斯里蘭卡漢班托塔港正式移交中國(guó)

Sri Lanka has formally handed over its southern port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease, which government critics have denounced as an erosion of the country’s sovereignty.

根據(jù)一份為期99年的租約，斯里蘭卡已正式將其南部港口漢班托塔(Hambantota)移交中國(guó)。斯里蘭卡政府的批評(píng)者譴責(zé)此舉有損國(guó)家主權(quán)。

The $1.3bn port was opened seven years ago using debt from Chinese state-controlled entities. But it has since struggled under heavy losses, making it impossible for Colombo to repay its debts.

這個(gè)耗資13億美元的港口是7年前利用中國(guó)國(guó)有控股實(shí)體的貸款建成的。但在投入運(yùn)營(yíng)后一直面臨巨額虧損，使斯里蘭卡政府不可能償還債務(wù)。

In 2016, Sri Lankan ministers struck a deal to sell an 80 per cent stake in the port to the state-controlled China Merchants Port Holdings.

2016年，斯里蘭卡的部長(zhǎng)級(jí)官員們敲定一筆交易，將該港口80%的股權(quán)出售給中國(guó)國(guó)有控股企業(yè)招商局港口控股有限公司(China Merchants Port Holdings)。

But that agreement sparked protests from unions and opposition groups, forcing the government to renegotiate it. Under the new plan, signed in July, the Chinese company will hold a 70 per cent stake in a joint venture with the state-run Sri Lanka Ports Authority.

但該協(xié)議引發(fā)工會(huì)和反對(duì)派組織的抗議，迫使斯里蘭卡政府重啟談判。根據(jù)7月簽訂的新計(jì)劃，這家中國(guó)公司將與國(guó)有的斯里蘭卡港務(wù)局(Sri Lanka Ports Authority)組建合資公司，并將持有合資公司70%的股權(quán)。

Ranil Wickremesinghe, Sri Lanka’s prime minister, welcomed the deal during the official handing over ceremony at the weekend. He said: “With this agreement we have started to pay back the loans. Hambantota will be converted to a major port in the Indian Ocean.

在周末舉行的正式移交儀式上，斯里蘭卡總理拉尼爾•維克拉馬辛哈(Ranil Wickremesinghe)對(duì)這筆交易表示歡迎。他表示：“有了這項(xiàng)協(xié)議，我們已開(kāi)始償還貸款。漢班托塔港將成為印度洋上的一個(gè)重要港口。”

“There will be an economic zone and industrialisation in the area which will lead to economic development and promote tourism.”

“該地區(qū)將設(shè)立經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)，走向工業(yè)化，這將帶來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，并促進(jìn)旅游業(yè)。”

But the renegotiated plan has failed to quell dissent within Sri Lanka. When it was first signed Namal Rajapaksa, Hambantota’s MP and son of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, tweeted: “Government is playing geopolitics with national assets? #stopsellingSL”.

但是，這份經(jīng)重新談判達(dá)成的計(jì)劃未能平息斯里蘭卡國(guó)內(nèi)的反對(duì)意見(jiàn)。在協(xié)議首次簽訂時(shí)，漢班托塔議員、前總統(tǒng)馬欣達(dá)•拉賈帕克薩(Mahinda Rajapaksa)的兒子納馬爾•拉賈帕克薩(Namal Rajapaksa)在Twitter上發(fā)帖稱：“政府正在用國(guó)家資產(chǎn)玩地緣政治?#別再變賣斯里蘭卡”。

For Beijing, the Hambantota project is a linchpin of the “One Belt One Road” project, which aims to build a new Silk Road of trade routes between China and more than 60 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe.

對(duì)于中國(guó)而言，漢班托塔港項(xiàng)目是“一帶一路”計(jì)劃的關(guān)鍵一環(huán)，該計(jì)劃的目標(biāo)是在中國(guó)與亞洲、中東、非洲和歐洲60多個(gè)國(guó)家之間打造一條新的絲綢之路貿(mào)易通道。

That project is underpinned by a network of harbours across the world that have put China in a position to challenge the US as the world’s most important maritime superpower. Other similar developments in the region include the Gwadar port in Pakistan, which is the centrepiece of the $55bn China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

該項(xiàng)目的基礎(chǔ)是世界各地的港口網(wǎng)絡(luò)，讓中國(guó)有能力挑戰(zhàn)美國(guó)作為世界最重要海洋超級(jí)大國(guó)的地位。在印度洋地區(qū)，其他類似項(xiàng)目包括巴基斯坦的瓜達(dá)爾港，該港是550億美元的“中巴經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊”(China-Pakistan Economic Corridor)的核心。

But some have accused Beijing of using projects such as this to increase its regional political power, noting the length of the lease agreed by Sri Lanka is the same as that which gave Britain control over Hong Kong in the 19th century.

但有些人指責(zé)北京方面利用此類項(xiàng)目來(lái)增加它在該地區(qū)的政治影響力，并指出斯里蘭卡同意的租約期限與19世紀(jì)中國(guó)把香港的控制權(quán)交給英國(guó)的租約一樣。

Constantino Xavier, a fellow at foreign policy think-tank Carnegie, said: “This is part of a larger modus operandi by China in the region.

外交政策智庫(kù)卡內(nèi)基(Carnegie)研究員康斯坦丁諾•澤維爾(Constantino Xavier)表示：“這是中國(guó)在該地區(qū)整體操作手法的一部分。”

“Beijing typically finds a local partner, makes that local partner accept investment plans that are detrimental to their country in the long term, and then uses the debts to either acquire the project altogether or to acquire political leverage in that country.”

“北京方面通常會(huì)在當(dāng)?shù)卣乙粋€(gè)合作伙伴，讓當(dāng)?shù)睾献骰锇榻邮荛L(zhǎng)期而言不利于其國(guó)家的投資計(jì)劃，然后利用債務(wù)要么收購(gòu)整個(gè)項(xiàng)目，要么在該國(guó)獲得政治影響力。”

New Delhi has become so concerned about Beijing’s plans at Hambantota that it has entered talks with Sri Lanka to operate an airport nearby.

新德里對(duì)北京在漢班托塔的計(jì)劃如此關(guān)注，以至于它已經(jīng)就在漢班托塔附近運(yùn)營(yíng)一個(gè)機(jī)場(chǎng)的事宜與斯里蘭卡展開(kāi)談判。

In recent months, however, there have been signs that China’s partners are starting to become wary over the terms being dictated to build projects under the One Road banner.

然而，最近幾個(gè)月有跡象表明，中國(guó)的合作伙伴們開(kāi)始對(duì)硬塞給自己的“一帶一路”建設(shè)項(xiàng)目條款變得謹(jǐn)慎起來(lái)。

Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar have all recently cancelled or sidelined major hydroelectricity projects planned by Chinese companies. The projects would have been worth a total of $20bn.

巴基斯坦、尼泊爾和緬甸最近都取消或擱置了中國(guó)公司計(jì)劃建設(shè)的大型水電項(xiàng)目。這些項(xiàng)目總共價(jià)值200億美元。