數(shù)字時(shí)代，戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)無(wú)處不在

The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit is a terrifying piece of military kit. The stealth bomber can fly undetected for many thousands of miles to drop a thermonuclear bomb on pretty much any target on the planet. According to one government estimate, each B-2 in operation on average has cost the US Air Force $2.1bn to develop and deploy.

諾思羅普•格魯曼公司(Northrop Grumman) B-2“幽靈”是一種可怕的軍事裝備。這種隱形轟炸機(jī)能夠在不被發(fā)現(xiàn)的情況下飛行數(shù)千英里，向地球上幾乎任何一處目標(biāo)投放一枚熱核炸彈。根據(jù)某一項(xiàng)政府估算，每架服役的B-2轟炸機(jī)的開(kāi)發(fā)和部署花費(fèi)了美國(guó)空軍21億美元。

Clearly, very few countries have the money or the technology to invent such weapons systems. There are also very few occasions on which such weapons can be used (God willing). The US therefore remains dominant in what it terms its first and second offset strategies: clear supremacy in nuclear weapons and precision-guided missiles. But although such technologies remain necessary to offset the challenges of rival powers, they are no longer sufficient in our rapidly changing world.

顯然，沒(méi)有幾個(gè)國(guó)家擁有發(fā)明這種武器系統(tǒng)的財(cái)力或技術(shù)。能夠用上這種武器的場(chǎng)合也很少(但愿如此)。因此，美國(guó)在其所謂的第一、二次抵消戰(zhàn)略中仍然占主導(dǎo)地位：也就是核武器和精確制導(dǎo)武器上的絕對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)。但盡管這些技術(shù)對(duì)抵消競(jìng)爭(zhēng)勢(shì)力的挑戰(zhàn)依然必不可少，但在我們這個(gè)瞬息萬(wàn)變的世界中，僅僅擁有這些技術(shù)已經(jīng)不再足夠。

Most defence spending in Nato countries still goes on crazily expensive metal boxes that you can drive, steer, or fly. But, as in so many other areas of our digital world, military capability is rapidly shifting from the visible to the invisible, from hardware to software, from atoms to bits. And that shift is drastically changing the equation when it comes to the costs, possibilities and vulnerabilities of deploying force.

北約(Nato)國(guó)家的大部分軍費(fèi)支出依然流向可以駕駛、航行或者飛行的天價(jià)金屬盒子。但是，就像當(dāng)今數(shù)字世界的其他許多領(lǐng)域一樣，軍事實(shí)力正快速地從可見(jiàn)范疇轉(zhuǎn)向不可見(jiàn)范疇，從硬件轉(zhuǎn)向軟件，從原子轉(zhuǎn)向比特。這些轉(zhuǎn)變正在戲劇性改變關(guān)于動(dòng)用武力的成本、可能性和脆弱程度的等式。

Compare the expense of a B-2 bomber with the negligible costs of a terrorist hijacker or a state-sponsored hacker, capable of causing periodic havoc to another country’s banks or transport infrastructure — or even democratic elections.

與一架B-2轟炸機(jī)的花費(fèi)相比，一名恐怖主義劫機(jī)者或者一名得到政府支持的黑客的花費(fèi)可以忽略不計(jì)，而后者有能力時(shí)不時(shí)對(duì)另一個(gè)國(guó)家的銀行、運(yùn)輸基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，甚至民主選舉造成嚴(yán)重破壞。

The US has partly recognised this changing reality and in 2014 outlined a third offset strategy, declaring that it must retain supremacy in next-generation technologies, such as robotics and artificial intelligence. The only other country that might rival the US in these fields is China, which has been pouring money into such technologies too.

美國(guó)已經(jīng)在一定程度上認(rèn)識(shí)到這一變化的現(xiàn)實(shí)，并在2014年出爐了第三次抵消戰(zhàn)略，宣告美國(guó)必須在機(jī)器人和人工智能(AI)等下一代技術(shù)領(lǐng)域保持霸主地位。在這些領(lǐng)域，唯一有可能成為美國(guó)對(duì)手的國(guó)家是中國(guó)，中國(guó)也在大舉投資于這些技術(shù)。

But the third offset strategy only counters part of the threat in the age of asymmetrical conflict. In the virtual world, there are few rules of the game, little way of assessing your opponent’s intentions and capabilities, and no real clues about whether you are winning or losing.

但第三次抵消戰(zhàn)略只能抵消不對(duì)稱(chēng)沖突時(shí)代的一部分威脅。虛擬世界幾乎沒(méi)有游戲規(guī)則，也幾乎沒(méi)有評(píng)估對(duì)手意圖和能力的辦法，甚至沒(méi)有能夠確定你在打贏還是落敗的真正線索。

Such murkiness is perfect for those keen to subvert the west’s military strength. China and Russia appear to understand this new world disorder far better than others — and are adept at turning the west’s own vulnerabilities against it.

這種混沌狀態(tài)正合那些渴望顛覆西方軍事實(shí)力的人的心意。中國(guó)和俄羅斯似乎遠(yuǎn)比其他人更了解這種新世界無(wú)序狀態(tài)——并且擅長(zhǎng)利用西方的脆弱性來(lái)做出對(duì)西方不利的事情。

Chinese strategists were among the first to map out this new terrain. In 1999 two officers in the People’s Liberation Army wrote Unrestricted Warfare in which they argued that the three indispensable “hardware elements of any war” — namely soldiers, weapons and a battlefield — had changed beyond recognition. Soldiers included hackers, financiers and terrorists. Their weapons could range from civilian aeroplanes to net browsers to computer viruses, while the battlefield would be “everywhere”.

中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略家是首批劃出這個(gè)新領(lǐng)域的人。1999年，中國(guó)兩名解放軍軍官在所著的《超限戰(zhàn)》(Unrestricted Warfare)中主張，任何戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)不可或缺的三個(gè)硬件——士兵、武器和戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)——已經(jīng)發(fā)生了天翻地覆的變化。士兵可以包括黑客、金融家和恐怖分子。他們的武器可以從民用飛機(jī)、網(wǎng)絡(luò)瀏覽器到計(jì)算機(jī)病毒等，而戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)可以是任何地方。

Russian strategic thinkers have also widened their conception of force. Moscow has used traditional military hardware in recent conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. But it has also launched cyber attacks against both countries as well as Estonia and stands accused of hacking the US presidential election.

俄羅斯戰(zhàn)略思想家也拓寬了他們對(duì)武力的看法。近年莫斯科在與格魯吉亞和烏克蘭的沖突中動(dòng)用了傳統(tǒng)軍事裝備。但莫斯科也對(duì)這兩個(gè)國(guó)家以及愛(ài)沙尼亞發(fā)動(dòng)了網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊，還被指對(duì)美國(guó)總統(tǒng)大選發(fā)動(dòng)了黑客入侵。

More broadly, it has been intensifying its KGB-derived “dezinformatsiya” operations as part of what Professor Mark Galeotti has called “the weaponisation of information”. According to Dmitry Kiselyov, the Russian television anchor and Kremlin propagandist, information wars have become “the main type of warfare”.

在整體層面，俄羅斯強(qiáng)化了當(dāng)年克格勃(KGB)拿手的“假情報(bào)”(dezinformatsiya)行動(dòng)，馬克•加萊奧蒂(Mark Galeotti)教授稱(chēng)之為“信息的武器化”。為克里姆林宮搖旗吶喊的俄羅斯電視主持人德米特里•基謝廖夫(Dmitry Kiselyov)稱(chēng)，信息戰(zhàn)已經(jīng)成為“戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的主要類(lèi)型”。

Rosa Brooks, a former Pentagon official, has argued that the US military is far from the ideal organisation to respond to this multiplicity of challenges. Instead, she suggests that the defence of western societies and the projection of soft power need to be rethought as a collective national purpose. “Imagine a revamped public sector premised on the idea of universal service — an America in which every young man and woman spends a year or two in work that fosters national and global security,” she has written.

前五角大樓官員羅莎•布魯克斯(Rosa Brooks)主張，美國(guó)軍方遠(yuǎn)非應(yīng)對(duì)這種多方位挑戰(zhàn)的理想組織。相反，她提出防御西方社會(huì)和投射軟實(shí)力需要被界定為一項(xiàng)國(guó)家集體宗旨，并據(jù)此重新思考。“想像一下以全民服役理念為前提進(jìn)行的公共部門(mén)大改革——讓美國(guó)每個(gè)年輕男女都花一兩年時(shí)間投身于促進(jìn)國(guó)家乃至全球安全的工作，”她寫(xiě)道。

Such ambitions are academic while Donald Trump remains in the White House, committed as he is to increasing spending on old-fashioned military hardware. Besides, the Kremlin could hardly wish for a more compliant US president than one who has praised Vladimir Putin’s strong leadership, been hesitant to support Nato’s collective security and denounced the US media for peddling “fake news”.

在唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)還主宰白宮的時(shí)候，從他對(duì)于提高傳統(tǒng)軍事裝備支出的承諾看，這樣的抱負(fù)只能是空談。此外，克里姆林宮不可能期盼找到一個(gè)比特朗普更好對(duì)付的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)了——他曾贊揚(yáng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的強(qiáng)勢(shì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)、不太情愿支持北約的集體安全，并且譴責(zé)美國(guó)媒體兜售“假新聞”。

In the realm of “memetic warfare”, as it has been called, the Kremlin would already appear to have won. But before it crows too loudly, Mr Putin’s entourage may reflect that the west depends far less on any one individual or institution than Russia. The US Congress is now pushing tougher sanctions against Moscow for meddling in the presidential election.

在所謂的“迷因戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”的領(lǐng)域，克里姆林宮似乎已經(jīng)取得了勝利。但在它過(guò)于自鳴得意之前，普京的親信們最好想一想這樣一點(diǎn)：西方對(duì)任何個(gè)人或者機(jī)構(gòu)的依賴(lài)程度遠(yuǎn)低于俄羅斯。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)正推動(dòng)加大對(duì)俄羅斯制裁力度，以懲罰俄羅斯干涉美國(guó)大選。

Moreover, the Russian president’s domestic opponents are also adopting new strategies. Earlier this year, the opposition leader Alexei Navalny released a slickly produced video highlighting the alleged corruption of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. It has since been watched almost 24m times on social media.

此外，俄羅斯總統(tǒng)的國(guó)內(nèi)反對(duì)者也在采取新的策略。今年早些時(shí)候，反對(duì)派領(lǐng)袖阿列克謝•納瓦爾尼(Alexei Navalny)發(fā)布了一段精心制作的視頻，揭露俄羅斯總理德米特里•梅德韋杰夫(Dmitry Medvedev)涉嫌貪腐。該視頻上在社交媒體上被觀看近2400萬(wàn)次。

No matter how well versed in the practice, authoritarian states are rapidly losing their own monopoly on the weaponisation of information.

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