中國與美澳在太平洋島國爭奪影響力

GUADALCANAL, Solomon Islands — When Toata Molea looks to the sea and his fleet of fishing boats on the island of Guadalcanal, he imagines the possibilities from a new connection to the outside world: a planned undersea internet cable to be built by Australia.

所羅門群島瓜達(dá)爾卡納爾——當(dāng)特塔·莫萊亞(Toata Molea)在瓜達(dá)爾卡納爾島上望向大海和他的漁船隊(duì)時，腦海中出現(xiàn)的是與外部世界新建立的連接所帶來的種種可能性：澳大利亞計劃建造一條海底光纜。

When he turns the other way, however, to the main road passing through Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, he sees another form of foreign investment: dozens of buildings and businesses bought or built by Chinese immigrants.

然而，當(dāng)他轉(zhuǎn)到另一邊，望向那條穿過所羅門群島首都霍尼亞拉的主干道時，他看到的是另一種形式的外國投資：由中國移民購買或建造的數(shù)十幢建筑和幾十個企業(yè)。

“They own everything,” Mr. Molea, 54, said of his ethnic Chinese neighbors. “My fear is that in the next 10 years, this place will be taken over by the Chinese.”

“他們擁有一切，”現(xiàn)年54歲的莫萊亞如此評價他的中國裔鄰居。“我擔(dān)心的是在下一個10年，這個地方都會被中國人接管。”

The last time Guadalcanal concerned itself with a takeover, 60,000 American troops were fighting Japanese soldiers for control of the island in one of the fiercest battles of World War II. Now, this stretch of jungle — a linchpin of the Australian-American alliance with a long history of naval importance — has become the stage for a new cold war of strategic competition.

上一次瓜達(dá)爾卡納爾擔(dān)心自己被接管時，六萬美國部隊(duì)為了該島控制權(quán)與日本士兵展開了戰(zhàn)斗，那是“二戰(zhàn)”中最為激烈的一場戰(zhàn)役。如今，作為澳大利亞—美國聯(lián)盟的關(guān)鍵，這一大片具有重大海軍意義的叢林已經(jīng)成為了一場戰(zhàn)略競爭新冷戰(zhàn)的舞臺。

After years of largely unchecked Chinese investment and immigration throughout the South Pacific, Australia and the United States are stepping up their efforts here and across the region — warning local officials against relying too much on China, and pushing to compete with more aid, infrastructure and diplomacy.

多年來，中國在南太平洋地區(qū)的投資和移民基本上不受限制，澳大利亞和美國目前正在加快在這里和整個地區(qū)的努力——警告當(dāng)?shù)毓賳T不要太過依賴中國，并且以更多援助、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)和外交政策推進(jìn)競爭。

There is no denying that “strategic competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific region is on the rise,” said Matt Matthews, a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. As a result, he said, “we must not take our longstanding friendships with the Pacific islands for granted.”

不可否認(rèn)，“印太地區(qū)為獲得影響力的戰(zhàn)略性競爭正在升溫，”東亞和太平洋事務(wù)局副助理國務(wù)卿馬特·馬修斯(Matt Matthews)表示。因此，他說，“我們不能把與這些太平洋島嶼長期以來的友誼視為理所當(dāng)然的事情。”

The United States has committed more than $350 million to Pacific island countries, in the form of law enforcement assistance, help with managing fisheries and other aid. The World Bank more than doubled its main development budget for the Pacific too, increasing it to $808 million over a three-year period.

美國對太平洋島國的投入超過3.5億美元，這些資金以協(xié)助執(zhí)法、幫忙管理漁業(yè)及其他援助的形式發(fā)放。世界銀行對太平洋島國的主要發(fā)展預(yù)算增加了一倍多，三年間漲至8.08億美元。

But Australia has gone even further. Pacific aid jumped to 1.3 billion Australian dollars ($960 million) in this year’s budget, an 18 percent increase. Nearly a third of Australia’s aid budget is now set aside for the Pacific — a region of nearly two dozen countries and territories with around 11 million people spread across more than 20,000 islands.

但澳大利亞在這方面走得更遠(yuǎn)。對太平洋島國的援助在它今年的預(yù)算中增加了18%，躍升至9.6億美元。澳大利亞近三分之一的對外援助預(yù)算都撥給了太平洋——這個地區(qū)有著近24個國家和地區(qū)，在超過兩萬個島嶼上生活著約1100萬人口。

A large portion of that money will go toward installing the undersea cable connecting Guadalcanal (and Papua New Guinea) to Australia’s global internet hub.

該資金的一大部分都會投入到將瓜達(dá)爾卡納爾(還有巴布亞新幾內(nèi)亞)與澳大利亞的全球互聯(lián)網(wǎng)中心連接在一起的海底光纜。

Experts consider Australia’s spending spree the strongest example yet of its intensified push to counter Chinese efforts in the region.

專家將澳大利亞的支出熱潮視為迄今為止，該國加強(qiáng)對抗中國在該地區(qū)努力的最有力例證。

The Chinese networking company Huawei announced last year that it planned to lay a cable and provide the Solomon Islands with a high-speed internet connection.

去年，中國網(wǎng)絡(luò)設(shè)備公司華為宣布計劃將鋪設(shè)一條電纜，為所羅門群島提供高速互聯(lián)網(wǎng)連接。

When Australia learned of that plan, it threatened to withhold a connection license when the cable reached Sydney because it considered Huawei a cybersecurity threat.

當(dāng)澳大利亞得知該計劃時，威脅要在該電纜鋪到悉尼時不給予連接許可，因?yàn)榘拇罄麃喺J(rèn)為華為是一個網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全方面的威脅。

Australian officials immediately offered an alternative: Australia would pay for a cable and it would be up and running by 2019.

澳大利亞官員立即給出了替代方案：澳大利亞會出錢建造這跟光纜，到2019年它就能投入運(yùn)行。

“The Australian government had been tracking that very closely,” said James Batley, a former Australian high commissioner to the Solomons and other countries in the region.

“澳大利亞政府一直在密切關(guān)注，”前澳大利亞駐所羅門及該地區(qū)其他國家的高級專員詹姆斯·巴特利(James Batley)表示。

When they saw the Chinese cable proposal, he said, the Australians “made an intervention and said, ‘Sorry, that’s a red line for us.’”

當(dāng)他們看到中國的光纜提案時，他說，澳大利亞人“進(jìn)行了干預(yù)，并且表示，‘不好意思，這對我們來說是紅線’”。

For business owners in particular, the undersea cable is long overdue. Connectivity is so weak across the Solomons that storm clouds often interfere with the satellites that currently provide internet access.

這個海底電纜早就該有了，尤其是對企業(yè)主來說。所羅門群島的網(wǎng)絡(luò)連接之差，烏云常常會干擾目前為當(dāng)?shù)靥峁┚W(wǎng)絡(luò)接入服務(wù)的衛(wèi)星。

“It’s important,” said Mr. Molea, the fish wholesaler, who also praised a small grant program from Australia that helped him build an ice factory for his sustainable fishing business. “With that cable, hopefully we can set up electronic banking and payment.”

“這很重要，”魚類批發(fā)商莫萊亞說，他還稱贊了一個澳大利亞的小型援助計劃，該計劃幫助他的可持續(xù)性捕魚生意建造了一座冰廠。“有了那條電纜，希望我們就能建立起電子銀行和支付服務(wù)了。”

But to truly compete with China, many people said, Australia, the United States and their allies need to do more, more visibly, with less bureaucracy.

但許多人說，為了與中國展開真正的競爭，澳大利亞、美國及其盟友還需要做得更多、更張揚(yáng)，并且少一些官僚作風(fēng)。

The cable stands out because it is a rarity. The aid packages cited with pride by officials in Canberra and Washington tend to focus not on the tangible infrastructure that struggling countries like this one crave, but rather on institutional assistance with governance and law enforcement.

海底光纜之所以引人注目，是因?yàn)樗怀Ｒ姟？芭嗬腿A盛頓的官員引以為傲的一攬子援助計劃，往往不會把重點(diǎn)放在陷入困境的國家希望得到的有形基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施上，而是關(guān)注治理和執(zhí)法方面的機(jī)構(gòu)援助。

That work is gradual, vital and complicated. Many Solomon Islanders still see Australia through the lens of a security intervention that ended last year after more than a decade of mixed reviews for its effort to establish stability in the wake of chronic ethnic violence.

那個工作是漸進(jìn)的，是至關(guān)重要也是復(fù)雜的。所羅門群島的許多民眾仍然透過去年結(jié)束的治安介入的視角來看澳大利亞，十多年來，人們對澳大利亞在長期的種族暴力后維持穩(wěn)定的努力褒貶不一。

And just as some Pacific islands have become more vocal about Australia’s “paternalistic aid,” officials in the Solomons often complain that the Australian and American governments do more dictating than developing.

就像一些太平洋島國對澳大利亞的“家長式援助”變得越來越直言不諱，所羅門群島的官員也經(jīng)常抱怨澳大利亞和美國政府喜歡指手畫腳，而不是幫助它發(fā)展。

Regional officials often argue that too much of the aid money is tightly restricted or boomerangs back to foreign consultants and contractors, leading many to ask: Well, why not try our luck with China?

地區(qū)官員經(jīng)常提出，很多援助資金被嚴(yán)格限制用于或者落回到外國顧問和承包商身上，這令很多人發(fā)問：既然如此，何不從中國那里試試運(yùn)氣呢?

Anthony Veke, 41, the ambitious premier of Guadalcanal, counts himself among those pushing toward a future with various partners.

41歲的安東尼·維克(Anthony Veke)是瓜達(dá)爾卡納爾省省長，雄心勃勃的他認(rèn)為，自己是那種會跟各種合作伙伴一起走向未來的人。

He told me he has gone to China twice in the past year to pursue investment for a tourism development on the island’s west coast that would include a new airport.

他告訴我，去年他曾兩次前往中國大陸，尋找投資開發(fā)該島西海岸的旅游項(xiàng)目，其中包括一座新機(jī)場。

He added that he would like to see a new road circumnavigating Guadalcanal, and an upgrade for the international airport. 他還說，希望建一條新的環(huán)島公路，以及對國際機(jī)場進(jìn)行升級改造。

“We can’t be boxed in,” Mr. Veke said, sitting in his office on the main road through Honiara, where dust and potholes still dominate. “We have to be given an opportunity to look at other places for things that are good for our people.”

“我們不能束手束腳，”維克坐在他位于霍尼亞拉主干道上的辦公室里說道，這條路塵土飛揚(yáng)，路面坑坑洼洼。“我們必須要給予機(jī)會，在其他地方尋找對人民有益的東西。”

Given the history, it is a striking shift — for the Solomons and the postwar order.

鑒于歷史，這是一個驚人的轉(zhuǎn)變——對所羅門群島和戰(zhàn)后秩序而言。

Honiara exists largely because of World War II and the United States Navy.

霍尼亞拉是因?yàn)榈诙问澜绱髴?zhàn)和美國海軍而得以存在的城市。

The airport Mr. Veke wants to upgrade was originally Henderson Field, the airstrip that thousands of American Marines in particular fought and died to capture and defend.

維克希望進(jìn)行升級換代的機(jī)場，就是原來的亨德森機(jī)場，當(dāng)年就是為了奪取和保衛(wèi)這個簡易機(jī)場，成千上萬的美國海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)在戰(zhàn)斗中犧牲。

Naval Construction Battalions, better known as Seabees, built most of the city’s roads, its major bridges and what was until recently its largest hospital.

海軍工程營(Naval Construction Battalions)，也就是眾所周知的海蜜蜂(Seabees)，修建了這座城市絕大部分的道路、主要橋梁，以及直到最近還是它最大的那家醫(yī)院。

Little development has occurred since — the airport still feels like a World War II relic — but much of what is new or prosperous seems to be owned by someone from China.

自那之后，發(fā)展就停了，機(jī)場給人的感覺像是一處“二戰(zhàn)”遺跡，但絕大多數(shù)新的或者繁華的東西，似乎都是歸某個從中國來的人所有。

Many, if not most, of the shops along the main road have Chinese owners, who sit in corner booths towering over their China-made merchandise and local employees.

在主干道上，許多店鋪(即使不是絕大多數(shù))都是中國人在經(jīng)營，他們坐在角落里的攤位上，位置要高出各種中國制造的商品和當(dāng)?shù)毓蛦T一截。

In Honiara’s Chinatown, a small strip of shops that has existed since the first wave of Chinese migrants arrived a century ago, signs of growth are visible: Scaffolding climbs above a new Chinese school that has received financial support from the Chinese government.

在霍尼亞拉的唐人街——自一個世紀(jì)前第一批中國移民抵達(dá)后就存在的一小片商店——經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的跡象很明顯：一所新的中文學(xué)校搭建起腳手架，它得到了中國政府的財政支持。

Matthew Quan, 52, the president of the Solomon Islands’ Chinese Association and a third-generation Solomon Islander who runs a large wholesale business across from the school, said Chinese expansion had been organic, driven by migration and economic factors rather than political or military direction from Beijing.

52歲的馬修·關(guān)(Matthew Quan)是所羅門群島中華總會(Chinese Association)的會長，也是所羅門群島的第三代華僑，在中文學(xué)校的對面經(jīng)營著一家大型批發(fā)市場。他說，中國的擴(kuò)張是有機(jī)的，是受移民和經(jīng)濟(jì)因素驅(qū)動，而非北京下達(dá)的政治或者軍事命令。

Centrally planned or not, the influx has not always been welcome. Frustration with Chinese shop owners flared up in 2006, leading to riots, and in 2014 Chinatown was set ablaze during another spasm of violence.

不管是不是中央計劃的結(jié)果，大量涌入并不總是受到歡迎。2006年，對華人店主的不滿情緒爆發(fā)，引發(fā)騷亂;2014年，唐人街在另一次暴亂中遭遇縱火。

The main concern for many people on Guadalcanal involves not Chinese government interference, but rather cronyism and corruption fueled by Chinese wealth. No one knows the extent of Chinese property ownership in the Solomons; even the size of the Chinese population is a mystery, Mr. Quan said, since many migrants come in as tourists and bribe officials for visas that let them stay.

對許多瓜達(dá)爾卡納爾的民眾來說，主要的關(guān)切還不是中國政府的干預(yù)，而是中國財富所推動的任人唯親和腐敗現(xiàn)象。沒有人知道華人在所羅門群島擁有多少財產(chǎn);甚至連華人的規(guī)模都是一個謎，馬修·關(guān)說，因?yàn)樵S多移民以游客身份進(jìn)來，然后向官員行賄拿到簽證留了下來。

“I suppose you could say they’re a lot more ruthless in how they do things,” Mr. Quan said, referring to the recent migrants. “And the government of the Solomon Islands is easily manipulated.”

“我認(rèn)為你可以說，他們做事更為冷酷無情，”馬修·關(guān)說道，他指的是最新的移民。“所羅門群島的政府很容易受到操縱。”

Mr. Molea called what’s happening “a different form of colonialism that’s a consequence of democracy.”

莫萊亞稱，眼下的情況是“一種不同形式的殖民主義，是民主的結(jié)果”。