印度尚無底氣拒絕中國投資

In mid-October, Guo Guangchang, founder of Fosun, flew to Mumbai in his private plane to attend the dinner celebrating the Chinese conglomerate’s purchase of Indian pharma company Gland. For many weeks, approval for the transaction had been held up — hostage to the border dispute between India and China in Doklam. The situation was finally resolved not because Delhi signed off but because Gland’s founder, PVN Raju, agreed to sell a smaller portion of his holdings, bringing the transfer below the 74 per cent threshold that triggered the need to secure the government’s blessing. Over mao-tai, (which the Fosun people claimed cost $1,000 a bottle), Mr Guo, clad in jeans and a T-shirt, said he hoped to do many more deals in India, according to several attendees. Fosun has already joined the many Chinese companies backing tech start-ups in the country.

10月中旬，復(fù)星集團(tuán)(Fosun)創(chuàng)始人郭廣昌乘坐自己的私人飛機(jī)前往孟買出席這家中國綜合企業(yè)收購印度制藥商Gland的慶祝晚宴。受制于印中兩國在多蘭(Doklam，中國稱洞朗——譯者注)的邊境爭端，該交易在好幾周期間遲遲未能獲得批準(zhǔn)。這一局面最終得以解決，并不是因?yàn)樾碌吕锓矫娣判?，而是因?yàn)镚land的創(chuàng)始人PVN Raju同意出售較少股份，使得股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓份額低于74%的門檻——超過這一門檻的交易必須獲得印度政府批準(zhǔn)。據(jù)一些參加晚宴的人介紹，身著牛仔褲和T恤衫的郭廣昌舉著裝著茅臺(tái)(復(fù)星員工稱一瓶茅臺(tái)的價(jià)格為1000美元)的酒杯說，他希望在印度做成更多交易。復(fù)星已經(jīng)加入了支持印度科技初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的中國企業(yè)大軍。

The Fosun deal is a pointer to how complicated India’s relationship with China has become. Swaths of the Indian economy are dependent on Chinese products. If solar energy is now competitive with polluting thermal power plants, owned by corporates such as Reliance and Tata, it is in large part because about 90 per cent of the solar panels come from China. The telecoms industry in India is thriving on cell phones that are made in China, assembled in India; Reliance Jio phones are largely sourced from Chinese maker ZTE. Moreover, some of India’s best-known start-ups, such as Paytm and Flipkart, rely on Chinese capital.

這筆交易表明印度與中國的關(guān)系如今變得多么復(fù)雜。印度經(jīng)濟(jì)在很多地方依靠中國產(chǎn)品。如果說現(xiàn)在太陽能發(fā)電具有競爭力，能夠與信實(shí)(Reliance)和塔塔(Tata)等企業(yè)旗下高污染的熱電廠較量，那主要是因?yàn)榇蠹s90%的太陽能電池板來自中國。印度電信行業(yè)正借力印度組裝的中國手機(jī)迅速發(fā)展;印度運(yùn)營商Reliance Jio提供的手機(jī)主要來自中國制造商中興通訊(ZTE)。此外，印度一些最著名的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)，比如Paytm和Flipkart，都依靠中國資本。

Business and government do not always look on China in the same way. The tensions over the disputed border area at Doklam have subsided at least temporarily. But China has few friends in Delhi. Most Indian politicians remain convinced that it is a political, economic and financial bully that wishes to impinge on India’s sovereignty and to solve its excess capacity issues at India’s expense.

印度企業(yè)和政府并不總是以同樣的方式看待中國。兩國在多蘭這個(gè)有爭議邊境地區(qū)的緊張局勢(shì)至少暫時(shí)平息了下來。但中國在德里幾乎沒有朋友。大多數(shù)印度政客仍然堅(jiān)信，中國在政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融方面恃強(qiáng)凌弱，企圖侵犯印度主權(quán)，并以印度的利益為代價(jià)解決中國的產(chǎn)能過剩問題。

However, the business community has a more nuanced view, based on its dependence on China. That adds to the risks facing corporate India today. Many local industries could ill-afford a political backlash from Delhi against China, but that does not mean that a rupture cannot happen. For example, the first anniversary of India’s big demonetisation push in early November led to a round of harsh rhetoric from the opposition Congress party, led by former prime minister Manmohan Singh and the man who would be prime minister, Rahul Gandhi. Somewhat curiously, what should have been an attack on the BJP government of prime minister Narendra Modi instead took the form of an attack on China’s manufacturing prowess.

然而，印度企業(yè)界基于自身對(duì)中國的依賴，看法更加細(xì)膩。這也加劇了眼下印度企業(yè)面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。印度本土很多產(chǎn)業(yè)承受不起新德里對(duì)中國的政治反彈，但是這并不意味著兩國關(guān)系破裂不可能發(fā)生。例如，11月初印度大力推行廢鈔令一周年之際，由前總理曼莫漢•辛格(Manmohan Singh)和未來有望成為總理的拉胡爾•甘地(Rahul Gandhi)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的反對(duì)黨——國大黨(Congress party)發(fā)起新一輪強(qiáng)烈抨擊。有些奇怪的是，原本應(yīng)該指向納倫德拉•莫迪(Narendra Modi)總理領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的人民黨(BJP)政府的矛頭，卻指向了中國制造業(yè)實(shí)力。

“One of the primary responsibilities of a state is to provide vocation for its people,” Mr Gandhi wrote in the Financial Times. “China’s global monopoly on blue-collar jobs is a fundamental challenge to other states.” Meanwhile, Mr Singh blamed demonetisation and a new goods and services tax for damaging India’s small businesses. “Our businesses had to turn to Chinese imports at the cost of Indian jobs,” he said.

“國家的主要職責(zé)之一就是為人民提供職業(yè)，”甘地為英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》撰文稱，“中國對(duì)藍(lán)領(lǐng)工作的全球壟斷，是其他國家面臨的根本挑戰(zhàn)。”與此同時(shí)，辛格指責(zé)廢鈔令和新的商品和服務(wù)稅(GST)傷害了印度小企業(yè)。他稱，“我們的企業(yè)不得不轉(zhuǎn)向從中國進(jìn)口的商品，使印度的就業(yè)付出代價(jià)。”

The situation is especially fraught for Indian entrepreneurs looking to China for funds, given the high cost of funds and the relative lack of domestic risk capital. Paytm ended up taking money from Alibaba (and Japan’s SoftBank) because its founder, Vijay Shankar Sharma, says he needs “continuous capital”. When Mr Sharma first took money from Alibaba (after meeting Jack Ma and his team in Hangzhou), “I knew that India was an open playground,” he says. “I knew Amazon will come and Facebook will come and PayPal will come. We needed outside capital and we needed Chinese money because China understands India. But I chose Jack Ma’s money because I wanted a figure with global respect. He was the first Chinese to inspire global respect. For Ali there is no check limit.”

對(duì)于尋求中國資金(由于本國融資成本較高、且相對(duì)缺少風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本)的印度企業(yè)家而言，局面尤其問題重重。Paytm最終接受阿里巴巴(Alibaba)(以及日本軟銀(SoftBank))的投資，因?yàn)槠鋭?chuàng)始人維杰•尚卡爾•夏爾馬(Vijay Shankar Sharma)稱，他需要“連續(xù)不斷的資本”。夏爾馬稱，當(dāng)他在杭州與馬云及其團(tuán)隊(duì)見面后、第一次從阿里巴巴獲得融資后，“我知道印度是一個(gè)開放競技場……我知道亞馬遜(Amazon)會(huì)來，F(xiàn)acebook會(huì)來，PayPal也會(huì)來。我們需要外部資本，我們需要中國資本，因?yàn)橹袊斫庥《?。但我選擇馬云的投資是因?yàn)槲蚁胍晃辉谌蛳碛新曌u(yù)的人物。他是第一位贏得全球尊重的中國人。對(duì)阿里來說，支票金額沒有上限。”

But there can be risks. Chinese money can come with strings attached, which is precisely why there is a risk of a political backlash. That is especially true when it comes to sensitive areas such as finance.

但是其中可能存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。中國資本可能附帶條件，這正是可能遭到政治反彈的原因，尤其是在涉及金融等敏感領(lǐng)域時(shí)。

For India to have more choices and less fraught choices, it needs to have more leverage. But until India’s economy and finances are in better shape, it will be in no position to turn down investments and acquisitions from China, or anywhere else.

要讓印度有更多選擇和不那么棘手的選擇，它需要具備更大支配力。但在印度經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融狀況進(jìn)一步改善之前，它沒有底氣拒絕來自中國或者其他地區(qū)的投資和收購要約。