特朗普啟動對華知識產權調查為何掌聲寥寥？
不久前，特朗普政府推出的一項新倡議從硅谷那里得到了明顯不夠熱情的歡呼。
Given the antipathy stirred up by the White House’s policies on immigration and several other issues, even that lukewarm welcome was more than what the current administration has been accustomed to. But this was an issue close to the technology world’s heart, and it might have been expected to draw a far more enthusiastic welcome.
鑒于白宮在移民和其他一些問題上的政策所引發(fā)的反感，即使是不冷不熱的歡迎可以說也讓現任政府受寵若驚。但這個問題對科技界來說非常重要，白宮原本可能期望它得到硅谷更熱烈的歡迎。
The occasion was commerce secretary Wilbur Ross’s announcement of an investigation into how China acquires US intellectual property. American companies have long complained about being forced to hand over IP in return for market access, and of losing control of it to outright theft.
這件事就是商務部長威爾伯•羅斯(Wilbur Ross)(見本文題圖)宣布對中國獲取美國知識產權的方式進行調查。美國企業(yè)長久以來一直抱怨被迫交出知識產權來換取進入中國市場的資格，或因公然的盜竊失去了對其知識產權的控制。
The fact that the White House salvo did not have tech companies racing to the IP barricades says much about the current state of play in both tech and Sino-US politics.
白宮的這一通炮火齊發(fā)，并沒有讓科技公司趁著炮火掩護朝知識產權工事飛奔，這一事實極大地揭示了科技和美中政治的狀況。
The tech companies that have built a mainland Chinese presence are not eager to risk their position on a political fight with a highly unpredictable outcome. ?One problem for them is that it is hard to gauge whether the US administration will stay the course. The Trump White House has made much of its willingness to do deals, something that could turn the charges of IP theft into a pawn in a larger negotiation about trade or security.
已經在中國內地立足的科技企業(yè)，不愿在一場結果極度難料的政治斗爭中用自己的地位來冒險。他們面臨的問題之一是，很難判斷美國政府是否會堅持到底。特朗普領導的白宮很愿意做交易，可能把竊取知識產權的指控變?yōu)橛嘘P貿易和安全的更大談判中的一顆棋子。
Another consideration is that many tech companies have already made the accommodations required to get a Chinese foothold, for instance by forging partnerships — and handing control — to local companies. Five years ago, the subject of IP was far more likely to arouse a passionate reaction in Silicon Valley. But now, the reality of doing business in China has sunk in.
另一種考慮是，很多科技公司為了在中國立足，已經按要求做出了讓步，比如與當地企業(yè)建立合伙關系——并且交出控制權。5年前，有關知識產權的話題遠比現在更可能引發(fā)硅谷的熱情反應。但如今，美國企業(yè)已經接受了在華經營的現實。
IBM, for instance, gave up on selling its own servers in China and instead licensed its Open Power chip technology to local manufacturers. And in 2015, Hewlett-Packard sold a majority stake in its Chinese networking subsidiary, H3C, to Tsinghua, the Beijing institution that embodies many of the country’s tech ambitions.
例如，IBM放棄了在中國銷售自己的服務器，而是把其OpenPower芯片技術授權給了當地制造商。2015年，惠普(HP)把其旗下的中國網絡公司華三通信(H3C Technologies)的多數股權賣給了清華大學旗下的公司——這所大學承載著中國很多科技抱負。
Meanwhile, Qualcomm, nudged by antitrust pressure, agreed new terms for licensing its technology to Chinese handset makers last year. Others have adapted in their own ways. Intel, which long restricted its activities there, opened its first full-scale chip factory in China at the start of the decade, although it has not employed its most up-to-date process technology.
與此同時，在反壟斷壓力下，高通公司(Qualcomm)去年同意了新條款，將其技術授權給了中國手機制造商。其他公司也以自己的方式適應了中國。長久以來一直限制在華業(yè)務規(guī)模的英特爾(Intel)于2010年代初在中國開設了首家完整規(guī)模的芯片廠，盡管它并未采用最新工藝技術。
Critics say that many US tech companies have traded their IP crown jewels for a form of market access that will have little value once local partners and licensees have extracted what they need. Mark Anderson, an independent technology analyst who has warned of wholesale stripping of American IP, says the country’s chief executives have faced a tough choice: as competitors bow to Chinese demands, it has been hard for others to stand firm.
批評者表示，許多美國科技公司都以代表其“看家本領”的知識產權換來了市場準入，而一旦中方合作伙伴和被許可方取得他們所需要的東西，市場準入將變得沒有任何價值。曾就美國知識產權可能大量流失提出警告的獨立科技分析師馬克•安德森(Mark Anderson)表示，美國的首席執(zhí)行官們面臨一個艱難選擇：當競爭對手屈服于中國要求時，其他公司就很難堅守自己的立場。
Other changes on the tech landscape, like the rise of cloud computing, have also reduced the urgency of the IP debate. Software piracy has been a long-running complaint; but when new movies, video games and Windows software are all accessed online, their distribution can be controlled more carefully.
科技行業(yè)的其他變化——比如云計算的興起——也降低了知識產權辯論的緊迫性。軟件盜版是長期以來引起抱怨的一個問題;但當新的電影、電子游戲和Windows軟件都可以在線獲得時，它們的發(fā)行能夠得到更小心的控制。
Instead, the cloud has created a different dilemma for US tech companies. Control of data, rather than control of IP, becomes a central issue, and one that is forcing companies that want to do business in China into positions that do not sit well with the principles they espouse back home. Just as Google was once forced to censor its search results in return for market access, a bargain it eventually abandoned, Apple has this year ceded control of its local data centre to a Chinese partner (although the California company says it still controls the data and only hands it over in response to lawful requests).
相反，云技術給美國科技公司造就了一種不同的兩難處境。對數據而非對知識產權的的控制，成了一個核心問題，迫使想在華開展業(yè)務的公司處于與它們在國內信奉的原則不太吻合的境地。正如谷歌(Google)曾為進入中國市場而被迫審查其搜索結果(它最終放棄入華)那樣，蘋果(Apple)今年已把中國數據中心的控制權移交給了一家中方合作伙伴(不過，蘋果表示，其仍控制著數據，只會應合法要求交出數據)。
Even so, protection of IP will remain a long-term issue for the US tech industry in China. The country’s Made in China 2025 initiative has targeted 10 industries for rapid development, including electric vehicles. Tesla, which already looks to China for nearly 20 per cent of its sales, hopes to announce a local manufacturing partner before the end of this year. That puts it next in line to face a tug of war over IP as it tries to break in.
即便如此，保護知識產權對在華美國科技企業(yè)而言仍將是一個長期問題。中國的“中國制造2025”計劃瞄準了要求快速發(fā)展的10個行業(yè)，其中包括電動車。特斯拉(Tesla)指望中國市場能占到其總銷量的近20%。該公司希望在今年底之前公布一家中方生產伙伴。在特斯拉嘗試打入中國市場之際，這會讓它成為下一個即將面臨知識產權拉鋸戰(zhàn)的公司。
If the Trump administration really means business, economic sanctions against companies or government entities responsible for commandeering US technology may be the only effective response, says Mr Anderson. It is still too early to tell how hard the Trump administration is prepared to fight.
安德森表示，如果特朗普政府確實是認真的，對強占了美國科技的公司或政府機構發(fā)起經濟制裁，也許是唯一有效的應對措施?，F在要判斷特朗普政府準備以多大力度投入戰(zhàn)斗為時尚早。
