意大利選民已從挺歐變?yōu)橐蓺W
意大利的大選結(jié)果給歐洲上了一課。意大利人曾經(jīng)是歐洲一體化最熱情的支持者群體之一。如今已不再是這樣。經(jīng)濟低迷加上政治無能，不僅使得意大利政治和決策精英名譽掃地，甚至還危及了該國與歐盟的關(guān)系。
This does not mean Italy will leave; the costs would be too great. It means instead that the threat of both friction between Italy and the European establishment and further financial and economic disruption is now far greater.
這并不意味著意大利會退歐;退出的成本太高了。但這意味著如今兩個大得多的威脅：一是意大利與歐洲建制派之間的摩擦，二是進一步的金融和經(jīng)濟動蕩。
The election results are quite as shocking as the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Tump in the US: 55 per cent of the voters chose Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties.
意大利大選結(jié)果令人震驚的程度與英國退歐公投和唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當(dāng)選美國總統(tǒng)相仿：55%的選民選擇了持歐洲懷疑論和反體制的政黨。
The Five Star Movement — an amorphous party of protest — gained 32 per cent of the vote and the League — a rightwing nationalist party — gained 18 per cent. The share of the centre-left Democratic party, in which the European establishment had put its trust, tumbled from 41 per cent four years ago to 19 per cent. The share of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia fell to 14 per cent. The populist revolution devours its parent.
無組織的抗議派政黨五星運動(Five Star Movement)贏得了32%的選票，而右翼民族主義政黨聯(lián)盟黨(League Party)贏得了18%的選票。承載著歐洲建制派信任的中左翼政黨民主黨(Democratic Party)的得票率從4年前的41%驟降至19%。西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)的意大利力量黨(Forza Italia)的支持率降至14%。在這場民粹主義革命中，青出于藍而勝于藍。
Why are Italian voters so disenchanted? The obvious answers are that economic performance has been so dismal, while established Italian policymakers appear so ineffective. This is certainly not only — probably not even mainly — due to Italy’s participation in the euro. But the eurozone has made things worse. Not least, it offers an external scapegoat, which unscrupulous politicians are happy to exploit. Blaming foreigners is always an attractive strategy. In a failing country with a frustrated population, it is irresistible.
意大利選民為何如此心灰意冷?顯而易見的答案是，近年經(jīng)濟表現(xiàn)如此慘淡，而體制內(nèi)的意大利政策制定者顯得如此無能。這肯定不僅僅是因為(甚至可以說主要不是因為)意大利加入歐洲單一貨幣。但歐元區(qū)確實使得情況更糟。尤其是，它提供了一個外部的替罪羊，而無底線的政客樂于利用這一點。責(zé)怪外國人永遠是具有吸引力的戰(zhàn)略。在一個民眾沮喪的正在走下坡路的國家，責(zé)怪外國人簡直是不可抗拒的沖動。
One aspect of the eurozone has been the inadequacy of its overall macroeconomic policy. In January 2018, the consumer price index of the eurozone (excluding erratic items) was 7.2 per cent lower than it would have been had it risen at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent since January 2007 — a rate of inflation that is a reasonable interpretation of the European Central Bank’s objective of “inflation rates below, but close to, 2 per cent over the medium term”.
歐元區(qū)的一個方面是缺乏整體的宏觀經(jīng)濟政策。2018年1月，歐元區(qū)核心消費價格指數(shù)(CPI，剔除了不穩(wěn)定項目)相比自2007年1月以來每年上漲1.9%(這個通脹率是對歐洲央行“通脹率在中期低于但接近2%”這個目標(biāo)的合理解讀)將會達到的水平低了7.2%。
An alternative assessment of macroeconomic policy is in terms of the growth of nominal gross domestic product. By the third quarter of 2017, eurozone nominal GDP was 11 per cent lower than it would have been had it grown at an annual rate of 3 per cent since early 2007 — a rate that would have been consistent with annual real growth of around 1 per cent and inflation of 2 per cent. Under Mario Draghi, the ECB did act successfully in the end. Yet overall macroeconomic policy has clearly been inadequate. It failed to deliver adequate growth in overall aggregate demand (see charts).
對宏觀經(jīng)濟政策的另一種評估方法是看名義GDP增長。截至2017年第三季度，歐元區(qū)名義GDP相比自2007年初以來每年增長3%(這個增速將與實際GDP約1%的年度增長和2%的年通脹率一致)將會達到的水平低了11%。在馬里奧•德拉吉(Mario Draghi)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，歐洲央行最終確實成功地采取行動。然而整體宏觀經(jīng)濟政策明顯不足。它未能帶來整體總需求的足夠增長(見圖表)。
Within this weak macroeconomic environment, huge divergences also opened up among individual member countries. Germany’s nominal GDP rose by 34 per cent between the first quarter of 2007 and the last quarter of 2017 (a compound average annual rate of 2.7 per cent). Italy’s rose by a mere 9 per cent over the same period (a compound average annual rate of 0.8 per cent).
在這個疲弱的宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境內(nèi)部，成員國之間也形成了巨大差異。從2007年第一季度到2017年第四季度，德國名義GDP增長了34%(平均年復(fù)合增長率為2.7%)。同期意大利名義GDP僅增長9%(平均年復(fù)合增長率為0.8%)。
Not surprisingly, given modest overall growth of nominal GDP, even Germany’s core annual inflation averaged a little over 1 per cent. Such low inflation in the core creditor country made adjustments in competitiveness within the eurozone far more difficult. 并不令人意外的是，鑒于名義GDP整體增長有限，就連德國的平均年核心通脹率也只是略高于1%。核心債權(quán)國通脹率如此之低，使得歐元區(qū)內(nèi)部的競爭力調(diào)整更加困難。
If the Italian government had been able to pursue its traditional policy of devaluation and inflation, it could have generated a far stronger rise in nominal GDP. That would surely also have delivered higher levels of real output. Italy’s real GDP in the last quarter of 2017 was, instead, 5 per cent below its level in the first quarter of 2007, while its real GDP per head was still some 9 per cent below the 2007 level a full decade later. No wonder Italians are disillusioned.
如果意大利政府可以實行貨幣貶值和通脹的傳統(tǒng)政策，它本可以實現(xiàn)名義GDP的更強勁增長。那肯定也會帶來更高的實際產(chǎn)出增長。相反，2017年第四季度意大利實際GDP比2007年第一季度的水平低了5%，而2017年人均實際GDP比2007年水平低了大約9%。難怪意大利人幻想破滅。
No doubt, Italy has huge structural economic problems, which tightly constrain growth, but potential output cannot have fallen this much since 2007. Italy also suffers from chronically deficient demand, a failing that the eurozone, as it is now run, is simply unable to remedy. This is partly because overall demand has been too weak and partly because, within the rules, demand cannot be directed to where it is weakest.
毫無疑問，意大利存在巨大的結(jié)構(gòu)性經(jīng)濟問題，嚴(yán)重制約著經(jīng)濟增長，但自2007年以來潛在產(chǎn)出不可能下滑這么多。意大利還面臨需求長期不振的問題;按照目前運行方式，歐元區(qū)根本無法解決該問題。部分原因是整體需求太疲弱，還有部分原因是在目前規(guī)則下需求無法被導(dǎo)向最疲軟的地方。
A prolonged recession, with high unemployment and low employment has inescapable political consequences. But the biggest frustration may be that the people Italians vote for have next to no room for manoeuvre. The question has rather been whom to elect (or sometimes not even elect) to carry out the policies decided in Brussels and Berlin. 長期衰退、外加失業(yè)率高企和就業(yè)率偏低，必然會帶來政治后果。但是最令人沮喪的事情也許是意大利人民選出的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人幾乎沒有回旋余地。迄今的問題是，選舉誰(有時甚至不用選)來執(zhí)行由布魯塞爾和柏林方面決定的政策。
Why not vote for a clown or a party created by a clown? It might not make much difference to what happens in Italy, but it might at least be more amusing.
何不選一個小丑或由一個小丑創(chuàng)建的政黨?這樣做也許不會怎么改變意大利的現(xiàn)實，但至少有可能更好玩。
Some Italian economists now argue that the country could obtain a degree of macroeconomic policy freedom by issuing what is known as “fiscal money” — a parallel currency that could be used to pay Italian taxes.
一些意大利經(jīng)濟學(xué)家現(xiàn)在提出，通過發(fā)行所謂的“財政貨幣”(可以用來在意大利交稅的平行貨幣)，意大利可以獲得一定程度的宏觀經(jīng)濟政策自由。
This is technically possible. It would surely create hysteria in northern Europe, since it would eliminate the monetary policy monopoly of the ECB. But the very fact that such a radical idea is being discussed demonstrates the scale of the disenchantment in so large and important a country.
這在技術(shù)上是可行的。此舉必然會造成北部歐洲歇斯底里的反應(yīng)，因為它意味著歐洲央行喪失對貨幣政策的專斷權(quán)。但是討論如此激進的想法本身表明了這個重要大國的人們心灰意冷的程度。
Unless and until the eurozone is able to generate widely-shared prosperity, it remains vulnerable to political upheaval. Weaknesses of the system, plus the impotence of democratic politics at the only level that really counts (the national one) remains a recipe for populism and fragility.
除非——以及直到——歐元區(qū)能夠營造廣泛共享的繁榮，否則它仍然容易受到政治動蕩的影響。體制的弱點、外加民主政治在國家這個真正重要的層面上無能，仍然是民粹主義和脆弱性的根源。
Italy, as many remark, is too big to fail and too big to bail. But its voters have moved from europhilia to scepticism. Like it or not, the risks of further upheaval are big.
正如很多人所說的那樣，意大利一方面太大而不能倒下，另一方面太大而無法紓困。但該國選民對歐元區(qū)的態(tài)度已經(jīng)從支持變?yōu)閼岩伞o論人們喜歡與否，意大利發(fā)生進一步動蕩的風(fēng)險很大。
