中國(guó)華為：硅谷風(fēng)混搭國(guó)企作派

The vibe on the Huawei campus, spread out across two square miles in the city of Shenzhen, north of Hong Kong, is more state-owned enterprise than Silicon Valley.

華為(Huawei)總部坐落在香港以北的深圳市，整個(gè)園區(qū)占地兩平方英里。這里的氛圍有點(diǎn)硅谷的感覺(jué)，但更像是一家國(guó)有企業(yè)。

Workers clock in at 8.30am (dawdlers are sent an email), lights are dimmed at noon and noisy printing of documents prohibited until 2pm, so they can pull out cots and snooze.

員工在早上8點(diǎn)半上班(遲到的人會(huì)收到一封電子郵件)，中午燈光調(diào)得很暗，下午1點(diǎn)半之前不允許有打印文件的噪聲，好讓大家可以拿出折疊床小睡一會(huì)兒。

The Chinese telecoms giant’s views on the bottom line betray a similarly collectivist bent: Huawei “does not pursue high profitability; we share our profits with our customers and industry partners”, it says.

這家電信設(shè)備巨頭對(duì)利潤(rùn)的看法，同樣折射出一種集體主義傾向：該公司表示，華為“不追求高利潤(rùn)，我們與客戶和行業(yè)合作伙伴共享利潤(rùn)”。

Yet there is an intriguing blend here of high-growth tech behemoth and a socialist indifference to making money.

然而，華為身上體現(xiàn)出一種耐人尋味的混合特質(zhì)：它既是一家高增長(zhǎng)的科技巨頭，又抱著一種不在乎賺不賺錢的社會(huì)主義情懷。

The mixture has produced success for a company that brought in Rmb521.6bn ($75.6bn) in sales last year. At the same time, as revenues jumped 32 per cent, net profits barely budged, whittling margins back to 7 per cent.

正是這種混合特質(zhì)成就了華為，去年該公司銷售額高達(dá)5216億元人民幣(合756億美元)。在營(yíng)收大增32%的同時(shí)，凈利潤(rùn)卻是沒(méi)什么變化，利潤(rùn)率回落至7%。

Its handsets are the third most popular globally, trailing just Apple and Samsung, and are now ranked top in China, according to the IDC research firm — overtaking shipments of its nearest rival Oppo in the first quarter, with a 20 per cent share. On the enterprise side, its network infrastructure equipment is used by telecoms carriers across much of the globe, pummelling Ericsson and the Alcatel-Lucent-bolstered Nokia.

研究公司IDC的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，以市場(chǎng)占有率來(lái)看，華為的手機(jī)位居全球第三，僅落后于蘋(píng)果(Apple)和三星(Samsung);在中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)目前排在第一位，今年第一季度其出貨量超過(guò)實(shí)力最接近的對(duì)手Oppo，市場(chǎng)占有率達(dá)20%。在企業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)方面，華為的網(wǎng)絡(luò)基建設(shè)備被全球許多地區(qū)的電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商所采用，大挫愛(ài)立信(Ericsson)以及收購(gòu)了阿爾卡特-朗訊(Alcatel-Lucent)的諾基亞(Nokia)。

But the US, rattled at the prospect of entrusting its communications network to a company founded by a former People’s Liberation Army officer and with what it sees as state links, remains a holdout here.

不過(guò)，華為在這塊業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域仍被美國(guó)拒之門(mén)外。該公司是由一名中國(guó)人民解放軍(PLA)的前軍官創(chuàng)辦的，而且在美國(guó)看來(lái)，華為與中國(guó)政府之間牽扯不清，因而美國(guó)不放心由這樣一家公司來(lái)承建本國(guó)的通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)。

So great are American concerns that when Japan’s SoftBank bought Sprint Nextel in 2013, it had to pledge not to use equipment made by the employee-owned Chinese company and rip out Huawei kit used by Clearwire, a data network operator being acquired by Sprint.

就因?yàn)槊绹?guó)顧慮重重，2013年日本的軟銀(SoftBank)收購(gòu)Sprint Nextel時(shí)，只得承諾不使用華為的設(shè)備——盡管華為是一家員工持股的公司——并將淘汰Sprint當(dāng)時(shí)正在收購(gòu)的數(shù)據(jù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)運(yùn)營(yíng)商Clearwire所使用的華為設(shè)備。

That did not please Masayoshi Son, according to a person close to the Japanese group’s founder. He was an early fan of Huawei telecoms gear, figuring any supplier to China’s massive carriers would achieve pricing advantages wrought by massive economies of scale.

一名接近軟銀創(chuàng)始人孫正義(Masayoshi Son)的人士表示，這種安排并不合孫正義的心意。作為華為電信設(shè)備的一名早期粉絲，孫正義認(rèn)為，中國(guó)電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商一律體量龐大，任何為它們供應(yīng)設(shè)備的企業(yè)都可享受到巨大規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)的定價(jià)優(yōu)勢(shì)。

Undeterred, Huawei’s sights are firmly set on the global stage. It is building out from handsets and network kit into new business lines, including cloud services, for which it is hiring about 2,000 people this year, while rolling out portable radio masts in congested areas. This month, it is set to expand in the beleaguered PC market with a new laptop, undeterred by slumping sales and the demise of smaller players.

華為毫不氣餒，依然堅(jiān)定地把目光投向全球舞臺(tái)。除了手機(jī)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)設(shè)備業(yè)務(wù)，華為又在開(kāi)辟新的業(yè)務(wù)線，其中云服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)計(jì)劃今年招聘大約2000名員工，同時(shí)推出在人流密集地區(qū)使用的可攜帶無(wú)線基站。華為沒(méi)有被個(gè)人電腦市場(chǎng)銷量下滑、一些較小廠商出局的現(xiàn)實(shí)嚇倒，還尋求在這個(gè)當(dāng)前低迷的市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)張，并定于本月發(fā)布一款新筆記本電腦。

“On the smartphone side, the volumes look great,” says David McQueen, research director at ABI Research, who attended Huawei’s recent analyst meeting in Shenzhen, the fishing village turned tech metropolis across the border from Hong Kong. “They need to bring it up another notch to really catch up with Apple and Samsung in the next generation.”

“在智能手機(jī)方面，華為的銷量看起來(lái)非常大，”ABI研究中心(ABI Research)研究總監(jiān)戴維•麥奎因(David McQueen)說(shuō)，他參加了華為近日在深圳舉行的分析師會(huì)議。“未來(lái)一代人時(shí)間里，他們需要更上一層樓，才能真正追趕上蘋(píng)果和三星。”

The handset division, contributing roughly a quarter of revenues, probably lost money last year, on the back of slashed prices and ramped-up marketing spend, reckons Richard Windsor, founder of research consultancy Radio Free Mobile.

研究咨詢公司Radio Free Mobile的創(chuàng)始人理查德•溫莎(Richard Windsor)推測(cè)，由于降價(jià)和營(yíng)銷費(fèi)用增加的緣故，為集團(tuán)貢獻(xiàn)約三分之一營(yíng)收的華為手機(jī)業(yè)務(wù)去年很可能虧損了。

But beyond the paternalistic platitudes, Huawei has taken a tougher stance. Founder and deputy chairman Ren Zhengfei, in an internal memo published by Reuters, railed against unproductive staff.

但是，除了家長(zhǎng)式的老生常談以外，華為也采取了更嚴(yán)厲的作風(fēng)。在由路透(Reuters)發(fā)布的一份內(nèi)部備忘錄里，華為創(chuàng)始人、副董事長(zhǎng)任正非訓(xùn)斥了工作不力的下屬。

Speaking at this month’s analyst conference, Shao Yang, president of strategy marketing at the consumer business group, said the company would slim down its handset model portfolio — which currently runs to 22 — and get out of smaller countries where it cannot gain big market share.

華為消費(fèi)者業(yè)務(wù)首席戰(zhàn)略官邵洋在本月的分析師會(huì)議上發(fā)表講話時(shí)透露，該公司打算精簡(jiǎn)手機(jī)產(chǎn)品線(目前有22款產(chǎn)品)，并撤出其無(wú)法奪得大片市場(chǎng)的較小國(guó)家。

Some advocate tougher action for the unit, which remains part of Huawei only because an abortive auction in 2008 failed to attract enough bidders. Mr Windsor suggests a tie-up with an internet titan such as Baidu or Tencent to help plug its service gap in China, and increasing the marketing of its lower-priced Honor brand in developed markets.

有些人主張對(duì)該部門(mén)采取更嚴(yán)厲的做法。其實(shí)2008年時(shí)華為就打算處置該業(yè)務(wù)并舉行了拍賣，只是因?yàn)槲茨芪阶銐蚨嗟耐稑?biāo)企業(yè)而流拍。溫莎建議其與百度(Baidu)或騰訊(Tecent)之類的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)巨頭攜手合作，以彌補(bǔ)自身在國(guó)內(nèi)服務(wù)領(lǐng)域的短板，同時(shí)在發(fā)達(dá)市場(chǎng)大力營(yíng)銷低端的榮耀(Honor)品牌。

But for now, “Huawei does not have the stomach or the resources to wade through the rivers of red ink that it will take to knock Samsung off its perch,” he wrote in a note to clients.

但就目前而言，“華為既沒(méi)有意愿也沒(méi)有資源來(lái)解決赤字，也就無(wú)法擊敗三星，”他在給客戶的一份報(bào)告中寫(xiě)道。

Others point to weaknesses elsewhere in the global footprint, including south-east Asia and India. Winning share in India means spending big, says Neil Shah, director at Counterpoint Technology Market Research, noting that rivals such as Oppo and Vivo are shelling out hundreds of millions of dollars on Bollywood and cricket sponsorships.

還有人指出，在包括東南亞和印度在內(nèi)的其他地區(qū)，華為的海外擴(kuò)張腳步顯得乏力。對(duì)位科技市場(chǎng)研究(Counterpoint Technology Market Research)的董事尼爾•沙阿(Neil Shah)指出，要想在印度奪取市場(chǎng)份額就得燒錢，比如說(shuō)華為的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手OPPO和vivo在寶萊塢和板球贊助方面已經(jīng)投了數(shù)億美元。

For its part, Huawei concedes there is scope to build a stronger ecosystem. “I think we need to learn from Apple,” says Mr Shao. “The business is like a tree: components are the roots, devices the tree trunks and data, payments, content aggregation the branches.”

華為自己承認(rèn)還有空間打造更強(qiáng)健的生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。邵洋表示：“我認(rèn)為我們需要向蘋(píng)果學(xué)習(xí)。把整個(gè)業(yè)務(wù)當(dāng)作一棵樹(shù)：零部件是樹(shù)根，設(shè)備是樹(shù)干，數(shù)據(jù)、支付、內(nèi)容聚合是樹(shù)枝。”

At the roots, it is manufacturing more sophisticated chips in-house; for the branches there is private cloud storage — where more than 40m photos a day are being uploaded — and mobile payments. It is also looking to beef up video offerings.

在“樹(shù)根”方面，華為自己正在生產(chǎn)更精密的芯片。在“樹(shù)枝”方面，華為提供私人云存儲(chǔ)服務(wù)(每天通過(guò)該服務(wù)上傳的照片超過(guò)4000萬(wàn)張)和移動(dòng)支付服務(wù)。此外，華為還在尋求加強(qiáng)視頻服務(wù)。

Huawei Pay is another catch-up step, tapping into a $5.5tn business that is dominated by Alibaba and Tencent. But for now, it is tiny and can only be used mainly on transport; even the coffee shop on campus accepts only its rivals’ payments.

推出Huawei Pay也是一項(xiàng)追趕的措施，希望打進(jìn)有5.5萬(wàn)億美元規(guī)模、已被阿里巴巴(Alibaba)和騰訊(Tencent)占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位的移動(dòng)支付市場(chǎng)。但眼下華為這項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)規(guī)模還很小，并且主要在交通工具上使用，即便是華為園區(qū)的咖啡店也只接受競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的支付服務(wù)。

Similarly, Huawei has nearly 200m consumers using its domestic cloud. But this is far from a profitable business line in China: Alibaba, the internet group that has the biggest market share, lost $5 on every $100 of sales of cloud services last year. Tencent, also chasing a slice of the markets, took on a contract from one provincial government for one fen (Rmb0.01).

目前已有近2億用戶在使用華為在國(guó)內(nèi)的云服務(wù)，但在中國(guó)這項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)距離實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利還很遙遠(yuǎn)。拿市場(chǎng)份額最大的阿里巴巴來(lái)說(shuō)，去年該公司的云服務(wù)每銷售出100美元就要虧損5美元。同樣想從這個(gè)市場(chǎng)分一杯羹的騰訊曾以1分錢價(jià)格拿下一個(gè)地方政府的訂單。

But all the talk about the cloud, radio masts and enterprise is at the heart of the tensions at Huawei, says Mr Shah. A common theme at their investor days is that discussions about smartphones are confined to only 2-3 per cent of the time.

不過(guò)，沙阿表示，在華為內(nèi)部，所有這些有關(guān)云服務(wù)、無(wú)線基站及企業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)的討論是引發(fā)緊張的核心因素。在投資者日，有關(guān)智能手機(jī)的討論向來(lái)只能占2%到3%的時(shí)間。

“This shows the rotating CEOs never see consumer as a huge part of the business,” he says. “There’s some mismatch between what the consumer business is trying to drive fast and what the overall leadership team has focused on.”

沙阿表示：“這表明歷任輪值CEO從來(lái)不把消費(fèi)者業(yè)務(wù)看作整體業(yè)務(wù)中的一個(gè)重頭戲。消費(fèi)者業(yè)務(wù)部門(mén)試圖快速取得進(jìn)展，他們的目標(biāo)與上面的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)團(tuán)隊(duì)所關(guān)注的東西并不對(duì)應(yīng)。”

Current chief executive Eric Xu certainly shows little love for the consumer business. In another business contradiction that typifies the dichotomies within Huawei, he abruptly dismissed the smartwatch in a Gerald Ratner moment — undeterred that he led a company that made them.

目前輪值的首席執(zhí)行官徐直軍(Eric Xu)就顯得對(duì)消費(fèi)者業(yè)務(wù)無(wú)感。他曾突兀地表現(xiàn)得不把智能手表放在眼里，一點(diǎn)不考慮他所領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的公司自己在生產(chǎn)這類產(chǎn)品，簡(jiǎn)直就是杰拉爾德•拉特納(Gerald Ratner，是一位曾因嘲笑自己企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品而導(dǎo)致企業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)一蹶不振的首席執(zhí)行官——譯者注)化身，這是在公司業(yè)務(wù)上的又一個(gè)矛盾行為，體現(xiàn)了華為內(nèi)部的分歧。

“I’m not a man who wears watches,” he said.” And I’ve never been optimistic about this market.”

當(dāng)時(shí)他說(shuō)：“我這人不戴表，也從不看好這個(gè)市場(chǎng)。”