FT社評(píng)：美歐日聯(lián)手對(duì)付中國(guó)將考驗(yàn)全球貿(mào)易體系

The yawning divergence between the political economies of China and the west has once more become the sub-text of crucial efforts to avert a surge in trade protectionism.

在力求避免貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義浪潮高漲這場(chǎng)至關(guān)重要的行動(dòng)背后，再一次隱含著中西方政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的巨大差異。

The US, EU and Japan last week ramped up pressure on China on trade, subsidies and intellectual property issues. In a rare effort towards international co-operation by the Trump administration, the three issued a statement on the sidelines of a World Trade Organization meeting in Buenos Aires last week that took aim at “severe excess capacity” in steel and other sectors and the role of illegal subsidies and state-owned enterprises in causing it.

美國(guó)、歐盟(EU)和日本在貿(mào)易、補(bǔ)貼和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)問(wèn)題上加大了對(duì)中國(guó)的施壓。它們上周在布宜諾斯艾利斯世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)會(huì)議的間隙發(fā)表了一份聲明，這是特朗普(Trump)政府在國(guó)際合作方面的罕見(jiàn)努力。聲明把矛頭指向了鋼鐵和其他行業(yè)的“嚴(yán)重產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩”，以及非法補(bǔ)貼和國(guó)有企業(yè)在其中扮演的角色。

The statement, which also targeted the forced transfer of intellectual property, did not name China directly. But officials have made clear that China is the statement’s main target, though not the only one. The intention behind the trilateral alliance is to avert a lurch towards protectionism by wringing concessions from Beijing.

該聲明也針對(duì)強(qiáng)制轉(zhuǎn)讓知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的做法。聲明中沒(méi)有直接提到中國(guó)。但有官員明確表示，中國(guó)是該聲明的頭號(hào)目標(biāo)，盡管不是唯一的目標(biāo)。三方聯(lián)盟背后的意圖在于迫使北京方面做出讓步，從而避免滑向保護(hù)主義。

But from a broader perspective, such mounting tensions represent an existential test for the global trading system. At issue is whether China’s state-driven, hybrid system has become so divergent from free-market principles that fruitful co-operation is precluded.

但從大局來(lái)看，這種日益加劇的緊張關(guān)系使全球貿(mào)易體系面臨一場(chǎng)生死攸關(guān)的考驗(yàn)。問(wèn)題在于，中國(guó)由國(guó)家驅(qū)動(dòng)的混合體制是否已與自由市場(chǎng)原則偏離太遠(yuǎn)，以至于無(wú)法開(kāi)展富有成效的合作。

The hope of “convergence” with the liberal economic order that attended China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 appears dead. Beijing has launched suits at the WTO against the US and EU for failing to follow through on what it claims was their promise to accord China “market economy status” within 15 years of its accession into the world trade body. China wants to be regarded officially as a market economy because such a designation boosts its ability to fight dumping cases against it.

2001年中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織時(shí)，外界曾希望中國(guó)“融入”自由經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序，如今這種希望似乎破滅了。北京方面已針對(duì)美國(guó)和歐盟向世貿(mào)組織提起訴訟，理由是它們沒(méi)有履行當(dāng)年關(guān)于中國(guó)入世15年后給予中國(guó)“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”的承諾。中國(guó)希望被正式視為市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)，因?yàn)檫@會(huì)提高其應(yīng)戰(zhàn)對(duì)華反傾銷案的能力。

Multinationals operating in China complain of a deteriorating environment, with nearly 50 per cent of European firms reporting in 2016 that it has become more difficult to do business in China than in the previous year. The American Chamber of Commerce similarly reported in 2017 that more than three-quarters of its member companies felt less welcome. The World Bank’s ease-of-doing-business ranking places China 78th out of 183 countries, and the OECD puts it fourth-to-last among 62 countries evaluated on restrictions to foreign investment.

跨國(guó)公司抱怨在華經(jīng)營(yíng)環(huán)境惡化，2016年近50%的受訪歐洲企業(yè)稱，在中國(guó)做生意的難度比上一年加大了。美國(guó)商會(huì)(American Chamber of Commerce)同樣在2017年表示，超過(guò)四分之三的會(huì)員企業(yè)感覺(jué)受歡迎程度下降。在世界銀行(World Bank)的“經(jīng)商便利度”排行榜中，中國(guó)在183個(gè)國(guó)家中排名第78位;經(jīng)合組織(OECD)對(duì)62個(gè)國(guó)家的外商投資限制進(jìn)行評(píng)估，中國(guó)的寬松度位列倒數(shù)第4。

Some of the reasons behind such perceptions derive from its technology drive. In 2015, it announced its “Made in China 2025” policy, which targets higher market shares in 10 global industries. The scheme is nakedly nationalistic, aiming to boost “indigenous innovation” and self-reliance in the manufacture of key components.

這些評(píng)價(jià)有一部分原因與中國(guó)的科技發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略有關(guān)。2015年，中國(guó)公布了“中國(guó)制造2025”政策，目標(biāo)是在全球10個(gè)行業(yè)占據(jù)更大市場(chǎng)份額。該計(jì)劃帶有赤裸裸的民族主義色彩，希望在關(guān)鍵部件制造方面加強(qiáng)“自主創(chuàng)新”和自力更生。

The success of China’s ascent on the technology ladder has brought it increasingly into direct competition with US and European companies. It has also turbo-charged Chinese acquisitions of technology leaders and brand champions in US and European markets. In 2016, for example, Chinese investment into the EU jumped 77 per cent to €35bn, while investment from European firms into China declined 23 per cent to €8bn and has continued to decline this year.

中國(guó)在攀升技術(shù)階梯方面的成功，導(dǎo)致其日益與歐美企業(yè)形成直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。這也促進(jìn)了中國(guó)企業(yè)收購(gòu)美歐市場(chǎng)的技術(shù)領(lǐng)軍企業(yè)和知名品牌。例如，2016年中國(guó)對(duì)歐盟的投資額猛增77%，達(dá)350億歐元，而歐洲企業(yè)對(duì)中國(guó)的投資下降了23%，至80億歐元，今年進(jìn)一步下降。

The US and EU argue that illegal subsidies, state financing and favourable policies toward state-owned enterprises have contributed to industrial overcapacity that is flooding world markets with cheap steel, aluminium and other commodities.

美國(guó)和歐盟認(rèn)為非法補(bǔ)貼、國(guó)家資助和偏袒國(guó)企政策造成了工業(yè)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩，導(dǎo)致中國(guó)向國(guó)際市場(chǎng)大量出口廉價(jià)的鋼鐵、鋁等大宗商品。

Such accusations may be justified. But this does not make the success of the trilateral approach to China any more likely. The issues that the US, EU and Japan identified are fused into the nature of Beijing’s party state. They are expressions of a political economy that China has no intention of rolling back.

這種指責(zé)可能是合理的。但是這絲毫不會(huì)提高三方聯(lián)盟成功的可能性。美歐日所指出的問(wèn)題融入了中國(guó)的黨國(guó)性質(zhì)里面。這些問(wèn)題是中國(guó)不打算放棄的一種政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的表現(xiàn)形式。