特朗普關(guān)稅將對(duì)中國(guó)產(chǎn)生什么影響？

SHANGHAI — Thanks to President Trump’s tariffs, Americans will soon be paying more for a wide variety of Chinese-made goods, and some American customers may end up buying from other countries instead.

上海——由于特朗普總統(tǒng)的關(guān)稅，美國(guó)民眾很快就要花更多的錢(qián)才能買(mǎi)到中國(guó)制造的各種商品，一些消費(fèi)者最終可能會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)而購(gòu)買(mǎi)其他國(guó)家的東西。

For now, China can live with that.

眼下，中國(guó)可以承受這一點(diǎn)。

The tariffs the White House announced on Friday will have little immediate impact on China, despite the size of the $50 billion in goods involved and the invective the move set off from Chinese official news media. Mr. Trump’s tariffs are ultimately too small and narrowly targeted to seriously affect China’s nearly $13 trillion economy, which no longer depends so much on exports and can easily find other places besides the United States to sell its products. In some ways, they are even smaller than tariffs imposed by previous presidents.

白宮周五宣布征收的關(guān)稅幾乎不會(huì)對(duì)中國(guó)產(chǎn)生直接影響，盡管關(guān)稅會(huì)影響500億美元(約合3200億元人民幣)的商品，并引發(fā)了中國(guó)官方新聞媒體的抨擊。特朗普的關(guān)稅從根本上來(lái)說(shuō)規(guī)模太小，目標(biāo)太狹隘，無(wú)法對(duì)中國(guó)近13萬(wàn)億美元的經(jīng)濟(jì)造成嚴(yán)重影響。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)不再那么依賴(lài)出口，并且輕而易舉就能找到除美國(guó)之外的其他地方銷(xiāo)售產(chǎn)品。在某些方面，這次關(guān)稅規(guī)模甚至不及以前的總統(tǒng)征收的關(guān)稅。

The tariffs could spread, of course. The United States has threatened to impose tariffs on $100 billion more in Chinese-made goods and could theoretically hit more than $500 billion in products, the total amount that Americans buy from China. China could retaliate with its own tariffs on the United States’ far smaller exports in the other direction across the Pacific, plus impose punitive measures against American companies doing business here.

當(dāng)然，關(guān)稅規(guī)?？赡軙?huì)擴(kuò)大。美國(guó)威脅要對(duì)另外1000億美元的中國(guó)商品征收關(guān)稅，理論上可能會(huì)影響超過(guò)5000億美元的產(chǎn)品。這相當(dāng)于美國(guó)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的總額。中國(guó)可能會(huì)進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)，對(duì)美國(guó)出口至太平洋對(duì)岸的商品——規(guī)模遠(yuǎn)小于進(jìn)口——征收關(guān)稅，并對(duì)在華開(kāi)展業(yè)務(wù)的美國(guó)公司采取懲罰性措施。

Any measures carry the risk that they could disrupt the global supply chain in sudden and unexpected ways, or could damage confidence among investors in building factories and other businesses in either country. Already there are signs of strains in the global economy from the broader trade tensions, weakness that China and the United States are both better positioned to weather than other nations.

任何措施都有可能以突然的和意想不到的方式擾亂全球供應(yīng)鏈，或損害投資者在兩國(guó)設(shè)立工廠(chǎng)和其他企業(yè)的信心。已經(jīng)有跡象表明，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)因更廣泛的貿(mào)易緊張局勢(shì)而承壓，而中國(guó)和美國(guó)都比其他國(guó)家更有能力度過(guò)這種難關(guān)。

Still, the absence of immediate impact could also give both sides breathing room to calm down.

但沒(méi)有造成直接影響也給了雙方冷靜下來(lái)的喘息空間。

Each has its reasons for ducking a fight. The United States may need China’s help to keep its uneasy peace with North Korea. Beijing has stickier issues, like breaking the country’s addiction to debt-fueled economic growth without hurting growth. Already some indicators show signs of a slowdown, though if it worsens significantly Beijing may find Mr. Trump’s tariffs could make a convenient scapegoat.

兩國(guó)都有避免貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的理由。美國(guó)可能需要中國(guó)的幫助來(lái)維持與朝鮮暫時(shí)的和平。北京也有一些棘手的問(wèn)題，比如在不損害經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的條件下打破中國(guó)對(duì)債務(wù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的依賴(lài)。已經(jīng)有一些指標(biāo)顯示出了放緩的跡象，但如果情況嚴(yán)重惡化，中國(guó)政府可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，特朗普的關(guān)稅是一個(gè)現(xiàn)成的替罪羊。

China in particular risks being distracted. Its point person on tackling debt, a senior economic official named Liu He, has also been deeply involved in trade negotiations, though Chinese officials say Beijing has the bandwidth to handle both.

中國(guó)尤其面臨精力被分散的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。其負(fù)責(zé)解決債務(wù)問(wèn)題的核心人物、高級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)官員劉鶴也深入?yún)⑴c了貿(mào)易談判，但中國(guó)官員稱(chēng)，北京有能力應(yīng)對(duì)這兩方面的問(wèn)題。

“The strain on the top leadership as it tries to fend off a trade war with the U.S. as well as de-risk China’s financial sector is considerable,” said Diana Choyleva, the chief economist with Enodo Economics, a London research firm specializing in China. “They cannot afford to drop the ball on either front.”

“中國(guó)高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在努力避免與美國(guó)爆發(fā)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)和降低中國(guó)金融領(lǐng)域的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)承受的壓力相當(dāng)大，”倫敦專(zhuān)門(mén)研究中國(guó)問(wèn)題的研究公司伊諾多經(jīng)濟(jì)公司(Enodo Economics)的首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家戴安娜·喬伊利瓦(Diana Choyleva)說(shuō)。“兩個(gè)陣地都不能出錯(cuò)。”

For both sides, the issue has become far more than a struggle over nuts-and-bolts economics. It has become a battle over which country will dominate the high-wage, high-skill industries of tomorrow. Washington and Beijing alike see those industries as essential to protecting national security and to creating jobs.

對(duì)雙方來(lái)說(shuō)，這個(gè)議題已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)非一場(chǎng)圍繞具體的經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題而展開(kāi)的斗爭(zhēng)。它已經(jīng)成了圍繞哪個(gè)國(guó)家會(huì)主宰未來(lái)高薪酬、高技術(shù)行業(yè)而爆發(fā)的一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)斗。華盛頓和北京都認(rèn)為，這些行業(yè)對(duì)保護(hù)國(guó)家安全和創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)至關(guān)重要。

The Trump administration is pushing hard for curbs on China’s $300 billion government program to bolster these industries, called Made in China 2025. Beijing aims to make the country a leader in the manufacturing of advanced products, including computer microchips and commercial aircraft. The Trump administration’s statement announcing tariffs managed to mention the Chinese industrial policy program no fewer than five times.

特朗普政府正在大力爭(zhēng)取限制中國(guó)一個(gè)旨在扶持這些行業(yè)的政府計(jì)劃。該計(jì)劃名叫《中國(guó)制造2025》，涉及資金3000億美元。北京的目標(biāo)是讓中國(guó)成為先進(jìn)產(chǎn)品，包括計(jì)算機(jī)微芯片和商用飛機(jī)制造的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。在特朗普政府宣布征收關(guān)稅的聲明中，中國(guó)這項(xiàng)工業(yè)政策計(jì)劃被提到不下五次。

But China appears just as determined to preserve the program. And the trade issue has become so high profile that the Chinese public has come to expect that Beijing will push back hard against the Trump administration’s trade measures.

但中國(guó)似乎也決心要維持這個(gè)計(jì)劃。并且貿(mào)易問(wèn)題變得如此廣受關(guān)注，以至中國(guó)民眾期待北京會(huì)大力回?fù)籼乩势照馁Q(mào)易措施。

“This pressure will be high,” said Tu Xinquan, the director of the China Institute of World Trade Organization Studies in Beijing. “There is no way to move back.”

“這種壓力會(huì)很大，”北京的中國(guó)世界貿(mào)易組織研究院院長(zhǎng)屠新泉表示。“沒(méi)有后退的辦法。”

While the American tariffs could hurt specific Chinese industries, they will probably do little to hit China’s overall growth.

盡管美國(guó)關(guān)稅可能會(huì)對(duì)特定的中國(guó)行業(yè)造成傷害，但可能對(duì)中國(guó)的整體增長(zhǎng)沒(méi)多大影響。

Under the tariffs announced on Friday, American buyers must pay 25 percent of the wholesale cost of Chinese-made goods when they hit American docks. The tariffs will ultimately be levied on $50 billion worth of Chinese exports, including electric cars and aircraft navigational equipment.

按照周五宣布的關(guān)稅，當(dāng)中國(guó)制造的商品到達(dá)美國(guó)碼頭時(shí)，美國(guó)購(gòu)買(mǎi)者必須要支付其批發(fā)成本的25%。美國(guó)最終將對(duì)價(jià)值500億美元的中國(guó)出口商品加征關(guān)稅，包括電動(dòng)汽車(chē)和飛機(jī)導(dǎo)航設(shè)備。

While $50 billion sounds like a lot, that represents just 0.4 percent of the Chinese economy. The details suggest the impact may be even less.

盡管500億美元聽(tīng)起來(lái)很多，但它只占中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的0.4%。相關(guān)細(xì)節(jié)表明，中國(guó)受到的影響可能更小。

The tariff level, 25 percent, is fairly small compared with those imposed by previous presidents. President Barack Obama put a 35 percent penalty on Chinese-made car- and light-truck tires during his first year in office, President George W. Bush imposed rates of as much as 30 percent on imported steel during his second year in office, while President Ronald Reagan imposed a 100 percent toll on some Japanese electronics near the end of his second term. All those were eventually dropped.

與前任總統(tǒng)曾經(jīng)施加的關(guān)稅相比，25%的關(guān)稅水平相當(dāng)?shù)?。貝拉?middot;奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)上任第一年期間，曾對(duì)中國(guó)生產(chǎn)的汽車(chē)及輕型卡車(chē)輪胎處以35%的處罰;喬治·W·布什(George W. Bush)上任第二年時(shí)，對(duì)進(jìn)口的鋼材征收高達(dá)30%的關(guān)稅;而羅納德·里根(Ronald Reagan)在其第二屆任期即將結(jié)束時(shí)，對(duì)一些日本電子產(chǎn)品征收了100%的關(guān)稅。上述所有關(guān)稅最終都被取消。

Some American buyers of Chinese goods may simply choose to pay the newly imposed tariffs rather than find new suppliers elsewhere. Brad Setser, a Treasury official in the Obama administration who is now an economist at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that China’s exports to the United States in the affected categories could easily be halved by the tariffs. But they would not disappear entirely, as some Chinese products would still be competitive in terms of cost.

一些購(gòu)買(mǎi)中國(guó)商品的美國(guó)人可能會(huì)選擇為新加征的關(guān)稅付錢(qián)，而不是在別的地方找到新的供貨商。奧巴馬政府的財(cái)政部官員、現(xiàn)為外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家布拉德·塞策(Brad Setser)表示，在受到影響的類(lèi)目?jī)?nèi)的中國(guó)對(duì)美出口很容易減半，但不會(huì)完全消失，因?yàn)樵诔杀痉矫?，中?guó)的一些商品仍然具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。

Some of the same goods could probably be sold to other countries at slightly lower prices, further limiting the effect on the Chinese economy, Mr. Setser said.

塞策說(shuō)，一些同樣的商品可能會(huì)以較為低廉的價(jià)格賣(mài)給其他國(guó)家，更進(jìn)一步限制了關(guān)稅對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響。

Moreover, China’s exports could grow in other areas to offset any drop. Its exports to the United States are already increasing by more than $50 billion each year, and more than 90 percent of China’s exports to the United States are not covered by the tariffs.

此外，中國(guó)的出口可能在其他地區(qū)得到增長(zhǎng)，抵消任何下滑。該國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)的出口每年已經(jīng)有超過(guò)500億美元的增長(zhǎng)，而且有超過(guò)90%的中國(guó)對(duì)美出口不在此次關(guān)稅之列。

“Even with tariffs on one-tenth of total imports from China, overall imports from China would likely rise,” Mr. Setser said.

“盡管對(duì)來(lái)自中國(guó)進(jìn)口商品的十分之一加征關(guān)稅，來(lái)自中國(guó)的整體進(jìn)口還是可能會(huì)增長(zhǎng)，”塞策說(shuō)。

The tariffs could have a longer-term effect on China, however.

然而，關(guān)稅可能會(huì)對(duì)中國(guó)造成較為長(zhǎng)期的影響。

Devised as essentially a pre-emptive strike against Chinese subsidies in the Made in China 2025 program, the Trump tariffs could limit eventual sales from these industries. And with the European Union also protesting the Made in China 2025 program, those exports to Europe could suffer, too.

特朗普關(guān)稅的設(shè)計(jì)初衷，是用來(lái)作為對(duì)《中國(guó)制造2025》計(jì)劃中中國(guó)補(bǔ)貼的先發(fā)制人的打擊，該關(guān)稅可能會(huì)最終限制來(lái)自這些行業(yè)的銷(xiāo)售。而且由于歐盟也在抗議《中國(guó)制造2025》，那些出口到歐盟的商品也可能受到損失。

Longer term, the tariffs could spur American companies to move their factories elsewhere. But companies have been reluctant so far to move, as China’s world-class transportation system and well-trained work force still make it highly competitive in all but the lowest-skill, lowest-wage industries.

更長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，關(guān)稅可能會(huì)引發(fā)美國(guó)公司將工廠(chǎng)搬到其他地方。但迄今為止，各家公司一直不愿意將工廠(chǎng)遷址，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)有著世界一流的交通體系以及訓(xùn)練有序的勞動(dòng)力，這仍能讓它在幾乎最低端技術(shù)、最低薪水的行業(yè)中極具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。

On the flip side, the tariffs could help the Chinese government take the heat if the broader economy starts to falter. The economy could slow further as Beijing intensifies debt reduction efforts. Chinese leaders could blame Washington for the slowdown instead.

另一方面，如果整體經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)始衰退，關(guān)稅可以幫中國(guó)政府承受壓力。隨著北京加強(qiáng)削減債務(wù)的努力，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)可能進(jìn)一步放緩。中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人可以將放緩的責(zé)任歸咎于華盛頓。

While American and European business have long criticized China for not living up to its promises on trade, Chinese officials point to significant moves to free up its limits on foreign businesses since Mr. Trump was elected. These include the removal of what had been a 25 percent limit on foreign investment in Chinese banks. China also plans to lower its tariffs on imported cars.

盡管美國(guó)及歐洲企業(yè)一直批評(píng)中國(guó)沒(méi)有實(shí)現(xiàn)在貿(mào)易方面的承諾，但中國(guó)官員指出，自特朗普被選為總統(tǒng)以來(lái)，中國(guó)采取了重大舉措，放開(kāi)對(duì)外國(guó)企業(yè)的限制。這些措施包括取消曾經(jīng)對(duì)外國(guó)投資中國(guó)銀行的25%限制。中國(guó)還計(jì)劃要降低對(duì)進(jìn)口汽車(chē)的關(guān)稅。

“They’ve done the things they said,” said Andrew Polk, a co-founder of Trivium/China, a Beijing economic consulting firm. “You’ve got to give them that.”

“他們已經(jīng)做到了曾經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò)的話(huà)，”北京的經(jīng)濟(jì)咨詢(xún)公司策偉(Trivium/China)的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人安德魯·波爾克(Andrew Polk)說(shuō)。“這點(diǎn)你要認(rèn)可。”