美國政要第5課
Transforming Defense
--Interview with Dr. Andrew F. Krepenevich, the Director of the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (May 4, 1998) 訪國防小組委員會成員、戰(zhàn)略與預(yù)算評估中心主任小安德魯•克雷佩利維奇博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: Recently, I read some documents on future warfare and the national defense development of the United States from Defenselink (on the web). One of the most impressive documents I read was a national defense panelist report titled. “Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st century.” I am very interested in interviewing its authors. And as the director of the National Defense Panel, I feel honored to have the opportunity to interview you today.
I’d like you to give me an introduction to the national defense panel. Could you please talk about issues such as the nature and the main roles of the institution, the selection of the panelists, and how the panel functions as a whole.
DR. ANDREW KREPENEVICH: The panel was formed by congressional legislation in the Defense Authorization Action1 1996, and it was the product of efforts by two senators, Senator Coats from Indiana and Senator Lieberman from Connecticut. And they were concerned that even though the Cold War was over, and different challengers were before the American military, that our armed forces were not changing very much from the way they were during the Cold War. And they wanted a different set of ideas to date. And so they were able to get the Congress to pass the legislation, and the panel was comprised of nine people. The people were selected by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Congress, and the nine panel members, then from February of 1997 until December, first reviewing the Quadrennial Defense Review, Process, and Report. and then the panel produced its own report. Its job was to look at the security challenges the United States would face in the Year 2010, and beyond. And so the panel focused on the year 2010 to 2020, and submitted its report, as I said, in December of 1997.
MR. CHEN: What was the purpose and background of writing the report “Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st century?” What was the response and impact of this report after its publication?
DR. KREPENEVICH: I think the response was generally favorable. Certainly the sponsors2 of the legislation and Congress were quite pleased, to the extent that they have introduced the proposal to extend the life of the National Defense Panel, so that they can call it back into session in the future.
In terms of the near-term effect, that I think is, in terms of steps taken to increase joint experimentation in the American military, there is legislation pending now that is designed to increase the American military’s resources and focus on experimenting with new technologies, new forces, designed to meet the challenges that will appear over the next 10 to 20 years.
Over the long term, I think the benefit of the panel will be in terms of having established an alternative3 to the administration’s defense program. It remains to be seen whether Congress will take the opportunity to use this alternative as the basis for a debate over the future of American national defense.
The congressional sponsors of the panel are hoping that this will happen, and so they are looking to take the results of the panel and educate their fellow members of Congress, so that there can be this kind of debate.
MR. CHEN: “Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st century” focused on the long term issues facing U.S. defense and national security. Obviously this “transformation” could not take place over night. How long do you think it will take to for this “transformation” to be complete? Will there be several stages in this “transformation” that you can currently identity?
DR. KREPENEVICH: If you look back at earlier periods of military transformation, typically it takes 15 or 20 years, from beginning to end, and sometimes even longer. And so given that we are in the early period of transformation, I would think that we still have maybe another 15 years or so. But the time can be lengthened, the time can increase, if we move slowly.
Much depends upon the willingness of the military services, the leadership and the government. That will help determine how quickly you move through a transformation.
In terms of the stages, it’s difficult to say because you don’t undertake a transformation just for the sake of doing it, you do it because you see challenges that you have to respond to, or opportunities that you need to exploit. And so a great deal depends upon what other military organizations are doing.
And so I can give you an example of a stage in the transformation, and that might be a stage in which the United States military develops missile4 defenses, that for a period of time seem quite effective. But this would be-it’s my guess-only for a short period of time before large numbers of missiles begin to appear in other military establishments. Once that happens, I think it will be very difficult to maintain effective missile defenses. But it’s very difficult to say with great confidence that this is exactly how the future will come to be.
MR. CHEN: According to the analysis of this report, the transformation aimed at meeting all the U.S. security needs in 2020, covers all aspects of national defense. In your opinion, what is the most important aspect of the transformation? What are some of the difficulties one is likely to come across in this transformation process?
DR. KREPENEVICH: I think the most important aspect of the transformation is to have a clear understanding of how the challenges to our military forces are going to change, because your vision of what the competition will be like; that drives, that informs everything else that follows.
And so, for example, the National Defense Panel said a challenge will be to project power without having the ability to use forward bases5. That is a statement that will influence everything else; the kinds of equipment, the kinds of organization, the way you conduct battle6. So having the vision of what the competition will be like is probably the most important aspect.
In terms of the difficulties in the transformation process, there are many difficulties, which perhaps is one reason it takes 20 years to bring about. I think one difficulty will be to convince7 the American political leadership that this transformation is necessary, especially given that the United States military today is viewed as very capable and very successful in recent years, and therefore people will ask why-if we are successful, why do we need to change. And I think that will be one of the big challenges that we face.
MR. CHEN: Implementing8 a transformation like that described in the report expected to be complicated and will require a delicate balance between near-term challenges and long-term challenges. What do you think about this balance9? Or in other words, what do you think is the best way to deal with the near-term and long-term challenges?
DR. KREPENEVICH: Well, that’s a very good question, because the defense planner’s job is to minimize the danger to the nation’s security, not only today, but in the future. And so the planner must, with the resources he has, seek to minimize the overall risk to the national security.
It was the opinion of the National Defense Panel, and it’s my personal opinion, that we are not devoting sufficient resources to preparing for the very different kinds of challenges that will emerge in the next 10 to 20 years. And so given a fixed level of resources, I would put more resources into preparing for the long term, while sacrificing10 some resources in the near term.
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.the Defense Authorization Action 《國防授權(quán)法》
2.sponsor [] n. 支持者，發(fā)動者
3.alternative [] n.二中擇一，可供選擇的事物
4.missile [] n.導(dǎo)彈
5.forward bases 前沿基地
6.conduct battle 作戰(zhàn)
7.convince [] v.使確信
8.implement [] v. 實(shí)施
9.balance [] n.平衡
10.sacrifice [] v.犧牲
QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 聽后答題:
1. When was the National Defense Panel formed?
A.1995 B.1997 C.1996 D.1998
2. How many people are there in the Panel?
A.8 B.9 C.11 D.10
3. How were the members of the Panel selected?
A.They were selected by the President.
B.They were selected by the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.
C.They were selected by the Secretary of State.
D.They were selected by the secretary of Defense in consultation with the Congress.
4. What was the Panel’s job?
A.It was to look at the security challenges the U.S. would face in the year 2010 and beyond.
B.It was to focus on the changes of environment in 2010.
C.It was to review the Report of National Defense.
D.It was to make weapon development plan.
5. What will be the benefit of the Panel in Dr. Krepenevich’s view?
A.To have an alternative to the administration’s defense program.
B.To have a better understanding on the administration’s defense program.
C.To have an alternative to administration’s education program.
D.To have an alternative to the administration’s weapon development program.
6. How long will it take for a military transformation in Dr. Krepenevich’s view?
A.15 or 20 years and sometimes even longer.
B.10 or 15 years.
C.8 or 10 years.
D.5 or 10 years.
7. How does Dr. Krepenevich comment on the missile defenses?
A.It will be very effective for a long time.
B.It will be unnecessary.
C.It will be effective for a short time before large numbers of missiles begin to appear in others military establishments.
D.It will be too expensive.
8. What is the most important aspect of the transformations?
A.It is to have a chance to expand the military forces.
B.It is to have a chance to increase the expenditure on the national defense.
C.It is to have a clear understanding of the trend of the world military development.
D.It is to have a clear understanding of how the challenges to the U.S. military forces are going to change.
9. What is one of the big challenges for the transformation?
A.It is to convince the American political leadership that the transformation is necessary.
B.It is to convince the congressmen that the transformation is necessary.
C.It is to convince the electorate that the transformation is necessary.
D.It is to convince the Secretary of Treasury that the transformation is necessary.
10. What is the defense planner’s job?
A.To strengthen cooperations with the allies.
B.To exchange views with the civil departments.
C.To expand the contract with foreign military forces.
D.To minimize the danger to the nation’s security.
【參考譯文】
國防的轉(zhuǎn)變
陳伯江：您是國防小組委員會成員，并參加該委員會就評審國防部《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》所寫的報(bào)告－《國防的轉(zhuǎn)變——21世紀(jì)的國家安全》的起草工作。今天我很高興能有機(jī)會采訪您。
首先我想請你介紹一下國防小組委員會的情況。請你談?wù)勑〗M委員會的性質(zhì)、主要任務(wù)、成員的選擇及其作用等。
克雷佩利維奇（以下簡為克）：國防小組委員會是根據(jù)國會1996年《國防授權(quán)法》成立的，也是兩名參議員（來自印第安納州的共和黨參議員科茨和來自康涅狄格州的民主黨參議員利伯曼）共同努力的結(jié)果。他們認(rèn)為，盡管冷戰(zhàn)已經(jīng)結(jié)束，但美國軍隊(duì)仍面臨著種種挑戰(zhàn)而美國的武器力量與冷戰(zhàn)期間的情況相比并沒有多大改變。他們想要了解到目前為止對這一問題的各種不同觀點(diǎn)。于是他們促使國會通過了成立國防小組委員會的提案。該小組委員會共由９名成員組成，他們由國防部長與國會協(xié)商選定。這９位成員從1997年2月至12月，先完成了對國防部《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》的提出過程與報(bào)告內(nèi)容的審查，然后提出了小組委員會自己的報(bào)告。
小組委員會在審查《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》時，著眼于2010年及以后美國將要面臨的安全挑戰(zhàn)，其重點(diǎn)放在2010年到2020年，并于1997年12月提交了審查報(bào)告。
陳：提出《國防的轉(zhuǎn)變－—21世紀(jì)的國家安全》報(bào)告的目的和背景是什么？該報(bào)告發(fā)表之后的反應(yīng)和影響如何？
克：對報(bào)告的反應(yīng)我認(rèn)為從總體一看都是贊同的。要求立法成立國防小組委員會的支持者們和國會當(dāng)然相當(dāng)滿意，他們已經(jīng)同意了延長國防小組委員會期限的建議，以便今后能召回小組委員會成員繼續(xù)工作。
從報(bào)告的近期影響來說，我認(rèn)為它促使政府采取步驟在美軍中增加美軍用于試驗(yàn)新技術(shù)和親部隊(duì)結(jié)構(gòu)的資源；以滿足今后10～20年將會出現(xiàn)的挑戰(zhàn)。
從報(bào)告的長遠(yuǎn)影響來說，我認(rèn)為建立國防小組 委員會的好處是它可以提出與政府的防務(wù)規(guī)劃不同的看法。國會是否利用這個機(jī)會將小組委員會用作對美國國防的未來進(jìn)行辯論的基礎(chǔ)，現(xiàn)在仍不清楚。
小組委員會的國會支持者們希望會是這樣，因此，他們正在設(shè)法利用報(bào)告的結(jié)果說服國會的其他成員，以期發(fā)起這樣的辯論。
陳：小組委員會的報(bào)告認(rèn)為國防的轉(zhuǎn)變將是一個長期的過程。您認(rèn)為完成這一轉(zhuǎn)變需要多少時間？將可能經(jīng)歷哪些階段？
克：如果你回顧以往發(fā)生過的軍事轉(zhuǎn)變，從開始到結(jié)束，一般需要15～20年，有時甚至更長。由于我們正處在這場轉(zhuǎn)變的開始，我認(rèn)為可能還需要15年左右時間。但是，如果我們進(jìn)展緩慢，時間可能會延長和增加。
轉(zhuǎn)變所需時間的長短更多地取決于各軍種、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層和政府的意愿。他們有沒有轉(zhuǎn)變的意愿，將決定這場轉(zhuǎn)變的過程會有多快。
就轉(zhuǎn)變的階段而言，這很難說。因?yàn)槟悴皇菫榱宿D(zhuǎn)變的緣故才進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)變；進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)變是因?yàn)橛辛吮仨氉龀龇磻?yīng)的挑戰(zhàn)，或出現(xiàn)了可以利用的機(jī)會。因此它在很大程度上取決于其他國家的軍事組織將做什么。
我可以給你舉一個這場轉(zhuǎn)變中的階段的例子。這就是美軍可能要發(fā)展導(dǎo)彈防御的階段，在一段時間里導(dǎo)彈防御似乎相當(dāng) 有效，但我猜這段時間會很短，導(dǎo)彈防御僅在其他國家的軍隊(duì)大量擁有了大量導(dǎo)彈，我認(rèn)為保持有效的導(dǎo)彈防御將是非常困難的。但是，要想有把握地預(yù)測未來會發(fā)生什么情況是極其困難的。
陳：在您看來，這場國防轉(zhuǎn)變最重要的內(nèi)容是什么？轉(zhuǎn)變過程中可能會遇到哪些困難？
克：我認(rèn)為這場轉(zhuǎn)變最重要的方面，是要對我們軍隊(duì)面臨挑戰(zhàn)的變化有一個清楚的認(rèn)識。因?yàn)槟銓ξ磥砀偁幍目捶?，將對其余的一切產(chǎn)生重要影響。
例如，國防小組委員會在報(bào)告中提到的一個挑戰(zhàn)，是要在沒有前沿基地的情況下投送兵力。這就是一個將對其余的一切都有影響的挑戰(zhàn)，包括裝備的類型、編制的類型、作戰(zhàn)的方式。因此，對未來的競爭有一個正確的看法，大概是最重要的方面。
就轉(zhuǎn)變過程中的困難來說，會有許許多多的困難，這也許是這場轉(zhuǎn)變需要花費(fèi)20年時間的一個原因。我認(rèn)為困難之一是說服美國的政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，使他們了解轉(zhuǎn)變的必要性，尤其是人們認(rèn)為今天的美國軍隊(duì)是近年最為能干、最為成功的，他們會提出這樣的問題：如果我們是成功的，那么我們?yōu)槭裁葱枰D(zhuǎn)變？所以我認(rèn)為這將是我們面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)之一。
陳：國防小組委員會在考慮國防轉(zhuǎn)變時，認(rèn)為應(yīng)當(dāng)怎樣處理好近期挑戰(zhàn)與長遠(yuǎn)挑戰(zhàn)的關(guān)系？
克：噢，這是一個很好的問題。因?yàn)榉绖?wù)計(jì)劃人員工作就是要盡可能減少國家安全上的危險(xiǎn)，不僅要減少今天的危險(xiǎn)，而且包括未來。因此，計(jì)劃人員必須利用他所擁有的資源，設(shè)法將國家安全所面臨的威脅減到最低。
國防小組委員會認(rèn)為（這也是我個人的意見），我們沒有將足夠的資源用于對付今后10～20年將要出現(xiàn)的與現(xiàn)在很不相同的挑戰(zhàn)。因此，在資源水平不變的情況下，我主張拿出部分用于應(yīng)付近期挑戰(zhàn)的資源，將更多的資源用于準(zhǔn)備對付長期挑戰(zhàn)。
KEYS TO THE QUESTONS 參考答案：
1.c 2.b 3.d 4.a 5.a 6.a 7.c 8.d 9.a 10.d
