diǎn)：

First, the nature of the South China Sea issue is territorial dispute over islands and reefs and demarcation dispute over relevant waters. However the Philippine side disguises its claim, it cannot cover up its real intention of negating China's territorial sovereignty over relevant islands and reefs in the South China Sea as well as China's maritime rights and interests. When it comes to issues relating to territorial sovereignty, no country in the world will accept a solution imposed on it by a third party dispute settlement mechanism not of its own choice.

一、南海問(wèn)題實(shí)質(zhì)是島礁領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端和有關(guān)海域劃界爭(zhēng)端。不論菲方對(duì)其訴求如何包裝，其真實(shí)意圖都是要否定中國(guó)對(duì)南海有關(guān)島礁的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)和相關(guān)海洋權(quán)利。對(duì)這樣涉及國(guó)家領(lǐng)土主權(quán)的問(wèn)題，世界上沒(méi)有任何國(guó)家會(huì)接受一個(gè)并非其自愿選擇的第三方機(jī)制強(qiáng)加的解決方案。

Second, the UNCLOS has nothing to do with issues concerning territorial sovereignty. As for issues on maritime demarcation, the UNCLOS allows optional exceptions to applicability of compulsory dispute settlement proceedings such as compulsory arbitration. China made a declaration in 2006, excluding disputes concerning maritime delimitation from arbitral proceedings. More than 30 other countries have made similar declarations as well. This kind of declaration has become an indispensible part of UNCLOS dispute settlement proceedings, binding on all state parties.

二、《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》根本不涉及領(lǐng)土主權(quán)問(wèn)題，而對(duì)于海域劃界問(wèn)題，《公約》允許締約國(guó)排除適用強(qiáng)制仲裁等強(qiáng)制爭(zhēng)端解決程序。中國(guó)已于2006年作出聲明，明確將海域劃界等問(wèn)題排除適用強(qiáng)制程序。另有30多個(gè)國(guó)家也作出了類似聲明。此類聲明構(gòu)成《公約》爭(zhēng)端解決程序不可或缺的組成部分，對(duì)《公約》所有締約國(guó)都具有法律效力。

Therefore, what the Philippines submitted are not suitable for compulsory arbitration at all. And there is no basis for the formation of the arbitral tribunal. How can it be binding, if the ruling is given by an institution that obviously has no jurisdiction? By not accepting nor participating in the arbitration, China is upholding the sanctity of international law, including that of the UNCLOS, and opposing the abuse of law. If some country or some people say that non-acceptance of the so-called arbitration means violating international law, then it reveals their ignorance of international law. If they keep making an issue of it, their hidden motives are nowhere to hide.

因此，菲律賓的那些所謂訴求，根本不是可以提交強(qiáng)制仲裁的爭(zhēng)端，仲裁庭的組建也根本沒(méi)有依據(jù)。對(duì)于一個(gè)明顯沒(méi)有管轄權(quán)的機(jī)構(gòu)作出的裁決，其約束力從何而來(lái)?中方不接受、不參與仲裁，正是為了維護(hù)包括《公約》在內(nèi)的國(guó)際法的嚴(yán)肅性，反對(duì)濫用。而某些國(guó)家、某些人表示，不承認(rèn)、不接受所謂仲裁就是違反國(guó)際法，這種說(shuō)法本身就是不懂國(guó)際法的表現(xiàn)。刻意炒作，更是別有用心。

Third, the US is not a state party to the UNCLOS. It neglects the nature of the arbitration case initiated by the Philippines, ignores the fact that the arbitral tribunal acts beyond its authority, selectively forgets what it used to do with international rulings and indulges in talks about the binding nature of arbitral rulings. I think everybody knows well what is really on its mind.

三、美國(guó)作為《公約》的非締約國(guó)，無(wú)視菲律賓所提南海仲裁案的本質(zhì)，無(wú)視仲裁庭越權(quán)裁判的事實(shí)，也選擇性地忘記自己以往對(duì)待國(guó)際裁決的做法，奢談什么仲裁庭裁決的約束性質(zhì)，真實(shí)目的是什么?恐怕大家都很清楚。

Last but not least, the US who is yet to join the UNCLOS took a preemptive move in 1979 before the signing of the UNCLOS and put forward the so-called "freedom of navigation operations" to contend with international law. It makes and dominates the American-style maritime order outside the framework of the UNCLOS, which is nothing but the logic and practice of hegemony. It is an open secret that the US abides by international law only when the law meets its interests. In this connection, the US is in no position to make critical remarks against China.

此外,美國(guó)不僅迄今沒(méi)有加入《公約》，反而在1979年《公約》簽訂前搶先推出所謂“航行自由計(jì)劃”，以對(duì)抗國(guó)際法，在《公約》框架外制訂和主導(dǎo)美式海洋秩序，這是赤裸裸的霸權(quán)邏輯、霸權(quán)行為。美國(guó)對(duì)國(guó)際法合則用，不合則棄，這已是世人皆知的秘密。在這一問(wèn)題上，美國(guó)沒(méi)有資格對(duì)中國(guó)說(shuō)三道四。