如果美國(guó)不再擔(dān)任全球盟主

History can veer off course. It happened in 1914 when the first age of globalisation was consumed in the flames of the Great War; and again during the 1930s when economic hardship, protectionism and nationalism nurtured the rise of fascism in Europe. Donald Trump’s election victory heralds another of these dangerous dislocations.

歷史可能偏離正軌。1914年第一波全球化被世界大戰(zhàn)的烈火吞噬的時(shí)候，歷史偏離了正軌;上世紀(jì)30年代經(jīng)濟(jì)凋敝、保護(hù)主義和民族主義盛行，助推歐洲法西斯主義興起，歷史再次偏離了正軌。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)勝選預(yù)示著歷史又一次面臨這種危險(xiǎn)的偏離。

It may well be that America is resilient and self-sufficient enough to survive a Trump presidency. The founding fathers of the republic foresaw the dangers of populist passions. James Madison set the first objective of the constitution as to “break and control the violence of faction”. For Madison “faction” was the power of any group “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion” to seize power at the expense of fellow citizens. The constitution’s intricate checks and balances are there to block the path to such tyranny.

美國(guó)很可能因具有足夠的適應(yīng)性和自給自足能力而安然度過(guò)特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)的幾年。美國(guó)的開(kāi)國(guó)之父?jìng)冾A(yù)見(jiàn)到了民粹主義高漲的危險(xiǎn)。詹姆斯•麥迪遜(James Madison)將憲法的第一個(gè)目標(biāo)確定為“打破和控制派系的暴力”。在麥迪遜來(lái)看，“派系”是任何“被某種共同感情或利益驅(qū)動(dòng)而團(tuán)結(jié)在一起”、以犧牲其他公民權(quán)利為代價(jià)來(lái)攥取權(quán)力的團(tuán)體。憲法精心設(shè)計(jì)了制衡措施來(lái)阻止此類(lèi)暴政。

Rereading this week Federalist No 10, perhaps the most celebrated of what became known as the Federalist Papers, it is obvious that Madison had Mr Trump in mind when he wrote about the need to safeguard the union from domestic insurrection. The president-elect has said he wants to muzzle the media, torture prisoners, lock out Muslims, expel millions of migrants, build a wall against Mexico and cosy up to to Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Lauded by white supremacists, Mr Trump won the prize by disinterring the demons of race.

近日我重讀了《聯(lián)邦黨人文集》第十篇(Federalist No 10)，這或許是《聯(lián)邦黨人文集》中最著名的一章。顯然麥迪遜在寫(xiě)道有必要保護(hù)聯(lián)邦不受?chē)?guó)內(nèi)叛亂危害的時(shí)候想到了特朗普之類(lèi)的人物。這位美國(guó)侯任總統(tǒng)表示，他要壓制媒體、對(duì)犯人嚴(yán)刑拷打，禁止穆斯林入境、驅(qū)逐數(shù)百萬(wàn)移民，在美墨邊境建造隔離墻以及親近俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)。特朗普獲得了白人至上主義者的贊揚(yáng)，他通過(guò)發(fā)掘出種族惡魔而成功問(wèn)鼎白宮。

And yet. Madison’s careful distribution of authority between the three branches of the federal government should check the president’s worst excesses. A strong judiciary creates a firewall against arbitrary rule. Military chiefs will refuse to break the laws against torture. There is a safety catch on the nuclear trigger. Republican-dominated it may be, but the new Congress will surely resist an advance to presidential autocracy. And, yes, given his character, temperament and unfamiliarity with truth, it is always possible that things will end badly for Mr Trump.

然而，麥迪遜精心設(shè)計(jì)的聯(lián)邦政府三權(quán)分立模式應(yīng)該可以制約特朗普最糟糕的濫權(quán)。一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的司法體系可以防止專(zhuān)政。軍方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將拒絕違反禁止酷刑法律。美國(guó)還有防止核觸發(fā)的安全機(jī)制。盡管新的國(guó)會(huì)由共和黨主導(dǎo)，但它肯定會(huì)抵制總統(tǒng)獨(dú)裁趨勢(shì)。誠(chéng)然，鑒于特朗普的性格、脾氣以及不熟悉真相，總是有可能出現(xiàn)不好的結(jié)果。

But America’s tragedy — and how else can one describe the passage to the White House of someone whose politics are so boastfully rooted in prejudice and hate — is also the west’s tragedy.

但美國(guó)的悲劇——除此之外還能怎么描述自詡政見(jiàn)根植于偏見(jiàn)和憎恨的某人入住白宮——也是西方的悲劇。

The liberal international order has rested not simply on economic vitality and military strength. It has been anchored by a set of values whose appeal is universal. Freedom, the rule of law, human dignity, tolerance, pluralist institutions: these are all now scorned by the president-elect of the world’s most powerful nation. Liberal democracy itself is thus delegitimised.

自由的國(guó)際秩序不僅依仗于經(jīng)濟(jì)活力和軍事實(shí)力，它還有賴于一系列人們普遍向往的價(jià)值觀來(lái)維系。自由、法治、人類(lèi)尊嚴(yán)、寬容和多元主義制度全都受到全球最強(qiáng)大國(guó)家的候任總統(tǒng)的蔑視。自由民主制度自身因此喪失權(quán)威。

Whatever the course of US politics, the damage inflicted on the alliance of nations that has shaped the world since 1945 is irreparable. Few of the Madisonian checks and balances apply to the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy. Barack Obama, as much as any other president, has shown how America’s place in the world is a choice made by the occupant of the Oval Office.

無(wú)論美國(guó)政治進(jìn)程如何，自1945年以來(lái)塑造全球秩序的國(guó)家聯(lián)盟所遭受的損害將是無(wú)法修復(fù)的。麥迪遜的制衡措施很少適用于外交行為和外交政策。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)和其他總統(tǒng)一樣，表明了美國(guó)在世界上的地位由白宮主人的選擇來(lái)決定。

The US-designed global system has been unravelling for some time. It will not survive the withdrawal of American leadership. The financial crash of 2008, income stagnation, austerity and disenchantment with free trade has buried the liberal economic consensus. Now Mr Trump has pledged to dismantle the political pillars of the old order.

美國(guó)設(shè)計(jì)的全球體系一段時(shí)間以來(lái)本就在瓦解。如果美國(guó)不再擔(dān)當(dāng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)角色，這種全球體系更將難以為繼。2008年金融危機(jī)、收入停滯、緊縮政策以及對(duì)自由貿(mào)易的失望情緒埋葬了自由經(jīng)濟(jì)共識(shí)?，F(xiàn)在特朗普承諾拆除舊秩序的政治支柱。

“America First” promotes belligerent isolationism — an approach to international order rooted in power rather than the rule of law. The narrowest interpretation of national interest takes precedence over broader considerations of international security.

“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”推動(dòng)了好斗的孤立主義——它基于權(quán)力、而非法治建立國(guó)際秩序。對(duì)國(guó)家利益最狹隘的解讀優(yōu)先于對(duì)國(guó)際安全的更廣泛考慮。

Mr Trump is content to preside over the dissolution of the US alliance system, leaving Europe vulnerable to Mr Putin’s revanchism and East Asia to the ambitions of an assertive China. Japan and South Korea, he has suggested, may want to build their own nuclear weapons. We can be sure that, if he keeps a promise to abrogate the international nuclear deal with Iran, then Tehran will soon enough build its own bomb.

特朗普樂(lè)于主持美國(guó)同盟體系的瓦解，讓歐洲承受普京的復(fù)仇主義，讓東亞承受日益強(qiáng)硬的中國(guó)的抱負(fù)。他表示，日本和韓國(guó)可能希望建造它們自己的核武器。我們可以確信，如果特朗普像他承諾的那樣廢除與伊朗簽署的國(guó)際核協(xié)議，那么德黑蘭將會(huì)很快建造出自己的核武器。

Other democracies face their own populist insurrections. Demagogues across Europe have been lauding Mr Trump’s success. Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s xenophobic National Front, hopes to emulate him in next year’s contest for the Elysée Palace. Hungary and Poland have fallen into the arms of far-right nativism. Britain’s vote in June to leave the EU in significant part was an expression of angry English nationalism.

其他民主國(guó)家內(nèi)部也出現(xiàn)了民粹主義的反叛。歐洲各地的煽動(dòng)者贊揚(yáng)特朗普的成功。法國(guó)仇外的國(guó)民陣線(National Front)的領(lǐng)袖馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)希望在明年的總統(tǒng)大選中能效仿特朗普獲勝。匈牙利和波蘭投入極右翼本土主義的麾下。英國(guó)在今年6月投票決定退出歐盟，這在很大程度上是憤怒的英國(guó)民族主義的表達(dá)。

Mr Trump goes further by repudiating the basic, organising idea of the west: the notion that the world’s richest democracies can oversee a fair and inclusive rules-based system to underwrite global peace and security. Co-operative internationalism is to be replaced by competitive nationalism.

特朗普更進(jìn)一步，他否定西方基本的組織理念：即全球最富裕的民主國(guó)家可以監(jiān)督基于公平和包容性規(guī)則創(chuàng)建的體系，從而為全球和平和安全背書(shū)。協(xié)同合作的國(guó)際主義將被競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的民族主義取代。

So the dangers will now come thick and fast. How much of a free Europe can survive the withdrawal of the US security umbrella? Will Russia be allowed to restore its influence over formerly communist states in eastern and central Europe? Will rising states in the east and south now look to authoritarianism rather than democracy as a model for their societies? Who will keep the peace in the East and South China seas? How safe or stable is a world organised around the interests of, and conflicts between, a handful of great powers?

因此，各種危險(xiǎn)將很快紛至沓來(lái)。失去了美國(guó)提供的安全保護(hù)傘，歐洲有多少國(guó)家能堅(jiān)持自由民主體制?俄羅斯將得以恢復(fù)其對(duì)東歐和中歐那些前共產(chǎn)主義國(guó)家的影響力嗎?東歐和南歐的新興國(guó)家將會(huì)把威權(quán)主義而非民主作為其社會(huì)模式嗎?誰(shuí)將維持南中國(guó)海和東中國(guó)海上的和平?一個(gè)圍繞幾大強(qiáng)國(guó)的利益和沖突而組織起來(lái)的世界有多安全或穩(wěn)定?

America will spurn eventually the lethal concoction of nativism and protectionism that won Mr Trump this election. But the west has lost its guardian, and democracy its champion.

美國(guó)最終將會(huì)摒棄本土主義和保護(hù)主義——正是這對(duì)致命組合讓特朗普贏得了此次大選。但西方失去了守護(hù)者，民主失去了倡導(dǎo)者。