四大問題左右2018年能源格局
2018年，哪些問題將左右全球能源市場格局?能源結(jié)構(gòu)、貿(mào)易模式和價(jià)格趨勢將是怎樣的?每個(gè)國家情況不同，包括政治在內(nèi)的本土因素很重要。但在全球?qū)用?，有四個(gè)關(guān)鍵問題，每個(gè)問題的答案都存在高度不確定性。
The first question is whether Saudi Arabia is stable. The kingdom’s oil exports now mostly go to Asia but the volumes involved mean that any volatility will destabilise a market where speculation is rife. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is apparently in control but it is a strange and fragile sort of control that requires the imprisonment of dozens of senior businessmen including members of the royal family, the concentration of power in the hands of one individual and a huge international PR campaign to persuade the world that MbS is a modernising liberal.
第一個(gè)問題是沙特阿拉伯能否保持穩(wěn)定。目前，沙特王國的石油出口大多流向亞洲，但其出口量意味著任何波動(dòng)都會(huì)讓這個(gè)充斥著投機(jī)活動(dòng)的市場變得不穩(wěn)定。穆罕默德•本•薩勒曼王儲(chǔ)(Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman)似乎控制著局面，但這是一種古怪而脆弱的控制：它有賴于羈押包括王室成員在內(nèi)的幾十名大商人、將權(quán)力集中于一人之手，以及發(fā)動(dòng)大規(guī)模國際宣傳活動(dòng)，以說服全世界穆罕默德•本•薩勒曼是一位現(xiàn)代化自由主義者。
That is certainly not the view held in Yemen or across the Middle East. Behind the grand plans for a new $500bn city (sorry, "urban metropolis for the world") run by robots and the radical notion of allowing Saudi women to drive for the first time is a degree of old-fashioned religious fanaticism directed against the Shia communities across the region and Iran in particular. This could produce real instability over the next few months.
顯然，也門或者整個(gè)中東并不這么想。在投資5000億美元建立一個(gè)由機(jī)器人運(yùn)營的新城(抱歉，原話是“世界的大都會(huì)”)的宏大計(jì)劃以及首次允許沙特婦女開車這種激進(jìn)思想背后，有一種針對整個(gè)中東地區(qū)、尤其是伊朗的什葉派的舊式宗教狂熱。這可能在接下來幾個(gè)月帶來真正的不穩(wěn)定。
The risk is that an open conflict, which Iran and Saudi have traditionally avoided despite all their differences, would spread and hit oil production and trade. It is worth remembering that the Gulf states account for a quarter of global production and over 40 per cent of all the oil traded globally. The threat to stability is all the greater given that Iran is likely to win any such clash and to treat the result as a licence to reassert its influence in the region.
盡管兩國存在種種分歧，伊朗和沙特一向避免公開沖突。倘若雙方爆發(fā)沖突，可能蔓延并影響到石油生產(chǎn)和貿(mào)易活動(dòng)。別忘了，海灣國家占全球石油產(chǎn)量的四分之一，占全球石油貿(mào)易的40%以上?？紤]到兩國若發(fā)生沖突伊朗很可能勝出，并將己方的勝利視為重新確立本國在中東地區(qū)影響力的通行證，這使可能的沖突對穩(wěn)定的威脅就更大了。
The second question is how rapidly production of oil from shale rock will grow in the US — 2017 has seen an increase of 600,000 barrels a day to over 6m. The increase in global prices over the past six months has made output from almost all America's producing areas commercially viable and drilling activity is rising. A comparable increase in 2018 would offset most of the current Opec production cuts and either force another quota reduction or push prices down.
第二個(gè)問題是美國的頁巖油產(chǎn)量會(huì)增長多快。2017年，美國的頁巖油日產(chǎn)量增加60萬桶，達(dá)到逾600萬桶。過去6個(gè)月，國際油價(jià)的上漲使美國幾乎所有石油產(chǎn)區(qū)具備了商業(yè)開發(fā)價(jià)值，鉆探活動(dòng)正在增加。如果2018年美國頁巖油產(chǎn)量有同等程度的增加，歐佩克(Opec)減產(chǎn)的影響將在很大程度上被抵消，結(jié)果是，或者歐佩克被迫再一次下調(diào)生產(chǎn)配額，或者油價(jià)被拉低。
The third question concerns China. For the last three years the country has managed to deliver economic growth with only minimal increases in energy consumption. Growth was probably lower than the claimed numbers — the Chinese do not like to admit that they, too, are subject to economic cycles and recessions — but even so the achievement is considerable. The question is whether the trend can be continued. If it can, the result will limit global demand growth for oil, gas and coal.
第三個(gè)問題與中國有關(guān)。過去3年，中國在能源消費(fèi)量微幅增長的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增速很可能低于對外宣稱的數(shù)字——中國人不情愿承認(rèn)他們也受到經(jīng)濟(jì)周期和衰退的影響——但即使如此，中國的這一成就依然是可觀的。問題在于這一趨勢能否持續(xù)。如果能的話，它將限制全球石油、天然氣和煤炭需求的增長。
China, which accounts for a quarter of the world’s daily energy use, is the swing consumer. If energy efficiency gains continue, CO2 emissions will remain flat or even fall. The country's economy is changing and moving away from heavy industry fuelled largely by coal to a more service-based one, with a more varied fuel mix. But the pace of that shift is uncertain and some recent data suggests that as economic growth has picked up, so has consumption of oil and coal. Beijing has high ambitions for a much cleaner energy economy, driven not least by the levels of air pollution in many of the major cities; 2018 will show how much progress they are making.
中國占全球能源日消費(fèi)量的四分之一，是一個(gè)能夠左右整體格局的能源消費(fèi)國。如果能效繼續(xù)提高，其二氧化碳排放量將持平甚至下滑。中國經(jīng)濟(jì)正在轉(zhuǎn)型，從主要由煤炭拉動(dòng)的重工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楦嗟赜煞?wù)業(yè)驅(qū)動(dòng)，能源結(jié)構(gòu)更多樣化。但經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的速度尚不確定，最近一些數(shù)據(jù)顯示，隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)增長提速，石油和煤炭消費(fèi)量也在增加。北京方面的一個(gè)遠(yuǎn)大理想是發(fā)展由更清潔能源驅(qū)動(dòng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)，這主要是考慮到很多大城市的空氣污染水平;2018年將可以看到他們?nèi)〉昧硕啻筮M(jìn)步。
The fourth question is, if anything, the most important. How fast can renewables grow? The last few years have seen dramatic reductions in costs and strong increase in supply. The industry has had a great year, with bids from offshore wind for capacity auctions in the UK and elsewhere at record low levels.
第四個(gè)問題可能是最重要的?？稍偕茉吹陌l(fā)展能有多快?過去幾年，可再生能源的成本大幅下滑，供應(yīng)強(qiáng)勁增長。該行業(yè)度過了美好的一年，在英國和其他地區(qū)，海上風(fēng)電拍賣的報(bào)價(jià)達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄低點(diǎn)。
Wind is approaching grid parity — the moment when it can compete without subsidies. Solar is also thriving: according to the International Energy Agency, costs have fallen by 70 per cent since 2010 not least because of advances in China, which now accounts for 60 per cent of total solar cell manufacturing capacity. The question is how rapidly all those gains can be translated into electric supply.
風(fēng)電正接近“電網(wǎng)平價(jià)”(grid parity)，到了那個(gè)拐點(diǎn)它可以在沒有補(bǔ)貼的情況下與其他能源競爭。太陽能也形勢大好：根據(jù)國際能源署(International Energy Agency)的數(shù)據(jù)，自2010年以來，太陽能的成本已下降70%，這主要是因?yàn)橹袊倪M(jìn)展，中國目前占全球太陽能電池制造能力的60%。問題是所有這些增長能夠多快轉(zhuǎn)化為電力供應(yīng)。
Renewables, including hydro, accounted for just 5 per cent of global daily energy supply according to the IEA's latest data. That is increasing — solar photovoltaic capacity grew by 50 per cent in 2016 — but to make a real difference the industry needs a period of expansion comparable in scale to the growth of personal computing and mobile phones in the 1990s and 2000s.
根據(jù)國際能源署的最新數(shù)據(jù)，包括水力發(fā)電在內(nèi)的可再生能源僅占全球每日能源供應(yīng)的5%。這個(gè)占比在上升(2016年，太陽能光伏發(fā)電能力增長50%)，但要真正產(chǎn)生影響，可再生能源行業(yè)需要經(jīng)歷一個(gè)擴(kuò)張期，其勢頭要能與上世紀(jì)90年代個(gè)人電腦、本世紀(jì)初手機(jī)的發(fā)展相提并論。
The problem is that the industry remains fragmented. Most renewable companies are small and local, and in many cases undercapitalised; some are built to collect subsidies. A radical change will be necessary to make the industry global and capable of competing on the scale necessary to displace coal and natural gas. The coming year will show us whether it is ready for that challenge.
問題是，該行業(yè)仍很分散。多數(shù)可再生能源公司規(guī)模小、本地化，很多公司資金不足;一些公司的成立是為了獲得補(bǔ)貼。要讓這個(gè)行業(yè)全球化、并以能夠取代煤炭和天然氣所需的規(guī)模競爭，必須進(jìn)行重大變革。接下來這一年，我們將看到該行業(yè)是否做好了應(yīng)對這種挑戰(zhàn)的準(zhǔn)備。
In many ways, the energy business is at a moment of change and transition. Every reader will have their own view on each of the four questions. To me, the prospect is of supply continuing to outpace demand. If that is right, the surge in oil prices over the past two months is a temporary and unsustainable phenomenon. It would take another Middle East war to change the equation. Unfortunately, that is all too possible.
從很多方面而言，能源行業(yè)正處于一個(gè)變革和過渡的時(shí)刻。每一個(gè)讀者對這四個(gè)問題都有著自己的看法。在我看來，未來供應(yīng)將繼續(xù)超過需求。如果這是正確的，那么過去兩個(gè)月的油價(jià)飆升將是暫時(shí)的、不可持續(xù)的。要改變這種供需關(guān)系除非再發(fā)生一場中東戰(zhàn)爭。不幸的是，這太有可能了。
