誤判可能導(dǎo)致朝鮮半島開戰(zhàn)

The great wars of the 20th century were often preceded by a catastrophic miscalculation. The Germans failed to anticipate that Britain would fight over Belgium in 1914. Stalin failed to anticipate Hitler’s invasion of Russia. Japan and America repeatedly misunderstood each other’s motives and reactions in the run-up to Pearl Harbor. In 1950, the US failed to anticipate that China would enter the Korean war.

20世紀(jì)的重大戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)在爆發(fā)之前通常都出現(xiàn)過災(zāi)難性的誤判。德國人未能預(yù)測(cè)到英國會(huì)在1914年因比利時(shí)加入大戰(zhàn)。斯大林(Stalin)未能預(yù)料到希特勒(Hitler)會(huì)入侵蘇聯(lián)。日本和美國在珍珠港事件之前曾多次誤會(huì)對(duì)方的動(dòng)機(jī)和反應(yīng)。1950年，美國未能料到中國會(huì)參加朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

A similar threat — that miscalculation could lead to war — hangs over the Korean peninsula today. The two key leaders, Kim Jong Un of North Korea and Donald Trump of the US, are unpredictable. The dangers that they will miscalculate each other’s actions, with catastrophic consequences, are real.

類似的威脅如今也縈繞著朝鮮半島，這個(gè)威脅就是誤判可能導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。兩位關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人——朝鮮的金正恩(Kim Jong Un)和美國的唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)——都是不可預(yù)測(cè)的。他們會(huì)誤判對(duì)方的行動(dòng)從而導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難性后果的危險(xiǎn)，是切實(shí)存在的。

North Korea is such a closed society that even academic specialists struggle to interpret its behaviour. The mainstream view is that Mr Kim’s pursuit of advanced nuclear weapons is motivated by a search for security. The North Korean leader has seen what happened to other dictators who failed to acquire these weapons — Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Muammer Gaddafi of Libya — and concluded that only nukes can guarantee his survival.

朝鮮是一個(gè)十分封閉的社會(huì)，甚至連學(xué)術(shù)專家都難以解讀它的行為。主流觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，金正恩堅(jiān)持不懈發(fā)展先進(jìn)核武器是為了尋求安全感。這位朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人目睹了其他未能獲得核武器的獨(dú)裁者的命運(yùn)，例如伊拉克的薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)和利比亞的穆阿邁爾•卡扎菲(Muammer Gaddafi)，他認(rèn)為只有核武器才能保證他的生存。

This view is relatively reassuring because it suggests that Mr Kim is unlikely to use nuclear weapons first. But there are aspects of the North Korean leader’s behaviour that may not fit this relatively comforting picture. If deterrence is his only concern, why is Mr Kim apparently going out of his way to provoke the US, Japan, even China?

這種觀點(diǎn)相對(duì)讓人放心，因?yàn)檫@表明，金正恩不太可能首先動(dòng)用核武器。但金正恩的行為有著可能與這種相對(duì)令人安心的畫面不太相符的特點(diǎn)。如果他關(guān)心的只有威懾，那么他為何還在明顯故意挑釁美國、日本甚至中國呢?

This week, North Korea staged its largest-ever nuclear test. Last week, it sent a ballistic missile over Japan. It may be that these actions are necessary steps on the way to achieving the ultimate form of deterrence: a nuclear missile that could hit the US. But the rapid succession of nuclear provocations also makes it much more likely that the Americans will conclude that Mr Kim really is an irrational actor, the proverbial “madman with nukes”. That, in turn, makes it easier to make the case inside the White House for a pre-emptive strike.

本周，朝鮮展開了有史以來規(guī)模最大的核試驗(yàn)。上周，朝鮮發(fā)射的彈道導(dǎo)彈飛越日本上空?；蛟S這些行動(dòng)是實(shí)現(xiàn)最終威懾形式(能夠打擊美國的核導(dǎo)彈)的必要步驟。但一次緊接一次的核挑釁還更有可能讓美國人認(rèn)為，金正恩真的是一個(gè)不理性的人，即俗話說的“擁有核武器的瘋子”。這進(jìn)而更容易讓美國政府覺得有理由發(fā)動(dòng)先發(fā)制人的打擊。

The risk that Mr Kim is miscalculating, by potentially provoking an American attack, is raised by the unpredictability of Mr Trump. He has vowed that North Korea will not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons that can threaten the US. He has also repeatedly suggested that he is prepared to stage a pre-emptive military strike, at one point threatening Mr Kim with “fire and fury”. But the US president’s efforts to use brinkmanship to force North Korea to back down are undermined by doubts about the credibility of his threats.

特朗普的不可預(yù)測(cè)性提升了金正恩誤判形勢(shì)、可能招致美國打擊的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。特朗普發(fā)誓說，不會(huì)允許朝鮮發(fā)展出能夠威脅美國的核武器。他還多次表示，他愿意發(fā)動(dòng)先發(fā)制人的軍事打擊，還一度威脅要讓金正恩見識(shí)“怒與火”。但外界對(duì)特朗普威脅的可信度的質(zhì)疑，減損了這位美國總統(tǒng)利用邊緣政策迫使朝鮮后退的努力的作用。

Steve Bannon, formerly the president’s chief strategist, has stated that the US cannot attack North Korea because of the risk of massive retaliation against South Korea that could kill millions.

前白宮首席戰(zhàn)略師史蒂夫•班農(nóng)(Steve Bannon)表示，美國不能打擊朝鮮，因?yàn)檫@可能導(dǎo)致韓國遭到可能導(dǎo)致無數(shù)人死亡的大規(guī)模報(bào)復(fù)。

Mr Trump’s reaction to the latest and most powerful North Korean nuclear test has increased the dangerous confusion about US policy. Rather than stressing American unity with South Korea, the president chose to criticise Seoul for its “appeasement” of Pyongyang. This, combined with the news that Mr Trump is actively considering scrapping the US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, risks encouraging North Korea to believe its nuclear provocations are working, by splitting the alliance between Seoul and Washington.

特朗普對(duì)朝鮮這次最新、而且威力最大的核試驗(yàn)的反應(yīng)，加劇了外界對(duì)美國政策的困惑，這是危險(xiǎn)的。特朗普沒有強(qiáng)調(diào)美國與韓國的團(tuán)結(jié)，而是選擇批評(píng)韓國“姑息”朝鮮。再加上特朗普正積極考慮退出美韓自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定(US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement)的消息，這可能會(huì)促使朝鮮認(rèn)為其核挑釁正在發(fā)揮作用——離間了美韓同盟。

The president has also damaged US credibility, at a crucial moment, by tweeting that America is considering “stopping all trade with any country doing business with North Korea”. Read literally, this would involve ending trade between the US and China, the two largest economies in the world; an action that would throw the global economy into chaos. Mr Trump’s threat underlines his naivety about both trade and international relations. It also suggests the president remains buffeted by competing instincts, with his instinctive protectionism potentially overriding his desire to combat the North Korean nuclear threat.

特朗普還在關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻破壞了美國的可信度，他在Twitter上稱，美國正在考慮“停止與任何跟朝鮮做生意的國家的一切貿(mào)易往來”。從字面上看，這將導(dǎo)致美中這兩個(gè)世界最大經(jīng)濟(jì)體之間貿(mào)易的終止;此舉將令全球經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入混亂。特朗普發(fā)出的威脅表明了他對(duì)貿(mào)易和國際關(guān)系的認(rèn)識(shí)十分幼稚。這一威脅還表明他仍受困于相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的兩種本能，其天生的保護(hù)主義傾向可能壓倒抗擊朝鮮核威脅的意愿。

The confusing signals from the White House increase the dangers of miscalculation, not just in Pyongyang, but in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo. With the North Korean threat mounting, the normal reaction for South Korea would be to move in lockstep with its American protector. But if the government of Moon Jae-in concludes the biggest danger is not that North Korea will attack but that Mr Trump will stage a pre-emptive strike, then the South’s incentives change. At that point, it might become rational to break publicly with Washington.

白宮發(fā)出的混亂信號(hào)增加了誤判的危險(xiǎn)，不僅是在平壤，在首爾、北京和東京亦然。隨著朝鮮威脅與日俱增，韓國的正常反應(yīng)是與其保護(hù)國美國保持一致步調(diào)。但如果文在寅政府認(rèn)為，最大的危險(xiǎn)不是朝鮮發(fā)動(dòng)襲擊，而是特朗普發(fā)動(dòng)先發(fā)制人的打擊，那么韓國的行為動(dòng)機(jī)就會(huì)發(fā)生變化。屆時(shí)，首爾與華盛頓公開決裂或許會(huì)成為合理選擇。

The Chinese government faces a similarly complex set of calculations. Mr Trump has repeatedly tried to persuade Beijing to exert more economic pressure on North Korea, threatening that the US will take unilateral military action if China fails to force Mr Kim into line. China has sought to placate Mr Trump by toughening sanctions on Pyongyang. But the Chinese also have to consider how Mr Kim might react if he is forced into a corner. The risk that the North Korean leader will use nuclear weapons first will surely rise if he is faced with the prospect of the collapse of his own regime — and his own certain death.

中國政府也面臨著同樣復(fù)雜的一系列計(jì)算。特朗普多次試圖說服北京方面向朝鮮施加更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力，并威脅稱，如果中國不能迫使金正恩棄核，美國將采取單方面軍事行動(dòng)。中國一直試圖通過加強(qiáng)對(duì)朝鮮的制裁來安撫特朗普。但中國也不得不考慮，如果被逼入絕境，金正恩可能做出怎樣的反應(yīng)。如果金正恩面臨政權(quán)垮臺(tái)(而且自己性命不保)的可能性，這位朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人首先使用核武器的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)肯定會(huì)上升。

These risks would be difficult to manage even with rational, experienced leaders in power. But the key decision makers are a 71-year-old businessman with a volcanic temper and no relevant experience, and a 33-year-old dictator, surrounded by frightened sycophants.

即便掌權(quán)的是理性、經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都將很難應(yīng)對(duì)。但如今，關(guān)鍵的決策者是一位脾氣火爆、沒有相關(guān)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的71歲商人，外加一位身邊圍繞著滿心恐懼的馬屁精的33歲的獨(dú)裁者。