“特朗普總統(tǒng)”將帶來(lái)“失序世界”

　　Sometimes history jumps. Think of the first world war, the Bolshevik revolution, the Great Depression, the election of Adolf Hitler, the second world war, the beginning of the cold war, the collapse of the European empires, Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” of China, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the financial crisis of 2007-09 and subsequent “great recession”.

　　歷史有時(shí)會(huì)發(fā)生跳躍。想想第一次世界大戰(zhàn)、布爾什維克革命(Bolshevik Revolution，即俄國(guó)十月革命)、大蕭條、阿道夫•希特勒(Adolf Hitler)當(dāng)選、第二次世界大戰(zhàn)、冷戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)、多個(gè)歐洲帝國(guó)的瓦解、鄧小平在中國(guó)實(shí)施的“改革開(kāi)放”、蘇聯(lián)解體，以及2007-09年的金融危機(jī)和隨后的“大衰退”。

　　We may be on the brink of an event as transformative as many of these: the election of Donald Trump as US president. This would mark the end of a US-led west as the central force in global affairs. The result would not be a new order. It would be perilous disorder.

　　我們或許即將面臨一起類(lèi)似的轉(zhuǎn)折性事件：唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當(dāng)選美國(guó)總統(tǒng)。那將標(biāo)志著以美國(guó)為首的西方在全球事務(wù)中擔(dān)當(dāng)核心角色的時(shí)代就要終結(jié)。其結(jié)果將不是形成新秩序，而是出現(xiàn)危險(xiǎn)的失序。

　　The fact that Mr Trump can be a credible contender for the presidency is astounding. In business, he is a serial defaulter and litigator turned reality TV star. He is a peddler of falsehoods and conspiracy theories. He utters racist calumnies. He attacks the independence of the judiciary. He refuses to reveal his taxes. He has no experience of political office, and incoherent policies. He glories in ignorance. He even hints at a federal default. He undermines confidence in the US-created trade order, by threatening to tear up past agreements. He undermines confidence in US democracy by claiming the election will be rigged. He supports torture and the deliberate killing of the families of alleged terrorists. He admires the former KGB agent who runs Russia.

　　特朗普能夠成為一名有希望當(dāng)選的總統(tǒng)競(jìng)選者，這一事實(shí)令人咋舌。在商界，他從一個(gè)連續(xù)違約者和訴訟當(dāng)事人轉(zhuǎn)型為真人秀電視明星。他兜售謊言和陰謀論。他進(jìn)行種族主義誹謗。他抨擊司法機(jī)構(gòu)的獨(dú)立性。他拒絕披露自己的稅單。他沒(méi)有從政經(jīng)驗(yàn)，沒(méi)有連貫的政策。他以無(wú)知為榮。他甚至暗示聯(lián)邦政府可以違約。他威脅要撕毀過(guò)去達(dá)成的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，削弱了人們對(duì)美國(guó)創(chuàng)建的貿(mào)易秩序的信心。他聲稱(chēng)大選將被操縱，削弱了人們對(duì)美國(guó)民主的信心。他支持酷刑，支持故意殺死疑似恐怖分子的家人。他欽佩正在掌管俄羅斯的那名前克格勃(KGB)特工。

　　Evidently, a huge number of US voters have lost confidence in the country’s political and economic systems. This is so to an extent not seen even in the 1930s, when voters turned towards an established politician. Yet, for all its challenges, the US is not in such terrible shape. It is the richest large country in the history of the world. Growth is slow, but unemployment is low. If voters were to choose Mr Trump — despite his failings, displayed again in the first presidential debate — this would tell us grim things about the health of the US.

　　顯然，數(shù)量眾多的美國(guó)選民已經(jīng)對(duì)這個(gè)國(guó)家的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)體系失去了信心。其程度之嚴(yán)重，即便是在上世紀(jì)30年代也未曾見(jiàn)過(guò)，當(dāng)時(shí)選民們支持一位老牌政治家。然而，盡管面臨各種挑戰(zhàn)，目前美國(guó)的情況并不是很糟。它是世界歷史上最富有的大國(guó)。增長(zhǎng)緩慢，但失業(yè)率低。如果選民們選擇了特朗普——盡管他有很多缺點(diǎn)并且在第一次競(jìng)選辯論中再次暴露無(wú)遺——這將告訴我們美國(guó)健康狀況有多嚴(yán)峻。

　　It is the world’s leading power, so this is not just a domestic US concern. What might a Trump presidency mean? Forecasting the policies of someone so unpredictable is impossible. But a few things seem at least reasonably clear.

　　美國(guó)是世界舞臺(tái)上處于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的大國(guó)，所以這個(gè)問(wèn)題不只是美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)民眾會(huì)關(guān)心。特朗普當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)可能意味著什么?要預(yù)測(cè)一個(gè)如此難以預(yù)測(cè)之人的政策，是絕無(wú)可能的。但有幾點(diǎn)至少是相當(dāng)明確的。

　　The US and its allies remain immensely powerful. But their economic dominance is in slow decline. According to the International Monetary Fund, the share of the high-income countries (essentially, the US and its chief allies) will fall from 64 per cent of global output (measured at purchasing power) in 1990 to 39 per cent in 2020, while the US share will fall from 22 per cent to 15 per cent over this period.

　　美國(guó)及其盟友仍然非常強(qiáng)大。但它們的經(jīng)濟(jì)主導(dǎo)地位正在緩慢下降。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(IMF)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，高收入國(guó)家(基本上就是美國(guó)及其主要盟友)占全球產(chǎn)出的比例(按購(gòu)買(mǎi)力計(jì)算)將從1990年的64%下降到2020年的39%，而同期美國(guó)的占比將從22%下降至15%。

　　While the US military might is still huge, two caveats must be made. One is that winning a conventional war is quite a different matter from achieving one’s aims on the ground, as the Viet­nam and Iraq wars showed. Furthermore, China’s rapidly rising defence spending could create serious military difficulties for the US in the Asia-Pacific region.

　　盡管美國(guó)的軍力仍然強(qiáng)大，但有兩點(diǎn)需要說(shuō)明。一個(gè)是，正如越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)所顯示的那樣，打贏一場(chǎng)常規(guī)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與實(shí)現(xiàn)你在地面上的目標(biāo)是完全不同的事情。此外，中國(guó)的國(guó)防開(kāi)支迅速增加，可能會(huì)使美國(guó)在亞太地區(qū)面臨嚴(yán)重的軍事難題。

　　It follows that the ability of the US to shape the world to its liking will rest increasingly on its influence over the global economic and political systems. Indeed, this is not new. It has been a feature of US hegemony since the 1940s. But this is even more important today. The alliances the US creates, the institutions it supports and the prestige it possesses are truly invaluable assets. All such strategic assets would be in grave peril if Mr Trump were to be president.

　　由此可見(jiàn)，美國(guó)按照自己意愿塑造世界的能力，將越來(lái)越多地依賴(lài)于其對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治體系的影響力。事實(shí)上，這并不是什么新鮮事。這已成為自1940年以來(lái)美國(guó)霸權(quán)的一個(gè)特點(diǎn)。但在今天，這一點(diǎn)顯得更重要。美國(guó)創(chuàng)建的聯(lián)盟、支持的機(jī)構(gòu)和擁有的聲望，是真正無(wú)價(jià)的資產(chǎn)。如果特朗普成為總統(tǒng)，所有這些戰(zhàn)略性資產(chǎn)都將面臨嚴(yán)重危險(xiǎn)。

　　The biggest contrast between the US and China is that the former has so many powerful allies. Even Vladimir Putin is not a reliable ally for China. America’s allies support the US largely because they trust it. That trust is based on its perceived commitment to predictable, values-based behaviour. Its alliances have not been problem-free, far from it. But they have worked. Mr Trump’s cherished unpredictability and transactional approach to partnerships would damage the alliances irreparably.

　　美國(guó)和中國(guó)的最大不同在于，前者有眾多強(qiáng)大盟友。而對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，即便普京也非可靠盟友。美國(guó)的盟友支持美國(guó)，主要是因?yàn)樗鼈冃湃蚊绹?guó)。這種信任是基于它們認(rèn)為，美國(guó)會(huì)采取的行動(dòng)是可以預(yù)測(cè)、以?xún)r(jià)值觀為基礎(chǔ)的。美國(guó)的聯(lián)盟關(guān)系并非毫無(wú)問(wèn)題，遠(yuǎn)非如此。但是，這些聯(lián)盟是起作用的。特朗普所重視的不可預(yù)測(cè)性，以及把伙伴關(guān)系當(dāng)成交易處理的做法，將會(huì)對(duì)聯(lián)盟關(guān)系造成不可挽回的損害。

　　A vital feature of the US-led global order has been the role of multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In binding itself by the rules of an open economic system, the US has encouraged others to do the same. The result has been extraordinary growth in prosperity: between 1950 and 2015, average global real output per head rose sixfold. Mr Trump does not understand this system. The results of repudiation could be calamitous for all.

　　美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的全球秩序的一個(gè)重要特征是多邊機(jī)構(gòu)——如國(guó)際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行(World Bank)和世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)——所扮演的角色。通過(guò)以開(kāi)放經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的規(guī)則約束自己，美國(guó)也鼓勵(lì)了其他國(guó)家這么做。其結(jié)果就是經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速繁榮：1950年至2015年間，全球人均實(shí)際產(chǎn)出增長(zhǎng)了6倍。特朗普不理解這種開(kāi)放經(jīng)濟(jì)體系。拋棄這種體系，可能給所有人帶來(lái)災(zāi)難性的后果。

　　The Iraq war has damaged trust in US wisdom and competence. But the global financial crisis has been even more destructive. Many have long suspected US motives. But they thought it knew how to manage a capitalist system. The crisis devastated that confidence.

　　伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)損害了世人對(duì)美國(guó)智慧和能力的信心。但是，全球金融危機(jī)產(chǎn)生了更大的破壞效果。許多人一直懷疑美國(guó)的動(dòng)機(jī)。但他們?cè)J(rèn)為美國(guó)懂得如何管理一個(gè)資本主義體系。危機(jī)已摧毀了這種信心。

　　After all this damage, election of a man as unqualified as Mr Trump would call into question something even more fundamental: belief in the capacity of the US to choose reasonably well-informed and competent leaders. Under a President Trump, the democratic system would lose much of its credibility as a model for the organisation of a civilised political life. Mr Putin and other actual or would-be despots would cheer. Their belief that talk of western values is just hypocrisy would be vindicated. But those who see the US as a bastion of democracy would despair.

　　在遭受這一切損害之后，把特朗普這樣一個(gè)不稱(chēng)職的人選上臺(tái)，將使一種更根本的東西遭到質(zhì)疑：那就是人們對(duì)于美國(guó)有能力選出見(jiàn)多識(shí)廣、能干的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的信心。如果特朗普當(dāng)上總統(tǒng)，民主制度作為文明政治生活組織制度之典范的信譽(yù)將損失大半。普京和其他當(dāng)前的獨(dú)裁者以及未來(lái)的準(zhǔn)獨(dú)裁者將會(huì)歡呼。他們認(rèn)為談?wù)撐鞣絻r(jià)值觀只是虛偽作派的觀點(diǎn)將被證明是正確的。但是，那些把美國(guó)視為民主堡壘的人會(huì)感到絕望。

　　If Mr Trump were to win, it would be a regime change for the world. It would, for example, end efforts to manage the threat of climate change, possibly forever. But even his candidacy suggests that the US role in the global order risks undergoing a transformation. That role depended not only on American economic and military prowess, but also on the values it represented. For all its mistakes, the ideal of a law-governed democratic republic remained visible. Hillary Clinton is an imperfect candidate. Mr Trump is something else altogether. Far from making America great, his presidency might unravel the world.

　　如果特朗普獲勝，這將是整個(gè)世界都要面對(duì)的一場(chǎng)政權(quán)更迭。比如，應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化威脅的努力大概將從此不了了之。但是，他成為總統(tǒng)候選人就已表明，美國(guó)在全球秩序中的角色可能經(jīng)歷一場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)變。這個(gè)角色不僅依賴(lài)于美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事實(shí)力，也依賴(lài)于它所代表的價(jià)值觀。盡管有許多錯(cuò)誤，一個(gè)法治的民主共和國(guó)的理想依然明顯可見(jiàn)。希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)是一個(gè)不完美的候選人。特朗普則完全是另類(lèi)。他若成為美國(guó)總統(tǒng)，非但不能讓美國(guó)變得偉大，還可能讓世界分崩離析。