科技企業(yè)如何為緩解不平等做貢獻(xiàn)？

Is monopoly power one of the reasons that the equity markets remain high nearly 10 years into a bull market? It is something I have begun to wonder about recently, since a lack of wage inflation is a key reason that the Federal Reserve is not moving faster to raise interest rates. A rate rise off the back of inflation is one of the most reliable ways to pop a market bubble. Yet many economists believe that one of the reasons that wage growth — a typical driver of inflation — remains relatively flat despite unemployment being at nearly pre-crisis lows is because of job-disrupting technology itself.

壟斷力量是不是股票市場保持近10年牛市的原因之一?這是我最近開始思考的一個問題，因?yàn)?，美?lián)儲沒有加快升息步伐的一個主要原因是，薪資上漲停滯。在通脹支撐下升息，是刺破市場泡沫最可靠的手段之一。然而，許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，盡管失業(yè)率接近危機(jī)前的低點(diǎn)，但薪資增長——推升通脹的典型因素——仍然不溫不火的原因之一是，搶走人們飯碗的技術(shù)本身。

There are a few sectors, like finance and information technology, which have seen strong wage growth. Yet they create relatively few jobs. Finance takes 25 per cent of all corporate profits while creating only 4 per cent of jobs, since it sits at the centre of the dealmaking hourglass, charging whatever rent it likes. Meanwhile, wealth and power continue to flow into the technology sector more than any other — half of all American businesses that generate profits of 25 per cent or more are tech companies. Yet the tech titans of today — Facebook, Google, Amazon — create far fewer jobs than not only the big industrial groups of the past, like General Motors or General Electric, but also less than the previous generation of tech companies such as IBM or Microsoft.

僅有為數(shù)不多的幾個行業(yè)的工資出現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁增長，其中包括金融和信息技術(shù)(IT)行業(yè)。但是他們創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)崗位相對較少。金融行業(yè)在所有公司利潤總額中的占比為25%，但創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)崗位的占比只有4%，因?yàn)樗幵诮灰纂p方中間的位置，收取多少傭金是它說了算。同時，財富和權(quán)力繼續(xù)向科技行業(yè)集中，在利潤率達(dá)到或超過25%的所有美國企業(yè)中，逾一半是科技公司。然而，今天的科技巨擘——Facebook、谷歌(Google)和亞馬遜(Amazon)——創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)崗位不僅遠(yuǎn)少于通用汽車(General Motors)或通用電氣(General Electric)等老牌工業(yè)巨頭，而且也比不上IBM或微軟(Microsoft)等上一代科技企業(yè)。

What’s more, it is not just the top sectors that control the majority of corporate wealth, but the top companies themselves. The most profitable 10 per cent of US businesses are eight times more profitable than the average company. In the 1990s, that multiple was just three. Workers in those super profitable businesses are paid extremely well, but their competitors cannot offer the same packages. Indeed, research from the Bonn-based Institute of Labor Economics shows that the differences in individual workers’ pay since the 1970s is associated with pay differences between — not within — companies. Another piece of research, from the Centre for Economic Performance, shows that this pay differential between top-tier companies and everyone else is responsible for the vast majority of inequality in the US.

更為重要的是，控制美國企業(yè)大部分財富的不是為數(shù)不多的頂尖行業(yè)，而是少數(shù)頂級公司。盈利能力最強(qiáng)的10%美國公司的盈利是普通公司平均水平的8倍。上世紀(jì)九十年代，這個數(shù)值僅為3倍。那些盈利能力超強(qiáng)的公司向員工支付很高的薪酬，但其競爭對手沒有能力提供相同的待遇。事實(shí)上，總部設(shè)在波恩的勞動經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究所(Institute of Labor Economics)的研究結(jié)果表明，自上世紀(jì)七十年代以來，個體勞動者之間的薪酬差距并非緣于公司內(nèi)部，而是緣于公司間的薪酬差距。另一項(xiàng)來自倫敦政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院(LSE)經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)中心(Centre for Economic Performance)的研究顯示，頂級公司與其他公司之間的薪酬差距是造成美國社會大部分薪酬不平等的原因。

One of the key reasons the top sectors and the top businesses can take so much of the economic pie is that they are the most digitised. As McKinsey Global Institute analysis of the “haves and have-mores” in digital America shows, industries that adopt more technology quickly are more profitable. Tech and finance sit at the top of that chart, but sectors that actually create the most jobs — such as retail, education and government — remain woefully behind the curve in terms of incorporating digital technology into their business models. That means you end up with a two-tiered economy: a top level that’s very productive, takes the majority of wealth, and creates very few jobs, and a bottom one that stagnates.

頂尖行業(yè)和頂尖企業(yè)從經(jīng)濟(jì)大蛋糕中分走如此大的一塊，主要原因之一就是，他們的數(shù)字化程度最高。正如麥肯錫全球研究院(McKinsey Global Institute)題為《數(shù)字時代的美國：賺錢和賺大錢企業(yè)的故事》(Digital America: A tale of the haves and have-mores)的分析報告顯示，快速應(yīng)用更多技術(shù)的行業(yè)盈利能力更強(qiáng)?？萍己徒鹑谛袠I(yè)位于行業(yè)排名表的頂端，但實(shí)際創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位最多的行業(yè)——如零售、教育和政府——在將數(shù)字技術(shù)融入其業(yè)務(wù)模式方面仍遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于其它行業(yè)。結(jié)果是一個經(jīng)濟(jì)體中形成兩個層級：上層生產(chǎn)率非常高，占有了大部分財富，創(chuàng)造了很少的就業(yè)機(jī)會，而下層則處于停滯不前的狀態(tài)。

This creates strange new market dynamics and exacerbates the disconnect between Wall Street and Main Street that was already well under way since the 1980s. The markets can do incredibly well, even if the majority of workers do not, because they are increasingly driven by a small handful of top-tier companies in the information technology business. This is not just a phenomenon in the US. As Ruchir Sharma, head of emerging markets at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, says, “technology has become the only big story in the markets” in high-growth countries such as China, where the weighting of tech stocks in major indexes is similar to roughly 25 per cent you see in the S&P 500.

這種雙層經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生了一個新的怪異市場動態(tài)，進(jìn)一步加劇了自上世紀(jì)八十年代以來，華爾街和實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)脫節(jié)的情況。即使大多數(shù)工人的生活狀況并不樂觀，但市場依然可以牛氣沖天，因?yàn)槭袌鲈絹碓蕉嗟赜缮贁?shù)頂尖IT公司所驅(qū)動。這一現(xiàn)象并非美國所獨(dú)有。摩根士丹利投資管理(Morgan Stanley Investment Management)新興市場業(yè)務(wù)主管魯奇爾•夏爾馬(Ruchir Sharma)表示，在諸如中國這樣的高增長國家，“技術(shù)已經(jīng)成為市場上唯一的重大題材”，科技股在主要股指中所占的權(quán)重為25%左右，與其在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500(S&P 500)指數(shù)中的權(quán)重相當(dāng)。

Tech stocks — with the exception of the big platform companies such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, which control vast amounts of data — seem overvalued to me. Yet the only things that I can see that would prick that bubble is a significant move away from easy monetary policy — which cannot happen at the moment for reasons already discussed — or a shift in the regulatory environment for technology. While that probably will not happen in the next couple of years, it is interesting how quick the reaction can be from investors when they think the playing field has changed.

我認(rèn)為，科技股——谷歌、Facebook、蘋果(Apple)和亞馬遜等控制大量數(shù)據(jù)的公司除外——的估值似乎有些偏高。然而，就我所見，會刺破這一泡沫的只有兩件事：大規(guī)模撤出寬松貨幣政策(基于已經(jīng)討論過的原因，這在目前不會發(fā)生)，或者是科技行業(yè)所面臨的監(jiān)管環(huán)境發(fā)生變化。雖然后一項(xiàng)在未來幾年也不會發(fā)生，但是，當(dāng)投資者認(rèn)為游戲規(guī)則已發(fā)生變化時，其反應(yīng)速度能有多快倒確實(shí)值得我們關(guān)注。

A few weeks ago, the Chinese internet company Tencent saw its stock price fall quickly on the news that it would limit users under 12 years of age to one hour of play on its most popular game, Honour of Kings. This followed criticism after the death by stroke of a 17-year-old who had been playing the game for 40 hours straight and reports of another teenager who broke his legs after jumping from a window when his parents stopped him playing. Extreme, but perhaps a harbinger of things to come as the public begins to understand the cognitive effects of digital technology.

不久前，中國互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司騰訊(Tencent)的股價急跌，因?yàn)橛邢⒎Q，該公司將為其最受歡迎游戲《王者榮耀》(Honour of Kings)制定新規(guī)，12歲以下用戶每日限玩一小時。之前，一位17歲少年在連續(xù)玩游戲40個小時后腦梗死亡，另有報導(dǎo)稱，一少年因父母阻止其玩游戲跳窗，摔斷了雙腿。上述事件引來批評聲一片。盡管騰訊的做法比較極端，但隨著公眾開始了解數(shù)字技術(shù)對人們的認(rèn)知產(chǎn)生的影響，未來可能會有更多類似的舉措出臺。

No wonder some big tech companies are trying to shift the “winner-takes-all” narrative and focus on their role in supporting larger economic ecosystems. In China, Alibaba is leading an effort to connect broadband into more than 1,000 rural communities, in order for local merchants to have access to the digital technologies that have become the only real place that wealth and profits live these days. In a more economically bifurcated and politically polarised world, there are plenty of good reasons for them to do so. Perhaps the US tech giants should take heed.

難怪一些大型科技公司正在努力改變“勝者為王”的故事，而是著重在建設(shè)更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)方面發(fā)揮作用。在中國，阿里巴巴(Alibaba)正在牽頭開展一項(xiàng)將寬帶接入1000多個村子的行動，以便當(dāng)?shù)厣虘裟軌蚪佑|到數(shù)字技術(shù)——數(shù)字技術(shù)已成為當(dāng)今世界唯一真正創(chuàng)造財富和利潤的領(lǐng)域。在一個經(jīng)濟(jì)兩級分化和政治極化日益嚴(yán)重的世界，它們有充分的理由這么做。也許，美國的科技巨擘也應(yīng)效仿其做法。