傳統(tǒng)思維不適合解決日本的經(jīng)濟(jì)問題
為什么日本發(fā)現(xiàn)要把通脹提高到2%的目標(biāo)水平如此困難?為什么它的貨幣政策變得如此極端?為什么日本的公共債務(wù)如此之高?答案是，該國面臨著跟其他高收入經(jīng)濟(jì)體一樣的挑戰(zhàn)，但它的挑戰(zhàn)以極端形式出現(xiàn)。這并不意味著日本的處境是災(zāi)難性的。這意味著傳統(tǒng)智慧具有誤導(dǎo)性。
Despite the efforts of the Bank of Japan, year-on-year inflation (without fresh food and energy) is only 0.2 per cent. Yet nearly five years have passed since, in concert with the government, the BoJ declared its intention to hit a target of 2 per cent inflation. Then, in April 2013, it announced “quantitative and qualitative easing”, which unleashed a huge expansion of its balance sheet. In January 2016, it announced a modestly negative rate on new bank reserves. In September 2016, it announced “yield curve control”. It has even said that it would continue to buy assets until inflation “exceeds the price stability target of 2 per cent and stays above the target in a stable manner”. That is a commitment to future irresponsibility.
盡管日本央行(BoJ)做出了種種努力，但同比通脹率(不含新鮮食品和能源)僅為0.2%。但是，自日本央行連同政府宣布打算實(shí)現(xiàn)2%的通脹目標(biāo)以來，已經(jīng)過去了近五年。那時(shí)，即2013年4月，日本央行宣布進(jìn)行“量化和質(zhì)化寬松”，導(dǎo)致其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表大幅擴(kuò)張。2016年1月，日本央行宣布對新增銀行準(zhǔn)備金實(shí)行適度負(fù)利率。2016年9月，日本央行公布了“收益率曲線控制”。它甚至表示會(huì)繼續(xù)購買資產(chǎn)，直至通脹“超過2%的價(jià)格穩(wěn)定目標(biāo)并穩(wěn)定保持在目標(biāo)水平上方”。這簡直是對未來不負(fù)責(zé)任的承諾。
Yet even all this has failed. This is not because these measures — supported by expansionary supplementary budgets — have failed to stimulate the economy. The rate of unemployment has fallen to 2.8 per cent, a level last seen in 1994. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has forecast growth at 1.5 per cent this year, up from 1 per cent in 2016, and it expects growth of 1.2 per cent and 1 per cent, in 2018 and 2019 respectively, both slightly above potential. Moreover, gross domestic product per head grew at close to the average rate of OECD members between 2012 and 2016. (See charts.)
然而，就連這一切都失敗了。這不是因?yàn)檫@些措施——在擴(kuò)張性補(bǔ)充預(yù)算的支持下——未能刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)。失業(yè)率已降至2.8%，為1994年以來未見的水平。經(jīng)合組織(OECD)預(yù)測今年日本增長率為1.5%，高于2016年的1%，并預(yù)計(jì)2018年和2019年的增長率分別為1.2%和1%，均略高于潛在增長率。此外，在2012年至2016年，日本人均國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)增長率接近經(jīng)合組織成員國的平均水平。
Yet the anchoring of inflation expectations appears so strong — at about zero in Japan — that wages and prices remain sticky. Does this matter? In an inescapably slow-growing economy, such as Japan, near-zero inflation does limit the effectiveness of monetary policy in a downturn, since it makes it harder to deliver negative real interest rates. Yet recent experience suggests monetary policy still works. The failure to raise inflation appears no disaster.
然而，通脹預(yù)期(在日本大約為零)的錨定如此強(qiáng)烈，以至于工資和價(jià)格仍然深陷停滯。這很重要嗎?在日本這樣一個(gè)增長必然緩慢的經(jīng)濟(jì)體中，近乎零的通脹確實(shí)會(huì)限制貨幣政策在經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)期的有效性，因?yàn)樗哟罅藢?shí)行負(fù)實(shí)際利率的難度。然而，近年經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明貨幣政策仍然是有效的。未能提高通脹似乎并非災(zāi)難。
Two more important challenges exist. On one of these, current orthodoxy is right. On the other, it is wrong. 日本還有兩個(gè)更重大的挑戰(zhàn)。對于其中一個(gè)，當(dāng)前的正統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)是正確的。而對于另一個(gè)，正統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)是錯(cuò)誤的。
Where orthodoxy is right is on productivity. Given Japan’s demography and currently low unemployment, raising productivity is essential, though increasing participation of women and older people also matters. Fortunately, Japan enjoys room for productivity improvement: its average productivity per hour is among the lowest of the high-income countries; big business is far more productive than smaller firms; and manufacturing vastly more productive than services.
在生產(chǎn)率方面，正統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)是正確的。鑒于日本的人口結(jié)構(gòu)和當(dāng)前很低的失業(yè)率，提高生產(chǎn)率是不可或缺的，盡管提高婦女和較年長人群的勞動(dòng)參與率也很重要。幸運(yùn)的是，日本存在提高生產(chǎn)率的空間：其每小時(shí)平均生產(chǎn)率在高收入國家中是最低的;大企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)效率遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于中小企業(yè);而制造業(yè)生產(chǎn)率大幅領(lǐng)先于服務(wù)業(yè)。
Where orthodoxy is wrong is on public deficits and debt. It is true that gross debt is 240 per cent of GDP and net debt about 120 per cent. Without elimination of the structural primary fiscal deficit (now close to 4 per cent of GDP), debt ratios are likely to rise still further in future. It is not surprising that official institutions — the OECD, the International Monetary Fund and the Ministry of Finance — agree on structural tightening. Yet there are two objections.
在公共赤字和債務(wù)方面，正統(tǒng)觀念是錯(cuò)誤的。沒錯(cuò)，日本的總債務(wù)已經(jīng)相當(dāng)于GDP的240%，凈債務(wù)達(dá)到GDP的約120%。如果不消除結(jié)構(gòu)性的基本財(cái)政赤字(目前接近GDP的4%)，債務(wù)比率未來可能進(jìn)一步升高。意料之中的是，官方機(jī)構(gòu)——經(jīng)合組織、國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)和財(cái)務(wù)省——都認(rèn)同結(jié)構(gòu)性收緊。然而，可以提出兩點(diǎn)反對意見。
The first is that the BoJ holds more than 40 per cent of all Japanese government bonds. It can continue to hold this debt forever, should it need to do so. It can also continue to pay no interest on commercial bank reserves if it wished. It need only change required reserves. More fundamentally, the Japanese public is the creditor: it is not hard to see ways for the government to manage its liabilities to the public. When the government ceases to run primary deficits, it could, for example, convert its debts into irredeemable low-yielding bonds.
第一個(gè)是，日本央行持有的國債占到日本國債總量的40%以上。如果需要的話，它可以無限期地永遠(yuǎn)持有這筆債務(wù);如果愿意的話，它也可以繼續(xù)對商業(yè)銀行的準(zhǔn)備金不支付利息。它只需要改變準(zhǔn)備金要求。更為根本的是，日本公眾是債權(quán)人：不難看出政府如何管理對公眾的負(fù)債。例如，當(dāng)政府停止運(yùn)行基本赤字時(shí)，它可以將自己的債務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)換成不可贖回的低收益?zhèn)?/p>
The more important point is that the government’s persistent deficits are simply the mirror image of the private sector’s huge and persistent financial surpluses. There is no point in discussing how the government will eliminate the former without indicating what is likely to happen to the latter.
更重要的一點(diǎn)是，政府的持續(xù)赤字只不過是私人部門龐大而持續(xù)的財(cái)務(wù)盈余的鏡像。討論政府將如何消除前者，而不說明后者可能會(huì)發(fā)生什么，是毫無意義的。
One possibility is for Japan to run far larger current account surpluses. In 2015, for example, that would have required a current account surplus almost twice as big, at close to 6 per cent of GDP. Foreigners would surely not have liked that. The alternative is for the Japanese private sector to invest more or consume more (or both). The problem with the first option is that Japan’s private sector already has an exceptionally high investment rate, especially for a high-income country with structurally low growth. The difficulty with the latter is that Japan’s household savings rate is already close to zero. Consumption will only rise if household income does.
對日本而言，一個(gè)可能性是運(yùn)行大得多的經(jīng)常賬戶盈余。例如，就2015年而言，這將需要經(jīng)常賬戶盈余增加近一倍，接近GDP的6%。外國人肯定不會(huì)喜歡這一點(diǎn)。日本的私營部門可以選擇加大投資或增加消費(fèi)(或者在兩方面都發(fā)力)。但問題是，對于前一個(gè)選擇，日本私營部門的投資率已經(jīng)非常高，尤其是對一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)性低增長的高收入國家來說;對于后一個(gè)選擇，日本的家庭儲(chǔ)蓄率已接近于零。唯有家庭收入增多，消費(fèi)才能增加。
The solution is not to tax consumption, as respectable opinion suggests. The solution is to tax savings. Uninvested and undistributed profits need to be turned into consumption. That could be done by “expensing” investment, while (quite logically) eliminating depreciation allowances.
解決方法不是像某些令人尊敬的觀點(diǎn)所認(rèn)為的那樣對消費(fèi)征稅。解決方法是對儲(chǔ)蓄征稅。未投資和未分配的利潤需要轉(zhuǎn)化為消費(fèi)。通過對投資“收費(fèi)”、同時(shí)(相當(dāng)合乎邏輯地)取消折舊免稅額，可以做到這一點(diǎn)。
Conversion of uninvested and undistributed corporate profits into private consumption would eliminate the private sector surpluses and so the need for offsetting public sector deficits. In the absence of such policies, efforts to close the fiscal deficits are likely to fail, since, as has happened so often before, they are likely to tip the economy back into recession. In the absence of some such reform, the Japanese private sector is doomed to lend to the government the money it cannot currently use, in the sure and certain knowledge that it will never get back in full what it has lent.
把未投資和未分配的公司利潤轉(zhuǎn)化為私人消費(fèi)，將消除私營部門的盈余，從而不需要公共部門的赤字作為抵消。如果沒有這類政策，消除財(cái)政赤字的努力很可能會(huì)失敗，因?yàn)檎缫酝鶎覍野l(fā)生的那樣，這些努力有可能使經(jīng)濟(jì)再度陷入衰退。如果沒有一些此類改革措施，日本私營部門注定要把現(xiàn)在用不到的錢借給政府，明知道這些錢永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)全額收回來。
Fiscal tightening is the respectable solution to Japan’s soaring public debt. On its own, however, it cannot work.
財(cái)政收緊是針對日本公共債務(wù)猛增的令人尊敬的解決方案。但是，僅靠該方案不能解決問題。
