班農(nóng)離職表明中國成功“遏制特朗普”
在唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)與習(xí)近平在前者位于佛羅里達州的度假別墅首次會面時，中國政府一名高級官員公開質(zhì)疑稱，美國總統(tǒng)最重要的國內(nèi)政治顧問是否真把北京方面視為敵人、甚至是死敵。
“But Steve Bannon spent years [working] at Goldman Sachs,” the official protested in a conversation with the Financial Times. “He also reads widely and understands history. I don’t think he will be that radical.”
“但史蒂夫•班農(nóng)(Steve Bannon)在高盛(Goldman Sachs)工作多年，”該官員在與英國《金融時報》(Financial Times) 談話時質(zhì)疑道，“他還博覽群書，了解歷史。我不認(rèn)為他會那么激進。”
Last week the ruling Chinese Communist party had its answer. In what turned out to be his swansong interview just before he was fired, Mr Bannon said the US was engaged in a winner-take-all “economic war” with China. He added that he fought “every day” with another Goldman Sachs alumnus, White House economic adviser Gary Cohn, and other administration figures who sought a more moderate approach towards dealing with America’s principal geopolitical rival.
上周，執(zhí)政的中國共產(chǎn)黨得到了答案。就在班農(nóng)被炒掉前不久接受的采訪中(結(jié)果成了他的告別采訪)，班農(nóng)表示美國正在與中國進行一場贏者通吃的“經(jīng)濟戰(zhàn)爭”。他補充稱，他“每天”都在與另一名高盛的前同事、白宮經(jīng)濟顧問加里•科恩(Gary Cohn)以及其他政府官員作斗爭，他們尋求以更溫和的方式與美國的這個主要地緣政治競爭對手打交道。
Mr Bannon’s abrupt departure is a reminder that Beijing’s strategy for “containing Trump” has so far been a successful one. But it is also a strategy that has benefited greatly from that most precious of commodities — luck.
班農(nóng)突然離職提醒人們，北京方面“遏制特朗普”的策略目前為止是成功的。但該策略也極大地得益于一樣最寶貴的東西——運氣。
As it stands, Chinese officials cannot believe their luck, beginning with Mr Trump’s decision to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement on his first full day in office.
目前，中國官員簡直無法相信自己的一連串好運——從特朗普上任第一天就決定拋棄《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement，簡稱TPP)開始。
The TPP would have locked the US and China’s largest Asian trading partners in a formidable economic block from which Beijing was initially excluded. In the likely event that the Chinese government later applied for TPP entry, Washington would have had its best opportunity to pry open the China market since Beijing asked to join the World Trade Organisation in the late 1990s.
TPP將把美國和中國最大的幾個亞洲貿(mào)易伙伴都鎖在一個強大的經(jīng)濟聯(lián)盟中，而中國被排除在創(chuàng)始成員國之外。中國政府之后可能申請加入TPP，屆時，華盛頓方面將得到自上世紀(jì)90年代末中國要求加入世貿(mào)組織(WTO)以來撬開中國市場的最佳機會。
As one disappointed US diplomat told the FT earlier this year: “We threw away our best leverage over China on day one.”
正如今年早些時候一個失望的美國外交官向英國《金融時報》所說的那樣：“我們在第一天就拋棄了我對中國施加影響的最佳工具。”
A People’s Liberation Army general was as gleeful as the diplomat was deflated. In a video of an internal talk that leaked online, Jin Yi’nan called the TPP decision a “grand gift, although [Trump] does not know it”.
中國人民解放軍一名將領(lǐng)的開心程度和這名外交官的氣餒程度差不多。在流出到網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的一段內(nèi)部講話視頻中，金一南稱關(guān)于TPP的決定是一份“大禮，雖然他(特朗普)不知道”。
In the months that followed Mr Trump’s TPP decision, Chinese officials breathed easier and easier as one threat after another melted away.
在特朗普做出TPP決定后的幾個月內(nèi)，隨著威脅一個接一個消失，中國官員的氣兒越來越順了。
The US president did not discard the long-standing “One China” as suggested by his unprecedented December phone call with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen. He did not declare, as promised on the campaign trail, China a “currency manipulator”. And the deadline for a “100-day” trade and investment negotiation begun in Florida passed last month without a meaningful agreement.
這位美國總統(tǒng)并沒有像他去年12月與臺灣總統(tǒng)蔡英文的首次通話所暗示的那樣，摒棄美國長期堅持的“一個中國”立場。他也沒有像競選時承諾的那樣，把中國列為“匯率操縱國”。此前在佛羅里達開啟的“百日”貿(mào)易和投資協(xié)商的截止日期已經(jīng)于上個月悄然過去，沒有達成任何有意義的協(xié)議。
While Mr Trump’s administration has just launched a probe into alleged Chinese theft of intellectual property, it will probably drag on for at least one year.
盡管特朗普政府剛剛啟動了對中國涉嫌竊取知識產(chǎn)權(quán)行為的調(diào)查，但該過程很可能拖拖拉拉地持續(xù)至少一年。
As a result Beijing has achieved its first objective vis-à-vis Mr Trump: to avoid any economic disruptions with its most important trading partner ahead of a Communist party congress this autumn that will mark the start of Mr Xi’s second term in office. The US president has, in other words, thus thrown out his second best piece of leverage over Beijing.
結(jié)果北京方面實現(xiàn)了與特朗普有關(guān)的第一個目標(biāo)：在今年秋天中共舉行“十九大”——標(biāo)志著習(xí)近平開始第二個任期——之前，避免與最重要的貿(mào)易伙伴之間的經(jīng)濟關(guān)系受到任何干擾。換句話說，這位美國總統(tǒng)就這樣丟掉了他對中國施加影響的次佳工具。
China must still navigate difficult trade and investment negotiations with a US commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, and a US trade representative who both understand that the Chinese Communist party’s unique brand of “state capitalism” poses challenges that the WTO is not equipped to handle.
中國仍然必須搞定與美國商務(wù)部長威爾伯•羅斯(Wilbur Ross)和一名美國貿(mào)易代表的艱難貿(mào)易和投資談判。二人都明白，中共獨一無二的“國家資本主義”構(gòu)成的挑戰(zhàn)是WTO無法解決的。
In his confirmation hearing in June, USTR Robert Lighthizer demonstrated that he understood the perils of Chinese state capitalism as well as Hillary Clinton did. Mrs Clinton sounded her own alarm on the subject in a series of detailed speeches while secretary of state, and would probably have been laser-focused on the issue had she defeated Mr Trump in last year’s presidential election.
在6月的任職確認(rèn)聽證會上，美國貿(mào)易代表羅伯特•萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)證明自己像希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)一樣明白中國國家資本主義的危險。希拉里在擔(dān)任國務(wù)卿期間曾在一系列詳細的演講中就該問題發(fā)出警告，如果她在去年的總統(tǒng)大選中擊敗了特朗普，現(xiàn)在她可能已經(jīng)瞄準(zhǔn)這一問題了。
But Beijing’s showdown with Mr Ross and Mr Lighthizer will run for a year at least. Mr Xi can live with that, especially when pitted against an American president whose competence and authority waste further away with each passing week.
但北京方面與羅斯和萊特希澤的較量將持續(xù)至少一年。這對習(xí)近平來說無所謂，更何況與他對弈的是一位稱職度和權(quán)威與日俱減的美國總統(tǒng)。
