歐洲該如何應對中國經(jīng)濟崛起？

Protectionism à la Donald Trump is a dead end. Nobody really believes that tariff barriers can reduce a trade deficit. Yet the EU finds itself in a quandary: if rising economies, particularly China, are making inroads into European markets, how can the continent protect itself without indulging in protectionism? 唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的保護主義是一個死胡同。沒人真的認為關稅壁壘可以減少貿(mào)易赤字。然而歐盟發(fā)現(xiàn)自己正處于進退兩難的境地：如果不斷崛起的新興經(jīng)濟體、特別是中國，正在打入歐洲市場，歐洲該如何在不求助于保護主義的情況下保護自己?

The EU needs to rebalance its economic relations with China, where there is currently a flagrant lack of reciprocity. While China maintains a largely open market for goods, it is less open for services and even less for investment. 歐盟需要重新調(diào)整自己與中國的經(jīng)濟關系，這一關系目前明目張膽地缺乏互惠。盡管中國基本上保持對商品開放的市場，但它對服務業(yè)不那么開放，對投資更是如此。

Now, China certainly does not flout the rules of the World Trade Organization. But its defence of the status quo at the WTO is unacceptable to Europe since the rules that prevailed when Beijing joined in late 2001 no longer hold. 應該承認，中國沒有公然違反世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)規(guī)則。但是，中國對于其在世貿(mào)組織的現(xiàn)狀的捍衛(wèi)是歐洲無法接受的，因為北京方面在2001年底加入WTO時實行的規(guī)則已不再適用。

This is why the EU is pushing for a form of offensive multilateralism that will enable it to benefit from its comparative advantages and, above all, take the initiative on a whole range of questions with which the WTO is not best suited to deal. These include state subsidies, the financial opacity of state-owned enterprises and obstacles to foreign investment. 這就是為什么歐盟正在推動某種形式的進攻型多邊主義，使其能夠獲益于自己的比較優(yōu)勢，最重要的是在WTO不適合處理的一系列問題上抓住主動。這些問題包括國家補貼、國有企業(yè)財務狀況的不透明以及外國投資障礙。

Paradoxically, European grievances with China chime perfectly with those of the US. But the approach to tackling the challenge posed by Beijing is very different on either side of the Atlantic. The Europeans favour more rules, in what might called a “WTO-plus” framework. By contrast, and notwithstanding the emollient tone on global trade struck by Mr Trump at Davos last week, the US administration is prioritising bilateral deals. The EU wants more rules, Mr Trump more outcomes. 矛盾的是，歐洲對中國的不滿與美國對中國的不滿完全吻合。但是，大西洋兩岸對付北京所構成的挑戰(zhàn)的方式非常不同。歐洲人傾向于出臺更多規(guī)則，即所謂的“WTO+”框架。與此形成反差的是，盡管特朗普上周在達沃斯對全球貿(mào)易的論調(diào)有所緩和，但美國行政當局優(yōu)先考慮的是雙邊協(xié)定。歐盟希望制定更多規(guī)則，而特朗普想要更多成果。

There is a risk, therefore, that Europe will find itself squeezed between a US that rejects multilateralism and a China that favours the status quo. To offset this threat, EU member states must seek to harmonise their positions with the European Commission if they are to have any leverage with the Chinese. That was the logic of French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beijing earlier this month. 因此，風險在于，歐洲發(fā)現(xiàn)自己被夾在拒絕多邊主義的美國和傾向于維持現(xiàn)狀的中國之間。為了化解這種威脅，如果歐盟成員國想要對中國有任何影響力的話，它們必須與歐盟委員會(European Commission)協(xié)調(diào)立場。這就是法國總統(tǒng)埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)上月訪華的邏輯。

The dangers Europe faces are especially clear in relation to strategic investment, where the EU runs the risk of seeing its technology stolen by China if it does not establish pan-European legislation. The good news is that Germany is ready to abandon its attachment to free trade dogma and side with France on the necessity of preventing any form of Chinese control of strategic European assets. Here too the interplay between national governments and Brussels is crucial. 在戰(zhàn)略投資方面，歐洲面臨的危險格外明顯——如果歐盟不建立泛歐洲法規(guī)，它可能會眼看著中國剽竊其技術。好消息是德國已經(jīng)準備放棄對自由貿(mào)易信條的執(zhí)念，轉而接受法國的立場，即有必要阻止中資以任何形式控制歐洲的戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)。在這方面，各國政府和布魯塞爾之間的相互合作也至關重要。

The other challenge is to avoid countries, principally China, reaching infrastructure agreements with single European nations, notably those in central and eastern Europe. These could and would breach European procurement rules, and threaten the continent’s businesses. The EU needs to push Beijing to become part of the WTO’s plurilateral agreement on government procurement. 另一項挑戰(zhàn)是避免某些國家(主要是中國)與個別歐洲國家(特別是中、東歐的那些國家)達成基礎設施協(xié)議。這些協(xié)議可能(而且會)違反歐洲的采購規(guī)則，威脅到歐洲的企業(yè)。歐盟需要推動北京方面加入WTO的政府采購諸邊協(xié)議。

Last, there is the challenge of protection where taxing multinationals is concerned. Here the EU is pitted against the US. The tax revenues of European states must be protected against widespread worldwide tax optimisation (the search by companies for jurisdictions that provide the lowest possible level of taxation). 最后，就向跨國企業(yè)征稅而言，還有保護的挑戰(zhàn)。在這方面，歐盟與美國處于競爭關系。歐洲國家的稅收收入必須得到保護，以免受到普遍的全球稅收優(yōu)化的影響(即企業(yè)尋找那些提供最低可能的稅收水平的司法管轄區(qū))。

In this case, the responsibility is Europe’s: when one takes into account that four European states shelter half of the optimised tax receipts in the world. Europe cannot seriously claim to be defending a rules-based system when four of its states knowingly participate in global fiscal deregulation. 在這種情況下，責任在于歐洲：考慮到4個歐洲國家庇護了世界上一半的優(yōu)化稅收收入。當歐洲有4個國家在知情的情況下參與全球財政去監(jiān)管時，歐洲無法宣稱自己在捍衛(wèi)基于規(guī)則的制度。

S 因此，在該議程上，無論對內(nèi)還是對外，歐盟都能面對全球競爭并重拾其亟需的東西：歐盟公民感受到歐盟在當今的狂野世界中保護他們。

o it is on this agenda, both internal and external, that the EU can face global competition and regain that which it needs most: the sentiment of its citizens that it is protecting them in this wild world. 本文作者為巴黎政治大學(Sciences Po)教授，曾為法國前總理曼努埃爾•瓦爾斯(Manuel Valls)擔任政治顧問

The writer is a professor at Sciences Po and served as a political adviser to former French prime minister Manuel Valls 譯者/馬柯斯