FT社評(píng)：高管巨額薪酬公平嗎？

What can a person do that is worth a third of a billion dollars? A retirement announcement from Kenneth Chenault, chief executive of American Express, prompts the question. This month he said he would leave the company next year, after 17 years as chief. His compensation as CEO to date runs to $370m in shares and cash, an average of $22m a year.

一個(gè)人做什么事情能價(jià)值3億多美元?美國(guó)運(yùn)通(American Express)首席執(zhí)行官陳納德(Ken Chenault)上月發(fā)表的退休聲明引發(fā)了這一問(wèn)題。陳納德表示，他在擔(dān)任17年首席執(zhí)行官之后將于明年退休。他擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官獲得的股票和現(xiàn)金薪酬至今總計(jì)達(dá)到3.7億美元，平均一年2200萬(wàn)美元。

The sum is all the more stunning in that it is not unusual for someone running a big company (American Express’s market capitalisation is over $80bn). The average S&P 500 CEO earned more than $10m in 2016. These vast sums raise questions of fairness. Is it possible that one person in a very large organisation can generate that much value? Can we tell if they do?

更令人震驚的是，這種薪酬對(duì)大公司老總來(lái)說(shuō)并不罕見(jiàn)——美國(guó)運(yùn)通的市值超過(guò)800億美元。標(biāo)普500(S&P 500)公司首席執(zhí)行官在2016年的平均收入為逾1000萬(wàn)美元。這些龐大的收入數(shù)字令人質(zhì)疑公平性。一家超大型機(jī)構(gòu)中的某一個(gè)人有可能創(chuàng)造那么大的價(jià)值嗎?我們能分辨出他們創(chuàng)造沒(méi)創(chuàng)造價(jià)值嗎?

American Express is a private company. What it pays its employees is for its board to decide and its shareholders to approve. Regulating upper limits on pay is a poor fit with a liberal society. But as with any price, it is worth asking whether companies, and the wider society, are getting value.

美國(guó)運(yùn)通是一家私人公司。其員工薪酬方案由董事會(huì)決定并由股東批準(zhǔn)。規(guī)定薪資上限與自由社會(huì)不符。但不管薪酬多高，都有必要問(wèn)問(wèn)公司以及更廣泛的社會(huì)是否獲得了價(jià)值。

The best argument in favour of high pay is that even a small movement in the value of a large company can be very significant. If the head of a $100bn company increases its value by 1 per cent a year, then she is creating $1bn in value. At $10m a year, she is a bargain.

支持高薪的最佳理由是，大公司的價(jià)值即便小幅上升那也可能非常可觀。如果一家1000億美元公司的老總每年將其價(jià)值提升1%，那她就創(chuàng)造了10億美元的價(jià)值。如果她的薪酬是1000萬(wàn)美元，那請(qǐng)她就很劃算。

The argument has two problems. First, it is hard to see where the argument stops. Apple’s value is approaching $1tn. Should Tim Cook, then, be paid $10bn a year? If not, why not? (he took home $9m last year). In a world increasingly dominated by huge companies, the argument from corporate size justifies sums that would make the steeliest capitalist blanch.

這種觀點(diǎn)有兩個(gè)問(wèn)題。首先，很難看到這種觀點(diǎn)的邊界在哪里。蘋(píng)果(Apple)的價(jià)值接近1萬(wàn)億美元。那么就得每年給蒂姆•庫(kù)克(Tim Cook) 100億美元?如果不給這么多，又是為什么呢?(他去年的薪資是900萬(wàn)美元。)在一個(gè)日益由大公司主導(dǎo)的世界里，這種用企業(yè)規(guī)模支持的觀點(diǎn)將會(huì)導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)讓最堅(jiān)定的資本家都會(huì)為之色變的薪酬。

Second, it is very hard to isolate the contribution of CEO skill when setting pay. Links to share performance means CEO pay will depend on market cycles. Benchmarking stock performance against peers helps, but only within limits. American Express shares, for example, have handily outperformed the broader financial sector over Mr Chenault’s tenure. But that is largely down to the fact that it is not a bank (bank shares were hammered in the crisis). American Express shares have badly underperformed those of the credit card networks MasterCard and Visa. But its business model is very different from theirs. Benchmarking will always leave room for judgment.

其次，在設(shè)定薪酬的時(shí)候很難理清首席執(zhí)行官技能的貢獻(xiàn)。與股票表現(xiàn)掛鉤意味著首席執(zhí)行官薪酬將取決于市場(chǎng)周期。將股票表現(xiàn)與同業(yè)比較會(huì)有所幫助，但幫助有限。例如，美國(guó)運(yùn)通股票在陳納德任職期間的表現(xiàn)輕易地超過(guò)了金融板塊。但這在很大程度上得益于它不是一家銀行的事實(shí)——銀行股在危機(jī)期間暴跌。美國(guó)運(yùn)通股票表現(xiàn)遠(yuǎn)遜于萬(wàn)事達(dá)(MasterCard)和Visa等信用卡網(wǎng)絡(luò)公司。但美國(guó)運(yùn)通的商業(yè)模式與它們截然不同?；鶞?zhǔn)比較總是會(huì)留下判斷的空間。

Using profit metrics instead of share performance, similarly, exposes CEO pay to the whims of input prices, exchange rates and technological advancements.

類(lèi)似地，使用利潤(rùn)指標(biāo)而非股票表現(xiàn)會(huì)讓首席執(zhí)行官薪酬受到投入價(jià)格、匯率和技術(shù)進(jìn)步的影響。

A final problem is that — again because at large companies even huge pay packages are small relative to total company value — shareholders have a limited incentive to push back on pay. Board members, too, have little reason make a fuss about a high-pay culture that has also served them well.

最后一個(gè)問(wèn)題是，股東抵制高薪的動(dòng)力有限——這同樣是因?yàn)?，在大公司即使是巨額薪酬與公司總體價(jià)值相比也相對(duì)較小。董事會(huì)成員也幾乎沒(méi)有理由對(duì)同樣讓他們受益的高薪文化大驚小怪。

None of this is to argue that CEO skill is not important, or that it is completely invisible. Nor is it to argue that pay is totally arbitrary. The components of sensible pay structure are increasingly well understood: pay the boss largely in stock that must be held for many years. De-emphasise options and short term performance incentives. Do all of this transparently. This should increase fairness and improve corporate performance. But it does not ensure that CEO pay fully corresponds to value creation.

這些并不是說(shuō)首席執(zhí)行官技能不重要或者完全不可見(jiàn)，也不是說(shuō)薪酬是完全隨意的。對(duì)合理的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)有越來(lái)越大的共識(shí)：向首席執(zhí)行官支付以股票為主的薪酬，他們必須持有多年。不以期權(quán)和短期業(yè)績(jī)激勵(lì)為重點(diǎn)。薪酬安排透明公開(kāi)。這應(yīng)該會(huì)增加公平性和提高企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)。但它不會(huì)確保首席執(zhí)行官薪酬完全與價(jià)值創(chuàng)造相匹配。

The lesson is that while proper incentives and full transparency are important, an element of judgment and a sense of proportion will always be required on the part of boards. There is such a thing as too much. Rules, guidelines and procedures cannot absolve us from recognising it when we see it.

教訓(xùn)在于，盡管正確的激勵(lì)和完全透明很重要，但董事會(huì)總是必須做出主觀判斷和有一種比例感。確實(shí)存在過(guò)高的薪酬。即使有規(guī)則、指引和程序，我們?cè)诳吹竭^(guò)高薪酬的時(shí)候還是會(huì)直接認(rèn)定它過(guò)高。