特朗普保護(hù)主義政策的沉重代價(jià)

Donald Trump really is a protectionist. It is more than mere rhetoric. This is the lesson from last week’s announcement that he would sign an order this week imposing global tariffs of 25 per cent on steel and 10 per cent on aluminium.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)是個(gè)不折不扣的保護(hù)主義者。這不是空話。上周美國(guó)方面宣布，特朗普將于本周簽署一項(xiàng)命令，對(duì)進(jìn)口鋼材和鋁材分別征收25%和10%的關(guān)稅。

These tariffs are not that important in themselves. But the rationale used to justify them, their proposed level and duration, the willingness to target close allies and the president’s statement that “trade wars are good and easy to win” must alarm all informed observers. This action is unlikely to be the end; it is more likely to be the beginning of the end of the rules-governed multilateral trading order that the US itself created.

這些關(guān)稅本身不是那么重要。但其征收理由、擬征收水平及持續(xù)時(shí)間、打擊親密盟友的意圖以及美國(guó)總統(tǒng)關(guān)于“貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)是好事，贏得貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)很容易”的言論一定會(huì)令評(píng)論界的有識(shí)之士憂心忡忡。美國(guó)不太可能就此止步;這更可能是由美國(guó)創(chuàng)造的受規(guī)則約束的多邊貿(mào)易秩序走向終結(jié)的序曲。

This may sound alarmist. It should not. True, the proposed actions target only a little over 2 per cent of US imports. If this is where they end, then the world — and the world economy — will surely take it in its stride. It is possible that, with someone as inconsistent as Mr Trump in charge, this is where it will end. But we cannot bet on it.

這聽(tīng)上去可能有些危言聳聽(tīng)。并非如此。誠(chéng)然，擬議舉措針對(duì)的產(chǎn)品僅占美國(guó)總進(jìn)口額的2%多一點(diǎn)。如果美國(guó)就此作罷，那么整個(gè)世界——以及世界經(jīng)濟(jì)——一定能從容應(yīng)對(duì)。也許，由于當(dāng)權(quán)的特朗普如此反復(fù)無(wú)常，從此再無(wú)下文。但我們對(duì)此沒(méi)有把握。

One reason US protectionism is likely to spread is that the proposed action, explicitly intended to last a long time, will tax all users of steel and aluminium. These include industries that employ vastly more people than the 81,000 employed in the US basic steel industry. The users will suffer “negative effective protection”. One result will be that imported products made of steel and aluminium will become cheaper. The “solution” will surely be to put tariffs on imports of these products, too.

美國(guó)保護(hù)主義可能蔓延的一個(gè)原因是，這項(xiàng)明顯要持續(xù)很久的擬議舉措，將對(duì)鋼材和鋁材的所有使用者征稅。相關(guān)行業(yè)的從業(yè)人員遠(yuǎn)多于美國(guó)鋼鐵業(yè)的工人(8.1萬(wàn)人)。這些用戶將受到“負(fù)面有效保護(hù)”。結(jié)果之一將是進(jìn)口的鋼鐵和鋁制品將變得相對(duì)便宜。“解決的辦法”肯定是對(duì)這些制成品的進(jìn)口也加征關(guān)稅。

Another reason why this action could spread is that those adversely affected could retaliate against the US in other areas. In practice, however, it is more likely that they will take the US into the dispute settlement process of the World Trade Organization, while imposing so-called safeguard protection on steel and aluminium to forestall diversion of imports on to their markets. In this way, too, protection will spread.

這種保護(hù)主義舉措可能蔓延的另一個(gè)原因是，那些受到不利影響的國(guó)家可能在其它領(lǐng)域?qū)γ绹?guó)展開(kāi)報(bào)復(fù)。不過(guò)在實(shí)踐中，它們更可能將美國(guó)訴至世界貿(mào)易組織(World Trade Organization)的爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制，同時(shí)針對(duì)鋼鐵和鋁實(shí)施所謂的保護(hù)措施，以防止受影響的產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)而流入本國(guó)市場(chǎng)。這也是令保護(hù)主義措施蔓延的一種方式。

A further reason for protectionism to spread is the US use of the national security loophole. The WTO does indeed allow a member to take “any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations”. But, as Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s foreign minister, suggests: “It is entirely inappropriate to view any trade with Canada as a national security threat to the United States.” Yet once this loophole is used so irresponsibly by the US, of all countries, where might it stop?

保護(hù)主義蔓延的第三個(gè)原因是美國(guó)鉆了國(guó)家安全的空子。世貿(mào)組織確實(shí)允許成員國(guó)“在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)期或國(guó)際關(guān)系處于其它緊急狀態(tài)時(shí)，采取任何必要舉措保護(hù)其基本的安全利益”。然而，誠(chéng)如加拿大外長(zhǎng)克里斯蒂婭•弗里蘭(Chrystia Freeland)所說(shuō)的：“認(rèn)為與加拿大的貿(mào)易對(duì)美國(guó)構(gòu)成國(guó)家安全威脅是完全不適當(dāng)?shù)摹?rdquo;然而，一旦美國(guó)如此不負(fù)責(zé)任地利用這個(gè)空子針對(duì)所有國(guó)家，那何時(shí)才會(huì)收手?

A crucial point is that this action is not about China, which accounts for less than 1 per cent of US steel imports. Its victims are friends and allies: Brazil, Canada, the EU, Japan and South Korea. Nor is it a measure taken against some form of unfair trade. This is a purely protectionist policy aimed at saving old industries. Yet, even on these terms, the rationale is feeble: US steel and aluminium production has been flat for years. If this action really makes sense to Mr Trump, what might not?

關(guān)鍵是，這項(xiàng)舉措與中國(guó)關(guān)系不大，美國(guó)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的鋼鐵不及美國(guó)鋼鐵進(jìn)口總量的1%。這一舉措的受害者是美國(guó)的友邦及盟邦：巴西、加拿大、歐盟(EU)、日本及韓國(guó)。這項(xiàng)舉措也并非針對(duì)某種不公平貿(mào)易。它純粹是一項(xiàng)旨在拯救老工業(yè)的保護(hù)主義政策。然而，即便如此，其理由也站不住腳：美國(guó)的鋼鐵和鋁產(chǎn)量多年來(lái)變動(dòng)不大。如果特朗普認(rèn)為這項(xiàng)舉措合情合理，那他還有什么做不出來(lái)?

For all these reasons, then, we should foresee more protectionist actions by the US and others. Yet a still more important reason exists for expecting this. Mr Trump seems to want a protectionist war. He is sure that a big country with large trade deficits must “win”. Furthermore, he believes those deficits are proof that the US has been taken for a ride by others. Both beliefs are economically ludicrous. Yes, the US might be less harmed than others in a protectionist war. But everybody, very much including the US, would be damaged by the Balkanisation of the global economy. In addition, it is wrong to view trade surpluses as the equivalent of a profit in business, as Mr Trump does. Imports are the goal of trade. Trade surpluses have no intrinsic merit.

因此，基于所有這些原因，我們應(yīng)該預(yù)見(jiàn)到美國(guó)和其它國(guó)家會(huì)采取更多的保護(hù)主義措施。然而，還有一個(gè)更重要的理由讓我們抱著這種預(yù)期。特朗普似乎想要發(fā)起一場(chǎng)保護(hù)主義戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。他確信，一個(gè)有著巨額貿(mào)易逆差的大國(guó)必須“贏”。此外，他認(rèn)為，這些逆差表明，其它國(guó)家一直在占美國(guó)的便宜。這兩種想法從經(jīng)濟(jì)上講都很荒唐。誠(chéng)然，倘若發(fā)生保護(hù)主義戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，美國(guó)受到的損害可能要比其它國(guó)家小。但包括美國(guó)在內(nèi)的所有國(guó)家，都將因全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的“巴爾干化”(Balkanisation)而受損。另外，像特朗普那樣將貿(mào)易順差等同于商業(yè)利潤(rùn)是錯(cuò)誤的。進(jìn)口是貿(mào)易的目的。貿(mào)易順差沒(méi)有內(nèi)在價(jià)值。

Yet this action is ultimately justified by the strong belief that the US has been a victim of the machinations of others. One bit of evidence used to justify this sense of grievance is the idea that the US is “the least protectionist large economy in the world”. No summary measure of overall protection is ideal. But the least bad one is the weighted-average applied tariff. According to the WTO, Japan’s weighted average tariff in 2015 was 2.1 per cent, that of the US 2.4 per cent and the EU’s 3 per cent. These are very similar. China’s was 4.4 per cent, largely because it has been part of just one global negotiation: its accession to the WTO in 2001, when it was rightly still viewed as a developing country.

然而，若堅(jiān)信美國(guó)一直是其它國(guó)家陰謀的受害者，這項(xiàng)舉措就顯得有道理。被用于證明這種委屈感合理的一點(diǎn)理由是，美國(guó)是“世界上保護(hù)主義程度最低的大型經(jīng)濟(jì)體”。沒(méi)有一個(gè)理想的衡量整體保護(hù)主義程度的指標(biāo)，“加權(quán)平均關(guān)稅率”還算差強(qiáng)人意。世貿(mào)組織的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2015年日本的加權(quán)平均關(guān)稅率為2.1%，美國(guó)為2.4%，歐盟為3%。這些國(guó)家的加權(quán)平均關(guān)稅率相差不大。中國(guó)的加權(quán)平均關(guān)稅率是4.4%，主要因?yàn)檫@是當(dāng)年一場(chǎng)全球談判的一部分：中國(guó)于2001年加入世貿(mào)組織，當(dāng)時(shí)中國(guó)被恰當(dāng)?shù)囟ㄎ粸橐粋€(gè)發(fā)展中國(guó)家。

Some US policymakers refer instead to the “bound” tariff. On that basis, US protection is relatively low. But a simple average of bound tariffs — the ceilings a country has agreed upon its tariffs — tells one very little about its actual level of protection. Furthermore, the US has bound its tariffs at low levels to obtain concessions from others, notably protection of its intellectual property.

一些美國(guó)政策制定者則傾向于使用“約定”關(guān)稅概念。以這個(gè)指標(biāo)衡量，美國(guó)的保護(hù)主義程度相對(duì)較低。但是，約定關(guān)稅的簡(jiǎn)單平均數(shù)反映不出實(shí)際的保護(hù)主義程度。此外，美國(guó)將其關(guān)稅限制在較低水平，以此獲得其它國(guó)家的讓步，尤其是在保護(hù)其知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)方面。

The other grievance is over trade deficits. But these are macroeconomic phenomena, not the result of trade policy. Mr Trump has just signed into law a large increase in the US structural fiscal deficit. Other things equal, this is sure to increase the trade deficit. This will be particularly true if, as the administration hopes, its tax cuts fuel a large rise in US private investment, while government deficits rise. Does the left hand of US policymaking understand what the right hand is doing? It appears not.

另一個(gè)不滿是針對(duì)貿(mào)易逆差。但這些是宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)象，而不是貿(mào)易政策的結(jié)果。特朗普最近簽署了一項(xiàng)法律，同意大幅增加美國(guó)的結(jié)構(gòu)性財(cái)政赤字。假定其它情況不變的話，這肯定會(huì)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)的貿(mào)易逆差增長(zhǎng)。如果像美國(guó)政府期望的那樣，減稅刺激了美國(guó)私人投資的大幅增長(zhǎng)，同時(shí)政府赤字則在上升，那么貿(mào)易逆差擴(kuò)大就更是確定無(wú)疑的了。在美國(guó)的政策制定機(jī)制中，左手明白右手在做什么嗎?似乎并沒(méi)有。

The International Monetary Fund is right to criticise this plan. It will impose substantial costs, disrupt alliances and surely lead to yet more costly protectionism, by the US and others. It is a product of a characteristic blend of self-pity — the world is mean to us — and bombast — we can easily bully others into submission. The result is likely to be further shredding of the fragile fabric of global trade. Well done, Mr Trump.

國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(International Monetary Fund)批評(píng)了美國(guó)限制鋼鋁進(jìn)口計(jì)劃，這是對(duì)的。這一計(jì)劃將造成巨大代價(jià)、影響同盟關(guān)系，并且必然會(huì)導(dǎo)致代價(jià)更高的保護(hù)主義措施，不管是出自美國(guó)還是其它國(guó)家之手。這是自憐和好大喜功兩種心態(tài)相結(jié)合的典型產(chǎn)物——一方面認(rèn)為世界對(duì)我們很刻薄，另一方面又認(rèn)為我們能夠輕易地迫使其它國(guó)家屈服。其結(jié)果可能是進(jìn)一步撕裂全球貿(mào)易的脆弱結(jié)構(gòu)。干得漂亮，特朗普。