FT社評：美韓須結(jié)成統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線震懾朝鮮

The world has no choice but to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea. The US — by choice and default the crucial counterbalance to the rogue regime — cannot change this fact without taking catastrophic risks. That does not mean the US has no options.

這個世界別無選擇，只能與擁有核武器的朝鮮共存。美國——不論自愿還是非自愿，它都是反制這個流氓政權(quán)的關(guān)鍵力量——也無法不承擔(dān)災(zāi)難性的風(fēng)險而改變這一事實。但這并不表示美國對此束手無策。

Its goals should be to maximise the deterrent forces acting on Kim Jong Un, the country’s pitiless dictator; make further development of his nuclear weapon programme as difficult as possible; and to keep alive the possibility, however faint, that in the future the hermit kingdom might accept limits on its nuclear ambitions in return for an end to its isolation.

美國的目標(biāo)應(yīng)該是：最大限度地威懾金正恩(Kim Jong Un)這個朝鮮冷酷的獨裁者;盡可能加大他的核武計劃進(jìn)一步發(fā)展的難度;無論多么渺茫，也要保留這種可能性：將來這個隱士王國為了結(jié)束其受孤立的狀態(tài)，會接受對其核野心的限制。

On Sunday North Korea conducted by far its largest underground nuclear weapon test, which followed the firing of a long-range ballistic missile near Japan. Since then, President Donald Trump and his advisers have let the possibility of pre-emptive military action hang in the air. Defence secretary James Mattis, for example, has stated that “any threat to the United States or its territory . . . will be met with a massive military response”. Whether “threat” in this context refers to an attack or something short of one is ambiguous. Presumably the ambiguity is intentional. But pre-emptive attack would probably end in a massive and unacceptable loss of life.

9月3日，朝鮮進(jìn)行了規(guī)模遠(yuǎn)超以往的迄今最大的地下核試驗，而且不久前才剛剛在日本附近發(fā)射了一枚遠(yuǎn)程彈道導(dǎo)彈。從那時起，對于對朝鮮采取“先發(fā)制人”軍事行動的可能性，美國總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)及其顧問們就語焉不詳。例如，美國國防部長詹姆斯•馬蒂斯(James Mattis)曾發(fā)表聲明稱，“任何威脅到美國或其領(lǐng)地的行為……都將遭遇大規(guī)模的軍事回應(yīng)”。在這一語境中，“威脅”指的是一次攻擊還是某種不構(gòu)成攻擊的行為，是模棱兩可的。也許這種語焉不詳是有意為之。但是先發(fā)制人的打擊很可能會以巨大的、無法接受的傷亡告終。

North Korea has demonstrated that it will pursue intercontinental nuclear weapons without regard for international condemnation or threats. Rhetorical escalation only dilutes US credibility while elevating tensions.

朝鮮已經(jīng)證明，它會不顧國際譴責(zé)或威脅繼續(xù)發(fā)展洲際核武器。言辭上的升級只會降低美國的可信度，同時加劇緊張局勢。

The US can, however, work to see that current sanctions regime is respected, including the mineral export bans unanimously approved by the UN Security Council last month. It can encourage China to limit its exports to North Korea, as well, particularly oil.

然而，美國可以努力確保當(dāng)前對朝采取的制裁措施得到遵守，包括聯(lián)合國安理會(UN Security Council)上月一致通過的禁止朝鮮出口礦物。美國還可以敦促中國限制其對朝鮮的物資出口，尤其是石油。

Again, there should be no illusions that Mr Kim will ever renounce his arsenal altogether in return for sanctions relief. He will have noticed the fate of his fellow despots Saddam Hussein and Muammer Gaddafi, who lacked nuclear weapons, and too much economic openness might by itself pose a threat to his regime. Limiting the regime’s access to hard currency will, however, make its nuclear programme harder to expand. And it is in the world’s interest that there are tough consequences for Mr Kim’s reckless behaviour.

不過，人們不應(yīng)幻想為換取制裁的解除，金正恩會放棄他的一切武裝部署。他應(yīng)該已經(jīng)看到?jīng)]有核武器的另外兩位暴君——薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)和穆阿邁爾•卡扎菲(Muammer Gaddafi)——的命運(yùn)，而且太多的經(jīng)濟(jì)開放也許本身就會威脅到他的政權(quán)。然而，限制該國獲得硬通貨，將令其核計劃更難推進(jìn)。讓金正恩為他的肆意妄為承擔(dān)嚴(yán)重后果，符合全世界的利益。

Should North Korea indicate, against all expectations, readiness to trade sanctions relief for verifiable limits on its nuclear programme, the US should be ready to talk, even if those limits fall short of total renunciation.

如果朝鮮出乎意料地表示，愿意為解除貿(mào)易制裁而接受對其核計劃的可驗證的限制，美國就應(yīng)準(zhǔn)備談判，即使這些限制還達(dá)不到讓朝鮮徹底放棄核武。

There is a crucial and at present unanswerable question about Mr Kim’s intentions. Is his commitment to a long-range nuclear arsenal purely a matter of self-preservation? Or does he hope to unify the Korean peninsula by force? If the former, the prospects for deterring him from using his weapons are better. If the latter, the situation will be much less stable, and it is this possibility for which the US and its allies must prepare.

對于金正恩的意圖，有一個至關(guān)重要而目前尚無法作出解答的問題。他決心發(fā)展遠(yuǎn)程核武器純粹是出于自衛(wèi)考慮?還是希望通過武力統(tǒng)一朝鮮半島?如果是前者，那阻止他動武的前景還比較樂觀。如果是后者，局勢將更不穩(wěn)定，美國和其盟國必須對此種可能做好準(zhǔn)備。

Mr Trump is failing to do so in the most fundamental way: by allowing a gap to open between the US and South Korea. After Sunday’s test, he did not speak to South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in for 36 hours, during which he accused the country of “appeasement” in a tweet. Mr Trump has also, astonishingly, chosen this moment to question the value of the US-South Korea free-trade agreement.

而特朗普在最根本上沒做到這一點：他讓美國與韓國的關(guān)系出現(xiàn)了裂痕。在周日朝鮮核試驗后，特朗普36小時沒有與韓國總統(tǒng)文在寅(Moon Jae-in)通話，其間他發(fā)推文譴責(zé)韓國“綏靖”。特朗普還令人驚訝地選擇這樣一個時機(jī)來質(zhì)疑美韓自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定的價值。

If Mr Kim dreams of refighting the Korean war, any indication of weakness in the US-South Korea alliance will encourage him. Mr Trump must demonstrate to North Korea and the world that America will stand stoutly behind South Korea, come what may.

如果金正恩想要重新發(fā)動朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭，美韓同盟顯現(xiàn)出的任何弱點都會令他感到鼓舞。特朗普必須向朝鮮和世界表明，無論發(fā)生什么，美國都將是韓國的堅實后盾。