特朗普與中國對抗會怎么樣？

The biggest surprise since Donald Trump’s election victory is his decision to pick a fight with China. Not once in his campaign did he mention the word Taiwan. Yet all of a sudden there is now a threat over America’s “One China” policy — a bedrock in today’s unstable global order. Beijing has so far chosen to blame a wily Taiwan for the call between Mr Trump and his Taiwanese counterpart — the US president-elect is “as ignorant as a child”, says China’s state media.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)贏得美國大選以來最令人震驚的地方，是他選擇與中國對抗。他在選戰(zhàn)中一次都沒提到過臺灣。然而，突然之間，美國的“一個中國”(One China)政策(這是當(dāng)今不穩(wěn)定的全球秩序的一個基石)遭到了威脅。到目前為止，對于特朗普和臺灣總統(tǒng)之間的通話，中國政府選擇將其歸咎于狡猾的臺灣方面——中國官媒表示，美國候任總統(tǒng)“懵懂得像個小孩子”。

On Sunday China agreed to return an underwater drone it had seized from a US naval vessel. Mr Trump claimed it had been stolen. China accused him of “overhyping” the incident. Next time, Beijing is unlikely to let him off the hook so easily.

周日，中國方面同意歸還從一艘美國海軍艦艇附近捕獲的一具潛航器。特朗普曾聲稱該裝置是被偷走的。中國指責(zé)特朗普“炒作”這一事件。下一次，北京不太可能如此輕易地放過他。

Without realising it, the US electorate appears to have opened the gates to a new cold war in which America’s hand will be far less strong than it was first time round. One of the reasons the US won the original one was its skill at breaking China away from the Soviet block. Detente between Richard Nixon’s US and Mao Zedong’s China in 1972 cemented the Sino-Soviet split and weakened Moscow’s global appeal. Mr Trump plans to do the reverse.

美國選民似乎開啟了通向新冷戰(zhàn)的大門，他們卻沒有認(rèn)識到這一點。而在這輪新冷戰(zhàn)中，美國手上的牌面遠(yuǎn)沒有第一次冷戰(zhàn)時那么強(qiáng)。美國之所以贏得第一次冷戰(zhàn)，其中一個原因是得益于美國把中國從蘇維埃陣營中分化出來的技巧。1972年理查德•尼克松(Richard Nixon)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的美國和毛澤東領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的中國關(guān)系緩和，強(qiáng)化了中蘇的分裂，削弱了莫斯科在全球的號召力。而特朗普打算做的事卻正好相反。

His strong rhetoric against China is mirrored only by his warm overtures to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It remains to be seen what strategic gain Mr Trump will derive from doing deals with Russia — a country that is stoking illiberal democracy in Europe and that played a role in helping Mr Trump defeat Hillary Clinton. But Mr Trump’s antagonism towards China is a gamble without an upside.

特朗普對中國的強(qiáng)硬措辭，與他對弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的俄羅斯的友好姿態(tài)形成反差。對于正在歐洲鼓動“非自由民主”體制、在幫助特朗普打敗希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)方面發(fā)揮作用的俄羅斯，特朗普通過與它做交易能獲得什么戰(zhàn)略收益還有待觀察。不過，特朗普與中國對抗將是一場全無好處的賭博。

Avoiding a US-China conflict will take Nixonian dexterity. Mr Trump is no Nixon. For all his abuse of domestic law, Nixon was a devout student of global affairs who grasped the geopolitical chessboard. Mr Trump is a 70-year-old neophyte with no interest in rectifying the gaps in his knowledge. He spurns the presidential daily intelligence briefings because they are too dull. Nor do any of Mr Trump’s advisers resemble Henry Kissinger, who was chief architect of the One China policy that Mr Trump is threatening to rip up. Mr Trump’s senior appointees reflect both his anti-China and pro-Russia intentions.

避免美中沖突需要尼克松式的靈活手段。特朗普卻不是尼克松。尼克松盡管對國內(nèi)法律有種種濫用行為，他卻是位全球事務(wù)領(lǐng)域的專注學(xué)生，理解地緣政治大棋局。而特朗普則是一位對填補(bǔ)自身知識空白不感興趣的70多歲的新手。他輕蔑地拒絕聽取為總統(tǒng)提供的每日情報簡報，原因是覺得它們太無聊。他身邊也沒有一位與亨利•基辛格(Henry Kissinger)相似的顧問，基辛格是特朗普威脅要顛覆的一個中國政策的首席設(shè)計師。特朗普對高級別職位的人選指定，既反映了他的反華意圖，也反映了他的親俄打算。

Michael Flynn, the retired lieutenant general who will play a key role as Mr Trump’s national security adviser, believes China is in league with Isis and other Islamist terrorist groups to defeat the US. It is a breathtaking fiction. Before he joined the Trump campaign, Mr Flynn believed Russia was part of the same anti-US axis. He has since dropped his Russia hawkishness for a Trumpian admiration.

將擔(dān)任特朗普國家安全顧問這一關(guān)鍵角色的，是退役陸軍中將邁克爾•弗林(Michael Flynn)。弗林認(rèn)為，中國與“伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)及其他伊斯蘭恐怖組織暗中勾連，意圖挫敗美國。這是一種令人驚嘆的虛構(gòu)情節(jié)。在加入特朗普陣營之前，弗林還曾認(rèn)為俄羅斯也是同一個反美軸心的一部分。而在加入特朗普陣營后，為獲得特朗普的贊賞，他已放棄了對俄羅斯的鷹派立場。

Conversely, Rex Tillerson, Mr Trump’s nominee as secretary of state, is an old friend of Russia — Mr Putin awarded him the Russian Order of Friendship in 2013. At his confirmation hearings next month, the world will learn how warmly Mr Tillerson feels towards Moscow. Several Republican senators, including John McCain, America’s leading Russia hawk, plan to make Mr Tillerson’s declaration that Russia interfered in the US election a condition of their support for him — an intelligence finding Mr Trump angrily rejects.

與弗林相反，特朗普的國務(wù)卿提名人雷克斯•蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)則是俄羅斯的老朋友——普京曾在2013年為他頒發(fā)過俄羅斯友誼勛章(Order of Friendship)。在下個月針對蒂勒森的提名確認(rèn)聽證會上，世界將會了解他對莫斯科感情有多深。包括美國頭號對俄鷹派約翰•麥凱恩(John McCain)在內(nèi)，幾位共和黨參議員打算把蒂勒森宣稱俄羅斯干預(yù)美國選舉(這是特朗普憤怒否認(rèn)的情報發(fā)現(xiàn))作為支持蒂勒森的前提條件。

It is possible Mr Tillerson’s prospects could fall at that hurdle. More likely is that he will find a way of finessing the Russia hawks without contradicting Mr Trump.

蒂勒森的任職前景有可能因這一障礙而化為烏有。不過更有可能的情況是，他會想辦法在不抵觸特朗普的情況下，在對俄鷹派人士面前蒙混過關(guān)。

So what will result from Mr Trump’s China gamble? The initial effect will be confusion. Mr Trump’s Taiwan threat took China as much by surprise as it did everyone else. In its guarded response, China gave Mr Trump room to correct what it chose to interpret as a naive mistake. The next step will be escalating tension. Mr Trump wants to be known as the president who returns manufacturing jobs to the US, and keeps existing ones from moving overseas. Wresting concessions from China — such as the voluntary export restraint Japan adopted in the late 1980s — is a key part of the story he wants to tell the American people.

那么，特朗普的對華賭博會有什么結(jié)果?起初是讓人大惑不解。特朗普在臺灣問題上發(fā)出的威脅，令中國方面與其他所有人一樣震驚。為防萬一，中國選擇將其解釋為幼稚的錯誤，為特朗普留下了糾正的空間。而下一步將造成緊張關(guān)系升級。對于特朗普來說，他希望被視為一位讓制造業(yè)工作崗位回流美國、并確?，F(xiàn)有崗位不流失海外的總統(tǒng)。在他想要告訴美國人民的故事中，爭取中國的讓步——就像上世紀(jì)80年代末日本曾采取過自愿限制出口措施——是關(guān)鍵的一環(huán)。

Mr Trump is using the threat to the One China policy as leverage in that quest. If he persists, which I believe he will, it will backfire. China will respond by putting a further squeeze on disaffected US investors, whose complaints about thin profits and Chinese intellectual property theft are becoming louder by the day. Far from checking Washington’s China-bashing, as US businesses have done in the past, many will be cheering Mr Trump on.

特朗普正在把對一個中國政策的威脅作為滿足上述訴求的手段。如果他堅持下去——我相信他會這么做——事情將適得其反。中國將通過進(jìn)一步擠壓已經(jīng)心懷不滿的美國投資者予以回應(yīng)，這些投資者對利潤微薄和中國竊取知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的抱怨聲正變得越來越大。與美國商界過去阻止華盛頓攻擊中國的做法大不相同的是，許多人會為特朗普鼓勁加油。

Once the dispute sets in, the risk of conflict will rise. China will find a way of testing Mr Trump’s resolve early into his presidency — something a little tougher than a seized naval drone. That is what happened with George W Bush in 2001 when it forced a US spyplane to land on China’s territory. The resulting stand-off, and eventual release of the American crew, was quickly forgotten after the 9/11 terrorist attacks a few months later.

一旦出現(xiàn)爭端，雙方爆發(fā)沖突的風(fēng)險將會增加。中國會在特朗普上任之初設(shè)法試探他的決心——找一件比捕獲潛航器更棘手的事情。2001年喬治•W•布什(George W Bush)就遭遇過這樣的情況。當(dāng)時，中國曾迫使一架美國偵察機(jī)在其領(lǐng)土著陸。這一事件導(dǎo)致的對峙、以及美國機(jī)組人員最終的獲釋，在幾個月后的9•11恐怖襲擊后被迅速淡忘。

Contrary to Mr Flynn’s view, China is a natural ally in America’s struggle against Islamist terrorism. The scope for an accident with today’s far more assertive China — whether over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea — is considerably greater than in 2001. China’s military clout is far greater than it was then. Just last week, new Chinese missile batteries were detected on reclaimed land in the South China Sea.

與弗林的看法相反，中國是美國在對伊斯蘭恐怖主義斗爭中的天然盟友。與遠(yuǎn)比當(dāng)初自信的中國鬧出事來的幾率比2001年大了許多，不管是在臺灣問題上還是在南中國?；驏|中國海問題上。中國的軍事實力也遠(yuǎn)勝當(dāng)年。就在上周，在南中國海中國填海造出的島嶼上，還發(fā)現(xiàn)有新部署的中國導(dǎo)彈發(fā)射裝置。

Can we trust Mr Trump’s instincts in a crisis? Will Mr Putin act as a restraint — or even a mediator — between a defensive US and a rising China? We cannot yet know the answer. What we do know is that Mr Trump’s closest adviser is a man who sees China as a mortal foe.

一旦發(fā)生危機(jī)，我們能相信特朗普的本能反應(yīng)么?在防守的美國和崛起的中國之間，普京會扮演勸架者、甚至是調(diào)停者的角色么?我們現(xiàn)在還無法知道答案。我們知道的是，特朗普最親信的一位顧問把中國視為死敵。