從摩根大通的“子孫”看金融業(yè)創(chuàng)造力

Investors’ eyes are on America’s mighty banks. No wonder. Wall Street groups this week will unveil their second-quarter financial results. And these could offer useful signals about the state of the US economy, and whether Donald Trump’s deregulation and tax cut pledges are still unleashing animal spirits.

投資者的眼睛盯著美國實(shí)力雄厚的銀行。這不奇怪。上周華爾街的各家銀行相繼公布了第三季度業(yè)績。這些業(yè)績數(shù)據(jù)可以提供有用的信號，用來判斷美國經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況，以及唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的去監(jiān)管和減稅承諾是否依然在激起動物精神。

But as investors and regulators watch names such as JPMorgan and Citigroup, they should also monitor the nameless world of non-banks as well. For one little secret about finance today is that the banking sector is not the really interesting game in town; instead, the real credit growth — and innovation — is now occurring in the world of private capital.

但當(dāng)投資者和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)盯著摩根大通(JPMorgan)和花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)等知名銀行的時(shí)候，他們也應(yīng)該關(guān)注聲名不顯的非銀行金融世界。因?yàn)椋?dāng)今金融界的一個(gè)小秘密就是，銀行業(yè)并不是真正有意思的領(lǐng)域;相反，真正的信貸增長——和金融創(chuàng)新——正在私人資本的世界里發(fā)生。

To understand this, take a look at HPS, a $39bn investment group that used to be part of the Highbridge Group, once owned by JPMorgan Asset Management. The roots of this entity used to be described as a “hedge fund” since it made money by investing in markets.

要理解這一點(diǎn)，看一看資產(chǎn)管理規(guī)模達(dá)390億美元的投資集團(tuán)HPS就明白了。HPS曾經(jīng)是高橋資本(Highbridge Capital)旗下公司，而高橋資本曾為摩根大通資產(chǎn)管理公司(JPMorgan Asset Management)所有。HPS曾經(jīng)被描述為一家“對沖基金”，因?yàn)樵摍C(jī)構(gòu)通過投資市場來賺錢。

But HPS has morphed. The New York-based group this week announced that it has raised $6.5bn to make loans to companies, mostly of the risky and smaller sort. This “speciality loan” or “private debt” vehicle is financed by $4.5bn of equity investment from limited partners, such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. But the HPS fund also has $2bn of debt from a consortium of banks, like those reporting their earnings this week.

但HPS已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)型。這家紐約公司上周宣布，已募集65億美元，用來向公司發(fā)放貸款，主要面向一些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高和規(guī)模較小的公司。這個(gè)“特殊貸款”或者“私人債務(wù)”工具有45億美元的資金來自養(yǎng)老基金和主權(quán)財(cái)富基金等有限合伙人的股權(quán)投資。但還有20億美元的債務(wù)借自銀團(tuán)，銀團(tuán)中就包括那些在上周公布業(yè)績的銀行。

What this essentially means is that big Wall Street banks will be lending money to HPS, which will then make corporate loans. Before the 2008 credit crunch, banks might have simply been expected to make those loans themselves.

基本上，這意味著華爾街的大銀行借錢給HPS，HPS再向企業(yè)發(fā)放貸款。如果是在2008年信貸危機(jī)爆發(fā)以前，銀行應(yīng)該自己發(fā)放這些貸款。

This overturns the layperson’s idea of how a bank is supposed to work. For financiers, however, it is the new norm. The HPS fund seems to be the biggest to date — although it is hard to tell precisely because the “private” market is opaque. But HPS has other, smaller funds. So do most of the other big private equity and hedge fund players, with groups such as Apollo and BlueBay having also created hefty multibillion-dollar vehicles. Consultants such as Prequin reckon that the overall private debt market is already $600bn in size; the industry expects this to hit the trillion-dollar mark in 2020, presuming that the heady growth continues.

這顛覆了外行對銀行運(yùn)行機(jī)制的想法。然而，對金融人士而言，這是新常態(tài)。到目前為止，HPS基金似乎是同類中最大的一只基金——盡管很難做出精確判斷，因?yàn)?ldquo;私人”市場是不透明的。但HPS還擁有其他的一些規(guī)模較小的基金。其他大多數(shù)大型私人股本機(jī)構(gòu)和對沖基金公司也是如此，Apollo和BlueBay等集團(tuán)也打造了金額龐大的投資工具。Prequin等咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)估計(jì)，私人債務(wù)市場的規(guī)模已達(dá)6000億美元;業(yè)內(nèi)預(yù)計(jì)，如果繼續(xù)保持目前的強(qiáng)勁增長勢頭，到2020年這個(gè)數(shù)字將沖破萬億美元大關(guān)。

Is this healthy? Financiers insist it is. They argue that these funds only exist because there is a tangible need: mid-market companies need cash, and banks are reluctant to provide this because the regulations introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis make it too costly for them to lend to risky, small clients.

這樣健康嗎?金融人士堅(jiān)稱這是健康的。他們認(rèn)為，存在這些基金，只是因?yàn)橛袑?shí)際需求：中端市場的公司需要資金，而銀行不太情愿為這類公司提供資金，因?yàn)?008年全球金融危機(jī)以后引入的法規(guī)，使銀行向風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的小型客戶提供貸款的成本變得過于高昂。

The evangelists thus argue that the private debt market should be applauded as a sign of entrepreneurial creativity — and force for economic growth. Private lending, they add, is less of a systemic threat since the banks are sharing credit risk with each other, and the limited partners are taking the first hit if loans turn sour. And since the equity in these funds is generally locked up for between five and seven years, there should not be any capital flight if loans go bad.

倡導(dǎo)者因此認(rèn)為，私人債務(wù)市場應(yīng)該作為一種企業(yè)創(chuàng)新的標(biāo)志和推動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的力量得到支持。他們補(bǔ)充稱，私人貸款的系統(tǒng)性威脅較小，因?yàn)楦骷毅y行共同承擔(dān)信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而有限合伙人將在貸款出現(xiàn)問題時(shí)承受第一波沖擊。而且，由于對這些基金的股權(quán)投資通常會被鎖定5到7年，就算貸款出現(xiàn)問題，應(yīng)該也不會出現(xiàn)資本逃逸。

These are entirely fair points. Yet as these funds grow in size, it is hard to escape a sense of déjà vu, particularly given the warning this week from the International Monetary Fund about credit bubbles. After all, what these funds are essentially doing is reaping profits from regulatory arbitrage. They are typically delivering low double-digit returns because they — unlike banks — can make loans without onerous capital requirements or regulatory scrutiny. Meanwhile, the banks make returns from their own cash by “lending” — but via somebody else.

這些觀點(diǎn)都很在理。然而，隨著這些基金的規(guī)模擴(kuò)大，難免讓人有一種似曾相識之感，尤其是考慮到上周國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)發(fā)出的有關(guān)信貸泡沫的警告。畢竟，這些基金本質(zhì)上是從監(jiān)管套利中謀利。它們提供的回報(bào)通常能夠達(dá)到較低的兩位數(shù)，因?yàn)檫@些基金與銀行不同，能夠在沒有苛刻的資本金要求或者監(jiān)管審查的情況下發(fā)放貸款。同時(shí)，銀行通過“放貸”利用自有資金獲取回報(bào)——只不過這些借貸行為通過其他人完成。

Thankfully, unlike 2007, this peculiar game does not really pose any systemic risk; or not yet. Relative to the global financial system, $600bn is a relatively small sum. The long-term nature of the financing means it should be more resilient than the credit market innovations seen a decade ago.

值得慶幸的是，與2007年不同，這種特殊的游戲并沒有真正造成任何系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，至少暫時(shí)還沒有。與全球金融體系的體量相比，6000億美元相對而言是個(gè)小數(shù)目。這種融資方式的長期性意味著，它應(yīng)該比10年前出現(xiàn)的信貸市場創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品更具韌性。

Yet, if nothing else, the tale is a powerful example of how ham-fisted regulation and super-loose monetary policy can create some peculiar unintended consequences; and a sign of how inventive financiers can be, as they hunt for returns in a low-interest rate world.

然而，不說別的，這個(gè)故事是一個(gè)很好的例子，反映出笨拙的監(jiān)管和超寬松貨幣政策會造成一些意想不到的特殊后果;這個(gè)故事也表明，在一個(gè)低息世界中尋求投資回報(bào)的金融人士多么具有創(chuàng)造性。

And it should provide a broader warning sign too: if you want to track what is really happening to credit today, in a financial system awash with cash, do not just look at the headline institutions. Regulators and investors alike should learn the lessons from 2008, and look at what is happening in the murky “shadow” banking world, be that in China, America or anywhere else. JPMorgan’s peculiar financial child — or grandchild — has become more interesting than JPMorgan.

這個(gè)故事還應(yīng)該提供一個(gè)更廣泛層面上的警示：在一個(gè)現(xiàn)金充裕的金融體系中，如果你想實(shí)時(shí)把握信貸領(lǐng)域的真實(shí)狀況，不要只看那些最著名的金融機(jī)構(gòu)。無論是在中國、美國或者其他任何地方，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和投資者都應(yīng)該從2008年危機(jī)中吸取教訓(xùn)，看一看在不透明的“影子”銀行世界里正在發(fā)生什么。摩根大通在金融領(lǐng)域的稀奇的“子孫”，已變得比摩根大通本身更耐人尋味。