土耳其與美國(guó)很難重修舊好

At the start of the Obama administration, when I took over the Europe portfolio at the state department, one of the brightest spots on the foreign policy horizon was Turkey. Here was a majority Muslim country with a dynamic and popular leader that was reforming its growing economy, expanding press freedoms and easing the once-repressive military establishment out of politics.

在奧巴馬政府上臺(tái)伊始，我接手了美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院歐洲事務(wù)助理國(guó)務(wù)卿一職，當(dāng)時(shí)土耳其是美國(guó)外交政策方面的亮點(diǎn)之一。這是一個(gè)穆斯林占多數(shù)的國(guó)家，那時(shí)，他們充滿活力又廣受愛(ài)戴的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人正在改革土耳其快速發(fā)展的經(jīng)濟(jì)、擴(kuò)大媒體自由以及讓一度專制的軍方逐漸退出政治事務(wù)。

It was eagerly pursuing EU membership and co-operating closely with the US and EU on Afghanistan, Iraq and Middle East peace. So hopeful was Barack Obama that success in Turkey could help demonstrate that it was possible for a Middle Eastern country to be Muslim, democratic and pro-western that he insisted on adding stops in Istanbul and Ankara to his first foreign trip. He told the Turkish parliament that the US and Turkey could build a “model partnership”. The visit would send a “message to the world”.

當(dāng)時(shí)土耳其熱切期望加入歐盟(EU)，并與美國(guó)和歐盟在阿富汗、伊拉克和中東的和平事務(wù)上積極合作。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)曾充滿希望地認(rèn)為，土耳其的成功也許有助于證明，一個(gè)中東國(guó)家可以是穆斯林國(guó)家，同時(shí)又是民主的、親西方的，因此他堅(jiān)持要在自己第一次外交訪問(wèn)中加入伊斯坦布爾(Istanbul)和安卡拉(Ankara)兩站。他告訴土耳其國(guó)會(huì)，美國(guó)和土耳其能夠建立一種“模范伙伴關(guān)系”。這次訪問(wèn)將“向全世界傳遞出一則信息”。

Today, less than a decade later, that vision is a shambles — and the relationship is probably beyond repair. Fleeting hopes that the Trump administration might put things back on track, based on the US president’s affinity for strongmen such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, have quickly faded. Instead, the two countries are discovering how fundamentally their core security interests have diverged. They are rapidly sliding into a cycle of mutual resentment that could easily get out of hand.

在不到十年后的今天，局面卻變得一團(tuán)糟——美土之間也許已無(wú)法重修舊好?；诂F(xiàn)任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普與像土耳其總統(tǒng)雷杰普•塔伊普•埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)這樣的鐵腕人物合得來(lái)，人們也曾期盼特朗普政府能讓事情重回正軌，但這樣的希望很快就變得渺茫了。相反，兩國(guó)正發(fā)現(xiàn)各自的核心安全利益存在根本分歧。美土兩國(guó)正迅速陷入一個(gè)相互怨恨的怪圈，事態(tài)很容易變得一發(fā)不可收拾。

The most recent flare-up started with Turkey’s detention of a growing number of US citizens caught up in Mr Erdogan’s mass round-up — over 50,000 Turks have so far been imprisoned — following the July 2016 coup attempt. American concern about the arrests grew considerably last summer, when Turkey began treating the US detainees as bargaining chips, suggesting they could be freed if Washington extradited Fethullah Gulen, the Turkish cleric Mr Erdogan accuses of masterminding the coup from his residence in Pennsylvania. After Turkey last week arrested a Turkish national who worked at a US consulate, the second such arrest this year, Washington announced it was suspending visa services in Turkey, publicly questioning Ankara’s commitment to protecting “the security of US mission facilities and personnel”. Turkey immediately responded in kind, with aides to Mr Erdogan claiming that Washington’s real motivation was to prevent its former employee from revealing an alleged, but unsubstantiated, US role in the coup. The escalating crisis will damage both countries’ business and tourism sectors, especially Turkey’s.

美土之間最近一次劍拔弩張始于在埃爾多安的大規(guī)模圍捕下，越來(lái)越多的美國(guó)公民被土耳其當(dāng)局拘捕。自2016年7月土耳其政變未遂后，迄今已有超過(guò)5萬(wàn)名土耳其人被拘禁。美國(guó)方面對(duì)土耳其當(dāng)局的抓捕行動(dòng)從今年夏天起更感憂心，當(dāng)時(shí)土耳其開(kāi)始用被捕的美國(guó)公民作為與美國(guó)討價(jià)還價(jià)的籌碼，土耳其表示，如果華盛頓方面同意引渡費(fèi)特胡拉•居倫(Fethullah Gulen)，這些美國(guó)公民就會(huì)得到釋放。居倫是土耳其的一名傳教士，埃爾多安指控他在賓夕法尼亞州的居所策劃了去年的政變。土耳其上周逮捕了一名曾在美國(guó)領(lǐng)事館工作的土耳其公民，這是今年土耳其當(dāng)局實(shí)施的第二起類似逮捕，華盛頓當(dāng)局隨即宣布暫停美國(guó)在土耳其的簽證服務(wù)，公開(kāi)質(zhì)疑安卡拉有關(guān)保護(hù)“美國(guó)使團(tuán)設(shè)施和人員安全”的承諾。土耳其立即以牙還牙，埃爾多安的助手稱，美國(guó)的真正動(dòng)機(jī)是為了防止其前雇員泄露美國(guó)在土耳其政變中可疑、但尚未得到證實(shí)的角色。這場(chǎng)逐漸升級(jí)的危機(jī)將對(duì)兩國(guó)(尤其是土耳其)的商業(yè)和旅游業(yè)造成損害。

Mr Erdogan and many Turks are furious, convinced the Americans fail to appreciate the severity of the coup, Mr Gulen’s role, and the existential threats they face. Many Americans, in turn, believe the greater problem is the authoritarian response to the coup, and using it as a pretext to pursue all those who oppose Mr Erdogan.

埃爾多安和許多土耳其人很憤怒，他們相信美國(guó)人沒(méi)有認(rèn)識(shí)到那場(chǎng)政變的嚴(yán)重性、居倫所扮演的角色，以及他們所面臨的生存威脅。反過(guò)來(lái)，許多美國(guó)人認(rèn)為，更大的問(wèn)題是土耳其當(dāng)局對(duì)政變做出的專制反應(yīng)，以及以政變?yōu)榻杩谧凡端蟹磳?duì)埃爾多安的人士的行為。

The two countries’ regional security interests have also dangerously diverged. Whereas Washington prioritises the fight against Isis, Turkey is far more concerned with the threat it perceives from the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds — who happen to be America’s main partners in that fight. The US is determined to prevent Iran from filling the vacuum created when Isis forces are driven from eastern Syria. Washington is almost certain to continue to back those Kurds, potentially provoking a violent Turkish response. Turkey’s vocal support for Islamist groups such as Hamas, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Libyan militias, its burgeoning military relationship with Qatar, and its recent decision to rebuff Nato and purchase Russian air-defence systems — a move itself designed to signal its displeasure with the US — will only exacerbate these divisions.

兩國(guó)的地區(qū)安全利益也出現(xiàn)了危險(xiǎn)的分歧。華盛頓把打擊“伊斯蘭國(guó)”(ISIS)列為優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)，而土耳其更關(guān)心可能來(lái)自敘利亞和伊拉克庫(kù)爾德人的威脅——這些庫(kù)爾德人正是美國(guó)在打擊ISIS行動(dòng)中的主要合作伙伴。美國(guó)決心防止伊朗填補(bǔ)ISIS部隊(duì)被從敘利亞?wèn)|部趕走而出現(xiàn)的真空。美國(guó)也幾乎肯定會(huì)繼續(xù)支持那些庫(kù)爾德人，這有可能激發(fā)土耳其的暴力反應(yīng)。土耳其聲援哈馬斯(Hamas)、埃及穆斯林兄弟會(huì)(Muslim Brotherhood)和利比亞民兵等伊斯蘭組織，與卡塔爾迅速發(fā)展軍事關(guān)系，最近還決定拒絕北約(Nato)要求從俄羅斯購(gòu)買(mǎi)防空系統(tǒng)——此舉意在表明其對(duì)美國(guó)的不滿——這一切行動(dòng)只會(huì)加劇美土分歧。

As Mr Erdogan and his party continue to whip up hostility to America for supporting enemies real and imagined, Turkish attitudes towards the US have descended, unsurprisingly, to new lows. Today only 13 per cent of Turks have a positive perception of US ideas, and 72 per cent of Turks feel threatened by US power and influence, according to Pew. Turkish attitudes toward Americans have never, of course, been particularly positive, but in the absence of a common threat to hold the alliance together the absence of positive mutual feelings will become ever more apparent.

埃爾多安及其政黨繼續(xù)以美國(guó)支持其真實(shí)和想象中的敵人為由，煽動(dòng)民眾對(duì)美國(guó)的敵意，毫不奇怪，土耳其人對(duì)美國(guó)的觀感降到了歷史新低。皮尤(Pew)的民意調(diào)查顯示，現(xiàn)在只有13%的土耳其人對(duì)美國(guó)的信念抱有積極看法，72%的土耳其人感到美國(guó)的實(shí)力和影響力構(gòu)成威脅。當(dāng)然，土耳其人對(duì)美國(guó)的態(tài)度從來(lái)都不是特別正面，但如果沒(méi)有共同的威脅來(lái)維系美土聯(lián)盟，相互之間缺乏正面觀感的問(wèn)題就會(huì)變得愈發(fā)明顯。

Americans have understandably wanted to ignore these realities for some time, given Turkey’s geopolitical importance. But it is now past time that they start to see and treat Turkey for what it is — a Middle Eastern country with its own values and priorities — and not as the like-minded, close and reliable ally they may wish it would be. That means continuing to co-operate where possible, but having no illusions, and standing up firmly when differences appear, such as when Mr Erdogan starts taking US citizens hostage.

考慮到土耳其在地緣政治中的重要性，可以理解，美國(guó)人在一段時(shí)間里曾想忽略這些現(xiàn)實(shí)。但美國(guó)早就該按照土耳其的本來(lái)面貌來(lái)認(rèn)識(shí)和對(duì)待這個(gè)國(guó)家——一個(gè)有自身價(jià)值觀和優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)的中東國(guó)家——而不是把土耳其當(dāng)做美國(guó)人所希望的那種志同道合、親密可靠的盟友。這意味著繼續(xù)在可能的領(lǐng)域與土耳其合作，但不抱幻想，在有分歧的時(shí)候堅(jiān)持立場(chǎng)，比如當(dāng)埃爾多安開(kāi)始把美國(guó)公民扣為人質(zhì)時(shí)。

When he first brought up possible prisoner swaps last August at a political party rally, Mr Erdogan exclaimed: “The old Turkey is no longer. This Turkey is the new Turkey!” He is right, and the US now needs to treat it as such.

今年8月，當(dāng)埃爾多安在一個(gè)政黨集會(huì)上首次提出囚犯互換的可能時(shí)，他大聲疾呼：“舊的土耳其不復(fù)存在?，F(xiàn)在的土耳其是一個(gè)新的土耳其!”他是對(duì)的，而美國(guó)現(xiàn)在也需要如此看待土耳其。

The writer is Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former US assistant secretary of state

本文作者是美國(guó)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)瑪麗和戴維•博伊斯高級(jí)研究員，曾任美國(guó)助理國(guó)務(wù)卿