中國(guó)的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位之爭(zhēng)

Three little words in the 102-page protocol that China signed when it agreed to join the World Trade Organization is turning into a litmus test for the institution itself: non-market economy.

中國(guó)在同意加入世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)時(shí)簽署了一份102頁(yè)的議定書(shū)，其中有幾個(gè)小字正成為對(duì)該機(jī)構(gòu)本身的一個(gè)嚴(yán)峻考驗(yàn)：非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)。

One year ago today was the 15th anniversary of China joining the WTO. The date is important because of a little clause in the accession protocols that deals with how countries should decide whether the goods that China exports have been unfairly dumped. It says: “In any event, the provisions [that allow trade disputants to treat China as a non-market economy] shall expire 15 years after the date of accession”.

一年前的12月11日是中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織的15周年紀(jì)念日。這個(gè)日子之所以異常重要，是因?yàn)橹袊?guó)入世協(xié)議中有一個(gè)小條款，是關(guān)于各國(guó)應(yīng)如何判定中國(guó)出口商品是否存在不公平傾銷(xiāo)。該條款寫(xiě)道：“無(wú)論如何，(允許貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)議者將中國(guó)視為非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的)項(xiàng)目的規(guī)定應(yīng)在加入之日后15年終止。”

In the year following that expiry date, a battle royale has erupted over whether Europe and the US should honour what Beijing sees as its agreement when the other countries say China has not stood by its commitments.

在這一期限屆滿(mǎn)后的一年里爆發(fā)了一場(chǎng)大混戰(zhàn)，其主題是當(dāng)其他國(guó)家表示中國(guó)沒(méi)有信守承諾時(shí)，歐洲和美國(guó)是否應(yīng)對(duì)北京方面認(rèn)為是協(xié)議規(guī)定的內(nèi)容予以承認(rèn)。

Let’s rewind first to the 1990s. At the time, the question for US and European negotiators was how anyone would know if Chinese exporters were dumping goods in other markets. The normal standard is whether the goods are being sold for less than their cost of production — in other words, being sold without any profit. But that standard was impossible to apply to the planned economies of the Soviet bloc, which lacked normal prices in their home markets. So goods suspected of being dumped by “non-market” economies could be measured against goods in another economy of more or less equivalent levels of development, to see whether the price was fair.

我們先倒回到上世紀(jì)九十年代。當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)和歐洲談判代表考慮的問(wèn)題是，如果中國(guó)出口商在其他市場(chǎng)傾銷(xiāo)商品，別人如何得知呢?一般的判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是商品是否以低于其生產(chǎn)成本的價(jià)格出售，換句話(huà)說(shuō)，該商品的出售是否毫無(wú)利潤(rùn)。但這一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)無(wú)法適用于蘇聯(lián)集團(tuán)的計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)體，它們的國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)缺乏正常價(jià)格。因此如果懷疑“非市場(chǎng)”經(jīng)濟(jì)體傾銷(xiāo)某樣商品，可以用另一個(gè)發(fā)展水平大致相當(dāng)?shù)慕?jīng)濟(jì)體的同樣商品來(lái)衡量，看其價(jià)格是否公平。

When China agreed to join, its negotiators understood “market economy” as referring to a country without price controls, and there are some indications that the foreign negotiators did too. Anyway, they were fixated on opening access to the Chinese market for goods produced by foreign firms. Now, however, the question of whether to grant market economy status (MES) to China has become a proxy for frustrations with China’s overall economic structure, and an excuse to throw the entire concept of the WTO into question.

當(dāng)中國(guó)同意加入時(shí)，中方談判代表對(duì)“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”的理解是指一個(gè)國(guó)家沒(méi)有價(jià)格管制，而有些跡象表明外國(guó)談判代表們也是這樣理解的?？傊麄円恍南氪蜷_(kāi)中國(guó)市場(chǎng)，讓外國(guó)公司生產(chǎn)的商品進(jìn)去?？墒乾F(xiàn)在，是否給予中國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位(MES)的問(wèn)題已成為對(duì)中國(guó)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)失望的代表，也成為質(zhì)疑整個(gè)世貿(mào)組織概念的一個(gè)理由。

After China joined the WTO, the “non-market” status very quickly became a disadvantage. With a burst of investment and competition in nearly every industry, Chinese producers of everything from steel to shoes to vitamins quickly drove domestic profit margins through the floor. Exporting became a way to capture the higher prices overseas. Far from dumping, the Chinese exporters were looking to make a profit. But their prices were well below those of most other countries, unleashing havoc on international producers’ margins and leading to numerous WTO complaints. No third country could replicate the scale, low labour costs and cut-throat competition of the Chinese market. But its trading partners used the clause to impose absurdly high tariffs, often exceeding 100 per cent, on its exports.

中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織后，“非市場(chǎng)”地位很快就成了一個(gè)劣勢(shì)。幾乎每一個(gè)行業(yè)都經(jīng)歷了投資的激增和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的加劇。從鋼鐵到鞋子再到維生素，中國(guó)所有生產(chǎn)商的國(guó)內(nèi)利潤(rùn)率都迅速降到極低。出口成了在海外賺取較高價(jià)格的方式。中國(guó)出口商非但不是在傾銷(xiāo)，反而是在尋求利潤(rùn)。但他們的價(jià)格遠(yuǎn)低于其他大多數(shù)國(guó)家的價(jià)格，對(duì)國(guó)際生產(chǎn)者的利潤(rùn)率造成巨大破壞，并讓世貿(mào)組織收到大量投訴。再?zèng)]有國(guó)家能復(fù)制中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的規(guī)模、低廉的勞動(dòng)力成本和激烈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。但其貿(mào)易伙伴利用上述條款對(duì)中國(guó)出口商品征收高到離譜的關(guān)稅——往往超過(guò)100%。

That is why Chinese negotiators are dead set on forcing the Europeans and Americans to recognise China as a “market economy”. The fight has focused on Europe, which needs to make a legal change. In a sleight of hand, the Europeans eliminated the entire category of “non-market economies” in October (delivering an unexpected boon to Vietnam, Albania, Mongolia and Turkmenistan) but reserves the right to do a third-country comparison on a case-by-case basis.

這就是為什么中方談判代表拼命想讓歐洲人和美國(guó)人承認(rèn)中國(guó)是“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”。這場(chǎng)斗爭(zhēng)主要集中在歐洲，這里需要修改法律。歐洲人耍了個(gè)花招，在10月份取消了整個(gè)“非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”類(lèi)別——給越南、阿爾巴尼亞、蒙古和土庫(kù)曼斯坦帶來(lái)了意想不到的好處——但保留根據(jù)具體情況進(jìn)行第三國(guó)比較的權(quán)利。

The US doesn’t have to change any law. It only has to refrain, in future cases, from comparing Chinese goods with third country goods when deciding if they were dumped. But China has requested WTO consultations with the US too, leading Washington’s lawyers to push back forcefully and claim they have the WTO’s laws on their side. The response fully demonstrates that this case is not about pricing any more but about all the ways the Chinese economy is different.

美國(guó)不必修改任何法律。它只需要——在未來(lái)的案例中——在判定中國(guó)商品是否存在傾銷(xiāo)時(shí)，不將中國(guó)商品與第三國(guó)商品作比較。但中國(guó)也要求世貿(mào)組織與美國(guó)進(jìn)行磋商，導(dǎo)致華盛頓的律師們激烈反對(duì)，并聲稱(chēng)世貿(mào)組織的法律站在他們這邊。其反應(yīng)充分表明此事不再是關(guān)于定價(jià)，而是關(guān)于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的與眾不同。

For their part, US and European negotiators feel China is nowhere near a market economy. Hidden advantages given to hometown players (especially state-owned companies) include cheap financing, discriminatory rules and Beijing’s value destroying attempts to jump-start new industries.

對(duì)于美國(guó)和歐洲的談判代表來(lái)說(shuō)，中國(guó)與市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)毫不沾邊。本土企業(yè)(特別是國(guó)企)享受的隱形優(yōu)勢(shì)包括低成本融資、歧視性規(guī)則和中國(guó)政府助推新行業(yè)的破壞價(jià)值的嘗試。

For many years, the Obama administration had been building slow and careful WTO cases against the hidden subsidies on land, water and interest rates that Beijing awards its state-owned companies and its larger, more favourite private ones.

多年來(lái)，奧巴馬政府一直緩慢而小心地在世貿(mào)組織針對(duì)中國(guó)政府賦予國(guó)企及其所偏愛(ài)的大型私企的土地、水和利率方面的隱形補(bǔ)貼提起訴訟。

“They had us,” one Chinese negotiator says. Although fiercely contested by the ministry of commerce’s crack WTO team, some Chinese reformers secretly welcomed them as a stick to force tougher structural reforms on recalcitrant domestic foes.

“他們說(shuō)的沒(méi)錯(cuò)，”一名中國(guó)談判代表表示。盡管這些訴訟受到中國(guó)商務(wù)部一流的世貿(mào)組織工作組的強(qiáng)烈反駁，但是中國(guó)一些改革者私底下歡迎這些訴訟，認(rèn)為它們可以作為針對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)頑固抗拒改革的勢(shì)力的一根大棒，以推行更為嚴(yán)格的結(jié)構(gòu)性改革。

The Trump administration threw the Obama administration’s forensic approach out the window. Instead of picking cases that might lead to structural reforms in China, it has fixed on specific items that are arriving on US shores in large quantities. It is an attempt to raise the walls of the levee, sandbag by sandbag, rather than fighting the flood at its source and risk getting swept away.

特朗普政府把奧巴馬政府訴諸法庭的方式拋到了腦后。特朗普政府沒(méi)有選擇那些可能推動(dòng)中國(guó)結(jié)構(gòu)性改革的案子，而是把目標(biāo)鎖定那些大量進(jìn)入美國(guó)的特定商品。此舉試圖冒著被洪水沖走的危險(xiǎn)一沙袋一沙袋地加高防洪墻，而不是在洪水的源頭抗洪。

This makes the MES a mess. Lawyers may quibble, but the literal text (“in any event”) is quite clear. Arguing against it makes the west look as though it signed the WTO accord (and other deals) in bad faith. Chinese reformers, who have staked their hopes for their country on creating a globally integrated economy, need international agreements to have credibility. Otherwise, they give fodder to the more nationalist strain in the country that believes international institutions are only designed to keep China down.

這使中國(guó)的“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”問(wèn)題成為一場(chǎng)混戰(zhàn)。律師們可能會(huì)狡辯，但是議定書(shū)寫(xiě)得明明白白——“無(wú)論如何”。爭(zhēng)辯這一點(diǎn)讓西方看起來(lái)像是心存欺騙地簽署了世貿(mào)組織協(xié)定(以及其他協(xié)議)。中國(guó)改革者把對(duì)國(guó)家的希望寄托在打造全球一體化經(jīng)濟(jì)上，他們需要有信譽(yù)的國(guó)際協(xié)議。否則，他們就給國(guó)內(nèi)更民族主義的論調(diào)提供了彈藥，這種論調(diào)認(rèn)為國(guó)際機(jī)構(gòu)的目的就是壓制中國(guó)。

Nonetheless, China clearly isn’t a market economy in the sense of “market competition”. For instance, Beijing prioritises the interests of its state-owned companies over private Chinese and foreign companies. Granting MES seems indefensible to businesses and workers who see profits and jobs hit when cheap Chinese goods arrive on their home shores. Denying MES is also disingenuous. For one thing, the “flood” of cheap “Made in China” goods often includes the products of joint ventures by multinationals that have moved production to China. And, since all Chinese companies, state or private, export away from their ultra-competitive home markets in order to secure profits, comparing Chinese export prices with domestic Chinese prices almost always shows the products weren’t dumped.

盡管如此，中國(guó)在“市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”方面明顯不算是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)。例如，中國(guó)政府把國(guó)企的利益置于私企和外企的利益之上。對(duì)于那些因廉價(jià)的中國(guó)商品涌入本國(guó)而遭受利潤(rùn)損失或者失去工作的企業(yè)和工人而言，賦予中國(guó)“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”似乎是不可原諒的。否定其“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”又是不誠(chéng)實(shí)的。一來(lái)，大量“涌入”的廉價(jià)的“中國(guó)制造”商品，往往包含把生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移至中國(guó)的跨國(guó)企業(yè)成立的合資企業(yè)所生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品。同時(shí)，由于所有中國(guó)企業(yè)——無(wú)論是國(guó)企還是私企——為了獲取利潤(rùn)而避開(kāi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)超級(jí)激烈的本土市場(chǎng)、選擇對(duì)外出口，因此對(duì)比中國(guó)商品的出口價(jià)格與本土價(jià)格幾乎總是顯示這些產(chǎn)品并不存在傾銷(xiāo)。

And then there is the politics of the US. WTO judges are very aware that the Trump administration is just looking for one “outrageous” ruling to justify pulling out of the WTO. They might be disinclined to provide one, no matter the merits of China’s argument that it has, in fact, transitioned from a Soviet-style planned economy to one based on market prices (if not market competition).

另外還有美國(guó)政治的因素。世貿(mào)組織法官非常清楚，特朗普政府只不過(guò)在尋求一次“不可容忍”的裁決作為退出世貿(mào)組織的借口。他們可能不愿意提供這樣的借口，無(wú)論中國(guó)自稱(chēng)實(shí)際上已從蘇聯(lián)式計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型為基于市場(chǎng)化定價(jià)(即使不是市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng))的經(jīng)濟(jì)的觀點(diǎn)有多可信。

“It’s become a political problem and so it will need a political solution,” said one western trade negotiator.

一名西方貿(mào)易談判代表稱(chēng)，“這已經(jīng)成了一個(gè)政治問(wèn)題，因此它需要政治解決方案。”

A bigger issue is that most of the complaints about the Chinese economy (and, to be fair, other countries’ complaints about Washington’s unhealthy economic choices) go well beyond strict trade and tariff issues. The WTO is a poor forum to debate broader structural issues in large economies, but there is no other option.

更大的問(wèn)題是，大多數(shù)關(guān)于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的抱怨(公平地說(shuō)，還有其他國(guó)家對(duì)華盛頓方面不健康的經(jīng)濟(jì)選擇的抱怨)都不僅是嚴(yán)格意義上的貿(mào)易和關(guān)稅問(wèn)題。世貿(mào)組織并不適合用來(lái)討論大型經(jīng)濟(jì)體更廣泛的結(jié)構(gòu)性問(wèn)題，但現(xiàn)在沒(méi)有別的選擇。