或許弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)原本就一直打算在本周三確認(rèn)(好像有誰(shuí)懷疑過(guò)這一點(diǎn)似的)明年他將參選,爭(zhēng)取第四個(gè)總統(tǒng)任期。或許他這樣做是為了讓俄羅斯被禁止參加明年在韓國(guó)舉行的冬奧會(huì)的慘痛消息“淡下去”。不管怎樣,從國(guó)際上看,被明年2月的平昌冬奧會(huì)(Pyeongchang Games)驅(qū)逐是一種令人難堪的羞辱。俄羅斯是第一個(gè)因服用興奮劑問(wèn)題被奧運(yùn)會(huì)禁賽的國(guó)家,不僅如此,明年還正好是它舉辦足球世界杯(World Cup)的年份。
The ban is belated but entirely justified. Even while Russia was hosting the most expensive winter games ever in Sochi in 2014, it was engaged behind the scenes in one of the most elaborate doping cover-ups in sporting history. Russian athletes’ urine samples were systematically switched for clean ones to hide drug-taking that continued throughout the games. The Federal Security Service assisted by working out how to open undetected, supposedly tamper-proof sample bottles.
雖然這一禁令?yuàn)檴檨?lái)遲,但完全有據(jù)可依。甚至就在俄羅斯2014年在索契舉辦有史以來(lái)最昂貴的一屆冬奧會(huì)時(shí),莫斯科方面還在秘密地實(shí)施體育史上最費(fèi)盡心機(jī)的計(jì)劃來(lái)掩蓋運(yùn)動(dòng)員服用興奮劑的行為。俄羅斯運(yùn)動(dòng)員的尿樣被系統(tǒng)地調(diào)換成了干凈樣本,以掩蓋他們?cè)诒荣惼陂g繼續(xù)服用藥物的行為。樣本瓶理論上是一經(jīng)打開(kāi)就無(wú)法還原的,俄聯(lián)邦安全局(Federal Security Service)幫助研究出了不留痕跡地打開(kāi)樣本瓶的辦法。
The International Olympic Committee should have acted last year and barred Russia from the Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, when the World Anti-Doping Agency revealed explosive findings on Moscow’s state-sponsored doping weeks before the games.
世界反興奮劑機(jī)構(gòu)(WADA)在去年里約夏季奧運(yùn)會(huì)舉行前幾周公布了針對(duì)俄羅斯存在得到國(guó)家支持的服用興奮劑行為的爆炸性調(diào)查結(jié)果,在那個(gè)時(shí)候國(guó)際奧委會(huì)(IOC)原本就應(yīng)該采取行動(dòng),禁止俄羅斯參加里約夏季奧運(yùn)會(huì)。
Instead, Thomas Bach, IOC president, left the decision to individual sporting federations — resulting in 271 of Russia’s original 386-strong team taking part. That looked weak, allowed Moscow to claim a political victory, and sullied the concept of clean sport.
然而,當(dāng)時(shí)國(guó)際奧委會(huì)主席托馬斯•巴赫(Thomas Bach)將決定權(quán)交給了各個(gè)國(guó)際單項(xiàng)體育聯(lián)合會(huì)——結(jié)果是,俄羅斯代表隊(duì)原有的386人中,有271人參加了奧運(yùn)會(huì)。這種弱勢(shì)表現(xiàn)使莫斯科獲得了政治上的勝利,也玷污了神圣的體育運(yùn)動(dòng)。
Post-Rio, the Olympic movement expected Russia would, over time, admit to the doping and commit to changing its system. The country, or at least its senior leadership, has refused to do so. The whistleblower Grigory Rodchenkov, who ran Moscow’s anti-doping laboratory in 2014, has been denounced as a fraudster and traitor.
里約奧運(yùn)會(huì)后,國(guó)際奧委會(huì)曾寄希望俄羅斯隨著時(shí)間的推移會(huì)承認(rèn)使用興奮劑,并承諾改革本國(guó)的體育系統(tǒng)。但俄羅斯(或者至少該國(guó)的高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo))拒絕這樣做。舉報(bào)人、2014年負(fù)責(zé)俄反興奮劑實(shí)驗(yàn)室的格里戈里•羅琴科夫(Grigory Rodchenkov)被譴責(zé)為騙子和叛徒。
Now, a further IOC-initiated probe has corroborated most of Wada’s findings last year and backed Mr Rodchenkov as a “truthful witness”. The Olympic governing body had little option but to bar the Russian flag and anthem from Pyeongchang.
如今,國(guó)際奧委會(huì)發(fā)起的一項(xiàng)進(jìn)一步調(diào)查證實(shí)了世界反興奮劑機(jī)構(gòu)去年公布的大部分調(diào)查結(jié)果,并證實(shí)羅德琴科夫是一名“誠(chéng)實(shí)的證人”。作為奧運(yùn)會(huì)管理機(jī)構(gòu)的國(guó)際奧委會(huì)別無(wú)選擇,只能禁止俄羅斯國(guó)旗和國(guó)歌出現(xiàn)在平昌冬奧會(huì)。
Anti-doping campaigners argue the IOC should have stopped any Russian athletes competing. Its decision to allow Russians who can prove they are clean to take part as “neutrals” under the Olympic flag is a defensible compromise aimed at avoiding penalising innocent individuals. Mr Putin is right to have refrained from announcing a mooted complete Russian boycott of the event, so letting them compete.
反興奮劑活動(dòng)人士認(rèn)為,國(guó)際奧委會(huì)本應(yīng)禁止任何俄羅斯運(yùn)動(dòng)員參加平昌冬奧會(huì)。國(guó)際奧委會(huì)的決定——允許能夠自證清白的俄羅斯運(yùn)動(dòng)員以“中立者”身份舉奧林匹克旗參賽——是一種合理的妥協(xié),旨在避免無(wú)辜的運(yùn)動(dòng)員受到懲罰。有人建議俄羅斯應(yīng)全面抵制平昌冬奧會(huì),但普京沒(méi)有這樣做,這是正確的。因此,這些運(yùn)動(dòng)員可以參賽。
Yet, however well-founded, the Olympic ban may only strengthen the Russian president. He can use it in his campaign for the election in March to bolster his message that Russia is surrounded by enemies. Russia’s powerful and poisonous state media will echo the claims. Many ordinary Russians will believe that the block on their sports stars is the result of a dastardly conspiracy, not of egregious wrong-doing by their own officials.
然而,無(wú)論證據(jù)多么確鑿,禁止俄羅斯參加平昌冬奧會(huì)或許只會(huì)鞏固普京總統(tǒng)的權(quán)力。他可以在自己的競(jìng)選活動(dòng)(俄羅斯大選將于明年3月舉行)中利用這一事件證明他的如下觀點(diǎn):俄羅斯已被敵人包圍。俄羅斯強(qiáng)大且善于洗腦的官方媒體將附和這些說(shuō)法。許多俄羅斯普通民眾會(huì)認(rèn)為,禁止本國(guó)體育明星參賽是一場(chǎng)卑鄙陰謀的結(jié)果,而非本國(guó)官員惡劣的錯(cuò)誤行徑所致。
For the western community, which has no desire either to buttress Mr Putin or to alienate the Russian people, that poses a dilemma. Yet for as long as the Russian leadership flouts established standards of behaviour — from doping its athletes to waging covert war in eastern Ukraine — the west has no choice but to take punitive measures.
對(duì)于既不想助普京一臂之力、也不想疏遠(yuǎn)俄羅斯民眾的西方社會(huì)來(lái)說(shuō),這造成了一種兩難。然而,只要俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層無(wú)視公認(rèn)的行為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)——從讓運(yùn)動(dòng)員服用興奮劑到在烏克蘭東部發(fā)動(dòng)秘密戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)——西方除了采取懲罰性措施別無(wú)選擇。
For the IOC, it remains unclear whether, after the winter games, Russia will make the concessions needed to return to the Olympic fold. The same issue may yet dog the higher profile summer games in Tokyo in 2020. After all, it seems ever more certain that Mr Putin will still be around by then.
國(guó)際奧委會(huì)仍不知道,平昌冬奧會(huì)結(jié)束后,俄羅斯是否會(huì)做出回歸奧運(yùn)會(huì)所需的讓步。同樣的問(wèn)題可能還會(huì)困擾更受世人矚目的2020年?yáng)|京夏季奧運(yùn)會(huì)。畢竟,看似越來(lái)越確定的是,普京到那時(shí)仍將在臺(tái)上。