特朗普攻擊WTO 全球貿(mào)易前景堪憂

Birthday parties for international treaties are never raucous affairs. But when old trade hands gathered in the pavilion of Washington’s Ronald Reagan building on a recent evening to celebrate the 70th birthday of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — the 1947 document that still guides international commerce — the mood was decidedly maudlin.

慶祝國(guó)際條約誕生的生日宴會(huì)從來(lái)都不熱鬧。但是在最近的一天晚上，當(dāng)貿(mào)易界資深人士匯聚華盛頓羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)大樓的前廳里慶祝《關(guān)稅與貿(mào)易總協(xié)定》(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade，簡(jiǎn)稱GATT)誕生70周年的時(shí)候——這份簽署于1947年的文件至今指導(dǎo)著國(guó)際貿(mào)易——眾人的情緒顯然有些傷感。

“This feels more like a wake than a birthday party,” grumbled one veteran trade negotiator after listening to a procession of speakers extol the virtues of the Gatt and warn of a looming protectionist tide.

在聽(tīng)了一個(gè)又一個(gè)演講者贊賞GATT的功績(jī)、并警告一股保護(hù)主義浪潮可能撲面而來(lái)之后，一位資深貿(mào)易談判代表抱怨稱：“這更像是守靈，而非生日宴會(huì)。”

The reason, he did not have to add, was sitting just a few blocks away in the White House. A year on from Donald Trump’s election as US president, the populist property tycoon is delivering on his promise to shake up the international system. Viewed from Washington, the future of global trade now seems to be predominantly about ripping up its glorious past.

不用他多說(shuō)，原因就坐在幾個(gè)街區(qū)外的白宮。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當(dāng)選美國(guó)總統(tǒng)一年后，這位民粹主義房地產(chǎn)大亨正在兌現(xiàn)其撼動(dòng)國(guó)際體系的承諾。從華盛頓的視角看，全球貿(mào)易的未來(lái)現(xiàn)在似乎主要在于拋棄其輝煌的歷史。

Soon after taking office in January, Mr Trump pulled the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an ambitious pact with Japan and 10 other economies that his predecessor, Barack Obama, painstakingly negotiated as a strategic response to a rising China.

特朗普在今年1月就職后不久就讓美國(guó)退出了《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡(jiǎn)稱TPP)。TPP是他的前任巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)花費(fèi)多年時(shí)間與日本以及另外10個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體好不容易談判達(dá)成的雄心勃勃的協(xié)定，是針對(duì)中國(guó)崛起做出的戰(zhàn)略回應(yīng)。

He has demanded a renegotiation both of the 23-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement and of a 2012 deal with South Korea that was meant to help solidify one of Washington’s most delicate and important strategic relationships in Asia. He has made clear that any trading partner with which the US runs a trade deficit — starting with China — should expect a difficult conversation about how to achieve more balanced trade.

他要求重新談判已實(shí)行23年的《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(NAFTA)以及2012年與韓國(guó)簽署的協(xié)議，后者旨在幫助鞏固華盛頓在亞洲最為微妙且最為重要的戰(zhàn)略關(guān)系之一。特朗普明確表示，任何讓美國(guó)出現(xiàn)貿(mào)易逆差的貿(mào)易伙伴——首先是中國(guó)——都應(yīng)該預(yù)料到會(huì)有一場(chǎng)艱難談判，目的是實(shí)現(xiàn)更均衡的貿(mào)易。

But Mr Trump has also signalled that he will pursue an even bigger scalp: the World Trade Organization, which as the Gatt’s successor since the 1990s, has acted as the global trade referee. “The WTO was set up for the benefit [of] everybody but us . . . They have taken advantage of this country like you wouldn’t believe,” Mr Trump told Fox Business in a recent interview. “We lose the lawsuits, almost all of the lawsuits in the WTO.”

但特朗普還表示將會(huì)追求更大的戰(zhàn)利品：作為上世紀(jì)90年代以來(lái)GATT的繼任者，世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)已經(jīng)成為全球貿(mào)易裁判。特朗普最近在接受?？怂股虡I(yè)頻道(Fox Business)采訪時(shí)表示：“WTO是為了除我們之外的所有人的利益建立起來(lái)的……他們以你無(wú)法想象的方式占這個(gè)國(guó)家的便宜。我們輸?shù)袅嗽V訟，幾乎所有的WTO官司都輸?shù)袅恕?rdquo;

Mr Trump’s view is not borne out in the data, experts point out. The US has won more than 90 per cent of the disputes it has taken to Geneva, though it has lost an almost equal share of the ones filed against it. While it has been frustrated by the institution’s consensual decision-making process, which requires agreement by all 164 members for anything to happen, it has also had a rare ability to shape the debate at the WTO as its dominant member.

專家們指出，根據(jù)數(shù)據(jù)，特朗普的觀點(diǎn)是站不住腳的。在美國(guó)提交至日內(nèi)瓦的訴訟中，逾90%都是美國(guó)勝訴，盡管在那些美國(guó)被訴的案件中，美國(guó)敗訴的比例也幾乎是這么高。盡管對(duì)WTO的共識(shí)決策過(guò)程(要求164個(gè)成員國(guó)全部同意才能通過(guò)決議)感到不滿，但作為占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位的成員國(guó)，美國(guó)擁有影響辯論的罕見(jiàn)能力。

But those facts matter little to an administration that has taken Mr Trump’s election — on the back of an anti-immigrant and anti-trade campaign that drew him enough Rust Belt votes to squeak into office — as an excuse to pursue America’s grievances.

但對(duì)于一個(gè)將特朗普當(dāng)選(打著反移民和反貿(mào)易旗號(hào)的競(jìng)選活動(dòng)，為他拉到足夠多的“銹帶”選票)視為發(fā)泄美國(guó)不滿的借口的行政當(dāng)局，這些事實(shí)是無(wú)關(guān)緊要的。

The assault on the WTO, to be fair, is in its early stages and on the ground in Geneva has taken a technocratic form. The US is now blocking appointments for two vacancies on the seven-strong appellate body that ultimately rules in trade disputes, which could kneecap the global trade referee.

公平地說(shuō)，對(duì)世貿(mào)組織的攻擊還處于早期階段，而且在日內(nèi)瓦的第一線只是以技術(shù)官僚的人選為形式。美國(guó)正在阻止對(duì)七人上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的兩個(gè)空缺職位的任命——該上訴機(jī)構(gòu)負(fù)責(zé)對(duì)貿(mào)易糾紛做出最終裁定——這可能讓全球貿(mào)易裁判機(jī)制陷入癱瘓。

A third vacancy looms in December and a fourth in September 2018, which will leave just three adjudicators in place, from China, India and the US. 今年12月還會(huì)出現(xiàn)第三個(gè)空缺職位，2018年9月會(huì)產(chǎn)生第四個(gè)空缺職位，這將導(dǎo)致該機(jī)構(gòu)只有3名裁判官，分別來(lái)自中國(guó)、印度和美國(guó)。

A custom of ensuring that the three-person panels that hear appeals do not include anyone from countries involved would make it difficult for the appellate body to rule in cases involving those three countries, effectively neutralising the appellate body.

依照慣例，審理上訴的三人小組不包括相關(guān)國(guó)家人員，這將讓上訴機(jī)構(gòu)很難裁決涉及這三個(gè)國(guó)家的案件，使其實(shí)際上陷入癱瘓。

Just what the US wants to see happen is unclear. But Robert Lighthizer, Mr Trump’s US trade representative, has long expressed his disdain for the WTO’s dispute resolution system.

不清楚美國(guó)的愿望到底是什么。但特朗普任命的美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表羅伯特•萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)一直對(duì)WTO的爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制嗤之以鼻。

In the 1990s he helped his political mentor, former Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole, push for the creation of a US commission to review WTO decisions that the US lost. One of his ideas would have required the US to consider leaving the body should it wrongfully, in US eyes, lose three WTO rulings in a five-year period.

上世紀(jì)90年代，萊特希澤幫助其政治導(dǎo)師、曾經(jīng)是共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人的鮑勃•多爾(Bob Dole)推動(dòng)成立一個(gè)美國(guó)委員會(huì)來(lái)審查美國(guó)在WTO輸?shù)舻牟脹Q。他提出的一個(gè)設(shè)想是，如果在五年期間美國(guó)在其自己看來(lái)被WTO錯(cuò)誤地判輸三次裁決，美國(guó)就得考慮退出這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)。

In a recent speech, Mr Lighthizer spoke wistfully of the Gatt’s old non-binding dispute resolution system. He also repeated a longstanding US complaint that the WTO’s appellate body had engaged in judicial over-reach and begun to make law rather than simply interpret it.

萊特希澤在最近一次演講中以懷念的語(yǔ)氣談到了以前GATT的不具約束力的糾紛解決體系。他還重復(fù)了美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的抱怨，即WTO上訴機(jī)構(gòu)逾越司法管轄權(quán)，并開(kāi)始制定(而不是簡(jiǎn)單地闡釋)法律。

“The United States sees numerous examples where the dispute-settlement process over the years has really diminished what we bargained for or imposed obligations that we do not believe we agreed to,” he said.

他說(shuō)：“美國(guó)看到有無(wú)數(shù)例子顯示，多年來(lái)這個(gè)爭(zhēng)端解決程序真的削弱了我方要求的東西，或者讓我方承擔(dān)了我方并不認(rèn)為自己曾經(jīng)同意的義務(wù)。”

Mr Lighthizer’s criticism of the WTO and the system are broader still. He is now the leading proponent of the increasingly popular view in Washington that the WTO has failed to rein in China, permitting Beijing to game the international trading system in support of its economic rise.

然而，萊特希澤對(duì)WTO及其體系的批評(píng)更為廣泛。他現(xiàn)在是華盛頓一種日益流行的觀點(diǎn)的主要鼓吹者，即認(rèn)為WTO未能約束好中國(guó)，使北京方面得以操縱國(guó)際貿(mào)易體系，以支持本國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)崛起。

“The sheer scale of [China’s] co-ordinated efforts to develop their economy, to subsidise, to create national champions, to force technology transfer, and to distort markets in China and throughout the world is a threat to the world trading system that is unprecedented,” Mr Lighthizer said. “The WTO and its predecessor, the [Gatt], were not designed to successfully manage mercantilism on this scale.”

萊特希澤表示：“(中國(guó))協(xié)調(diào)一致的大規(guī)模努力，發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)、提供補(bǔ)貼、打造國(guó)家冠軍企業(yè)、強(qiáng)迫轉(zhuǎn)讓技術(shù)，以及扭曲中國(guó)乃至整個(gè)世界的市場(chǎng)，這一切對(duì)世界貿(mào)易體系是一個(gè)史無(wú)前例的威脅。當(dāng)初設(shè)計(jì)WTO及其前身GATT不是為了成功管理這種規(guī)模的重商主義的。”

The Trump administration’s assault on the WTO may be nascent, but it has already drawn concern from defenders of the multilateral system both inside and outside the US.

雖然特朗普政府對(duì)WTO的攻擊可能還處于早期階段，但這已經(jīng)引起了美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)外多邊體制捍衛(wèi)者的擔(dān)憂。

EU trade commissioner Cecilia Malmström warned the US stance on the WTO’s dispute settlement body risked “killing the WTO from inside” in a recent Financial Times interview. Days before, Roberto Azevêdo, the WTO’s director-general, issued a similarly gloomy warning. “If we ­compromise this pillar, we will be ­compromising the system as a whole. There is no doubt about that,” he told the FT.

歐盟貿(mào)易專員塞西莉亞•馬姆斯特羅姆(Cecilia Malmström)最近在接受英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》采訪時(shí)警告稱，美國(guó)在WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制上的立場(chǎng)可能會(huì)“從內(nèi)部殺死WTO”。數(shù)天前，WTO總干事羅伯托•阿澤維多(Roberto Azevêdo)發(fā)出了同樣令人沮喪的警告：“如果我們損害這根支柱，我們就是在損害整個(gè)系統(tǒng)。這是毋庸置疑的，”他告訴英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》。

Bill Brock, who as Reagan’s US trade representative served as Mr Lighthizer’s boss, has a dim view of his former deputy’s assault on a system that was born in the wake of the second world war following the protectionism that exacerbated the Great Depression.

曾在里根政府任美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表、當(dāng)時(shí)是萊特希澤上司的比爾•布羅克(Bill Brock)不認(rèn)同他的前副手攻擊在二戰(zhàn)后締造的制度——在那之前，保護(hù)主義曾加劇上世紀(jì)30年代的大蕭條。

“We’d seen what [the Smoot Hawley tariff act of 1930] and a tariff war started by the United States could do to destroy the world economy and put us into a 10-year depression that was impossible to recover from without having to go to war,” Mr Brock says. “The insanity of that left a pretty big impression on us.”

“我們見(jiàn)證過(guò)(1930年《斯穆特-霍利關(guān)稅法》(Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act))和美國(guó)發(fā)起的關(guān)稅戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)重創(chuàng)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)，讓我們陷入長(zhǎng)達(dá)10年、不參加戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)就無(wú)法復(fù)蘇的蕭條。”布羅克說(shuō)：“那種愚蠢的行為讓我們銘記在心。”

Born in 1995, the WTO created a binding arbiter for trade disputes. “We very much needed that because it was just too easy to get into a tit-for-tat. You hit me with a tariff, I hit you with a bigger one and back and forth,” says Mr Brock. “It was simply a formula for chaos.”

誕生于1995年的WTO創(chuàng)建了一個(gè)具有約束力的貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)。“我們非常需要它，因?yàn)楦鲊?guó)很容易陷入一報(bào)還一報(bào)的狀態(tài)。你用關(guān)稅來(lái)打擊我，我用更高的關(guān)稅來(lái)打擊你，如此針鋒相對(duì)，沒(méi)完沒(méi)了。”布羅克說(shuō)：“那是一種釀成混亂的配方。”

Yet the US is also not alone in expressing concerns about WTO dysfunction.

然而，對(duì)WTO功能失常表達(dá)擔(dān)憂的不僅是美國(guó)。

Since the 2008 collapse of negotiations in the so-called Doha Round the organisation has struggled to innovate and remain relevant. Importantly, the WTO is only just beginning to tackle the issues raised by digital trade and ecommerce.

在2008年“多哈回合”(Doha Round)談判失敗之后，WTO一直在艱難地創(chuàng)新和保持相關(guān)性。重要的是，WTO才剛剛開(kāi)始應(yīng)對(duì)數(shù)字貿(mào)易和電子商務(wù)帶來(lái)的問(wèn)題。

Mr Azevêdo concedes that “the global system has been and will remain a work in progress,” as he told the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington recently. But the Brazilian also adds: “I think it represents the world’s best efforts to keep economic tensions at bay.”

阿澤維多最近在華盛頓對(duì)美國(guó)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)發(fā)表講話時(shí)承認(rèn)，“這個(gè)全球體系一直是，也仍將是，‘進(jìn)展中的工作’”。但這位巴西人也補(bǔ)充道：“我相信它代表了世界為了不使經(jīng)濟(jì)緊張加劇而做出的最佳努力。”

If Mr Azevêdo and others cannot convince Donald Trump to buy into that idea, the Gatt’s next major birthday may indeed be marked with a wake.

如果阿澤維多和其他人無(wú)法說(shuō)服唐納德•特朗普接受這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)，我們可能真的要用守靈來(lái)紀(jì)念GATT的下一個(gè)重要生日了。