一部影響美國(guó)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全政策的電影

　　Movies rarely influence public policy, butWashington’s policies on cyberattacks, computersurveillance and the possibility of cyberwarfare weredirectly influenced by the 1983 box-office hit“WarGames.”

　　電影很少能夠影響到公共政策，但是華盛頓對(duì)于網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊、電腦監(jiān)控和可能的網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的政策，卻直接受到1983年票房大片《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)游戲》(WarGames)的影響。

　　The film — starring Matthew Broderick as a tech-whiz teenager who unwittingly hacks into thecomputer of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and nearly sets offWorld War III — opened nationwide that June 3. The next night, President Ronald Reaganwatched it at Camp David. And that is where this strange story — culled from interviews withparticipants and Reagan Library documents — begins.

　　該片于當(dāng)年6月3日在全國(guó)公映，片中馬修·布羅德里克(Matthew Broderick)飾演一個(gè)天才技術(shù)少年，無(wú)意中侵入了北美航空航天防御指揮部(NORAD)的電腦，差點(diǎn)發(fā)起了第三次世界大戰(zhàn)。上映第二天，羅納德·里根(Ronald Reagan)總統(tǒng)就在戴維營(yíng)看了這幅片子。于是本文講述的這個(gè)奇怪的故事(來(lái)自相關(guān)人士的訪談和里根圖書(shū)館的檔案)就從那里開(kāi)始了。

　　The following Wednesday, back in the White House, Reagan met with his national-securityadvisers and 16 members of Congress to discuss forthcoming nuclear arms talks with theRussians. But he still seemed focused on the movie.

　　接下來(lái)的星期三，回到白宮的里根與國(guó)家安全顧問(wèn)們以及16名議員開(kāi)會(huì)討論即將與俄國(guó)人開(kāi)展的核武器談判。但他的心思似乎還在那部電影上。

　　At one point, he put down his index cards and asked if anyone else had seen it. No one had, sohe described the plot in detail. Some of the lawmakers looked around the room withsuppressed smiles or raised eyebrows. Three months earlier, Reagan had delivered his “StarWars” speech, imploring scientists to build laser weapons that could shoot down Soviet missilesin outer space. The idea was widely dismissed as nutty. What was the old man up to now?

　　后來(lái)他推開(kāi)面前的資料卡，問(wèn)其他人看沒(méi)看過(guò)那部電影。其他人都說(shuō)沒(méi)看過(guò)，于是他就把故事情節(jié)詳細(xì)講述了一遍。幾名議員不禁忍著笑，揚(yáng)起眉毛環(huán)視四周。三個(gè)月之前，里根剛剛做了“星球大戰(zhàn)”講演，要求科學(xué)家們開(kāi)發(fā)激光武器，從外太空擊落蘇聯(lián)的導(dǎo)彈。很多人都覺(jué)得這個(gè)想法簡(jiǎn)直太瘋狂了。這個(gè)老家伙現(xiàn)在又想干什么?

　　After finishing his synopsis, Reagan turned to Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., the chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, and asked: “Could something like this really happen?” Could someonebreak into our most sensitive computers? General Vessey said he would look into it.

　　講完劇情，里根轉(zhuǎn)向參謀長(zhǎng)聯(lián)席會(huì)議主席小約翰·W·維西將軍(Gen. John W. Vessey Jr.)，問(wèn)道：“這種事真的會(huì)發(fā)生嗎?”也就是說(shuō)，真的會(huì)有人侵入我們最敏感的電腦中去嗎?維西將軍答應(yīng)調(diào)查一下。

　　One week later, the general returned to the White House with his answer. “WarGames,” itturned out, wasn’t far-fetched. “Mr. president,” he said, “the problem is much worse than youthink.”

　　一周后，維西將軍帶著答案回到白宮。調(diào)查結(jié)果表明《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)游戲》并非不著邊際。“總統(tǒng)先生，”他說(shuō)，“這個(gè)問(wèn)題比你想的還要嚴(yán)重得多。”

　　Reagan’s question set off a series of interagency memos and studies that culminated, 15months later, in his signing a classified national security decision directive, NSDD-145, titled“National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security.”

　　里根的問(wèn)題引出了一系列各部門(mén)協(xié)作的備忘錄與研究，15個(gè)月后，這些研究達(dá)到了頂峰，里根簽署了機(jī)密的國(guó)家安全決策指導(dǎo)方案NSDD-145，名為《電子通信與自動(dòng)化信息系統(tǒng)安全國(guó)家政策》。

　　The first laptop computers had barely hit the market; public Internet providers wouldn’t existfor another few years. Yet NSDD-145 warned that these new machines — which governmentagencies and high-tech industries had started buying at a rapid clip — were “highlysusceptible to interception.” Hostile foreign powers were “extensively” hacking into themalready; “terrorist groups and criminal elements” had the ability to do so, too.

　　當(dāng)時(shí)，第一批筆記本電腦幾乎還沒(méi)上市;公共互聯(lián)網(wǎng)服務(wù)商還要過(guò)一兩年才會(huì)出現(xiàn)。但是NSDD-145提出警告，這些新機(jī)器——當(dāng)時(shí)政府部門(mén)和高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)已經(jīng)開(kāi)始大量采購(gòu)了——“很有可能被侵入”。惡意的外國(guó)勢(shì)力已經(jīng)“廣泛地”黑入了這些機(jī)器;“恐怖組織與犯罪分子”也有了這個(gè)能力。

　　General Vessey could answer the president’s question so promptly — and national-securityaides could compose NSDD-145 in such detailed language — because, deep within thebureaucracy, a small group of scientists and spies had been concerned about this loomingthreat for more than a decade.

　　維西將軍之所以能夠如此迅速地回答總統(tǒng)的問(wèn)題，國(guó)家安全部門(mén)的工作人員之所以能夠以這樣詳細(xì)的措辭起草NSDD-145，這都是因?yàn)樵诠倭艡C(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部，有一小群科學(xué)家與間諜，十幾年前便已經(jīng)開(kāi)始關(guān)注這個(gè)即將到來(lái)的威脅。

　　In the 1960s, the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency undertook aprogram called the ARPAnet. The idea, a precursor to the Internet, was to let Pentagon labsand contractors share data and research on the same network.

　　20世紀(jì)60年代，國(guó)防部的高級(jí)研究計(jì)劃署(Defense Department’s Advanced Research ProjectsAgency )開(kāi)展了一個(gè)名叫ARPAnet的項(xiàng)目。它是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的先驅(qū)，目的是令國(guó)防部的實(shí)驗(yàn)室與承包商分享數(shù)據(jù)資料，在同一個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)內(nèi)進(jìn)行研究。

　　Just before the program’s rollout, in April 1967, an engineer named Willis Ware wrote a papercalled “Security and Privacy in Computer Systems.” A computer pioneer dating back to the ’40s,Mr. Ware headed the computer science department at the RAND Corporation, the think tank inSanta Monica, Calif.

　　這個(gè)項(xiàng)目于1967年4月啟動(dòng)，在此之前，一個(gè)名叫威利斯·威爾(Willis Ware)的工程師寫(xiě)了一篇論文，名為《電腦系統(tǒng)的安全與隱私》。早在40年代，威爾便已經(jīng)是電腦領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的先驅(qū)，他在加利福尼亞州圣塔莫尼卡的智庫(kù)——蘭德公司(RAND Corporation)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)著一個(gè)電腦科技部門(mén)。

　　In his paper, he lauded the goals of the ARPAnet but explained some risks of what he called“on-line” networks. As long as computers sat in isolated chambers, security wasn’t a problem.But once multiple users could gain access to data from unprotected locations, anyone withcertain skills could hack into the network — and, once inside, roam at will, pilferingunclassified and secret files alike. Mr. Ware’s warnings went unheeded for decades, though heremained a frequent consultant. (He died in 2013, at the age of 93.)

　　在論文中，他贊美了ARPAnet的目標(biāo)，但也解釋了他所謂的“在線”網(wǎng)絡(luò)系統(tǒng)中的一些危險(xiǎn)。只要電腦是孤立的，安全就不成問(wèn)題。但是一旦許多用戶都可以從未經(jīng)保護(hù)的地址獲取信息，有些具備某些特殊能力的人就可以黑進(jìn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，一旦他們進(jìn)入網(wǎng)絡(luò)隨意漫游，就可以竊取公開(kāi)或機(jī)密文件之類的東西。幾十年來(lái)，威爾的警告都沒(méi)有受到重視，盡管他仍然是一位經(jīng)常受到資訊的顧問(wèn)(他于2013年逝世，享年93歲)。

　　In 1980, Lawrence Lasker and Walter Parkes, former Yale classmates in their late 20s, werewriting the screenplay for “WarGames.” (It would be nominated for an Oscar but would lose toHorton Foote’s “Tender Mercies.”) A hacker friend had told them about “demon-dialing,” inwhich a telephone modem searched for other modems by automatically dialing each phonenumber in an area code and letting it ring twice before proceeding to the next number. If amodem answered, it would squawk; the demon-dialing software would record the number, sothe hacker could call back later. In their screenplay, this was how their hero broke into NORAD.But they wondered if this was plausible: Didn’t the military close off its computers to publictelephone lines?

　　1980年，耶魯?shù)耐嗤瑢W(xué)、快30歲的勞倫斯·拉斯科(Lawrence Lasker )與沃爾克·帕克斯(Walter Parkes)寫(xiě)了《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)游戲》的劇本——它后來(lái)獲得了奧斯卡最佳劇本獎(jiǎng)提名，但最終敗給霍頓·福特(Horton Foote)的《溫柔的憐憫》(Tender Mercies)。一個(gè)黑客朋友給他們講了“魔鬼?yè)芴?hào)軟件”的事情，意思是，一個(gè)電話調(diào)制解調(diào)器會(huì)通過(guò)自動(dòng)撥打一個(gè)地區(qū)內(nèi)的其他電話號(hào)碼找出其他調(diào)制解調(diào)器。它會(huì)讓對(duì)方電話響兩聲，之后撥打另一個(gè)電話號(hào)碼。如果對(duì)方調(diào)制解調(diào)器應(yīng)答了，就會(huì)發(fā)出粗糙的聲音;這個(gè)魔鬼?yè)芴?hào)軟件就會(huì)記下這個(gè)號(hào)碼，黑客過(guò)一會(huì)兒再撥回去。在劇本里，主人公正是這樣闖入了NORAD。但是兩個(gè)編劇不知道這種事情是不是真能實(shí)現(xiàn)：軍方難道不應(yīng)該把自己的電腦隔離在公共電話線路之外嗎?

　　Mr. Lasker lived in Santa Monica, a few blocks from RAND. Figuring someone there might behelpful, he called the public affairs office, which put him in touch with Mr. Ware, who invited thepair to his office.

　　拉斯科當(dāng)時(shí)住在圣塔莫尼卡，距離蘭德只有幾個(gè)街區(qū)。他知道那個(gè)公司有人可能能夠幫助自己，于是就給該公司的公共事務(wù)辦公室打了電話，就這樣聯(lián)系上了威爾，威爾請(qǐng)兩人去自己的辦公室見(jiàn)面。

　　They’d come to the right man. Not only had he long known about the vulnerability ofcomputer networks, but he’d also helped design the software for the real NORAD computer. AndMr. Ware proved remarkably open, even friendly. Listening to the writers’ questions, he wavedoff their worries. Yes, he told them, the computer was supposed to be closed, but some officerswanted to work from home on weekends, so they’d leave a port open. Anyone could get in, ifthe right number was dialed.

　　他倆可真算找對(duì)了人。威爾不僅早就了解電腦系統(tǒng)有多么容易受到攻擊，而且還參與設(shè)計(jì)了現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中NORAD的電腦軟件。威爾知無(wú)不言，非常友善。聽(tīng)了兩個(gè)編劇的問(wèn)題，他一口就打消了他倆的顧慮。沒(méi)錯(cuò)，他告訴他們，軍方的電腦本應(yīng)是關(guān)閉的，但有些軍官希望周末回家工作，所以他們就讓端口開(kāi)著。任何人如果撥對(duì)了號(hào)碼都可以連接進(jìn)來(lái)。

　　“The only computer that’s completely secure,” Mr. Ware told them with a mischievous smile, “is a computer that no one can use.”

　　“唯一徹底安全的電腦就是根本沒(méi)有人使用的電腦，”威爾帶著頑皮的微笑說(shuō)。

　　Ware gave the writers the confidence to go ahead with their project. It’s fitting that thescenario of “WarGames” — which aroused Reagan’s curiosity and led to the first national policyon reducing the vulnerability of computers — owed a crucial debt to the man who’d firstwarned that they were vulnerable.

　　威爾給了兩個(gè)編劇信心繼續(xù)寫(xiě)下去?！稇?zhàn)爭(zhēng)游戲》中的情節(jié)引起了里根的好奇心，結(jié)果就是第一個(gè)強(qiáng)化電腦安全性的國(guó)家政策出臺(tái)，而這些情節(jié)很大程度要?dú)w功于那個(gè)第一次提出警告，說(shuō)電腦非常容易遭受攻擊的人，這是非常適宜的。

　　Meanwhile, Reagan’s directive hit a roadblock. It put the National Security Agency in charge ofsecuring all of the nation’s computer servers and networks — government, business andpersonal. The agency had been established in 1952 to intercept foreign communications; itwas expressly barred from spying on Americans. Representative Jack Brooks, a TexasDemocrat and a fiery civil-liberties advocate, wasn’t about to let a classified presidentialdecree blur the distinction. He sponsored and got passed a law overriding that directive.

　　與此同時(shí)，里根的指令遇到了困難。它讓國(guó)家安全局(National Security Agency)負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)家電腦服務(wù)商與網(wǎng)絡(luò)的安全，其中包括政府網(wǎng)絡(luò)、商用網(wǎng)絡(luò)與個(gè)人網(wǎng)絡(luò)。國(guó)家安全局1952年創(chuàng)立時(shí)，是為了攔截外國(guó)通訊;它特意被禁止偵查美國(guó)公民。得克薩斯州民主黨眾議員杰克·布魯克斯(Jack Brooks)是一位堅(jiān)決的公民自由擁護(hù)者，他不愿讓一紙秘密的總統(tǒng)命令模糊了其中的區(qū)別。他提起一項(xiàng)法律，推翻這條指令，最終獲得了通過(guò)。

　　The main author of Reagan’s NSDD-145 was Donald Latham, the Pentagon’s liaison to theNational Security Agency — and a former N.S.A. analyst himself. General Vessey had assignedhim to answer Reagan’s question on “WarGames” (Could something like this really happen?).Mr. Latham answered as he did (The situation is much worse than you think.) because he knewthat the N.S.A. had long been hacking into the communications systems of the Soviet Unionand China — and what we were doing to them, they could someday do to us.

　　里根的NSDD-145指令的起草者是國(guó)防部對(duì)國(guó)家安全局的聯(lián)絡(luò)員唐納德·萊瑟姆(Donald Latham)，他本人之前在國(guó)家安全局擔(dān)任聯(lián)絡(luò)員。維西將軍派遣他去回答里根關(guān)于《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)游戲》的問(wèn)題(“這種事真的會(huì)發(fā)生嗎?”)萊瑟姆照實(shí)回答了這個(gè)問(wèn)題(“這個(gè)問(wèn)題比你想的還要嚴(yán)重得多”)，因?yàn)樗?，?guó)家安全局一直都在侵入蘇聯(lián)和中國(guó)的通訊系統(tǒng)——我們對(duì)他們做的事情，他們有一天也可以這樣對(duì)我們做。

　　Mr. Ware had been among the first to draw this conclusion. Mr. Latham knew about it early onbecause the two were longtime friends, Mr. Ware having served on the N.S.A.’s scientificadvisory board. The N.S.A. was the most secretive branch of the American intelligencecommunity. Reagan’s screening of “WarGames” brought Mr. Ware’s concerns into high policy-making circles for the first time. And it sparked the first public controversy over the tensionsbetween security and privacy on the Internet, as well as the first public power struggle aboutthe subject between the N.S.A. and Congress — a debate and a struggle that persist today.

　　威爾是最早得出這種結(jié)論的人之一。萊瑟姆也早就知道，因?yàn)閮扇耸抢吓笥?。威爾曾?jīng)在國(guó)家安全局的科學(xué)顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)工作過(guò)。國(guó)家安全局當(dāng)時(shí)是美國(guó)情報(bào)部門(mén)中最隱秘的一個(gè)分支。里根對(duì)《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)游戲》的關(guān)注令威爾的憂慮得以第一次進(jìn)入最高決策圈。引發(fā)了關(guān)于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)安全與隱私之間緊張關(guān)系的第一次公開(kāi)討論，以及國(guó)家安全局與議會(huì)之間的第一次公開(kāi)權(quán)力斗爭(zhēng)——這樣的討論與斗爭(zhēng)一直延續(xù)至今。