美日澳印重啟“四方安全對(duì)話”

Alongside the gladhanding, strutting and tweets from world leaders at two Asian summits over the past few days, one of the most important geopolitical developments came from a low-key meeting between civil servants from four countries.

在過去幾天舉行的兩場(chǎng)亞洲峰會(huì)上，除了各國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人友好的相互招呼、昂首闊步的身影以及各自發(fā)出的推文之外，帶來極為重要地緣政治變化的是四個(gè)國(guó)家的官員之間的一次低調(diào)會(huì)晤。

Officials from the US, Japan, Australia and India met at the weekend on the sidelines of the Asean summit in Manila to restart the “quad”, a diplomatic initiative set up a decade ago to counterbalance China’s growing power in the region.

上周末，在馬尼拉的東盟(Asean)峰會(huì)間隙，來自美國(guó)、日本、澳大利亞和印度的官員進(jìn)行了會(huì)晤，目的是重啟“四方安全對(duì)話”(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue，簡(jiǎn)稱quad)——一項(xiàng)10年前搭建的、旨在制衡中國(guó)在該地區(qū)日益擴(kuò)大的影響力的外交倡議。

None of the four mentioned China in subsequent statements but each touched on issues likely to make Beijing nervous. They talked of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region being “free and open” and bound by a “rules-based order”. All except India called for freedom of navigation in the region, potentially challenging China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

在隨后發(fā)表的聲明中，上述四國(guó)都沒有提及中國(guó)，但他們都觸及了可能令北京方面緊張的問題。他們談到印度洋-太平洋地區(qū)保持“自由、開放”以及維持“基于規(guī)則的秩序”的重要性。除了印度，其他三國(guó)都對(duì)這一地區(qū)的航行自由提出了要求，此舉可能對(duì)中國(guó)在南中國(guó)海的領(lǐng)土主張構(gòu)成挑戰(zhàn)。

“The very fact that this meeting happened is very important,” says Harsh Pant, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi think-tank. “It tells you that major powers have looked back at the last decade and made an assessment that whatever China has done has not been beneficial to the balance of power.”

“這次會(huì)晤舉行了，這一事實(shí)本身就非常重要。”新德里智庫(kù)觀察家研究基金會(huì)(Observer Research Foundation)研究員哈什•潘特(Harsh Pant)表示，“它傳達(dá)的信息是，幾個(gè)大國(guó)回顧了過去10年并做出如下判斷——中國(guó)的所作所為對(duì)權(quán)力平衡沒起好作用。”

The quad, short for Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, was conceived in 2007 but disbanded the following year after complaints from Beijing. Those objections were heard loudest in New Delhi, which is traditionally wary of formal alliances, and Canberra, where the government hoped to dissuade China from acting aggressively in the region.

四方安全對(duì)話肇始于2007年，但在北京方面的抗議下于次年解散。反對(duì)的聲音最響亮的地方是新德里和堪培拉，新德里傳統(tǒng)上就對(duì)正式結(jié)盟持警惕態(tài)度，而澳大利亞政府希望勸服中國(guó)不要在這一地區(qū)采取咄咄逼人的行動(dòng)。

“Involving all four parties was seen as too provocative back then,” says Dhruva Jaishankar, a fellow at the Brookings India research group. “So to do this on the sidelines of a major summit [now] is a significant break from the past.”

“將四方聚到一起當(dāng)時(shí)被視為過于挑釁，”布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)(Brookings Institution)印度中心研究員德魯瓦•賈伊尚卡爾(Dhruva Jaishankar)表示，“因此，(如今)在一場(chǎng)重大峰會(huì)間隙舉行這一會(huì)晤，是一次重大改變。”

The break-up of the quad in 2008 was seen as a particular blow to Tokyo, which has long sought greater co-operation between the four democratic countries. In an effort to overcome resistance from India and Australia, Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, has targeted the leaders of both countries with his personal style of diplomacy.

2008年四方安全對(duì)話的解體對(duì)東京的打擊尤甚，日本長(zhǎng)期致力于推動(dòng)這四個(gè)民主國(guó)家之間加強(qiáng)合作。為了克服來自印度和澳大利亞的阻力，日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)親自上陣對(duì)這兩國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人進(jìn)行游說。

This has proved successful particularly with India’s Narendra Modi, with the two leaders swapping repeated bilateral visits.

事實(shí)證明此法對(duì)印度總理納倫德拉•莫迪(Narendra Modi)尤為成功，兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人多次互訪。

Despite this, India’s government has until recently been reluctant to co-operate with the three other nations. This year, for example, New Delhi refused to let Australia join the Malabar naval exercise, held jointly with Japan and the US.

盡管如此，印度政府直至最近還一直不太情愿配合另外三國(guó)。例如，今年新德里拒絕了讓澳大利亞加入印度與日美兩國(guó)聯(lián)合舉行的馬拉巴爾(Malabar)海上軍演。

Foreign policy specialists say the mood has changed in Canberra and New Delhi because of a perception that seeking to appease China has not curtailed Beijing’s expansionist policies. They point especially to the way China has turned a number of reefs into de facto military bases in the South China Sea since 2012.

外交政策專家稱，堪培拉和新德里的心態(tài)已經(jīng)發(fā)生變化，因?yàn)閷で蟀矒嶂袊?guó)的做法似乎并未阻止北京方面奉行擴(kuò)張主義政策。尤其是，自2012年以來，中國(guó)已將南中國(guó)海的多處島礁變成了事實(shí)上的軍事基地。

John Hemmings, director of the Asia Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society, a foreign policy think-tank, says: “We must ask ourselves: by avoiding collective security arrangements in 2008, did we persuade China to behave as a model citizen in the region?”

外交政策智庫(kù)亨利杰克遜學(xué)會(huì)(Henry Jackson Society)亞洲研究中心主任約翰•黑明斯(John Hemmings)說：“我們必須捫心自問：我們?cè)?008年取消集體安全安排的舉動(dòng)，說服中國(guó)在這一地區(qū)像模范公民那樣行事了嗎?”

As well as reining in Beijing, observers say the creation of a formal alliance is designed to tie in Washington at a time when many US allies are unsure how reliable a partner Donald Trump’s administration will prove. 除了牽制北京方面，觀察人士表示，打造一個(gè)正式聯(lián)盟的目的還在于綁住華盛頓——眼下美國(guó)的諸多盟友都不確定唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)政府作為盟友在遇到事情時(shí)會(huì)有多靠得住。

“This represents an attempt by Japan, Australia and India to keep the US engaged in the region at a time when there are concerns about America’s position following the election of Donald Trump,” says Euan Graham, director at the Lowy Institute in Sydney.

“此舉是日本、澳大利亞、印度約束美國(guó)的一次努力，其目的是保持美國(guó)對(duì)這一地區(qū)的介入，在唐納德•特朗普當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)后，有人擔(dān)心美國(guó)的立場(chǎng)發(fā)生變化。”悉尼洛伊研究所(Lowy Institute)負(fù)責(zé)人尤安•格雷厄姆(Euan Graham)表示。

Many in India were delighted by Mr Trump’s adoption of the phrase “Indo-Pacific” to describe the region, which they feel gives a formal acknowledgment of the role New Delhi would like to play.

印度國(guó)內(nèi)許多人對(duì)特朗普用“印度洋-太平洋”(Indo-Pacific)一詞形容這一地區(qū)感到興奮，他們覺得這是正式認(rèn)可新德里想要扮演的角色。

So far, Beijing has not protested at initial steps towards the creation of a new regional alliance.

到目前為止，北京方面還未就這些打造一個(gè)新地區(qū)同盟的初步舉動(dòng)提出抗議。

“There is no reason to believe it is targeting China,” Zhang Jun, a senior official at the Chinese foreign ministry, said at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in Vietnam. “No matter what [Trump’s Indo-Pacific] strategy is, it should be open, inclusive and embody equality, mutual benefit and respect as opposed to serving the interests of a small group of countries.”

中國(guó)外交部高級(jí)官員張軍在越南舉行的亞太經(jīng)濟(jì)合作論壇(APEC)上表示，沒有理由相信這是在針對(duì)中國(guó)，不管(特朗普的印度洋-太平洋)戰(zhàn)略是什么，它應(yīng)該開放、包容，體現(xiàn)平等、互利和尊重，而不是為一小撮國(guó)家的利益服務(wù)。

Yet some believe the greater threat to the quad is not from China, but the commitment shown by the unpredictable Mr Trump.

然而，有人認(rèn)為，四方安全對(duì)話面臨的更大威脅不在于中國(guó)，而在于不按常理出牌的特朗普在對(duì)這項(xiàng)倡議的承諾上的表現(xiàn)。

“Despite coining his regional policy approach the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ . . . Mr Trump largely avoided discussing the importance of promoting human rights and good governance in the region,” says Paul Haenle, director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing and a former White House adviser. “Instead, he focused on respect for sovereignty and independence. This cannot have been the reassurance that Asian countries were seeking.”

“雖然特朗普將自己的地區(qū)政策定義為‘印度洋-太平洋戰(zhàn)略’……但他基本上回避了對(duì)于在該地區(qū)推進(jìn)人權(quán)和良好治理的重要性的討論。”北京的清華-卡內(nèi)基全球政策中心(Carnegie-Tsinghua Center)的主任、前白宮顧問韓磊(Paul Haenle)表示，”相反，他把重點(diǎn)放在尊重主權(quán)和獨(dú)立上。這顯然不是亞洲國(guó)家希望得到的保證。”

Additional reporting by Demetri Sevastopulo in Da Nang, Robin Harding in Tokyo and Tom Mitchell in Beijing 迪米(Demetri Sevastopulo)峴港、羅賓•哈丁(Robin Harding)東京、米強(qiáng)(Tom Mitchell)北京補(bǔ)充報(bào)道