維系朝鮮經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈的“隱秘船隊(duì)”
聯(lián)昇國際(Union Link International HK)只是一家管理著一小批貨船的香港公司，卻懸掛著一系列外籍旗幟，包括從中國、坦桑尼亞到太平洋島國紐埃和帕勞的國旗。
But one stands out: a five-pointed red star on broad horizontal stripes of red and dark blue. It is North Korea’s national banner and the vessel that flies it, the Dolphin 26, is just one in a vast network helping Pyongyang survive the international sanctions that target its rapidly advancing weapons programme.
但有一面國旗引人注目：紅色和深藍(lán)橫條紋上一顆紅色的五角星。這是朝鮮的國旗，懸掛這面國旗的“Dolphin 26”號(hào)只是幫助朝鮮在國際制裁中生存下來的大規(guī)模網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的一環(huán)(國際制裁針對(duì)的是朝鮮快速發(fā)展的武器計(jì)劃)。
The UN Security Council on Monday passed its toughest measures yet against North Korea and reiterated an agreement to identify and inspect vessels suspected of transporting proscribed goods from the country. But the opacity of the web of ships, people and businesses perpetuating such trade flows suggests the international community faces a huge challenge if its clampdown is to succeed.
聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)(UN Security Council)周一通過了迄今最為嚴(yán)厲的對(duì)朝制裁措施，并重申同意對(duì)涉嫌運(yùn)輸來自該國的禁運(yùn)物資的船只進(jìn)行識(shí)別和檢查。但維持這種貿(mào)易流動(dòng)的船只、人員和企業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)極不透明，這意味著如果國際社會(huì)想要成功實(shí)施禁運(yùn)，將面臨巨大挑戰(zhàn)。
Hundreds of the vessels involved are owned and managed by companies based in Hong Kong, where it is not illegal to do business with North Korea. Some of the companies are operated by North Koreans, corporate records show, although most are backed by Chinese nationals.
其中涉及的數(shù)百艘船只由一些總部位于香港的公司所有和管理，在香港，與朝鮮做生意并不違法。公司注冊(cè)信息顯示，其中一些公司由朝鮮人經(jīng)營，不過多數(shù)還是由中國公民經(jīng)營。
“These networks have to be important to North Korea because the North Korean economy has been able to do something no Soviet economy was ever able to do before, and that’s stabilise the balance of trade and the currency,” says Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank.
保守派智庫美國企業(yè)研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的尼古拉斯•埃伯施塔特(Nicholas Eberstadt)表示：“這些網(wǎng)絡(luò)肯定對(duì)朝鮮很重要，因?yàn)槌r經(jīng)濟(jì)能夠做到穩(wěn)定貿(mào)易平衡和匯率，這件事從沒有一個(gè)蘇維埃經(jīng)濟(jì)體能夠做到。”
Washington-based research group C4ADS has detailed the characteristics of shipping networks important to North Korea. Of a sample of the 248 companies it identifies as managing or operating businesses connected to North Korea, 160 are registered in Hong Kong.
總部位于華盛頓的研究機(jī)構(gòu)C4ADS詳細(xì)描述了這些對(duì)朝鮮非常重要的航運(yùn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的特征。該機(jī)構(gòu)選取了248家它認(rèn)為管理或經(jīng)營與朝鮮相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)的公司，其中有160家在香港注冊(cè)。
One C4ADS report notes that the companies employ “a variety of schemes to disguise beneficial ownership including using flags of convenience for ships, establishing shell and front companies to register their holdings . . . and using multiple layers of intermediaries to conduct business”.
C4ADS的一份報(bào)告指出，這些公司利用“多種安排來掩蓋其收益權(quán)歸屬，包括在船上懸掛方便旗、設(shè)立殼公司和幌子公司來控股……還利用多層中介開展業(yè)務(wù)”。
The Dolphin 26’s rusty hull has seen better days. Its decks were corroded enough to draw the attention of inspectors in February, according to a Chinese port’s disciplinary report. The vessel was last spotted in mid-May in China’s northern port of Tianjin, ship-tracking service MarineTraffic shows.
船身銹跡斑斑的“Dolphin 26”號(hào)早已不在鼎盛狀態(tài)了。根據(jù)中國一港口的執(zhí)勤報(bào)告，這艘船的甲板腐蝕嚴(yán)重，以至在今年2月引起了檢查人員的注意。船只跟蹤服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)MarineTraffic的記錄顯示，這艘船上次被發(fā)現(xiàn)是在5月中旬，地點(diǎn)是中國天津港。
There is no evidence to suggest it has been used to break any laws. But it shares many of the characteristics of ships that have.
目前沒有證據(jù)表明，這艘船被用于從事違法活動(dòng)。但它的許多特征與從事違法活動(dòng)的船只相同。
The Dolphin 26 has changed its registered owner and manager six times and its name three times in the past eight years, while its flag has been switched four times in five years, according to maritime database Equasis.
海洋數(shù)據(jù)庫Equasis的信息顯示，過去8年，“Dolphin 26”號(hào)注冊(cè)的所有者和管理者更換了6次，船名更改了3次;船上懸掛的旗幟在5年內(nèi)更換過4次。
By swapping flags and shifting ownership between shell companies, experts say it is much more difficult to identify patterns and track the activities of people behind the shipping companies. Many of the businesses share Hong Kong addresses with the secretarial companies paid to represent them, a set-up commonly used by shell companies with no real assets in the territory.
專家表示，通過更換旗幟和改變殼公司所有權(quán)，發(fā)現(xiàn)規(guī)律以及追尋這些航運(yùn)公司背后人物的活動(dòng)蹤跡就難上加難了。很多公司與有償代表它們的秘書公司(secretarial companies)共用香港地址，這是在香港沒有實(shí)際資產(chǎn)的殼公司普遍采取的做法。
The other ships managed by Union Link show similar patterns. The Oriental Lady has changed flag six times — twice to North Korea’s — since 2003. The Zhi Hui has used a North Korean flag four times since 2006.
聯(lián)昇國際旗下的其他船只顯示出類似的規(guī)律。自2003年以來，“Oriental Lady”號(hào)更換了6次旗幟，有兩次更換為朝鮮國旗。自2006年以來，“Zhi Hui”號(hào)有4次懸掛朝鮮國旗。
“If you think about the time, energy and money these companies take to hide their true identity, you have to think that this is important,” says William Newcomb, former deputy co-ordinator of the US state department’s North Korea Working Group under President George W Bush.
曾在小布什(George W. Bush)時(shí)期擔(dān)任美國國務(wù)院朝鮮工作小組(North Korea Working Group)副協(xié)調(diào)員的威廉•紐科姆(William Newcomb)表示：“如果你考慮到這些公司為隱藏真實(shí)身份所花費(fèi)的時(shí)間、精力和資金，你不得不認(rèn)為這肯定很重要。”
Xie Qun, the registered owner of Union Link, says she has cut down on the “stressful work” of running a shipping company in order to look after her child and elderly parents.
聯(lián)昇國際注冊(cè)的所有人Xie Qun說，為了照顧孩子和年邁的父母，她把經(jīng)營一家船運(yùn)公司的“繁重工作”削減了一些。
Speaking at a McDonald’s restaurant in Dalian, she says she severed ties with her last North Korean client in February, as the UN was about to approve fresh sanctions, and that she has never knowingly helped North Korean companies break the law.
她在大連的一家麥當(dāng)勞(McDonald's)餐廳里說，今年2月，她切斷了與最后一名朝鮮客戶的聯(lián)系，因?yàn)槁?lián)合國即將批準(zhǔn)實(shí)施新的制裁決議，而且她也從未在知情的情況下幫助朝鮮公司從事違法活動(dòng)。
Ms Xie notes that many small shipping companies were registered under her name in Hong Kong, a strategy aimed at spreading risk — should one ship become involved in a dispute, other ships and companies would not be affected.
Xie Qun指出，香港有許多小型船運(yùn)公司以她的名字注冊(cè)，這一策略是為了分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)——如果一艘船卷入糾紛，其他船只和公司不會(huì)受影響。
“It’s common practice in the industry to register many companies,” she says, adding that industry peers had told her to do so in Hong Kong, where companies can be registered without an address or assets in the territory.
她說：“注冊(cè)許多公司是這一行里的常見做法。”她還說，當(dāng)初是同行告訴她可以在香港注冊(cè)，在那里注冊(cè)公司不需要有當(dāng)?shù)氐牡刂坊蛸Y產(chǎn)。
Hong Kong company records show two dissolved shipping companies registered under Xie Qun’s name.
香港公司注冊(cè)記錄顯示，有兩家已告解散的船運(yùn)公司是以Xie Qun的名字注冊(cè)的。
The Chinese territory’s Commerce and Economic Development Bureau says it is aware of reports from the UN Panel of Experts accusing companies of facilitating illicit trade with North Korea and is “looking into the cases in which Hong Kong-registered companies are said to be involved”.
香港商務(wù)及經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展局(Commerce and Economic Development Bureau)表示，它知悉聯(lián)合國專家小組(Panel of Experts)指責(zé)有公司為對(duì)朝非法貿(mào)易提供便利的報(bào)告，并“正在調(diào)查據(jù)說牽涉其中的香港注冊(cè)公司”。
US regulators and research groups have homed in on several large Chinese companies, many based in Dandong on the border with North Korea, which they believe are aiding Pyongyang’s weapons programme, as well as the people behind the companies.
美國監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和研究團(tuán)體已經(jīng)鎖定了數(shù)家中國大公司以及這些公司背后的人員，其中許多公司的總部位于靠近中朝邊境的丹東市，他們相信，這些公司正在幫助平壤發(fā)展武器項(xiàng)目。
In late June, the US Treasury department accused the Bank of Dandong of financing activities related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Last September, the justice department charged Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development with conspiring to evade US sanctions and violating nuclear proliferation rules.
今年6月末，美國財(cái)政部指責(zé)丹東銀行(Bank of Dandong)為與大規(guī)模殺傷性武器擴(kuò)散相關(guān)的活動(dòng)提供融資。去年9月，美國司法部指控丹東鴻祥實(shí)業(yè)發(fā)展有限公司(Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development)共謀逃避美國制裁并違反了核武器擴(kuò)散條約。
A C4ADS report in June showed how Dandong Dongyuan Industrial had sent North Korea a shipment of navigational equipment worth $790,000 in 2016. A Chinese national, Sun Sidong, owned the Hong Kong-registered company whose ship transported it, which was seized in Egypt last year carrying 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades made in North Korea.
C4ADS今年6月的一份報(bào)告描述了丹東鴻祥是如何在2016年向朝鮮運(yùn)送了一船價(jià)值79萬美元的導(dǎo)航設(shè)備的。運(yùn)送這批貨物的船屬于一家香港注冊(cè)公司，該公司的所有人是一位名叫Sun Sidong的中國公民，這艘船去年在埃及被扣押時(shí)，裝載著3萬枚朝鮮制造的火箭推進(jìn)榴彈。
However, North Korea-flagged ships — such as the Dolphin 26 — are falling into disuse.
然而，“Dolphin 26”號(hào)等懸掛朝鮮旗幟的船只正在被淘汰。
“My sense is the decrepit fleet of North Korea-flagged ships is increasingly less central to North Korean trade activity,” says Marcus Noland, a North Korea expert who is director of studies at Washington’s Peterson Institute for International Economics. “The North Korean flags are like targets . . . There are more and more of these ships flagged with Southeast Asian or African flags.”
位于華盛頓的彼得森國際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所 (Petersen Institute for International Economics)研究主任、朝鮮問題專家馬庫斯•諾蘭(Marcus Noland)表示：“我的感覺是，懸掛朝鮮旗幟的破舊船隊(duì)越來越不占據(jù)朝鮮貿(mào)易活動(dòng)的核心地位。朝鮮旗幟就像靶子……越來越多船只懸掛東南亞或者非洲國家的旗幟。”
In a Hong Kong industrial district far from the financial centre, a small accounting firm called Trustworthy Secretarial is Union Link’s only physical connection to the city in which it is registered. Trustworthy represents Union Link in Hong Kong but representatives in the company’s small, cluttered office said they could not comment on their client’s business.
在香港一個(gè)遠(yuǎn)離金融中心的工業(yè)區(qū)，一家名為信捷秘書服務(wù)(Trustworthy Secretarial)的小型會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所，是聯(lián)昇國際與香港的唯一實(shí)體聯(lián)系。信捷秘書服務(wù)是聯(lián)昇國際在香港的代表，但在該公司小而雜亂的辦公室里，代理人們表示，他們不能就客戶業(yè)務(wù)置評(píng)。
