特朗普的“富商治國論”

When Warren Harding was 19, in 1884, he bought a small Ohio newspaper, probably for $450. By the time he ran for president in 1920, it had made him rich. Harding campaigned as an entrepreneur, promising “less government in business and more business in government”. He is often described as the worst US president, until now.

1884年，19歲的沃倫•哈丁(Warren Harding)收購了俄亥俄州一份發(fā)行量不大的報(bào)紙，很可能花了450美元。到了1920年他競(jìng)選美國總統(tǒng)時(shí)，這份報(bào)紙讓他變成了富豪。哈丁以企業(yè)家的形象參加競(jìng)選，承諾“讓政府少管企業(yè)的事情，讓政府更像企業(yè)”。他往往被形容為美國最沒水平的總統(tǒng)，直到現(xiàn)在。

The “businessman fallacy” — the notion that a rich businessman (never a woman) can run government better than a mere politician — is Donald Trump’s basic promise. That’s why the combustion of his son-in-law, fellow real-estate heir and senior adviser Jared Kushner — whose business dealings in the White House scream conflict of interest — is so telling. Kushner incarnates the businessman fallacy. Here’s why it is a fallacy.

“商人謬論”——有關(guān)商界富翁(從來不是女性)能夠比單純的政治人物更好地管理政府的理念——是唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的基本承諾。這就是為什么他的女婿、房地產(chǎn)同行繼承人、高級(jí)顧問賈里德•庫什納(Jared Kushner)——他在白宮的生意往來存在明顯的利益沖突——的隕落如此說明問題。庫什納是商人謬論的化身。以下是這之所以是謬論的原因。

• It is a lot simpler to run a company than a country. It’s not even the difference between checkers and chess. It’s the difference between checkers and playing simultaneous chess on infinite boards.

• 管理企業(yè)比治理國家簡(jiǎn)單得多。兩者甚至并不能用跳棋和國際象棋之間的區(qū)別來解釋，而是跳棋和在無限大的棋盤上同時(shí)下幾盤國際象棋的區(qū)別。

Especially in the US, a company has one aim: making profits, usually in one sector. The simplest companies — privately owned family businesses like Kushner’s and Trump’s — don’t need to worry about shareholders. The boss decides. He doesn’t waste time listing his foreign contacts on bureaucratic forms. If an employee gets in the way — like James Comey, head of the FBI, obsessing over imaginary Russians — you sack him: pow! No boring checks and balances in New York real estate.

特別是在美國，企業(yè)只有一個(gè)目的：盈利，通常是在某個(gè)行業(yè)盈利。最簡(jiǎn)單的公司——像庫什納家族和特朗普家族這樣的私有家族企業(yè)——不需要擔(dān)心股東。老板決定一切。他不浪費(fèi)時(shí)間在官僚的表格上列出自己的境外關(guān)系人。如果某個(gè)雇員礙事——比如一心追查“通俄案”的聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)局長詹姆斯•科米(James Comey)——你就炒掉他：嘭!紐約房地產(chǎn)界沒有無聊的制衡機(jī)制。

By contrast, governments deal with “wicked problems” that can’t be solved (or even fully understood) but only managed: social injustice, hostile powers or climate change. The “solutionism” of Silicon Valley rarely works in politics.

與此形成反差的是，政府要處理無法解決(甚至無法完全理解)、只能管控的“棘手問題”：社會(huì)不公、敵對(duì)大國或者氣候變化。硅谷的“解決主義”在政壇很少管用。

Running the government is a little like running a large publicly quoted conglomerate, or the US military. But in fact, the presidency itself is unique, so the candidate’s character and intelligence matter more than his experience.

管理政府有點(diǎn)像管理一家上市的大型綜合企業(yè)或美國軍隊(duì)。但事實(shí)上，總統(tǒng)一職本身很特殊，因此候選人的性格和智力比經(jīng)驗(yàn)更重要。

• The businessman-turned-politician is often blinded by hubris. This usually stems from the “money delusion”: the idea that life is a race to make money, and that rich people (“winners”) therefore possess special wisdom.

• 商人出身的政治人物往往盲目自大。這通常源自于“金錢至上的錯(cuò)覺”：有關(guān)人生是一場(chǎng)發(fā)財(cái)致富的競(jìng)賽，因此富人(“贏家”)擁有獨(dú)到智慧的觀念。

Many businessmen imagine they pulled themselves up by the bootstraps in a free market, something that more people could do if only there was “less government in business”. This self-image usually omits context: the fact, say, that the businessman’s father built the company (before being jailed on a ridiculous technicality) or that government enforced his contracts and schooled his employees. A corrective to the businessman’s fallacy is to consider what happens to businessmen in Congo: they die young of cholera.

很多商人想象自己在自由市場(chǎng)中白手起家;只有“讓政府少管企業(yè)的事情”，才能讓更多人走上這條路。這種自我形象往往忽視了大環(huán)境：此人的父親打造了這家企業(yè)(最終因某個(gè)荒謬的技術(shù)細(xì)節(jié)而入獄)或者政府確保他的合同得到履行，并為他的員工提供了教育。糾正商人謬論的方法是思考剛果商人的命運(yùn)：他們會(huì)因感染霍亂而英年早逝。

Kyle Pope, who edited Kushner’s newspaper The New York Observer, recalls the boss’s “disdain” for journalists: “It was almost like, ‘If you earn $30,000, $40,000 a year . . . you must be a total loser,’” he said in a Vanity Fair podcast. Kushner seems equally disdainful of loser bureaucrats working in grubby government offices (remember that Trump called the White House a “dump”). When you’re handling China, why listen to so-called China specialists who haven’t even fixed the China problem?

曾在庫什納的報(bào)紙《紐約觀察家》(New York Observer)當(dāng)主編的凱爾•波普(Kyle Pope)回憶了他的老板對(duì)新聞從業(yè)人員的“鄙視”：“感覺幾乎像是，‘如果你的年薪只有3萬、4萬美元……你必然是個(gè)十足的輸家’，”他在《名利場(chǎng)》雜志(Vanity Fair)的一個(gè)播客上表示。庫什納似乎同樣鄙視在簡(jiǎn)陋的政府辦公室(記得特朗普曾稱白宮是“垃圾場(chǎng)”)工作的沒出息官僚。在你對(duì)付中國時(shí)，為什么要聆聽那些從未解決過中國問題的所謂中國專家的意見?

Rich Americans tend to feel contempt for politicians because they have learnt to treat them as lowly service providers who will sit up and beg for donations. Kushner’s father, a Democratic donor, once even had Benjamin Netanyahu to stay at his house in New Jersey. (The future Israeli leader got Jared’s room; the boy moved to the basement.)

美國富人傾向于蔑視政治人物，因?yàn)樗麄円呀?jīng)學(xué)會(huì)把后者當(dāng)作卑微的服務(wù)提供者，只會(huì)直挺挺地坐著乞求捐款。庫什納的父親是民主黨的捐款者，曾經(jīng)讓本雅明•內(nèi)塔尼亞胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)在他位于新澤西的家里留宿。(當(dāng)時(shí)這位以色列的未來領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人睡在賈里德的房間里;而賈里德搬到地下室睡了。)

• The businessman imagines he is a generalist: he made money (at least his dad did), so he can apply his skills to any political problem. The truth is, he’s a specialist: he knows New York real estate, but not Iraq.

• 商人臆想自己是多面手：他賺了錢(至少他父親賺了錢)，所以他可以把自己的技能運(yùn)用于任何政治問題。真相是，他是個(gè)專家：他了解紐約的房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)，但不了解伊拉克問題。

• Anyone running a long-standing family company almost inevitably enters government with conflicts of interest. From age five, he has imbibed dinner-table conversations about the company’s wellbeing. All family relationships are structured around it. The family business is who they are, says Mike Driver, a successful British entrepreneur who now helps other entrepreneurs sell their businesses. “How could you ever expect that person to not act in the best interests of that business?”

• 任何經(jīng)營創(chuàng)辦已久的家族企業(yè)的人，在進(jìn)入政府時(shí)幾乎都會(huì)不可避免地帶著利益沖突。從5歲時(shí)起，他就開始在餐桌上聽到有關(guān)企業(yè)福祉的談話。所有的家庭關(guān)系都圍繞企業(yè)福祉構(gòu)建。英國成功企業(yè)家、如今幫其他企業(yè)家出售公司的麥克•德賴弗(Mike Driver)稱，家族企業(yè)就是他們自己。“你怎么能指望那個(gè)人不以家族企業(yè)的最佳利益為出發(fā)點(diǎn)行事呢?”

This dates back even before Silvio Berlusconi. When Harding was president, the managing editor of his Ohio paper contacted him with problems, asking, “Do you have any connections to help us?”

這甚至可以追溯到西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)之前。當(dāng)哈丁擔(dān)任美國總統(tǒng)時(shí)，他那份俄亥俄報(bào)紙的執(zhí)行主編在遇到問題時(shí)會(huì)聯(lián)系他，問，“你有什么人脈能幫助我們?”

• The family business also structures relationships beyond the family. Driver says, “For people who live that kind of life, everyone you meet can do something for you. They probably don’t even think it’s wrong. It’s just the nature of their relationships.” If a fellow rich businessman whom you meet on government business can help you with a pesky $1.2bn mortgage due on 666 Fifth Avenue next year, that’s serendipity.

• 家族企業(yè)在家族以外也精心設(shè)計(jì)人際關(guān)系。德賴弗稱，“對(duì)于過著那種生活的人來說，你遇到的每一個(gè)人都能為你做點(diǎn)什么。他們甚至很可能不認(rèn)為這是錯(cuò)的。這只是他們的人際關(guān)系的性質(zhì)。”如果你在處理政府事務(wù)時(shí)見到的一位富有的商人，可以幫你解決第五大道(Fifth Avenue) 666號(hào)明年到期的12億美元抵押貸款的爛攤子，那是緣分。

• Many businessmen believe politicians get to blunder with impunity, while in business (often described as “real life”) only the best survive. This belief has outlived Trump’s six corporate bankruptcies (even his casinos went bust), and Kushner’s purchase of 666 for a record price at the market peak in 2007.

• 很多商人認(rèn)為政客們可以搞砸事情而不受懲罰，而商界(往往被稱為“現(xiàn)實(shí)生活”)是最強(qiáng)者才能生存的環(huán)境。即使在特朗普6次破產(chǎn)(就連他的賭場(chǎng)也破產(chǎn)了)、以及庫什納在2007年市場(chǎng)高點(diǎn)以創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的價(jià)格買下第五大道666號(hào)后，這種信念仍然存在。

Kushner looks doomed, and Trump probably won’t become president for life. But America’s next businessmen-saviours are lining up in Silicon Valley.

庫什納看來會(huì)出局，特朗普很可能不會(huì)成為終身總統(tǒng)。但美國的下一批商人救世主們正在硅谷排起長隊(duì)。