俄羅斯——散布假消息的高手
對于歐洲人而言，如今的美國發(fā)揮著某種有用的功能：作為反面教材，告訴你哪些運(yùn)行社會的方式是不可取的。美國已經(jīng)表明它多么容易陷入富豪統(tǒng)治，或讓國家分裂成兩個敵對的部落。現(xiàn)在，它提供了又一個警示：如何通過把問題黨派化而讓俄羅斯的干涉得手。從大多數(shù)共和黨人的表現(xiàn)看，問題好像不是俄羅斯插手了2016年選舉，而在于聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)對這件事的處理。
Russia now has big ambitions for Europe. In the Italian elections on March 4, if you add up the predicted votes of the pro-Kremlin Five Star Movement and the Northern League, plus Vladimir Putin’s chum Silvio Berlusconi, you get to about 58 per cent. Possibly too late, officials around Europe are frantically building defences against Kremlin meddling.
如今俄羅斯對歐洲有很大的野心。在意大利3月4日的選舉中，如果你把親克里姆林宮的“五星運(yùn)動”(Five Star Movement)和北方聯(lián)盟(Northern League)的預(yù)測選票加在一起，然后再加上弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的密友西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)，你會得到58%左右的得票率?？赡転闀r已晚，但歐洲各國的官員正瘋狂建立防范措施來抵御克里姆林宮的干預(yù)。
People who warn about Russian disinformation are often accused of hysteria, so I’ll start with some caveats. True, Russia wasn’t the biggest factor in the US election. True, the US (like the UK) has an oversupply of homegrown fake news that dwarfs the quantity made in Russia. True, Hillary Clinton was a bad candidate. True, liberals need to understand the popular anger that Donald Trump embodies.
對俄羅斯造謠發(fā)出警告的人往往被指責(zé)為歇斯底里，因此我先作一些說明。沒錯，俄羅斯并不是影響美國大選的最大因素。沒錯，美國(就像英國一樣)國內(nèi)自生的假新聞泛濫，使得俄羅斯假新聞在數(shù)量上相形見絀。沒錯，希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)是個不理想的候選人。沒錯，自由派人士需要理解唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)所代表的民眾憤怒。
Still, given that Trump’s winning margin was 77,744 votes spread over three states, it’s plausible that Russia’s hack of Democratic emails — broadcast by the useful idiots of WikiLeaks and mainstream journalists — made the difference. Even if it didn’t, any election-meddling by a hostile power is a serious matter.
盡管如此，鑒于特朗普憑借三個州總共77744票的微弱優(yōu)勢勝出，俄羅斯對民主黨電子郵件發(fā)起的黑客攻擊——被維基解密(WikiLeaks)的有用傻瓜和主流媒體新聞從業(yè)人員廣為宣傳——有可能起到了關(guān)鍵作用。即使這些攻擊沒有帶來任何差別，一個敵對大國干預(yù)選舉的任何行為都是嚴(yán)重問題。
Putin’s Kremlin began focusing on disinformation in 2008, after losing the international “information war” over its invasion of Georgia. It scaled up disinformation in 2014, during its proxy war in Ukraine. In 2016, it increased its targeting of western countries. A regime that once feared social media has now mastered it. Russia has found disinformation a cheaper and arguably more effective route to influence than sending in tanks or making foreign investments.
在輸?shù)袅藝@俄羅斯入侵格魯吉亞的國際“信息戰(zhàn)”后，普京領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的克里姆林宮從2008年開始關(guān)注造謠。2014年，在其發(fā)動烏克蘭代理戰(zhàn)爭期間，俄羅斯擴(kuò)大了造謠規(guī)模。2016年，俄羅斯開始更多地針對西方國家。一個曾經(jīng)害怕社交媒體的政權(quán)如今成為操弄社交媒體的高手。俄羅斯發(fā)現(xiàn)，相比出動坦克或進(jìn)行對外投資，造謠可以更便宜地施加影響力，可以說也更有效。
Broadly, the Kremlin aims to split the EU and Nato. A quick way to do this is to bolster populist movements such as Brexit or Five Star. So every time there’s a terrorist attack in Europe, pro-Kremlin media, Russian diplomats and trolls spread conspiracy theories that it was an inside job by the host government. Some other favoured storylines: George Soros masterminded the refugee influx; Nato is scheming to invade Russia; the west is lying about Russian doping and wars, and is blaming all its problems on Russia.
總的來說，克里姆林宮的目標(biāo)是分裂歐盟(EU)和北約(Nato)。捷徑之一是支持英國退歐或“五星運(yùn)動”等民粹主義運(yùn)動。因此，每當(dāng)歐洲發(fā)生恐怖襲擊后，親克里姆林宮的媒體、俄羅斯外交官和噴子就會散布陰謀論，稱這是所在國政府賊喊捉賊。他們偏愛的其他情節(jié)包括：喬治•索羅斯(George Soros)一手策劃了難民涌入;北約密謀入侵俄羅斯;西方在俄羅斯參與戰(zhàn)爭和俄羅斯運(yùn)動員使用興奮劑的問題上撒謊，并把自己的所有問題都賴在俄羅斯頭上。
The Russians constantly adapt their disinformation, depending on what works where. In Nordic countries, the Kremlin-controlled Sputnik media flopped and soon closed, but trolls on social media had success in intimidating Nordics, who weren’t used to their brand of verbal aggression. Georgians are told that the EU wants to turn them into gay people or paedophiles. But targeting can be micro too: Nato soldiers in Lithuania and their spouses get text messages from Russia, as do Ukrainian soldiers fighting Russian separatists.
取決于實(shí)際效果，俄羅斯人不斷因地制宜，變著花樣造謠。在北歐國家，克里姆林宮控制的“俄羅斯衛(wèi)星網(wǎng)”(Sputnik)媒體遭遇慘敗，很快關(guān)閉，但社交媒體上的噴子成功地嚇住了北歐人，后者不習(xí)慣他們那種言語攻擊。格魯吉亞人被告知，歐盟想把他們變成同性戀或戀童癖。但目標(biāo)也可能是個體：駐立陶宛的北約官兵及其配偶收到了來自俄羅斯的短信息，同俄羅斯支持的分離主義者作戰(zhàn)的烏克蘭軍人也是如此。
Angela Merkel has displaced Hillary Clinton as the chief target of Russian disinformation, especially in central Europe, where suspicion of Germany is easy to arouse. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic each host dozens of pro-Kremlin media outlets. Many Balts get their news from Russian-language media, and the two million or so Russian speakers in Germany are also deluged with Kremlin propaganda. In Greece, Kremlin-linked oligarchs own stakes in local media.
安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)已取代希拉里•克林頓，成為俄羅斯造謠的主要目標(biāo)，尤其是在很容易引發(fā)對德國疑慮的中歐。匈牙利、波蘭和捷克都有數(shù)十家親克里姆林宮的媒體。許多波羅的海地區(qū)的居民從俄語媒體獲取信息，而德國200萬左右使用俄語的人士也面對克里姆林宮的宣傳洪流。在希臘，與克里姆林宮有關(guān)聯(lián)的寡頭們持有當(dāng)?shù)孛襟w的股份。
Pro-Kremlin public figures across Europe (and Russia keeps lists) can amplify Russian messages. Take France’s Front National, which borrowed €9.4m from the Kremlin-linked First Czech Russian Bank in 2014 while Russia was annexing Crimea. During last spring’s French elections, pro-Front National Twitter accounts that spread certain rumours — such as Emmanuel Macron being gay — were also the most likely to spread Russian disinformation, says Alexandre Alaphilippe of EU Disinfolab, an NGO. Similarly, Five Star’s network of websites and social-media accounts takes many items from “Kremlin-controlled media”, reports the Atlantic Council.
歐洲各地親克里姆林宮的公眾人物(俄羅斯保持著名單)可以放大俄羅斯發(fā)出的各類消息。例如，2014年法國國民陣線(Front National)從第一捷克俄羅斯銀行(First Czech-Russian Bank)——該行與克里姆林宮有關(guān)聯(lián)——借得940萬歐元，而當(dāng)時俄羅斯正在吞并克里米亞。非政府組織EU Disinfolab的亞歷山大•阿拉菲利普(Alexandre Alaphilippe)表示，去年春天法國大選期間，散布某些謠言(如埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)是同性戀)的親國民陣線的Twitter賬號也極有可能在散播俄羅斯的造謠。另據(jù)大西洋理事會(Atlantic Council)報(bào)告，“五星運(yùn)動”掌控的網(wǎng)站和社交媒體賬戶網(wǎng)絡(luò)有很多消息取自“克里姆林宮控制的媒體”。
All this activity creates the psychologically important belief that pro-Kremlin views are more widely shared by the general public than they are. And fake-news items create distrust of all media. This damages a European information ecosphere that, for now, remains healthier than the US’s: most people in most of western Europe still trust public broadcasters. (That’s why the Kremlin aims to persuade Britons that the BBC lies.)
所有這些活動產(chǎn)生了重要的心理認(rèn)同，即親克里姆林宮的觀點(diǎn)被更廣泛的公眾所接受，而實(shí)際并非如此。同時虛假新聞報(bào)道使人們對所有媒體都產(chǎn)生了不信任。這損害了眼下仍比美國健康的歐洲信息生態(tài)圈：多數(shù)西歐國家的大部分人仍信任公共廣播機(jī)構(gòu)。(這就是為什么克里姆林宮力求說服英國人相信BBC說謊。)
What can European governments do? Warn people to be sceptical of what they read on social media or certain websites, recommends Stephan Lewandowsky, psychologist at Bristol University. Use big data to track which groups of people are susceptible to pro-Kremlin messaging, and reach them first, advises Michel Rademaker of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. And he urges mainstream media not to repeat Kremlin narratives, not even to refute them.
歐洲各國政府能做些什么呢?布里斯托大學(xué)(Bristol University)心理學(xué)家斯蒂芬•萊萬多夫斯基(Stephan Lewandowsky)建議，要提醒人們對社交媒體或某些網(wǎng)站上的內(nèi)容保持懷疑態(tài)度。海牙戰(zhàn)略研究中心(Hague Centre for Strategic Studies)的米歇爾•拉德馬克(Michel Rademaker)建議，利用大數(shù)據(jù)來追蹤哪些人群易受親克里姆林宮信息的影響，然后搶先接觸他們。他還敦促主流媒體不要重復(fù)克里姆林宮的敘事，甚至不去反駁它們。
The European Commission’s East StratCom task force has about six staffers (three of them full-timers) countering Russian disinformation. That’s not many. The Kremlin-linked Internet Research Agency in St Petersburg — a “troll factory” where paid trolls dream up constant news stories — just trebled its workspace to 12,000 square metres.
歐盟委員會(European Commission)的東方戰(zhàn)略通信司令部工作組(East StratCom Task Force)有大概6名工作人員(其中三人是全職)負(fù)責(zé)反擊俄羅斯的造謠。這實(shí)在太少了。在圣彼得堡，與克里姆林宮有關(guān)聯(lián)的“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)研究機(jī)構(gòu)”(Internet Research Agency)——一家由職業(yè)噴子不斷編造新聞的“噴子工場”——剛剛將其辦公空間擴(kuò)大了兩倍，至1.2萬平方米。
