去工業(yè)化的詛咒

In the debate about how to understand the rise of anti-globalism — is it most deeply driven by cultural or economic anxiety — there is little disagreement that the heartlands of support for Donald Trump, Brexit and other anti-establishment movements were areas of marked industrial decline such as the US Rust Belt or northern England.

圍繞如何理解反全球化主義崛起的辯論(這個(gè)現(xiàn)象最深層的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素是文化還是經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的焦慮?)，各方至少對(duì)于一點(diǎn)沒(méi)有什么異議，那就是支持唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)、英國(guó)退歐和其他反建制運(yùn)動(dòng)的心臟地帶，也是出現(xiàn)顯著工業(yè)衰敗的地區(qū)，比如美國(guó)“銹帶”或者英格蘭北部。

These areas have been deindustrialising for a long time. The end of the old manufacturing sectors — and the disappearance of plentiful and reasonably well-paid jobs for low-skilled men — started in the 1970s, with British industry going through the most rapid change of all in the 1980s. But we should note that everywhere, it was not the amount produced by factories that fell — it didn’t — but that production could increasingly happen with fewer workers thanks to technological change.

這些地區(qū)的去工業(yè)化已經(jīng)持續(xù)了很久。老制造業(yè)走上末路，低技能男子有望獲得的大量且報(bào)酬相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)的工作崗位消失，這一切始于上世紀(jì)70年代;英國(guó)工業(yè)在上世紀(jì)80年代經(jīng)歷了最為急劇的變化。但我們應(yīng)該注意到，無(wú)論是在哪里，工廠的產(chǎn)出并未下降，而是技術(shù)變革使得達(dá)到相同產(chǎn)量所需要的工人減少了。

Diane Coyle writes movingly in the FT about the her Lancashire home town which saw huge losses of factory jobs in the late 1970s. Her main point is that the economic damage to such communities, and the anger it engendered, came long before the immigration that was such a big factor in the Brexit debate. And that it was caused not by globalisation but by automation — and the “catastrophic failure by the UK and other western governments to deliver on the most basic task of a democracy: insure people against a system-wide shock that they could not have foreseen or prevented”.

黛安•科伊爾(Diane Coyle)在英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》撰文，深情描述了蘭開(kāi)夏郡(Lancashire)的故鄉(xiāng)小鎮(zhèn)是如何在上世紀(jì)70年代末經(jīng)歷工廠就業(yè)崗位的大規(guī)模流失的。她的主要觀點(diǎn)是，這些社區(qū)所受的經(jīng)濟(jì)損害以及因此產(chǎn)生的憤怒，在移民問(wèn)題成為英國(guó)退歐辯論中的一大議題之前早就出現(xiàn)了。其誘因并不是全球化，而是自動(dòng)化——以及“英國(guó)和其他西方國(guó)家政府在履行民主政體的最基本任務(wù)上出現(xiàn)了災(zāi)難性的失?。罕Ｗo(hù)人民免受他們無(wú)法預(yù)見(jiàn)或者預(yù)防的系統(tǒng)性沖擊的傷害”。

There is evidence, however, that the “China shock” has made things worse, and prompted the upsurge in support for anti-globalist politics. Economists have analysed the US election results and found that the swing in the voting shares towards the Republican party since 2000 was larger in areas that were hit harder by Chinese import penetration after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. For example, the findings suggest that “had Chinese import growth been 25% smaller, they calculated, Mrs Clinton would have won Wisconsin and Michigan”.

然而，有證據(jù)表明“中國(guó)沖擊”讓情況變得更糟，引發(fā)了反全球化政治的人氣高漲。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們分析了自2001年中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織(WTO)以來(lái)幾次美國(guó)大選的結(jié)果，發(fā)現(xiàn)自2000年以來(lái)，在那些被來(lái)自中國(guó)的進(jìn)口滲透沖擊比較嚴(yán)重的地區(qū)，投票立場(chǎng)的轉(zhuǎn)變(從投民主黨轉(zhuǎn)為投共和黨)比例更大。比如，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的推算似乎表明，“如果來(lái)自中國(guó)的進(jìn)口增長(zhǎng)比實(shí)際水平低25%，希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)將能夠拿下威斯康辛州和密歇根州”。

The same seems to hold true in Britain. Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig establish that “regions that have been more exposed to the recent surge of manufacturing imports from China, due to their historical industry specialisation, show systematically higher Leave vote shares. We claim that this causal effect is driven by the displacement determined by globalisation in the absence of effective compensation of its losers.” The same researchers have earlier found a similar link between exposure to Chinese import competition and support for nativist parties across European regions.

同樣的規(guī)律似乎也適用于英國(guó)。伊塔洛•科蘭托內(nèi)(Italo Colantone)和皮耶羅•斯塔尼格(Piero Stanig)證實(shí)：“一些地區(qū)由于歷史性的專(zhuān)業(yè)化工業(yè)，受近期來(lái)自中國(guó)的制造業(yè)進(jìn)口激增的影響更大，這些地區(qū)系統(tǒng)性地表現(xiàn)出更高比例的人群投票選擇退歐。我們主張，驅(qū)動(dòng)這種因果關(guān)系的是在缺乏對(duì)全球化的輸家進(jìn)行有效補(bǔ)償?shù)那闆r下，全球化所造成的取代效應(yīng)。”此前這兩名研究人員還在歐洲各個(gè)地區(qū)發(fā)現(xiàn)，受到中國(guó)產(chǎn)品競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的程度，與本土主義政黨得到的支持率存在類(lèi)似關(guān)聯(lián)。

So the China shock mattered. But the forward march of technology means that even without it, similar disruptions should be expected as the consequence of increased automation over time. Which raises the question of what governments must do about it.

因此，中國(guó)沖擊的確事關(guān)重大。但是不可阻擋的技術(shù)進(jìn)步意味著，即使沒(méi)有中國(guó)沖擊，隨著自動(dòng)化程度逐漸提高，類(lèi)似的沖擊也可以預(yù)見(jiàn)。這就提出了一個(gè)問(wèn)題，政府針對(duì)這種情況必須采取什么行動(dòng)呢?

Not restrict trade, as Chad Bown explains: cancelling trade agreements does not do much to help displaced workers (though enforcing them better might), and there is little in modern trade deals that stops governments from enacting domestic policies to mitigate the harm for those on the losing side, such as better healthcare provision in the US. The solution is not for national governments to “take back control” from global institutions and rules, but to use better the control they have always retained.

答案并非限制貿(mào)易，查德•鮑恩(Chad Bown)解釋道：取消貿(mào)易協(xié)定對(duì)失業(yè)工人幫助不大(不過(guò)更好地執(zhí)行貿(mào)易協(xié)定或許有幫助)，而且現(xiàn)代貿(mào)易協(xié)定中并沒(méi)有什么內(nèi)容阻止政府實(shí)施國(guó)內(nèi)政策來(lái)緩解輸家所受的傷害，比如美國(guó)可以推出更好的醫(yī)療保健服務(wù)。對(duì)國(guó)家政府來(lái)說(shuō)，解決方案不是從全球機(jī)構(gòu)和規(guī)則那里“奪回控制權(quán)”，而是更好地利用它們一直保留著的控制權(quán)。

This will, as Coyle points out, require taking place seriously: “national policies . . . are delivered in specific places. The geography of the economy was ignored.” In the presence of a regional shock, national policy should be directed to maintain strong aggregate demand in the affected locations, so that new job creation is stimulated.

就如黛安•科伊爾指出的，這個(gè)過(guò)程需要嚴(yán)肅認(rèn)真地進(jìn)行：“國(guó)家政策……在特定地區(qū)實(shí)施。以往經(jīng)濟(jì)的地理分布受到忽視。”在存在地區(qū)性沖擊的情況下，國(guó)家政策應(yīng)該著眼于在受影響的地方保持強(qiáng)勁的總需求，從而刺激新的工作崗位產(chǎn)生。

Then there is the pedestrian but crucial need for policies to adapt people’s skills to what those new jobs may be. David Leonhardt reports from New Castle, Delaware, which has “had to confront post-industrial devastation . . . that now has the country’s attention”. A skills and school development policy that has tapped into the area’s “deep cultural connection to craftsmanship — to making things and working with their hands” seems to have helped address both economic decline and the status anxiety that comes with it. It amounts to, in the words of Leonhardt’s headline, “a jolt of blue-collar hope”. That is something mainstream politicians everywhere should aim to provide, lest the false hope peddled by the anti-globalists is seen as the last resort.

然后是看似瑣碎但十分關(guān)鍵的政策需要——讓人們的技能適應(yīng)新的工作。戴維•倫哈特(David Leonhardt)在特拉華州的紐卡斯?fàn)栠M(jìn)行了報(bào)道。該地區(qū)“不得不面對(duì)后工業(yè)時(shí)代的毀滅性打擊……現(xiàn)在受到舉國(guó)關(guān)注。”一項(xiàng)技能和學(xué)校發(fā)展政策挖掘了該地區(qū)“在手藝(用雙手工作和制作東西)方面的深厚文化淵源”，這一政策似乎有助于同時(shí)解決經(jīng)濟(jì)滑坡問(wèn)題和隨之而來(lái)的身份焦慮。用倫哈特的標(biāo)題來(lái)說(shuō)，這帶來(lái)了“一股藍(lán)領(lǐng)的希望”。任何地方的主流政治人士都應(yīng)以提供這一希望為己任，以防反全球主義分子所兜售的虛假希望被人們視為最后手段。