從特朗普勝選看美國(guó)政治

The election of Donald Trump has triggered a thousand questions and much soul searching about America and the future of the west. Here are my initial takeaways based on five days in New York, including election night.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當(dāng)選引發(fā)了人們的重重疑問(wèn)和深刻反思，有些問(wèn)題是關(guān)于美國(guó)的，有些問(wèn)題是關(guān)于西方的未來(lái)的。以下是我在紐約逗留五天(包括大選之夜)得出的初步結(jié)論。

1) Cultural and identity politics are the common thread of instability running through the world right now.

1)文化及身份認(rèn)同政治是當(dāng)今世界不穩(wěn)定局勢(shì)的共同主線。

From Donald Trump’s triumph to Brexit and the rise of a new caliphate in the Middle East, the tension is likely to get worse before it gets better. In the US, Trump played on middle class and working class fears about immigration and cultural nostalgia for a bygone era in America. He brilliantly exploited anger about political correctness, especially among elites, including the mainstream media. Ultimately, as in Brexit Britain, identity politics may have “trumped” pocketbook politics.

從唐納德•特朗普在美國(guó)大選中獲勝到英國(guó)脫歐和中東新哈里發(fā)的崛起，緊張局勢(shì)可能會(huì)繼續(xù)惡化，然后才有望好轉(zhuǎn)。在美國(guó)，特朗普利用了中產(chǎn)和工薪階層對(duì)移民的恐懼和對(duì)一個(gè)逝去時(shí)代的文化懷舊。他成功地利用了民眾對(duì)政治正確、特別是精英階層(包括主流媒體)的政治正確的憤怒。最終，如脫歐的英國(guó)一樣，身份認(rèn)同政治(identity politics)或許會(huì)“戰(zhàn)勝”錢包政治(pocketbook politics)。

2) The anti-globalisation movement is growing.

2)反全球化運(yùn)動(dòng)風(fēng)頭日盛。

Mr Trump’s anti-free trade rhetoric was not challenged by Hillary Clinton. The elites, including the media, have become complacent about globalisation, failing to grasp the importance of defending the postwar liberal order, institutions and treaties which have underpinned growth and prosperity. Illiberal democrats such as Marine Le Pen in France and the AfD in Germany will take heart ahead of elections in 2017. Trump has shown that populism is not just framing the debate, it can win. The unthinkable is now possible.

特朗普的反自由貿(mào)易言論沒(méi)有受到希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)的挑戰(zhàn)。包括媒體在內(nèi)的精英階層對(duì)全球化感到沾沾自喜，他們沒(méi)有明白維護(hù)戰(zhàn)后自由秩序、制度和條約——它們是增長(zhǎng)和繁榮的基礎(chǔ)——的重要性。反自由的民主主義者，如法國(guó)的馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)和德國(guó)新選擇黨(AfD)，將在2017年選舉前受到鼓舞。特朗普已經(jīng)證明，民粹主義不僅正在左右辯論，而且還可以獲勝。以往不可想象的情況，現(xiàn)在已變得可能。

3) The parallels between Donald Trump and Ronald Reagan are overdone.

3)將唐納德•特朗普與羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)相提并論有些過(guò)了。

Trump has no previous political experience and he is a creature of reality TV and the moment. By the time he became president, Ronald Reagan had been a two-time governor of California and a trade union organiser in Hollywood. When he won the White House in 1980, Reagan had a political philosophy. He was the political leader of a low-tax, small-government movement. Mr Trump said in his victory speech that he too was head of a movement (not, interestingly, a party), but many of his positions on the economy and foreign policy are incoherent, contradictory and inherently high-risk.

特朗普毫無(wú)從政經(jīng)驗(yàn)，他是電視真人秀和當(dāng)下時(shí)代的產(chǎn)物。里根就任總統(tǒng)前，當(dāng)過(guò)兩屆加利福尼亞州州長(zhǎng)，還曾是好萊塢的一名工會(huì)組織者。1980年在總統(tǒng)選舉中獲勝時(shí)，里根已形成了自己的政治哲學(xué)。他是一場(chǎng)主張低稅、“小政府”的運(yùn)動(dòng)的政治領(lǐng)袖。特朗普在勝選演說(shuō)中也說(shuō)他是一場(chǎng)運(yùn)動(dòng)(有趣的是，并非某個(gè)政黨)的領(lǐng)袖，但他許多關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)和外交政策的立場(chǎng)不一致、相互矛盾，從本質(zhì)上來(lái)說(shuō)充滿風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

4) There are huge questions about a Trump administration’s foreign policy.

4)關(guān)于特朗普政府的外交政策存在許多大問(wèn)題。

Mr Trump loves to be liked, and his five favourite words are: “The art of the deal”. But a transactional foreign policy which places all bets on personal relationships and negotiating skills — rather than alliances and long-term policy planning — is a source of serious concern in Europe and Asia. His threat to undo the nuclear deal with Iran is high-risk too. In his first two years, he may well face a showdown with North Korea over its nuclear programme. His temperament and judgment will be put to the test.

特朗普喜歡被人喜歡，他最愛(ài)的五個(gè)字是：“交易的藝術(shù)”(The art of the deal)。但是，一種將所有賭注都押在個(gè)人關(guān)系和談判技巧、而非是聯(lián)盟和長(zhǎng)期政策規(guī)劃上的交易式外交政策，會(huì)令歐洲和亞洲感到嚴(yán)重?fù)?dān)憂。他威脅撤銷與伊朗核協(xié)議的說(shuō)法也隱含很大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在上任頭兩年，他可能圍繞朝鮮核計(jì)劃與對(duì)方攤牌。他的性格和判斷將遭受考驗(yàn)。

5) The Democrats are in a terrible state.

5)民主黨人處于可怕的狀態(tài)之中。

They have won the popular vote in six out of the past seven elections, but only won the White House four times. Mrs Clinton was a deeply flawed candidate who failed to motivate voters. If turnout had been a little higher in key states (Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) she could have won. But her decades of public service counted for nothing and Bernie Sanders, the socialist from Vermont, did more damage to her candidacy during the Democratic primary campaign than realised. Now the question is, can the party rebuild — or will it turn to its own Trump-like populist?

在過(guò)去七次選舉中，他們有六次贏得了民眾的更多選票，但只有四次成功入主白宮。希拉里是一名有很大缺陷的候選人，她沒(méi)能把選民們動(dòng)員起來(lái)。如果關(guān)鍵州(佛羅里達(dá)州、密歇根州、賓夕法尼亞州和威斯康星州)的投票率稍微高一點(diǎn)兒，她就獲勝了。但她幾十年的公共服務(wù)毫無(wú)作用，佛蒙特州的社會(huì)主義者伯尼•桑德斯(Bernie Sanders)在民主黨初選中對(duì)她的候選人資格造成的傷害，要大于人們所意識(shí)到的程度。現(xiàn)在的問(wèn)題是，民主黨是否能夠重建——還是將轉(zhuǎn)向自己黨內(nèi)的特朗普式民粹主義者?

6) Fears that the Trump victory heralds the start of illiberal democracy in America are overblown.

6)對(duì)于特朗普勝選預(yù)示著“無(wú)自由的民主”(Illiberal Democracy)開(kāi)始在美國(guó)興起的擔(dān)憂是過(guò)慮了。

Mr Trump is no Vladimir Putin or Viktor Orban, and the US is not Russia or Hungary. Mr Trump must operate within the checks and balances and separation of powers under the US constitution. True, the president has considerable executive power, but America has strong institutions that will act as a counterweight. See my Lunch with James Baker, former chief of staff to Reagan and former secretary of state, and his prescient words of advice on how to read a US election.

特朗普不是弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)或歐爾班•維克托(Viktor Orban)，美國(guó)也不是俄羅斯或匈牙利。特朗普必須根據(jù)美國(guó)憲法規(guī)定的制衡和權(quán)力分立原則行事。誠(chéng)然，總統(tǒng)有相當(dāng)大的行政權(quán)力，但美國(guó)有強(qiáng)大的制度，這將成為一種平衡力量。請(qǐng)看我的《與FT共進(jìn)午餐：詹姆斯•貝克》，了解他關(guān)于如何解讀美國(guó)大選的真知灼見(jiàn)。貝克曾任里根的幕僚長(zhǎng)，也當(dāng)過(guò)國(guó)務(wù)卿。

7) Trump destroyed two political dynasties (Bush and Clinton) and threatens to blow up Washington.

7)特朗普摧毀了兩個(gè)政治世家(布什和克林頓)，并威脅要攪翻華盛頓。

Now he must show if he is capable of playing a new role: the builder. The real estate mogul and political neophyte defied convention in every respect. He rewrote the rules of campaigning, spent next to nothing on TV advertising and relied on brand Trump and a simple message: “Make America great again.” The business of government will involve much harder choices and priorities. He must work with Congress through the Republican majorities in the House and Senate. Mike Pence, his vice-president and a former congressman, will play a leading role, maybe even as influential as Dick Cheney. We know Trump can play showman-in-chief, but he must now show, in terms of temperament and judgment, that he is ready to become commander-in-chief.

現(xiàn)在他必須證明，他是否能夠扮演好新的角色：建設(shè)者。這位房地產(chǎn)大亨、政治新手在各方面都打破了傳統(tǒng)。他重寫了競(jìng)選規(guī)則，幾乎沒(méi)有花錢在電視做廣告，他就依靠“特朗普”這支品牌和一條簡(jiǎn)單的口號(hào)：“讓美國(guó)再次偉大”。政府事務(wù)將涉及更艱難的選擇和優(yōu)先排序。他要憑借共和黨在參眾兩院獲得的多數(shù)議席與國(guó)會(huì)合作。他的副總統(tǒng)、前國(guó)會(huì)議員邁克•彭斯(Mike Pence)將扮演一個(gè)主要角色，其影響力甚至可能與迪克•切尼(Dick Cheney)相仿。我們知道，特朗普可以扮演好“總作秀官”(showman-in-chief)，但他現(xiàn)在必須證明，在性情脾氣和判斷方面，他準(zhǔn)備好了擔(dān)任總指揮。