巴西歡迎中國(guó)投資基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施

When Li Keqiang, China’s premier, sought to emphasise the strength of Beijing’s relations with Brazil, he wrote of the Chinese love for Brazilian soap operas, such as the 1970s telenovela Escrava Isaura (Isaura the Slave Girl). The series, which played to enthusiastic audiences in China, traces the beautiful and modest Isaura’s tortuous battles with adversity.

當(dāng)中國(guó)總理李克強(qiáng)試圖強(qiáng)調(diào)北京方面與巴西的緊密關(guān)系時(shí)，他曾寫(xiě)到中國(guó)人對(duì)巴西肥皂劇的喜愛(ài)，比如上世紀(jì)70年代的電視連續(xù)劇《女奴》(Escrava Isaura)。這部在中國(guó)膾炙人口的電視劇，描述了美麗質(zhì)樸的伊佐拉與逆境斗爭(zhēng)的曲折故事。

A similar narrative could be applied — admittedly with a great deal less romantic heat — to Brazil’s seesawing economic relationship with China. The ardour that had attended the boom in commodity exports to China from the early years of the millennium had dissipated by 2015 as an economic crash threw millions out of work.

類似的描述也適用于闡釋巴西與中國(guó)忽冷忽熱的經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系，但不可否認(rèn)的是這其中并沒(méi)有那么多浪漫元素。21世紀(jì)頭些年里伴隨巴西對(duì)華大宗商品出口繁榮的熱情，到2015年已消失殆盡——那時(shí)巴西遭遇經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰，導(dǎo)致數(shù)百萬(wàn)人失去工作。

But in the same 2015 article in which he lionised Isaura, Li struck an optimistic tone. The “natural partners” would forge a new path that would transcend the reliance on commodity trade and emphasise Chinese investment in infrastructure to help Brazil avoid the “middle income trap”, Li wrote.

但是就在2015年李克強(qiáng)贊美伊佐拉的那篇文章里，他表現(xiàn)出了樂(lè)觀的情緒。他寫(xiě)道，中巴這兩個(gè)“天然的合作伙伴”將走出一條超越對(duì)大宗商品貿(mào)易依賴的新路，并強(qiáng)調(diào)中國(guó)對(duì)巴西基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的投資將幫助巴西跨越“中等收入陷阱”。

“China is willing to participate in the Brazilian freight railway network, power grid, communications network and other large construction projects, and co-operate with the Brazilian side through the whole industrial chain in shipbuilding, chemical, oil and gas exploration and other areas,” Li added.

李克強(qiáng)還稱，“中方愿參與巴西貨運(yùn)鐵路網(wǎng)、電網(wǎng)、通信網(wǎng)等重大項(xiàng)目建設(shè)，與巴方一道推進(jìn)造船、化工、油氣勘探等領(lǐng)域全產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈合作。”

Over the past 18 months, Beijing has started delivering, in emphatic fashion. Kevin Gallagher, professor of global development policy at Boston University, says a new phase in China’s commercial relationship with Brazil is under way. “The boom is over with respect to commodities, but there is now a shift toward infrastructure, banking and some manufacturing.”

過(guò)去18個(gè)月，北京方面開(kāi)始明確兌現(xiàn)承諾。波士頓大學(xué)(Boston University)全球發(fā)展政策教授凱文•加拉格爾(Kevin Gallagher)表示，中國(guó)與巴西的商業(yè)關(guān)系正步入新階段。“大宗商品繁榮期已經(jīng)結(jié)束，但是如今基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施業(yè)、銀行業(yè)和部分制造業(yè)正在活躍起來(lái)。”

One of the clearest expressions of China’s new resolve came in June this year, when it agreed to allocate $15bn toward a bilateral $20bn fund earmarked mainly for infrastructure projects. Brazilian financial institutions are scheduled to provide $5bn to the fund, which was first proposed by Li during his 2015 visit to the country.

有關(guān)中國(guó)新決心最清晰的表現(xiàn)之一出現(xiàn)在今年6月，當(dāng)時(shí)中方同意為總值200億美元的雙邊基金(主要用于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目)出資150億美元。巴西金融機(jī)構(gòu)計(jì)劃為該基金出資50億美元。此項(xiàng)基金最初由李克強(qiáng)在2015年訪問(wèn)巴西時(shí)提出。

“China has been really quick in setting up the $20bn infrastructure fund because it wants to get going [on investments],” Gallagher says. “Brazil is, of course, very hot to trot because the cost of capital is expensive for it right now. Brazil has major infrastructure gaps that won’t be filled by private capital or even development banks, so those funds are sorely needed.”

“中國(guó)很快就成立了這個(gè)總值200億美元的基建基金，因?yàn)樗腴_(kāi)始(投資)，”加拉格爾表示，“當(dāng)然，巴西非常樂(lè)意配合，因?yàn)槿缃駥?duì)它來(lái)說(shuō)資本的成本太高了。巴西存在很大的基建缺口，私人資本、甚至發(fā)展銀行都無(wú)法填補(bǔ)，因此巴西迫切需要這些基金。”

The scope of Brazil’s infrastructure needs — and therefore the size of the opportunity to China’s contract-hungry engineering companies — is huge. The Global Infrastructure Hub, a G20 research initiative, estimates that Brazil will need to put $2.7tn into infrastructure by 2040, but at the current rate of investment will achieve only $1.5tn of this, leaving a shortfall of $1.2tn.

巴西對(duì)基建的需求巨大，因此也給迫切需要合同的中國(guó)工程公司帶來(lái)了巨大的機(jī)遇。二十國(guó)集團(tuán)(G20)研究計(jì)劃“全球基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施中心”(Global Infrastructure Hub)預(yù)計(jì)，2040年年底前，巴西將需要向基建投入2.7萬(wàn)億美元，但以目前的投資速度只能獲得1.5萬(wàn)億美元的資金，還剩1.2萬(wàn)億美元的資金缺口。

Such pressures, reinforced by those of an economy in recession, have led to a more open attitude to foreigners owning and building infrastructure. China’s big state groups have seized on this, snapping up some prize infrastructure assets and preparing bids for many more, officials and analysts say.

此類壓力、再加上經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退帶來(lái)的壓力，導(dǎo)致巴西對(duì)外國(guó)人擁有并建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施持較為開(kāi)放的態(tài)度。政府官員和分析師表示，中國(guó)大型國(guó)企抓住了這一點(diǎn)，搶占了部分一流的基建資產(chǎn)并準(zhǔn)備參與更多項(xiàng)目競(jìng)標(biāo)。

“Some countries will not allow investment from China in these sectors [basic infrastructure], but this is not the case in Brazil,” says Roberto Jaguaribe, president of Apex-Brazil, the Brazilian trade and investment promotion agency. “We are very open to infrastructure investments from China.”

“一些國(guó)家不允許中國(guó)投資進(jìn)入這些領(lǐng)域(基建)，但巴西不是這樣，”巴西出口投資促進(jìn)局(Apex-Brazil)主席羅伯托•雅瓜里貝(Roberto Jaguaribe)表示，“我們非常歡迎中國(guó)資本投資基建。”

Jaguaribe, a former Brazilian ambassador to China, is in no doubt about the macroeconomic importance that Chinese investments represent as his country grapples to free itself from the deep recession that followed the commodity boom. “China is the biggest year-to-year investor in Brazil in recent years and we think these investments are going to go even higher,” he says.

前巴西駐華大使雅瓜里貝認(rèn)為，在巴西努力擺脫在大宗商品繁榮后到來(lái)的深度衰退之際，中國(guó)投資對(duì)巴西宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要性是毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)的。他稱，“近年來(lái)中國(guó)是對(duì)巴投資同比增速最快的國(guó)家，我們認(rèn)為中國(guó)投資還會(huì)越來(lái)越多。”

In hard numbers, China’s infrastructure-led acquisitions amounted to $5.7bn in the first four months of 2017, accounting for nearly 40 per cent of total inward investment, according to Dealogic, the consultancy. The Brazil-China Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo predicts this number could reach $20bn for the whole of 2017, up 70 per cent on 2016.

以具體數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)看，根據(jù)咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)Dealogic的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2017年第一季度與基建有關(guān)的中國(guó)企業(yè)收購(gòu)總計(jì)達(dá)57億美元，幾乎占巴西外來(lái)投資總額的40%。位于圣保羅的巴中工商總會(huì)(Brazil-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry)預(yù)計(jì)，2017年整年的數(shù)字可能將達(dá)到200億美元，較2016年增長(zhǎng)70%。

The importance of Chinese infrastructure investments can be seen clearly in the power generation and transmission sectors. State Grid Corp, a state-owned Chinese power transmission company and the world’s largest utility, bought a controlling stake in CPFL Energia last year. This made the Chinese company, which already operated nearly 10,000km of power lines in Brazil, responsible for one of the largest parts of the country’s power grid.

在巴西發(fā)電和輸電部門可以明顯看出中國(guó)基建投資的重要性。全世界最大的公用事業(yè)公司、中國(guó)國(guó)有輸電公司國(guó)家電網(wǎng)(State Grid Corp)，去年收購(gòu)了CPFL Energia的控股權(quán)。這使得這家已經(jīng)運(yùn)營(yíng)了巴西近10000公里輸電線的中國(guó)企業(yè)，控制了巴西電網(wǎng)的最大部分之一。

In power generation, the China Three Gorges Corporation bought a 30-year franchise for two large hydropower plants, the Jupiá and Ilha Solteira, for $3.7bn in late 2015. But this might be just the start of a wave of deals. Several other Chinese power companies, including Shanghai Electric, China Southern Power Grid and Huaneng, are considering bids for power industry assets set to be sold off, analysts say.

在發(fā)電方面，2015年末中國(guó)長(zhǎng)江三峽集團(tuán)公司(China Three Gorges Corporation)以37億美元收購(gòu)了Jupiá和Ilha Solteira這兩座電站30年的特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)。但這可能只是這波交易潮的開(kāi)始。分析人士稱，包括上海電氣(Shanghai Electric)、中國(guó)南方電網(wǎng)(China Southern Power Grid)和華能(Huaneng)等其他幾家中國(guó)電力公司正在考慮競(jìng)標(biāo)計(jì)劃出售的電力資產(chǎn)。

In one sense, the Chinese are acting as white knights. Some Brazilian electricity companies’ debt is rising to unsustainable levels, exacerbated by the recession and a government measure in 2012 that forced companies to cut tariffs to renew their 30-year contracts with the government. A severe drought between 2013 and 2015 shrivelled the country’s reservoirs, hitting hydropower companies hard, as customers switched from hydroelectric to thermoelectric sources.

在某種意義上，中國(guó)正在扮演白衣騎士的角色。受經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退和2012年巴西政府措施(要求企業(yè)必須下調(diào)電費(fèi)價(jià)格才能續(xù)簽與政府的30年合同)拖累，一些巴西電力公司的債務(wù)正在攀升至不可持續(xù)的水平。2013年至2015年的嚴(yán)重干旱使得巴西的水庫(kù)干涸，重創(chuàng)了水電公司，因?yàn)橛脩魪乃娹D(zhuǎn)向了熱電。

The strategic dimension to this is that Beijing regards Brazil as an important ally in the developing world, a key potential market of more than 200m people and a springboard for commercial opportunities in the rest of Latin America. That Brazil is situated in the strategic backyard of the US, which has an increasingly fraught relationship with China, only increases the value of Beijing’s ties with the country.

在戰(zhàn)略層面上，北京方面把巴西視為發(fā)展中世界的重要盟友、擁有逾2億人口的關(guān)鍵潛在市場(chǎng)、也是中國(guó)企業(yè)在拉美其他地區(qū)尋找商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的跳板。在地理位置上，巴西正處于美國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略后院內(nèi)。美國(guó)與中國(guó)的關(guān)系愈發(fā)令人擔(dān)憂，這只會(huì)進(jìn)一步提升中巴關(guān)系的重要性。

There are, however, residual concerns, says Jaguaribe. Chinese infrastructure companies should be careful to observe Brazilian labour practices, environmental and social standards as they go about acquiring big chunks of the country’s basic infrastructure, he warns. “The biggest barrier is that they can’t act abroad as they do in China,” says Jaguaribe. “Some countries let them do this, but this does not happen in Brazil.”

然而，雅瓜里貝表示仍然存在一些顧慮。他警告稱，中國(guó)基建公司在準(zhǔn)備收購(gòu)巴西大型基建項(xiàng)目時(shí)，應(yīng)該小心遵守巴西在用工做法、環(huán)境和社會(huì)方面的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。“最大的障礙是他們不能像在中國(guó)一樣在外國(guó)行事，”雅瓜里貝表示，“一些國(guó)家允許他們這樣做，但巴西不會(huì)。”