職場(chǎng)英語(yǔ)貼士：加薪一定會(huì)激勵(lì)員工嗎?

Numerous studies have attempted to find a clear link between pay practices and performance, but have largely failed. In Good to Great, Jim Collins said his team "found no systematic pattern linking executive compensation to the process of going from good to great."

許多研究都試圖找到薪酬措施與績(jī)效之間的明確聯(lián)系，但多數(shù)都以失敗告終。在《從優(yōu)秀到卓越》中，吉姆·科林斯稱，他的研究小組"發(fā)現(xiàn)管理層薪酬與企業(yè)從優(yōu)秀走向卓越的過(guò)程沒有系統(tǒng)性聯(lián)系。"

There was no indication, for instance, that bonuses or stock options were more widely used by the good-to-great companies. Moreover, Collins found that the executives who lead the good-to-great transition actually received slightly less total cash compensation than their counterparts at comparison companies.

例如，沒有證據(jù)表明從優(yōu)秀走向卓越的企業(yè)對(duì)獎(jiǎng)金或股票期權(quán)的應(yīng)用更廣泛。而且，科林斯還發(fā)現(xiàn)，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)企業(yè)從優(yōu)秀走向卓越的管理人員實(shí)際得到的現(xiàn)金薪酬總額略低于對(duì)照企業(yè)中職位相當(dāng)?shù)娜恕?/p>

Pfeffer and Sutton come to a similar conclusion about most efforts to boost performance by creating pay incentives:

普費(fèi)弗和薩頓分析了試圖通過(guò)提供薪酬激勵(lì)提高績(jī)效的多數(shù)措施，并得出一個(gè)類似的結(jié)論:

There is, in fact, little evidence that equity incentives of any kind, including stock options, enhance organizational performance. One review of more than 220 studies concluded that equity ownership had no consistent effect on financial performance. Another massive study and review of research on executive compensation published by the National Bureau of Economic Research reported that most schemes designed to a1igol managerial and shareholder interests failed to do so.

"實(shí)際上，幾乎沒有證據(jù)表明任何種類的股權(quán)激勵(lì)——包括股票期權(quán)——能夠提高組織績(jī)效。一篇對(duì)220多項(xiàng)研究的文獻(xiàn)綜述得出結(jié)論，股權(quán)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效沒有一致性影響。"另一篇由美國(guó)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局發(fā)表的關(guān)于管理層薪酬研究的大型研究與文獻(xiàn)綜述稱，多數(shù)旨在協(xié)調(diào)管理層利益與股東利益的薪酬方案都失敗了。"

It's not that people don't respond to financial incentives.They clearly do. When you pay salespeople commissions based on their sales, for instance, they will always sell more than when you simply pay them a flat salary. The same goes for an individual crafts person who gets paid on a per piece basis.

這并不是說(shuō)人們對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)激勵(lì)無(wú)動(dòng)于衷。他們顯然會(huì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)激勵(lì)做出反應(yīng)。例如，當(dāng)你根據(jù)銷售人員的銷售額向他們支付提成時(shí)，他們的銷售額總是比你只付給他們固定工資時(shí)多。同樣的道理也適用于按件計(jì)酬的單個(gè)手工業(yè)者。

The Journal's Jon Auerbach captured the kind of supercharged environment that pay incentives can create in a profile of a salesman for EMC Corp. named John Chatwin in 1998. At the time, the company paid salespeople about 65% of their total pay in commissions, and put no cap on the commissions they could earn.

《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》記者奧爾巴克在一篇報(bào)道中通過(guò)1998年易安信公司中一位叫查特溫的推銷員的經(jīng)歷，揭示了薪酬激勵(lì)可能帶來(lái)的激勵(lì)環(huán)境。當(dāng)時(shí)，易安信公司對(duì)銷售人員支付的薪酬總額中，約65%是提成，而且對(duì)銷售人員能拿到的提成不設(shè)上限。

The story begins with Chatwin, an ex college hockey player, fearing he won't make his sales target for the quarter. To ensure that doesn't happen, he shifts into overdrive, calling clients while ferrying relatives to his son's christening, and breaking away from a family barbecue to contact a customer about a deal. "I may not be brilliant," Chatwin told Auerbach, "but I'm hungry, I'm scrappy."

這個(gè)故事就從曾是大學(xué)曲棍球隊(duì)隊(duì)員的查特溫說(shuō)起，他總擔(dān)心自己達(dá)不到當(dāng)季的銷售目標(biāo)。為了確保不發(fā)生這種情況，他開始拼命工作，在接親戚參加他兒子的受洗儀式時(shí)還在給客戶打電話，還在一次家庭烤肉聚餐時(shí)中途離開去和客戶談生意。"我可能并不聰明"，查特溫告訴奧爾巴克"但是我心懷渴望，我斗志旺盛。"

The problem, however, is that most jobs today aren't like Chatwin's, where performance depends largely on individual effort and can be easily measured. Today's jobs generally involve team work. Success is less due to an individual's effort, and measurement of individual effort becomes more complex, if not impossible. In these situations, pay for performance can often seem unfair and arbitrary, and the result can demotivate, rather than motivate, employees. Resentment can fester, and significant time and energy can be wasted by people trying to get personal credit rather than working for team success.

但問(wèn)題是，如今的多數(shù)工作都不像查特溫的工作那樣業(yè)績(jī)主要取決于個(gè)人努力，衡量起來(lái)也很容易。而如今的工作通常需要團(tuán)隊(duì)合作。成功對(duì)個(gè)人努力的依賴降低了，而衡量個(gè)人努力即使有可能，也變得更加復(fù)雜。在這種情況下，根據(jù)業(yè)績(jī)支付薪酬經(jīng)常顯得不公平而隨意，結(jié)果反而會(huì)打消員工的積極性，而不是激勵(lì)他們。負(fù)面情緒可能會(huì)惡化，員工會(huì)追求個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)而不是團(tuán)隊(duì)成功，從而浪費(fèi)大把時(shí)間和精力。

The bottom line is this: Incentive pay is an effective tool in situations where performance can be fairly measured and where it is based largely on individual effort. But it is less effective in situations -common in today's workplace -where the measurements are highly subjective and the work is done by teams.

歸根結(jié)底，當(dāng)業(yè)績(jī)可以公平衡量且主要取決于個(gè)人努力時(shí)，激勵(lì)性薪酬是一項(xiàng)有效的工具。但是當(dāng)業(yè)績(jī)衡量的主觀性很高，且工作是由團(tuán)隊(duì)完成時(shí)(這正是當(dāng)今工作環(huán)境中的普遍情況)，激勵(lì)性薪酬的有效性將會(huì)降低。

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