FT社評：美國政壇籠罩著“反烏托邦”情緒

　　Anyone watching the first presidential debate would be forgiven for thinking the US was on the brink of collapse. The Republican candidate, Donald Trump, insisted the US was a third-world country suffering an almost biblical flight of jobs to China and beyond. Violence was out of control and parts of the country were now in open warfare.

　　如果你觀看美國總統(tǒng)候選人首場電視辯論后得出美國危在旦夕的印象，那是可以理解的。共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)堅稱，美國是第三世界國家，承受著工作機會大規(guī)模流失到中國和其他地區(qū)的苦果。國內(nèi)暴力活動已經(jīng)失控，部分地區(qū)如今陷于公開的沖突之中。

　　Hillary Clinton’s language may have been rather less melodramatic. But she shared Mr Trump’s premise about the threat posed to the US by an open global economy. She declined the chance to re-embrace the Trans-Pacific Partnership that she once labelled a gold standard of trade deals. She also failed to spell out what kind of America the world should expect if she were to succeed Barack Obama. Their message to Americans was: “Be afraid. Be very afraid.” The rest of the world should take note.

　　希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)的措辭或許沒那么聳人聽聞，但她也贊同特朗普關(guān)于開放的全球經(jīng)濟對美國造成威脅的觀點。她排除了重新支持《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡稱TPP)的可能性，她曾經(jīng)稱這份協(xié)定為貿(mào)易協(xié)定的黃金標準。希拉里也未能闡明，如果她接替了巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)之位，世界將會看到一個怎樣的美國。這兩位都向美國人傳達了這樣的信息：“要小心，要十分小心。”世界其他地區(qū)應(yīng)該注意這一點。

　　The big puzzle is the gap between the relatively healthy reality of the American economy, particularly compared with Europe and Japan, and the dystopia gripping its politics. Contrary to Mr Trump’s depiction of a jobless America, the US unemployment rate is just 4.9 per cent, which is less than half that of parts of Europe.

　　美國經(jīng)濟狀況實際上是比較健康的，特別是與歐洲和日本相比的話，然而美國政壇卻籠罩著一種“反烏托邦”情緒，這是讓人頗為費解的地方。按照特朗普的描述，美國到處充斥著無業(yè)人員，而實際上美國失業(yè)率僅為4.9%，不到歐洲部分國家的一半。

　　Even in rust belt states such as Michigan and Ohio, joblessness has fallen far and reasonably fast since the Great Recession of 2008. Moreover, immigrants, illegal or otherwise, are not taking all the jobs — or suppressing workers’ wages. The rate of illegal entries into the US mostly from Mexico has gone into reverse. After a drought lasting more than a decade, US median incomes last year finally began to grow again. It is one thing to scapegoat trade and foreigners in the midst of a depression. It is quite another to do so when recovery is finally bearing some fruit.

　　就算是在密歇根州和俄亥俄州等“銹帶”地區(qū)，自2008年大衰退(Great Recession)以來，失業(yè)率也以相當(dāng)快的速度有了大幅度的下降。另外，移民——不管是非法移民還是合法移民——并沒有搶走所有的工作崗位，也沒有拉低工資水平。主要來自墨西哥的非法移民數(shù)量已經(jīng)在減少。在經(jīng)歷了長達10多年的停滯后，美國收入中值去年終于開始再次增長。在經(jīng)濟蕭條時把貿(mào)易和外國人當(dāng)成替罪羊是一回事。在經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇終于取得一些成果時這么嫁禍于人就是另一回事了。

　　That said, there is method in America’s frustration, even if the blame for it is misdirected. Middle-class incomes have finally started to advance again. But they remain considerably below where they were at the start of the century. If annual income growth had tracked normal patterns, they would now be almost a third higher than they are.

　　話雖如此，美國的失望情緒自有其道理，即便個中原因受到了誤導(dǎo)。中產(chǎn)階級收入終于開始再次增長，但依然遠低于本世紀初的水平。如果年度收入增長遵循正常形態(tài)，它們現(xiàn)在的收入將會高出近三分之一。

　　The distribution of US aggregate growth has also skewed more sharply towards the top 10 per cent, particularly the top 1 per cent. Meanwhile, US productivity growth, and trend annual growth in gross domestic product, have both slowed sharply in recent years.

　　美國總體增長的分配向收入最高的10%人群——尤其是1%人群——傾斜得更厲害了。與此同時，美國生產(chǎn)率增速以及國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)趨勢年度增長率在最近幾年都大幅放緩了。

　　There is little reason to suppose that there is another 1990s productivity miracle just around the corner. The outlook for blue-collar men in particular is bleak. One in eight prime-aged males is no longer in the job market, according to a report from the Council of Economic Advisers. In the absence of a dramatic turnround in skills training, that number is set to rise further. So too, will the politics of irate venting that has fuelled Mr Trump’s candidacy.

　　幾乎沒有理由認為，上世紀90年代那種生產(chǎn)率增長奇跡即將重現(xiàn)。藍領(lǐng)男性的前景尤其黯淡。白宮經(jīng)濟顧問委員會(US Council of Economic Advisers)的報告顯示，八分之一的壯年男性退出了就業(yè)市場。在技能培訓(xùn)沒有顯著改善的情況下，這一比例勢必進一步上升。發(fā)泄憤怒的政治策略——特朗普憑借這種策略獲得候選人資格——也將更有用武之地。

　　What can be done? The responsibility of a leader is to be straight with the people. Neither trade, nor technology, should be blamed for Washington’s failure to equip its workforce for the 21st century.

　　怎么做呢?領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人有責(zé)任向民眾說清實情。政府未能幫助其勞動人口掌握應(yīng)對21世紀所需的知識技能，這不應(yīng)該怪貿(mào)易，也不應(yīng)該怪技術(shù)。

　　Both Mr Trump and Mrs Clinton pander to the idea that comfortable mid-20th century factory-floor jobs can simply be willed back into existence. It is a myth. The blame for America’s labour force woes and the increasingly skewed distribution of the fruits of growth are to be found at home. It is Washington, not Beijing, which sets US tax rates. The answer to most of America’s challenges are to be found in the booming cities and technological hubs of 21st century America. Blaming it on foreigners may be good tactics. But it could result in terrible policies that will only deepen the malaise.

　　特朗普和希拉里都附和有關(guān)20世紀中葉那種安逸的工廠工作還會回來的觀點。這簡直是神話。美國勞動力困境和增長果實分配日益不公平的問題應(yīng)該從國內(nèi)找原因。是華盛頓、而非北京制定了美國稅率。解決美國大部分挑戰(zhàn)的答案可以在21世紀美國那些欣欣向榮的城市和科技中心找到。怪罪在外國人身上可能是好策略，但可能導(dǎo)致糟糕的政策，從而加劇困境。