麥克阿瑟告別演講稿：老兵不死（中英文）

麥克阿瑟告別演講“老兵永不死”(英文版)

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride -- humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.

I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You can not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.

In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support -- not imperious direction -- the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.

The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore -- with sea and air power every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to Singapore -- and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

*Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure.

Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible defense against aggression. The holding of this littoral defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.

This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I have strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.

To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant, aggressive tendencies.

Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism.

There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.

I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.

The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.

Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.

Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them -- as in our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government, and politically, economically, and socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we -- as I said, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification of our economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory.

There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.

Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description.

They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety.

Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good Bye.

麥克阿瑟告別演講“老兵永不死”(中文版)

總統(tǒng)先生，演講者，議會杰出的成員們：

我懷著深深的謙卑和無比的自豪感站在這演講臺上----謙卑是因?yàn)槊鎸υ谖颐媲暗哪切﹤ゴ竺绹^去的建設(shè)者們;自豪是因?yàn)橄氲絿鴥?nèi)立法爭論所設(shè)計(jì)的代表人類最純潔的自由。整個(gè)人類的希望、抱負(fù)、信念都集中于此。我站在這里不為任何黨派目的辯護(hù)，因?yàn)樽h題的根本性超出了黨派所能考慮的區(qū)域。如果能證明我們的路線穩(wěn)妥且我們的前途有保障,那些問題就應(yīng)被放在最高位來解決.因此，我相信，你們會公正地把我所表達(dá)的當(dāng)作一個(gè)美國同胞的觀點(diǎn)。

我演講既不帶人生暮年的怨恨也不帶傷感之情，但心中只有一個(gè)目的：為我的祖國效勞。雖然亞洲被認(rèn)為是通往歐洲的大門，但說歐洲是通往亞洲的大門也沒有錯(cuò)。且一方的廣泛影響不得不帶動(dòng)另一方。一些人聲稱我們的力量不足以同時(shí)保護(hù)兩條線路，我們不能分散精力。我認(rèn)為沒有比這更能表現(xiàn)出失敗主義的了。如果潛在性的敵人能將他們的力量分為兩條路線，那對我們來說就要對他們的力量予以反擊。共產(chǎn)主義者的威脅是一個(gè)全球性的問題。他們在每個(gè)防區(qū)的成功進(jìn)展直接預(yù)示著我們每隔一個(gè)防區(qū)將遭到破壞。我們不會為讓亞洲的共產(chǎn)主義投降而不能同時(shí)削弱我們的力量去遏止歐洲的發(fā)展而感到安慰。

說了太多的共知之理，我會簡略我關(guān)于亞洲地區(qū)的討論。在某人能客觀地對那里存在的形勢作出評估之前，他必須了解一些關(guān)于亞洲的過去和他們沿著自己的路線發(fā)展至今的改革變化。被所謂的殖民統(tǒng)治長期的剝削，便很難有機(jī)會建立社會的公正尺度，維護(hù)個(gè)人尊嚴(yán)，或者實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)高水平的生活，就像保衛(wèi)我們在菲律賓自己崇高的政府，亞洲的人民抓住了他們的時(shí)機(jī)在戰(zhàn)爭中擺脫了殖民統(tǒng)治的束縛并且看到了新時(shí)機(jī)的曙光，一種從未感受過的尊嚴(yán)和一個(gè)國家自由后的自尊感。

集合地球一半的人數(shù)，有60%的自然資源被這些人迅速地加強(qiáng)成為一種新的力量，精神上的和物質(zhì)上的都被用來提升生活水平也是為適應(yīng)對自己的不同文化環(huán)境的最新進(jìn)展的謀劃。不管誰是否拘泥于殖民的概念，這是亞洲發(fā)展進(jìn)步的方向且不會被終止。這是世界金融尖端轉(zhuǎn)變的必然結(jié)果，就像整個(gè)世界事物的中心正循環(huán)著回到它的起始點(diǎn)。

在這種形勢之下，我們用基本發(fā)展的狀況使自己國家和東方國家在政策上保持和諧而不是一味追求不明現(xiàn)實(shí)的路線，因?yàn)橹趁駮r(shí)代已經(jīng)過去且亞洲人正為實(shí)現(xiàn)他們自由的命運(yùn)而垂延。他們當(dāng)今尋求的是友好的指引、協(xié)議、和支持——而不是專橫的引導(dǎo)——是平等尊嚴(yán)而不是恥辱地屈從。他們戰(zhàn)前的生活標(biāo)準(zhǔn)低得令人同情，現(xiàn)在又因戰(zhàn)爭所帶來的破壞而變得更加無限的低。世界的意識形態(tài)幾乎不把亞洲考慮在內(nèi)，不給予他們體諒。那兒的人民為之拼命的只是為了能得到更多一點(diǎn)食物來填飽肚子，有稍好一點(diǎn)的衣物來遮背，蓋結(jié)實(shí)些的屋頂在他們的頭上，和普通國民們渴望政治自由的意識。這些政治社會性的條件為國內(nèi)安全給予了間接的保障，不過要對慎重考慮過的現(xiàn)時(shí)方案建立背景來決定我們是否要避免不切實(shí)際的意外事件。

能直系和快速地穩(wěn)固住國內(nèi)安全的是過去太平洋戰(zhàn)爭路線戰(zhàn)略上的改變。先前的美國西面戰(zhàn)略部署是美國原本線路，附和著暴露的島嶼夏威夷、中途島、關(guān)島通向菲律賓。這種戰(zhàn)線證明了不是敵方前哨的力量而是我方暴露的弱點(diǎn)使敵人有機(jī)可乘太平洋地區(qū)是個(gè)令任何強(qiáng)國都虎視眈眈謀求發(fā)展和擴(kuò)張領(lǐng)土的地方。所有一切都被太平洋戰(zhàn)爭的勝利改變了，我們那具有戰(zhàn)略意義的邊界才成為我們所擁有的整個(gè)太平洋，只要我們能夠抓住它便能使其成為巨大的護(hù)城河。千真萬確，它充當(dāng)?shù)氖撬忻绹酥琳麄€(gè)太平洋自由領(lǐng)土的護(hù)盾。我們控制亞洲成弧形鏈狀海岸線的島嶼從琉球到馬尼拉都受我們和盟軍控制。由這諸些島嶼我們能支配從海參葳到新加坡亞洲港口的海洋和空中力量——有了海洋上的和空中的力量——如我所說的——從海參葳到新加坡——保護(hù)并抵御太平洋上不友好的動(dòng)機(jī)。

在亞洲任何兇狠的進(jìn)攻都必須具備兩股力量。無任何兩種力量能在沒有海洋和空中的掌控權(quán)之下在推進(jìn)道路上取得成功。有了海軍、重要的空軍和適度的陸軍來保衛(wèi)基地，任何對亞洲大陸的以及我們和我們在太平洋上的朋友的蓄意攻擊都必將逃不了失敗的厄運(yùn)。

在如此狀況下，太平洋代表的不僅僅是預(yù)想中的侵略者的一種威脅。假定那里是個(gè)友好的和平湖畔，我們的防御路線就十分自然而且可花費(fèi)最小的軍事代價(jià)來維持。想象沒有任何襲擊，也用不著為突襲性的攻擊而設(shè)置堡壘，只要適當(dāng)維護(hù)，這將是抵制侵略的不可戰(zhàn)勝的防御。

在西太平洋上想擁有這種防御力因此要依賴各個(gè)部分，因?yàn)椴挥押玫牧α繉?dǎo)致的任何線路破裂都會遭來每個(gè)部分在有預(yù)謀的攻擊下變得十分脆弱。

這是我仍在尋找的要接替我的軍事領(lǐng)頭者應(yīng)當(dāng)持有的軍事評估。因?yàn)檫@個(gè)原因，我過去強(qiáng)烈地推薦自己，成為一個(gè)至關(guān)重要的軍事代理，沒有穩(wěn)固的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)臺灣就只能在共產(chǎn)主義的掌控下。這樣一個(gè)世界有可能立刻就威脅到菲律賓和失敗后的日本的自由，也會迫使我們西方的防守邊界退到加利福尼亞沿岸、奧勒崗和華盛頓。

要了解中國大陸所發(fā)生的變化，就必須知道50年來中國體制和文化的變化。中國，50年前是完全沒有團(tuán)結(jié)意識，分裂成很多團(tuán)體互相爭斗。經(jīng)過過去的五十年中國人開始有了武裝的概念和理想。如今他們組成了擁有勝任的參謀長和司令的優(yōu)秀士兵團(tuán)體。這就在亞洲誕生了一股新的統(tǒng)治力量，為了實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的目標(biāo)，他們與觀念方法都成了具帝國主義的蘇聯(lián)結(jié)盟，同時(shí)他們也帶著擴(kuò)張領(lǐng)土、增強(qiáng)實(shí)力的渴望趨向帝國主義。

他們都使用精力來扭曲我的職位。結(jié)果我被說成了是個(gè)好戰(zhàn)分子。沒有事物能夠越加遠(yuǎn)離真理。我明白現(xiàn)在活著的人當(dāng)中幾乎沒多少能真正了解戰(zhàn)爭，沒有比這更令我心情不悅的了。因?yàn)閷ε笥押蛿橙藥淼钠茐囊呀?jīng)致使一系列國際上的爭論都毫無用處，我倡導(dǎo)這項(xiàng)廢除令很久了。事實(shí)上，在1945年9月2日，就跟在日本國在密蘇里號戰(zhàn)艦上投降后，我正式警告如下：

“人類從一開始就尋求和平。不同的時(shí)代各式各樣的方法都被用來設(shè)計(jì)國際性的進(jìn)程，來平息和解國與國之間的爭論。有許多可行性的方法是被個(gè)別的公民發(fā)掘的，但是在一個(gè)巨大的國際范圍中，技術(shù)工人用單一的手段還從未成功過。軍事的聯(lián)盟，實(shí)力的平衡，國家的結(jié)盟，輪流著失敗，留下這唯一的路徑來當(dāng)作戰(zhàn)爭的嚴(yán)酷考驗(yàn)。戰(zhàn)爭帶來的整個(gè)破壞現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)生了二選一。我們只有最后的機(jī)會。如果我們我們不能設(shè)計(jì)出一些更好更公平的制度，大決戰(zhàn)將近在咫尺。問題是神奇的，它涉及到一種精神的再生和人類性格的改進(jìn)，將與我們在科學(xué)、藝術(shù)、文學(xué)及所有物質(zhì)文化2000年來的發(fā)展近乎史無前例的同步進(jìn)展。如果我們要保存肉體就必須有精神作支撐。”

但是一旦戰(zhàn)爭逼迫著我們發(fā)生，那就沒有選擇的盡力使戰(zhàn)爭盡快結(jié)束。戰(zhàn)爭的目的是為了勝利，而不是為了無休止的延長。戰(zhàn)爭中沒有東西能代替勝利。有一些人因?yàn)楦鞣N原因要安慰紅色中國。他們無視歷史的教訓(xùn)，因?yàn)闅v史無庸質(zhì)疑地強(qiáng)調(diào)了撫慰只能招致更血性的戰(zhàn)爭。就像敲詐勒索，它爆發(fā)于連續(xù)不斷的新的需求，在威脅中，暴力成為了僅存的另外選擇。“為什么?”我的士兵問我，“難道要我們在戰(zhàn)場上放棄對敵人的優(yōu)勢?”我無言以對。

有人會說：和中國攜手進(jìn)行一次全力以赴的戰(zhàn)爭來避免沖突的傳播;另外，要避免蘇聯(lián)的干涉。似乎沒有一種解釋是有效的，因?yàn)橹袊呀?jīng)表明有了最大限度的影響力，且蘇聯(lián)不會迎合我們的步伐。就如一條眼鏡蛇，當(dāng)新的敵人感到軍事上的相互依存或者別的遍及世界的潛在誘惑，他們就很可能會發(fā)動(dòng)進(jìn)攻。

事實(shí)使韓國的悲劇更為加深了，軍事行動(dòng)縮小了他們的國界。那個(gè)我們要拯救的國家、他們要飽受整個(gè)海軍和空軍毀滅性的對抗，然而敵人的地盤卻在如此的攻擊和破壞之下全全得到保護(hù)，這是受到譴責(zé)的。在世界上所有的國家中，韓國是僅存的唯一冒險(xiǎn)反對共產(chǎn)主義的國家。韓國人民巨大的勇氣和剛毅拒絕描述。比起奴隸身份他們情愿選擇了拼死。他們對我留下的最后一句話是：“決不能逃離太平洋!”我只為你們留下了英勇善戰(zhàn)的兒子們。他們在那遇到了各種各樣的考驗(yàn)，我會毫無保留地向你們匯報(bào)他們在每個(gè)方面都很出色。

我持久地盡我所能去保護(hù)他們光榮地結(jié)束這場野蠻的沖突，并且要花費(fèi)最少的時(shí)間，付出最小的犧牲。那些日趨增長的殺戮給我?guī)砹藰O度的痛苦和憂慮。那些勇敢的人們永久地留在我的腦海中以及我的祈禱文里。

我即將結(jié)束我52年的戎馬生涯了。還在本世紀(jì)開始前當(dāng)我加入陸軍時(shí)，我孩提時(shí)代所有的希望和夢想便實(shí)現(xiàn)了。自從我在西點(diǎn)廣場上虔誠地宣誓以來，世界已幾經(jīng)傾覆，希望和夢想也早已消失，但我仍記得那時(shí)最流行的一首軍歌中的句子，它自豪地宣布：

“老兵永遠(yuǎn)不死，他們只是悄然隱去。”

像那首歌中的老兵一樣，我作為一名在上帝的光輝下盡心盡職的老兵，現(xiàn)在結(jié)束我的軍事生涯，悄然隱去。

再見。