姍姍來遲的蘋果中國研發(fā)中心

Until recently, Apple research and development centres never fell far from the tree. The group still does no significant research and development outside the US. Its head office in Cupertino keeps a strong hold on the core design of its products.

直到最近，蘋果(Apple)的研發(fā)中心從未與總部相隔太遠(yuǎn)。該集團(tuán)目前依然沒有重要的研發(fā)工作放在美國之外。蘋果在庫比蒂諾(Cupertino)的總部依然牢牢掌控著其產(chǎn)品的核心設(shè)計。

Last week, though, chief executive Tim Cook said Apple planned to open a research centre in China, where its products are made, rather than researched or developed. He has strong commercial reasons to plant more Apple flags. Apple sales in China have been dented by local rivals such as Huawei. Mr Cook’s announcement came while he met vice premier Zhang Gaoli — a reminder that R&D centres punch above their weight politically.

然而，蘋果首席執(zhí)行官蒂姆•庫克(Tim Cook)上周表示，蘋果計劃在中國設(shè)立一個研究中心。蘋果的產(chǎn)品在中國制造，但卻不是在中國研究或者開發(fā)出來的。從商業(yè)角度而言，庫克有充分理由在更多地方插上蘋果的旗幟。蘋果在華銷售遭到華為(Huawei)等中國本土競爭對手的蠶食。庫克是在和中國副總理張高麗會面時宣布此事的——這提醒人們，從政治角度而言，研發(fā)中心具有超乎其本身的重要性。

Foreign investors do not have to commit much money or employ many scientists to build an R&D hub, but the suggestion that they detect some magical innovation-fertiliser in the local water is like catnip to politicians. In return for handing over the keys to land, granting planning permission and even ladling on subsidies, the mayor or minister briefly gets to look as clever as the people the new R&D hub will hire.

外國投資者不必投入太多錢或雇傭太多科學(xué)家就能建立一個研發(fā)中心，但是，外國投資者在當(dāng)?shù)厮林邪l(fā)現(xiàn)了某種神奇“創(chuàng)新肥料”的跡象，對政治人士而言就像貓薄荷之于貓一樣有巨大的吸引力。市長或者部長移交土地使用權(quán)、授予規(guī)劃許可、甚至是大量提供補(bǔ)貼，作為回報，他們在短時間里能夠顯得像新研發(fā)中心將要雇傭的那些人一樣聰明。

The question in Apple’s case is what took it so long?

就蘋果而言，令人不解的問題是它為何花了這么長時間才做出這一決定呢?

Multinationals’ habit of setting up research centres abroad is more than 50 years old, and international companies’ interest in setting down research roots in developing countries dates at least to the early 2000s.

跨國公司在海外設(shè)立研究中心的慣用做法可以追溯到50多年前，而跨國企業(yè)在發(fā)展中國家設(shè)立研究分支的興趣至少可以追溯到2000年代初。

When IBM wanted to establish a non-US R&D centre in the 1950s, it sent an engineer called Arthur Samuel to scout sites in Europe. Samuel described the London suburbs he visited as “the most dismal places that I have ever seen”. He was drawn instead to Zurich by its “proximity to talent”. This remains among the most popular reasons for companies’ choice of foreign R&D locations, according to fDi Markets, the Financial Times’ cross-border investment research service. IBM’s Swiss facility fostered four Nobel laureates but R&D strategy has since evolved to put fast-growing markets and customers closer to the centre.

上世紀(jì)50年代，IBM想要在美國以外建立一個研發(fā)中心，于是派出一個名叫阿瑟•塞繆爾(Arthur Samuel)的工程師在歐洲尋覓合適的地點。塞繆爾把他到訪的倫敦郊區(qū)稱為“我見過的最差勁的地方”。相反，“接近人才”的蘇黎世吸引了他。英國《金融時報》旗下跨境投資研究服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)fDi Markets的研究表明，這一點依然是企業(yè)將某個地點選為海外研發(fā)中心地址的原因中最普遍的一個。IBM的瑞士研發(fā)中心培養(yǎng)了4名諾貝爾獎得主，但此后研發(fā)中心的選址策略轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樽屟邪l(fā)中心更靠近快速發(fā)展的市場和客戶。

Jaideep Prabhu of Cambridge’s Judge Business School says Apple might have held back from China so far because of worries about intellectual property leaking into a market notorious for knock-offs of its flagship products. But when he studied the research centre phenomenon in the mid-2000s, he found many large companies were already challenging the idea that R&D was “too important to be offshored”. The quality of skilled local researchers was the main attraction of Bangalore or Shanghai. The fact they could be hired for much less than in New York or Silicon Valley added to the allure.

英國劍橋大學(xué)(Cambridge)嘉治商學(xué)院(Judge Business School)的賈伊迪普•普拉布(Jaideep Prabhu)表示，蘋果一直到現(xiàn)在才決定在中國設(shè)立研發(fā)中心的原因，可能是蘋果擔(dān)憂其知識產(chǎn)權(quán)會泄露——中國是一個因為“山寨”蘋果旗艦產(chǎn)品而聲名狼藉的市場。但當(dāng)他研究了2000年代中期的研發(fā)中心現(xiàn)象后，他發(fā)現(xiàn)很多大公司已經(jīng)在挑戰(zhàn)這一觀念，即研發(fā)“太重要，以至于不能設(shè)在海外”。當(dāng)?shù)馗咚降氖炀氀芯咳藛T是班加羅爾或者上海的主要吸引力。再者，企業(yè)能夠以比在紐約或者硅谷低得多的成本雇傭這些人員也增強(qiáng)了這些地方的吸引力。

The added expense of co-ordinating research with headquarters and the feverish market for the talented staff quickly soaked up that cost advantage. What continued to make India and China attractive as bases for research, however, was their growing domestic markets, and the opportunity to study customers’ desire for subtly (and sometimes radically) different products. The realisation that some of the simpler designs developed there could be exported back to established markets underpinned the trend.

與總部之間協(xié)調(diào)研究帶來的成本增加，以及優(yōu)秀員工面對的活躍人才市場很快消耗掉上述成本優(yōu)勢。然而，讓印度和中國作為研究基地持續(xù)具有吸引力的是這兩個國家不斷擴(kuò)大的國內(nèi)市場，以及有機(jī)會研究消費者對略微(或非常)不同的產(chǎn)品的意愿。企業(yè)認(rèn)識到在那些地方研發(fā)出來的一些更簡單的設(shè)計可以輸回到成熟市場，這一認(rèn)識也支撐了這種趨勢。

Since 2003, China and India have topped the table for inbound investment in R&D projects, fDi says. This year alone, General Electric has flagged investment in an industrial internet “centre of excellence” for Chennai, and Volkswagen has plans for an innovation centre for Beijing, focused on digitisation and self-driving technology. Inward investors have spent twice as much in China and created twice as many jobs over the past 13 years than in the third-placed US. Chinese and Indian multinationals have also borrowed western rivals’ original logic by themselves investing in R&D centres abroad. Huawei, for instance, has bet on Canada and Scandinavia, where the skills legacy of Nortel, Nokia and Ericsson persists.

fDi表示，在2003年以后，中國和印度占據(jù)了研發(fā)項目外來投資排行榜的頂端。僅今年，通用電氣(GE)就已經(jīng)預(yù)定在印度金奈(Chennai)投資建立一個工業(yè)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)“卓越中心”(centre of excellence)，大眾汽車(Volkswagen)計劃在北京建立一個著重數(shù)字化和自動駕駛技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新中心。在過去13年中，外來投資者對中國的投資是對排在第三位的美國的兩倍，在中國創(chuàng)造的工作機(jī)會也是在美國的兩倍。中國和印度的跨國公司也借鑒了西方競爭對手的原始思路，在海外投資建立研發(fā)中心。比如，華為押注了加拿大和斯堪的納維亞，這些地方還有著北電網(wǎng)絡(luò)(Nortel)、諾基亞(Nokia)和愛立信(Ericsson)遺留下來的技術(shù)傳統(tǒng)。

Agility and customer engagement now complement the rigid approach that relied on white-coated boffins in sterile laboratories. In Frugal Innovation, Prof Prabhu and Navi Radjou criticise the old industrial R&D model that “values perfect solutions over general usefulness”. They recount, for instance, how two Fujitsu engineers had to join Japanese mandarin farmers in the fields to identify flaws in HQ’s assumptions about which technology was worth developing.

過去的企業(yè)研發(fā)依賴無菌實驗室里穿著白大褂的研究人員，現(xiàn)在，靈活性和“接觸客戶”已經(jīng)成為這種僵硬模式的補(bǔ)充。在《節(jié)約式創(chuàng)新》(Frugal Innovation)中，普拉布教授和納維•拉德友(Navi Radjou)批評舊的工業(yè)研發(fā)模式“比起普遍實用性更看重完美的解決方案”。比如，他們講述了兩名富士通(Fujitsu)工程師的故事：為了找出總部關(guān)于哪種技術(shù)值得開發(fā)的假設(shè)中存在的缺陷，他們得跟種植柑橘的日本農(nóng)民一起下到田間地頭。

Here, then, is a chance for Apple, the Chinese R&D late-comer. Its overall “designed in California, assembled in China” philosophy is unlikely to change. But Apple already has 9,000 staff in China. Half work in its stores, gaining insights into how local customers use their devices that could be applied more widely. Mr Cook says the new centre will unite Apple’s Chinese engineering and operating teams. To stay ahead of rivals, he should tell his researchers there to leave their labs and embed themselves in the shops.

因此，這就是較晚在中國建立研發(fā)中心的蘋果的一個機(jī)會。蘋果的總體理念“加州設(shè)計，中國組裝”不太可能改變。但蘋果已經(jīng)在中國雇傭了9000名員工。其中一半的人在蘋果門店中工作，了解到當(dāng)?shù)叵M者的種種值得推廣的使用習(xí)慣。庫克表示，新研發(fā)中心將整合蘋果在中國的工程師團(tuán)隊和運營團(tuán)隊。如果蘋果想要繼續(xù)領(lǐng)先于競爭對手，庫克就應(yīng)該告訴蘋果的研究人員：走出實驗室，深入蘋果門店。