中國對基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的依賴程度創(chuàng)歷史新高

China’s reliance on infrastructure to drive overall investment hit a new high last month, raising worries that Beijing’s intensifying crackdown on local government debt, which mainly finances infrastructure, will drag down overall growth.

中國依靠基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施來推動整體投資的程度上月達到新高，令人擔(dān)心北京加緊打壓地方政府舉債的努力將拖累整體增長;中國的地方政府債務(wù)主要用作基建資金。

Fixed-asset investment remains the biggest engine of China’s economy and also fuels global demand for commodities such as coal, steel and base metals. Fixed investment contributed 45 per cent to China’s GDP last year, by far the highest share of any major economy. The US share is 22 per cent, while Japan’s is 30 per cent.

固定資產(chǎn)投資仍然是中國經(jīng)濟的最大發(fā)動機，還推動著煤炭、鋼鐵和基礎(chǔ)金屬等大宗商品的全球需求。固定資產(chǎn)投資去年占中國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的45%，在大型經(jīng)濟體中遙遙領(lǐng)先地占據(jù)首位。美國的這一比重是22%，日本是30%。

The infrastructure share of overall fixed-asset investment hit 21.4 per cent in the year to July, the highest on record, according to FT calculations of official data. That compares with 17.7 per cent for real estate.

根據(jù)英國《金融時報》對官方數(shù)據(jù)進行的計算，在截至7月的一年里，基建在固定資產(chǎn)總投資中的占比達到21.4%，創(chuàng)歷史新高。相比之下房地產(chǎn)的占比為17.7%。

“It’s a very important data point. There are so many different ways that local governments finance urban infrastructure. But now there’s a real concern about how they can continue,” said Shen Jianguang, China economist at Mizuho Securities.

“這是一個非常重要的數(shù)據(jù)點。地方政府有很多不同的方式為城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施融資。但現(xiàn)在對于它們?nèi)绾文芾^續(xù)下去存在真正的擔(dān)憂，”瑞穗證券(Mizuho Securities)中國經(jīng)濟學(xué)家沈建光表示。

“I believe we’re headed for another deleveraging cycle like the one in 2010-11. The growth slowdown will probably be sizeable over the next year.”

“我相信我們將進入又一個去杠桿周期，就像2010-11年那樣。未來一年的增長放緩程度可能相當(dāng)大。”

Chinese economic planners have turned more heavily to infrastructure as stimulus since 2015, preferring this approach over further investment in manufacturing, where the initial round of post-2008 stimulus caused a surge of excess capacity.

自2015年以來，中國經(jīng)濟規(guī)劃者在更大程度上依靠基建作為刺激手段，相比之下不愿進一步投資于制造業(yè);2008年后最初推出的一輪刺激在制造業(yè)造成了大量過剩產(chǎn)能。

While working to cut overcapacity in steel, coal and other commodities, investment was channelled into roads, railways and water projects.

在致力于減少鋼鐵、煤炭等大宗商品過剩產(chǎn)能的同時，投資被導(dǎo)向道路、鐵路和水利工程。

“Infrastructure and property have long been the main pillars supporting China’s economy. But property has cyclical ups and downs, so property investment is volatile. Infrastructure is something the government can directly control,” said Xu Gao, chief economist at China Everbright Securities in Beijing.

“基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和房地產(chǎn)一直是支撐中國經(jīng)濟的主要支柱。但房地產(chǎn)有周期性的起起伏伏，所以房地產(chǎn)投資是有波動性的?；A(chǔ)設(shè)施是政府可以直接控制的東西，”北京的中國光大證券(China Everbright Securities)首席經(jīng)濟學(xué)家徐高表示。

But infrastructure stimulus has strained local finances. Local government debt will hit Rmb42tn ($6.3tn) by the end of this year when various forms of off-budget borrowing are included, or 51 per cent of GDP, according to International Monetary Fund estimates.

但是，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施刺激措施使地方政府財政緊張。根據(jù)國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的估計，在計入各種形式的預(yù)算外借款后，到今年底地方政府債務(wù)將達到42萬億元人民幣(合6.3萬億美元)，相當(dāng)于GDP的51%。

In May, the FT reported on a private World Bank presentation that warned in stark terms of financial risks from mounting debt owed by local governments’ off-budget entities.

5月，英國《金融時報》報道了世界銀行(World Bank)的一份保密報告，后者就地方政府的預(yù)算外實體越來越多的債務(wù)所帶來的財務(wù)風(fēng)險發(fā)出嚴(yán)重警告。

“Whenever the authorities issue new rules, some clever bankers come along to help local governments find new loopholes,” said the head of infrastructure investment at a large insurer.

“每次當(dāng)局發(fā)布新的規(guī)定后，一些腦瓜靈光的銀行家就會來幫助地方政府發(fā)現(xiàn)新的漏洞，”一家大型保險公司的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資主管表示。

This year the finance ministry has issued a series of new rules to rein in disguised fiscal borrowing through various complex financing arrangements.

今年中國財政部發(fā)布了一系列新規(guī)則，以打擊通過各種復(fù)雜融資安排來偽裝的財政借款。

Since 2016, the finance ministry and the National Audit Office have named and shamed eight local governments for irregular borrowing. This month the ministry acknowledged that local governments had used “public-private partnerships” as a form of disguised borrowing.

自2016年以來，中國財政部和國家審計署點名批評8個地方政府進行不正當(dāng)借款。本月，財政部承認(rèn)地方政府將公私合作伙伴關(guān)系(PPP)當(dāng)作變相舉債的工具。

In May, the finance bureau of Jiangsu, China’s most indebted province, sent an “extra-urgent document” to lower levels ordering them to halt “invisible borrowing”, local media reported.

據(jù)當(dāng)?shù)孛襟w報道，今年5月，中國負(fù)債最重的江蘇省的財政廳下發(fā)了一份特急文件，要求各地停止隱形借款。

But economists note that the government has the means to widen legitimate channels for local governments to finance infrastructure spending, such as local government bond sales, if they chose to do so.

但經(jīng)濟學(xué)家們指出，中央政府有辦法拓寬地方政府為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施支出融資的合法渠道(如地方政府債券發(fā)售)，如果中央政府選擇這樣做。

“The rules are intended to discourage unqualified local governments from borrowing, but the central government does not intend to cut financing across the board.”

“這些規(guī)定是為了遏制不合格的地方政府進行借款，但中央政府并不打算全面削減融資。”

Additional reporting by Nan Ma Nan Ma補充報道

Twitter: @gabewildau 譯者/何黎