硅谷在反恐戰(zhàn)爭中的領(lǐng)導力

The political debate about the role of the internet in terrorism, following three attacks in the UK, has become confused. It is driven by frustration on one side that the ethics, values and legalities of the real world are not simply applied online. On the other, politicians of all parties do not always understand the technology or the economics of the internet and are portrayed as asking for the impossible.

在英國發(fā)生3起恐怖襲擊之后，圍繞互聯(lián)網(wǎng)在恐怖主義中所扮演角色的政治辯論變得令人困惑。一方面，人們由于對真實世界的道德、價值觀和法律并未簡單地適用于網(wǎng)上而倍感挫折。另一方面，所有政黨的政客們并不總是理解互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)或者互聯(lián)網(wǎng)經(jīng)濟學，他們被描述為要求完成不可能完成的任務(wù)。

But it is in the interests of both sides — and all of us — that the internet is not a values-free zone. Technology is morally neutral, but providers and consumers are not. The digital and “real” worlds are not separate, they are the same. If we are to preserve the freedom of the internet, the greatest achievement of this age, we need to meet this challenge. How to do so is complex and needs untangling.

但互聯(lián)網(wǎng)不是價值觀中立區(qū)域，這符合辯論雙方(以及我們所有人)的利益。技術(shù)在道德上是中性的，但提供者和消費者并非如此。數(shù)字世界和“真實”世界并非是分開的，他們是一體的。如果我們要維護互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上的自由——互聯(lián)網(wǎng)是當今時代最偉大的成就——我們就需要解決這種挑戰(zhàn)。如何做到這一點是非常復雜的，而且需要解開困惑。

There are two separate complaints about the internet: that it facilitates covert communication between terrorists through encrypted messaging, and that it enables the spread of radicalising propaganda by hosting extremist material.

人們對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)有兩種不同的抱怨：一個是它通過加密信息方便了恐怖分子的秘密交流，另一個是它通過托管極端主義內(nèi)容使激進宣傳得以傳播。

The first is a technical issue: “end-to-end” encryption — where only the user has the key and neither service provider nor law enforcement can read the content — is here to stay. It cannot be uninvented and those of us focused on cyber security would not want encryption weakened even if it were possible. But there are things that can be done to tackle the abuse of encryption by terrorists and criminals, through private co-operation, under the law, between companies and government agencies. That co-operation has improved markedly, even if it has further to go.

第一個是技術(shù)問題：“端對端”加密——只有用戶擁有密鑰，無論是服務(wù)提供商還是執(zhí)法者都無法閱讀內(nèi)容——已經(jīng)被普遍接受。這種加密技術(shù)無法抹除，我們這些致力于網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全的人不愿削弱加密技術(shù)，即便它是有可能的。但公司和政府機構(gòu)可以采取一些措施，在合法的前提下私下合作以解決恐怖分子和犯罪分子對加密技術(shù)的濫用。這種合作如今已經(jīng)明顯改善，雖然它還有進一步改進的空間。

The hosting of extremist material is a different issue and goes to the heart of the ideological struggle driving Islamist terrorism. We should be clear about what we are asking for. This is not about suppressing freedom of speech. The west did not win the ideological struggle against totalitarian communism by never discussing it. Islamism needs exposing and countering.

極端主義內(nèi)容托管的問題有所不同，它觸及到了推動伊斯蘭恐怖主義的意識形態(tài)斗爭的核心。我們應(yīng)該明確我們的要求。這不是說要遏制言論自由。西方?jīng)]有因從未討論過而贏得與極權(quán)共產(chǎn)主義的意識形態(tài)斗爭。伊斯蘭主義需要曝光和反擊。

But those trying to counter the ideas of terrorist groups often feel they are fighting against a wave of material produced by well-funded organisations that understand strategic communications better than the west. They feel that the very openness of the internet, and its economics, crudely based on the volume of “clicks” on sensational or grotesque material, are used against them.

但那些試圖反擊恐怖主義組織的思想的人往往覺得，他們對抗的是由資金充足、比西方更明白戰(zhàn)略交流的組織制作的一系列內(nèi)容。他們覺得，被用來反對他們的正是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的開放性及其基本建立于對嘩眾取寵或荒誕內(nèi)容“點擊”量基礎(chǔ)之上的經(jīng)濟性。

The glory of the internet is that it creates networks and communities of interest; the downside is that it can rapidly validate extreme behaviour which in the past would have been moderated by real communities. We know from convicted terrorists the effect of watching brutal videos of captives set on fire or drowned, of children crucified in front of their parents, or graphic images glorifying atrocities in London or Paris. While it is fashionable to blame technology companies, these images are more likely to be found on video hosting sites that are not household names, on news sites or even academic services.

互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的優(yōu)點在于，它創(chuàng)造了志趣相投的網(wǎng)絡(luò)和社區(qū);缺點是，它能夠迅速證實極端行為——過去通過實體社區(qū)證實的效果會減弱。我們從已經(jīng)伏法的恐怖分子那里知道了觀看殘忍視頻的效果——燒死或淹死俘虜，在孩子父母面前將孩子釘死在十字架上，或者贊美倫敦或巴黎暴行的畫面。盡管人們一般會譴責技術(shù)公司，但這些畫面更可能在并非家喻戶曉的視頻托管網(wǎng)站或者新聞網(wǎng)站、乃至學術(shù)服務(wù)網(wǎng)站上找到。

There will of course always be dark spaces and hidden sites where fanatics will find this material. But that is why we have law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

當然總是存在能讓狂熱分子發(fā)現(xiàn)這種內(nèi)容的黑暗空間和隱藏網(wǎng)站。但這正是我們擁有執(zhí)法和情報機構(gòu)的原因。

The rest of us should focus on driving material off the mainstream and seek to make the open internet a civilised space, reflecting the liberal democratic values that led to its creation in the first place. For the internet and the web would not have been invented and could not have flourished in Islamist or totalitarian regimes.

我們其他人應(yīng)該致力于將恐怖內(nèi)容逐出主流網(wǎng)站之外，并設(shè)法讓開放的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)成為文明之地，反映出最初導致其誕生的自由民主價值觀。這是因為在伊斯蘭或極權(quán)政權(quán)下，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)不會被發(fā)明并蓬勃發(fā)展。

How do we achieve this? We need a practical coalition, led and funded by Silicon Valley, which has been making progress but now needs to accelerate, and by global online advertisers, which have been too slow to look forensically at what their ads are supporting. This coalition should agree a code of what is acceptable, working with democratic governments and civil society. It should apply technology and human beings to the rapid removal of material and the isolation of offending sites. It should not be afraid to exercise judgment and it should not wait for legislation, the courts or proposed fines, which will inevitably be slow and blunt.

我們?nèi)绾尾拍茏龅竭@些?我們需要一個務(wù)實的聯(lián)盟，由硅谷和全球網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告主領(lǐng)導并提供資金，前者不斷進步，但現(xiàn)在需要加快腳步，后者過于遲緩而無法看真切他們的廣告在支持什么內(nèi)容。該聯(lián)盟應(yīng)該就可接受準則達成一致，并與民主政府和公民社會合作。它應(yīng)該運用技術(shù)和人類快速消除恐怖主義內(nèi)容并孤立違規(guī)網(wǎng)站。它不應(yīng)害怕做出判斷，也不應(yīng)等待法律、法庭或者擬議的罰款，后者將會不可避免地反應(yīng)遲鈍。

Finally, it should do all this in order to preserve the freedom of the internet, as well as our safety.

最后，它應(yīng)該為了維護互聯(lián)網(wǎng)自由以及我們的安全而采取所有這些行動。

The writer is a former director of GCHQ, a UK government intelligence and security organisation

本文作者曾經(jīng)擔任英國政府情報和安全機構(gòu)——英國政府通信總部(GCHQ)的主管