打破壟斷：用交易所模式管理叫車平臺
優(yōu)步(Uber)正在作死。之所以屢屢出事(就差出現(xiàn)攻擊顧客的事件了)還沒有倒閉，顯示出將這一叫車應(yīng)用變?yōu)橐患覊艛嗥髽I(yè)的強(qiáng)大力量。這種支配地位對司機(jī)和乘客都不是好事。然而，有一個優(yōu)雅的解決方案是：復(fù)制自由市場資本主義的典型標(biāo)志，把優(yōu)步當(dāng)作一家證券交易所(它實質(zhì)上就是)。
Online platforms such as Uber for rides, eBay for auctions or Airbnb for hotels enjoy a network effect. This very quickly results in one player in the market. The more drivers on Uber’s taxi-hailing app, the better for riders; once the riders are using Uber, the drivers can go nowhere else. That network effect underpins its $70bn valuation, forced Uber to sell its China operation to local leader Didi Chuxing, and explains why behaviour such as founder Travis Kalanick’s sweary tirade at a driver does little business harm.
叫車應(yīng)用優(yōu)步、拍賣網(wǎng)站eBay、共享民宿網(wǎng)站愛彼迎(Airbnb)等在線平臺擁有網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)。這很快就會導(dǎo)致市場上一家獨(dú)大。優(yōu)步叫車應(yīng)用上的司機(jī)越多，對乘客越有利;一旦乘客都使用優(yōu)步，司機(jī)們便無他處可去。這種網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)支撐著優(yōu)步700億美元的估值，也迫使優(yōu)步將其在華業(yè)務(wù)出售給中國本土市場領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者滴滴出行(Didi Chuxing)，還可以解釋為什么創(chuàng)始人特拉維斯•卡蘭尼克(Travis Kalanick)對一名優(yōu)步司機(jī)進(jìn)行人身攻擊的行為，沒有對優(yōu)步造成多少傷害。
Platforms are one species of the superstar companies taking an increasing share of total income in the economy, according to economist David Autor and colleagues. A dominant Uber is bad for riders, who get no choice or innovation; bad for drivers, who face a monopoly employer; bad for competitors, who have no chance no matter how good their product; bad, in short, for everyone except a few founding investors who capture most of the value in the global taxi industry, forever, simply by moving aggressively on a fairly obvious idea.
根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授戴維•奧托爾(David Autor)及其同事的研究，在線平臺這類超級明星公司正在拿走經(jīng)濟(jì)總收入中越來越大的份額。支配著市場的優(yōu)步對乘客有害，因為后者沒有了選擇，也享受不到創(chuàng)新;對司機(jī)有害，因為后者面對一個壟斷雇主;對競爭對手有害，因為無論后者的產(chǎn)品多好，都沒機(jī)會贏;簡言之，這樣的優(yōu)步對所有人都有害，除了對少數(shù)創(chuàng)始投資者——他們永久性地占據(jù)了全球出租車行業(yè)的大多數(shù)價值，僅僅因為大膽實施了一個很大程度上沒有新意的想法。
Monopoly ruins capitalism. But traditional antitrust measures — ordering a break-up or regulating prices or conduct — are powerless before the network effect. Europe is fining Google €2.4bn for abuse of its dominance in web search. The Democratic party in the US wants tougher scrutiny of mergers. Neither will make much difference to platforms such as Uber.
壟斷會毀滅資本主義。但傳統(tǒng)的反壟斷措施——要求拆分壟斷企業(yè)、或監(jiān)管價格或企業(yè)行為——在網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)面前不起作用。谷歌因濫用網(wǎng)絡(luò)搜索領(lǐng)域的支配地位在歐洲被罰24億歐元。美國民主黨希望對并購進(jìn)行更嚴(yán)格的審查。這些舉措都不會對優(yōu)步等在線平臺產(chǎn)生多大影響。
What we need is a shift in perspective, a change in our understanding of what a business like Uber really is: not a smartphone app, not a taxi-hailing service, not a software company, but a marketplace where buyers meet sellers in order to trade. Uber, a classic middleman, has inserted itself between the two.
我們需要轉(zhuǎn)換視角，改變我們對優(yōu)步企業(yè)本質(zhì)的理解：優(yōu)步不是一款智能手機(jī)應(yīng)用，不是一種叫車服務(wù)，不是一家軟件公司，而是一個集市：想要做成交易的買家和賣家在這里會面。優(yōu)步是一個典型的中間商，已占據(jù)了買賣雙方之間的位置。
There is a fine, historical model of how to run a fair and open market. Stock exchanges evolved out of the physical marketplace of a coffee shop, but online platforms need the modern version that began in 1975, when Congress created the National Market System in order to boost competition in equity trading. It should pass a similar law for online platforms.
如何運(yùn)營一個公平、開放的市場，有一種完善的傳統(tǒng)模式。最早的證券交易所就是咖啡館的實體店鋪，但在線平臺需要參照的是1975年開始的現(xiàn)代版交易所，當(dāng)時美國國會創(chuàng)建了全國市場體系(National Market System)，以促進(jìn)股票交易的競爭。國會應(yīng)該為在線平臺通過一部類似的法律。
The NMS has several rules but two matter a lot. The access rule says markets must maintain electronic links to share buy and sell orders. The order protection rule says brokers must send orders to the venue with the best price. Together, they turn multiple stock exchanges into a single composite market. Everyone can see and trade with everyone else.
全國市場體系有多條規(guī)則，但其中有兩條最重要。接入規(guī)則規(guī)定，各市場必須允許人們用電子方式接入、查詢買賣訂單。訂單保護(hù)規(guī)則規(guī)定，經(jīng)紀(jì)人必須將訂單發(fā)給價格最優(yōu)的交易所。這兩條規(guī)則合起來，將多個證券交易所變成了一個綜合市場。每個人都可以相互看到和交易。
Almost exactly the same rules would work for ride sharing. The access rule would require Uber and its rivals to provide each other with feeds of bids — that is, geo-located passengers looking for a ride — and feeds of offers — drivers looking for a passenger. The order protection rule would require Uber to match riders with the closest available driver, whether that driver was using their own app or a different one, such as Lyft.
相同的規(guī)則幾乎完全適用于叫車領(lǐng)域。接入規(guī)則將要求優(yōu)步及競爭對手互相提供需求信息(即處于某一位置、正在找車的乘客)和供給信息(正在找乘客的司機(jī))。訂單保護(hù)規(guī)則將要求優(yōu)步將乘客與距離最近的可接單司機(jī)進(jìn)行匹配，無論這個司機(jī)使用的是優(yōu)步，還是Lyft等別的應(yīng)用。
For a passenger, that means when they open their Uber app, they can see and hail cars driving for Uber, Lyft or any other provider. Likewise for drivers. All the market’s liquidity is available through every provider. The network effect becomes irrelevant. The monopoly is broken.
對乘客而言，這意味著當(dāng)他們打開優(yōu)步叫車應(yīng)用時，他們可以看到并呼叫優(yōu)步、Lyft或其他任何服務(wù)提供商旗下的汽車。對司機(jī)而言也一樣。通過每一家服務(wù)提供商，都可以接入整個市場的資源。網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)變得無關(guān)緊要。壟斷被打破了。
Competition would sweep the market with profound results. Existing operators would give up loss-leader pricing. New services would spring up to connect riders and drivers to the market: if Uber’s chief executive swore at a driver, the driver could easily go elsewhere. A genuine market price would emerge for the brokerage service that apps provide.
競爭將會給這一市場帶來深遠(yuǎn)影響?，F(xiàn)有運(yùn)營商將放棄“賠本賺吆喝”的定價策略。將乘客與司機(jī)連入這一市場的新服務(wù)將涌現(xiàn)：如果優(yōu)步首席執(zhí)行官對一名司機(jī)進(jìn)行人身攻擊，這名司機(jī)可以很容易地到轉(zhuǎn)投其他服務(wù)。叫車應(yīng)用提供的經(jīng)紀(jì)服務(wù)將形成真正的市場價格。
Turning platforms into exchanges would need a certain amount of infrastructure: a settlement system, for example, so passengers using one app could pay drivers using another, leave feedback or resolve disputes. But if it is possible to link trillions of dollars in trading across thousands of equities on dozens of exchanges, then it is possible to do the same for ride-sharing.
將在線平臺變?yōu)榻灰姿枰欢ǖ幕A(chǔ)設(shè)施：例如一個結(jié)算系統(tǒng)，這樣使用一款應(yīng)用的乘客可以付款給使用別的應(yīng)用的司機(jī)，留下反饋或解決糾紛。但如果可以做到將數(shù)十個交易所數(shù)以千計股票的數(shù)萬億美元交易相互連接，那么將同樣的模式復(fù)制到叫車服務(wù)上也可以實現(xiàn)。
Just as in financial markets, exchanges work best when a product is standardised, but the principle extends to other platforms with a network effect. Luigi Zingales and Guy Rolnick of the University of Chicago have made a similar proposal for social networks: that data portability is required, so a user can access all their Twitter data from Facebook, or vice versa.
正如金融市場一樣，當(dāng)一種產(chǎn)品標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的時候，交易所才能發(fā)揮最佳作用，但這一原則同樣適用于其他具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)的平臺。芝加哥大學(xué)(University of Chicago)的路易吉•津加萊斯(Luigi Zingales)和蓋伊•羅爾尼克(Guy Rolnick)對社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)提出了類似的建議：數(shù)據(jù)應(yīng)該是可移動的，這樣用戶就能夠從Facebook訪問自己所有的Twitter數(shù)據(jù)，反之亦然。
The case to act is especially strong in Europe, where foreign players dominate ride sharing or it is not allowed at all. Moving to an exchange would offer a fresh start.
在外國企業(yè)主導(dǎo)叫車市場的歐洲，采取行動的理由尤其充分。轉(zhuǎn)為交易所模式將帶來一個全新的開始。
Ride sharing and other online platforms have brought great benefits for buyers and sellers alike. To wreck that with regulation would be wrong. But shifting to an exchange makes the transaction more efficient, not less. In a world of rising discontent about wage stagnation and the fairness of the capitalist system, this is a liberal, free-market answer. The Silicon Valley trend of the past few years is an “Uber for everything”. Let us have an exchange for everything instead.
叫車平臺及其他在線平臺給買家和賣家都帶來了巨大好處。用監(jiān)管來破壞這一切是不對的。但轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榻灰姿焦芾頃菇灰赘咝?，而不是使效率降低。在一個對工資停滯和資本主義體系的公平性日益不滿的世界，這是一個自由主義的、自由市場式解決方案。硅谷過去幾年的趨勢是“一切都優(yōu)步化”(Uber for everything)。讓我們轉(zhuǎn)而把一切都“交易所化”。
