短線觀點(diǎn)：中國要學(xué)會(huì)對人民幣匯率放手

Put helicopters in the same sentence as central banks and the assumption is you are discussing boosting an economy by showering cash from on high. In China, however, the notion is in reality more akin to so-called “helicopter parenting”, given Beijing’s constant micromanagement. The renminbi is one example. If China truly wants to internationalise its currency, it must learn to let go.

把“直升機(jī)”與“央行”放在一個(gè)句子里，人們會(huì)假設(shè)你說的是從高處拋撒現(xiàn)金以提振經(jīng)濟(jì)。然而在中國，北京方面持續(xù)不斷的微觀管理意味著，這個(gè)概念實(shí)際上更像所謂的“直升機(jī)式育兒”。人民幣就是一個(gè)例子。如果中國真的要讓人民幣國際化，它必須學(xué)會(huì)放手。

Last week was a case in point. A rapid rally in the renminbi pushed the currency to 21-month highs before the People’s Bank of China relaxed two controls that had acted to boost the currency. The moves could be seen as a stepping back, if it were not for two things. The tweaks were targeted at limiting a rally, not letting the renminbi find its own level. And the gains were ed by the onshore market, which in itself is a sign of the PBoC’s control because it has crushed the offshore market — the wilder of the two renminbi markets — during the past two years.

上周就是一個(gè)說明問題的例子。快速上漲使人民幣匯率升至21個(gè)月高點(diǎn)，隨后中國人民銀行(PBoC)放松了之前采取的旨在提振人民幣的兩項(xiàng)控制措施。要不是兩件事，這些舉動(dòng)可以被看作后退一步。首先，這些微調(diào)的目的是遏制漲幅，而不是讓人民幣發(fā)現(xiàn)自己的水平。其次，人民幣匯率漲幅是由在岸市場引領(lǐng)的，這本身就是中國人民銀行實(shí)行管控的一個(gè)標(biāo)志，因?yàn)榻鼉赡陙硭鼔褐屏巳嗣駧烹x岸市場，即兩個(gè)人民幣市場中比較野性的那個(gè)市場。

If China is ever to change its helicopter habits, the offshore market is the key. Unlike onshore traders, tethered to moving the renminbi by a maximum of 2 per cent each day from a central point (and in reality never using half that range), their offshore brethren can in theory set their own level. But this has not been happening. Renminbi deposits in Hong Kong have virtually halved and a weaker currency is only one reason. The renminbi “dim sum” bond market has also shrunk dramatically, while China too has played its part by restricting renminbi flows into Hong Kong. With fewer products and a far smaller liquidity pool, many international investors have little interest in the market.

如果中國有朝一日要改變“直升機(jī)”習(xí)慣，離岸市場將是關(guān)鍵。與在岸交易員(被限制在人民幣每日中間價(jià)上下2%的浮動(dòng)區(qū)間范圍內(nèi)，實(shí)際上從未用到一半?yún)^(qū)間)不同，離岸交易員理論上可以設(shè)定自己的價(jià)位。但這種情況尚未發(fā)生過。香港的人民幣存款已幾乎減半，這其中人民幣走弱只是一個(gè)原因。人民幣“點(diǎn)心”債券市場也已戲劇性縮水，而中國通過限制人民幣流入香港也在這方面發(fā)揮了作用。由于產(chǎn)品數(shù)量較少，且流動(dòng)資金池小得多，許多國際投資者對該市場沒什么興趣。

Internationalisation has no single definition. Standard Chartered, for example, is now factoring foreign investors’ onshore access into its renminbi globalisation index, which in July gained by the most in almost two years. The renminbi has also edged back into fifth place among international payment currencies. But these are small developments in light of China’s overall control. For the renminbi to internationalise, investors worldwide would have to be comfortable in their ability to trade it at will, and Chinese officials would need to leave the market alone. Either, right now, is as likely as money falling from helicopters.

國際化沒有單一的定義。例如，渣打銀行(Standard Chartered)目前將在岸市場的外國投資者準(zhǔn)入程度計(jì)入其人民幣全球化指數(shù)，7月份該指數(shù)出現(xiàn)近兩年來最大漲幅。人民幣在國際支付貨幣中的排名也回升至第五位。但從中國的整體控制看，這些都是小的發(fā)展。要讓人民幣國際化，就必須讓世界各地的投資者對自己自由買賣的能力感到放心，同時(shí)中國官員們將需要放手讓市場自行運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。目前來看，這兩者的幾率都像直升機(jī)撒錢一樣渺茫。