FT社評(píng)：特朗普劍指巴基斯坦的“兩面性”

Like other US leaders before him, President Donald Trump has concluded that Pakistan is a Janus-faced ally. The country’s security services receive US assistance, while they provide sanctuary to the Taliban and other terrorist organisations at war with the US and its allies, including India.

與之前的美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人一樣，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)總統(tǒng)已得出結(jié)論：巴基斯坦是一個(gè)有兩副面孔的盟友。巴安全部門一面接收美國(guó)的援助，一面向塔利班(Taliban)等與美國(guó)及其盟友(包括印度)開戰(zhàn)的恐怖組織提供庇護(hù)。

Mr Trump is right in one respect. America is not getting value for the money (some $33bn since the 9/11 terror attacks on the US, according to the US president) it provides to a country whose military and intelligence services, the ISI, have manipulated religious fanatics partly to keep a hand in the great game playing out next door in Afghanistan.

特朗普有一點(diǎn)說(shuō)對(duì)了。美國(guó)未從向巴基斯坦提供的援助(根據(jù)這位總統(tǒng)的表述，自“9•11”恐怖襲擊以來(lái)這筆錢已達(dá)到約330億美元)中獲得相應(yīng)回報(bào)，而巴軍事情報(bào)部門“三軍情報(bào)局”(ISI)操縱著宗教狂熱分子，部分目的是繼續(xù)插手鄰國(guó)阿富汗上演的大國(guó)博弈。

The decision taken last week to suspend $2bn in security assistance is therefore understandable. Moreover, this money has helped to empower parts of the state — the armed forces and ISI — that have enfeebled civilian institutions and civil society. If the suspension can be used as leverage to persuade them to take a firmer line against the Taliban and to support rather than weaken the government, it could prove a worthwhile gamble.

因此，特朗普上周決定暫停向巴基斯坦提供20億美元安全援助是可以理解的。此外，美國(guó)的援助資金過(guò)去幫助巴基斯坦部分國(guó)家機(jī)構(gòu)——武裝部隊(duì)和三軍情報(bào)局——增強(qiáng)了實(shí)力，同時(shí)削弱了文職機(jī)構(gòu)和公民社會(huì)的力量。如果暫停援助可以用作籌碼來(lái)規(guī)勸巴軍事和情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)塔利班采取更強(qiáng)硬的立場(chǎng)，同時(shí)支持、而非削弱政府，那此舉將是一場(chǎng)值得的賭博。

It is far from certain, however, that this will be the outcome. The ISI was involved in the creation of the Taliban at the outset. Its operatives perceive the group as an asset, which gives them strategic depth. They will let go reluctantly, if at all.

然而，這樣的結(jié)局還遠(yuǎn)未確定。三軍情報(bào)局從一開始就參與了塔利班的創(chuàng)立。該局人員將塔利班看作一種可給他們帶來(lái)戰(zhàn)略縱深的資產(chǎn)。如果真要放棄塔利班，他們會(huì)很不情愿。

The substantial risks of blowback persuaded Mr Trump’s predecessors to be more cautious about sanctioning such a complex, unpredictable and potentially dangerous ally. The first is to US troops who rely for supplies on Pakistani co-operation. Mr Trump chose last year to double down on a failing military strategy in Afghanistan. Should Islamabad retaliate against the aid suspension by closing land and air routes, as they did once before in 2011, it would jeopardise the lives of American soldiers. Of the alternative supply routes, one is through Iran and therefore off limits to the US. The other requires co-operation from Russia, which is playing its own double games in the region. It is to be hoped that the Trump administration has a plan B that takes all this into account.

受到反彈的巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)使特朗普的前任們對(duì)于制裁這樣一個(gè)復(fù)雜、不可預(yù)測(cè)且具有潛在危險(xiǎn)性的盟友更加謹(jǐn)慎。首先是對(duì)美國(guó)軍隊(duì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，他們依賴與巴基斯坦的合作來(lái)獲得補(bǔ)給。特朗普去年選擇對(duì)美國(guó)在阿富汗失敗的軍事戰(zhàn)略加大下注。如果巴基斯坦像2011年那樣通過(guò)關(guān)閉陸路和空中通道來(lái)報(bào)復(fù)美國(guó)暫停援助，這將危及美軍士兵的生命。在替代性補(bǔ)給線中，有一條要通過(guò)伊朗，因此對(duì)美國(guó)而言不可行。另一條需要俄羅斯的合作，后者在該地區(qū)也有自己的雙重博弈。希望特朗普政府有一個(gè)將所有這些因素考慮在內(nèi)的B計(jì)劃。

Another consequence of souring relations between Washington and Islamabad is that these strengthen fast-growing ties between Islamabad and Beijing. The Chinese are promising to invest $60bn into Pakistan as part of their one belt one road initiative to extend Beijing’s influence across Asia and beyond.

美巴關(guān)系惡化的另一個(gè)后果，是將加強(qiáng)巴基斯坦與中國(guó)之間快速發(fā)展的關(guān)系。中國(guó)承諾向巴基斯坦投資600億美元，這是擴(kuò)大北京方面在整個(gè)亞洲及更廣大地區(qū)影響力的“一帶一路”倡議的一部分。

US officials appear surprisingly at ease with this. After all, the Chinese are no more tolerant of radical Islam, and have no interest in seeing Pakistan overrun by it. If Beijing can navigate the duplicity of the Pakistani state more effectively, it would help to ease the burden on America.

出人意料的是，美國(guó)官員似乎對(duì)此并不在意。畢竟，中國(guó)人不再容忍激進(jìn)的伊斯蘭主義，看到巴基斯坦被激進(jìn)的伊斯蘭主義席卷對(duì)中國(guó)而言沒(méi)有好處。如果北京方面能更有效地駕馭巴基斯坦的兩面性，這將有助于減輕美國(guó)的負(fù)擔(dān)。

Yet, were the current dispute between the US and Pakistan to evolve into long-term hostility, it would pose a very real threat. This is a country with more than 100 nuclear warheads. Its civilian government is chronically weak, and the state is threatened by its own homegrown, radical Islamists — another reason why the security forces have been reluctant to provoke a more direct conflict with them.

然而，如果當(dāng)前美巴之間的爭(zhēng)端演變成長(zhǎng)期敵對(duì)，那將造成真正的威脅。巴基斯坦擁有100多枚核彈頭，文職政府長(zhǎng)期處于弱勢(shì)，該國(guó)還受到本土激進(jìn)伊斯蘭主義者的威脅，這也是巴安全部隊(duì)不愿更直接地與他們發(fā)生沖突的另一個(gè)原因。

The case for reducing aid to Pakistan has long been clear. Ideally, it will prompt Islamabad to earn back the US assistance it has lost. But Pakistan’s internal weaknesses, the terrorists it harbours and its nuclear arsenal make for an explosive mix. Sanctions do not make a policy in and of themselves. Washington also needs to figure out how to lower the odds of Pakistan becoming a failed state.

減少對(duì)巴基斯坦援助的理由一直都擺在那里。理想的情況是，此舉將促使巴基斯坦做出努力重新贏得其失去的美援。但是巴基斯坦內(nèi)部的種種薄弱點(diǎn)、其庇護(hù)的恐怖分子以及核武庫(kù)構(gòu)成了一個(gè)易爆的混合體。制裁本身并非一項(xiàng)政策。華盛頓方面還需想辦法降低巴基斯坦成為一個(gè)失敗國(guó)家的可能性。