中國經(jīng)濟(jì)金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的債轉(zhuǎn)股有什么不好
今年早些時(shí)候，中國總理李克強(qiáng)在一場新聞發(fā)布會(huì)上回應(yīng)有關(guān)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)中金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的問題時(shí)說：“(我們)也可以通過市場化債轉(zhuǎn)股的方式來逐步降低企業(yè)的杠桿率”。
This remark was seized upon by the media, bothinside and outside of China, but there has been almost no policy clarification by officials.
中外媒體都注意到了這句話，但中國官員幾乎還沒有從政策層面進(jìn)行任何闡釋。
While details are sketchy, to say the least, I have nevertheless been surprised at thegenerally negative response to the proposal from analysts reported in the western news.
至少可以說，細(xì)節(jié)還沒有敲定，但在西方媒體的報(bào)道中，分析師們對(duì)債轉(zhuǎn)股的提議普遍持負(fù)面看法，這讓我感到驚訝。
Allowing banks to swap debt for equity in their borrowers is a prerequisite for consensualrestructuring of indebted companies. For example, some businesses may be viable with alower debt burden. If they can negotiate a “haircut” with lenders then they can continue totrade, preserving jobs and achieving a turnround. Alternatively, a debt reduction could pavethe way for new investment, or enable struggling firms to be acquired by competitors drivingsynergies and much needed sector consolidation.
允許銀行將債務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)為對(duì)借款人的股權(quán)，是在雙方同意的情況下對(duì)負(fù)債企業(yè)進(jìn)行重組的前提條件。比如，有些公司只要減輕債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)就能繼續(xù)運(yùn)營下去。如果它們能夠和貸款人協(xié)商進(jìn)行減記，它們就能維持運(yùn)營，保留就業(yè)崗位，實(shí)現(xiàn)扭虧為盈。削減債務(wù)還能為新投資鋪平道路，或者讓處境艱難的公司被競爭對(duì)手收購，從而產(chǎn)生協(xié)同效應(yīng)，實(shí)現(xiàn)亟需的行業(yè)整合。
But banks are not motivated to write down their loans if they get nothing back in return. Indoing so the banks take a loss and if the company can be turned around all of the upside goesto the shareholders. Allowing banks to take an equity stake in return for writing off someportion of their loans (they will rarely convert all) enables the banks to share in any upside. Insuccessful cases, the equity upside could exceed the amount of the original loan.
但是，銀行如果得不到任何回報(bào)就沒有動(dòng)力減記貸款。那樣做銀行要蒙受損失，即使公司扭虧為盈，好處也都?xì)w股東。允許銀行持有一部分股權(quán)，以減記公司的一部分貸款(銀行很少會(huì)將全部債務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)為股權(quán))，一旦公司獲得盈利，銀行能夠從中分一杯羹。在成功的案例中，股權(quán)帶來的紅利可能超過原始貸款的金額。
To make an example, suppose Company X owes Bank Y $100m. Company X has a decentunderlying business and with say $40m of investment in new plant and equipment itsmanagement believes they could improve margins and increase sales and ebitda.
舉個(gè)例子，假如X公司欠Y銀行1億美元。X公司的基礎(chǔ)業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)營得不錯(cuò)，其管理層相信，如果能夠獲得4000萬美元的投資用于建設(shè)新廠房和購置設(shè)備，他們就能夠改善利潤率，提高銷售額和息稅折舊及攤銷前利潤(Ebitda)。
But Company X’s debt burden is too high, though it could handle $60m of debt if it got thenew investment. In a case like this New Investor Z might sit down with Company X and Bank Yto negotiate a deal involving a debt-for-equity swap. Investor Z puts in $40m of new money foran equity stake. Bank Y also contributes $40m by way of debt forgiveness in return for equity.
但是X公司的債務(wù)太重了，不過如果它獲得4000萬美元新投資，它就能應(yīng)付得起6000萬美元債務(wù)。在這種情況下，新投資方Z可能會(huì)和X公司、Y銀行坐下來協(xié)商一項(xiàng)債轉(zhuǎn)股協(xié)議。投資方Z拿出4000萬美元新投資，獲得股權(quán)。Y銀行也通過債務(wù)減免的方式貢獻(xiàn)4000萬美元，并換取股權(quán)。
A deal like this seems fair. Without the new money Company X will fail and everyone loses.Instead, Bank Y is asked to make the same contribution as Investor Z, but shares the returnsif things go to plan. Although quite normal elsewhere, restructuring like this cannot happen inChina as the banks are forbidden to hold equity.
這樣的協(xié)議看上去公平合理。沒有新投資，X公司就會(huì)破產(chǎn)，各方都有損失。而在這樣的協(xié)議下，Y銀行被要求與投資方Z貢獻(xiàn)同樣的資金，但如果事情按計(jì)劃進(jìn)行，兩方就能分享回報(bào)。像這樣的重組在別的地方相當(dāng)正常，但在中國不可能發(fā)生，因?yàn)殂y行被禁止持有股權(quán)。
So I fail to see how permitting the Chinese commercial banks to swap debt for equity can bebad per se for the banks or the economy at large. The alternative is either to crystallise acertain loss for the banks or, as is prevalent in China, to kick the can along the road by rollingover non-performing loans ad-infinitum (and we get so called “zombie enterprises”). Either caseis bad for both the banking sector and the general economy.
因此，我看不出允許中國的商業(yè)銀行實(shí)施債轉(zhuǎn)股怎么會(huì)對(duì)銀行本身，或者對(duì)更大范圍上的經(jīng)濟(jì)有害。其他方案或者是讓銀行承擔(dān)一定的損失，或者就像中國盛行的做法，把不良貸款無休止地展期(于是就產(chǎn)生了所謂的“僵尸企業(yè)”)。不管是哪種做法，對(duì)銀行業(yè)和對(duì)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)都是有害的。
Of course, if debt-equity swaps are mandated by the state or used only to patch upinefficient SOEs that might not be such a good thing. Although little known, there isprecedent in China: banks were allowed to make equity conversions around the turn of thecentury at the same time as the big four asset management companies were established andin the boom years that followed some of these stakes may have done rather well.
當(dāng)然，如果債轉(zhuǎn)股是政府強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行的，或者僅僅是用來改善效率低下的國有企業(yè)，那么債轉(zhuǎn)股可能就不是那么好的一件事。盡管外界所知不多，但在中國的確有先例：大概在世紀(jì)之交的時(shí)候，銀行被允許進(jìn)行債務(wù)置換，同時(shí)四大資產(chǎn)管理公司成立了起來，在之后的繁榮時(shí)期，其中一些股份的表現(xiàn)可能相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)。
In mature economies around the world debt restructurings are negotiated at arm’s length oncommercial terms. If no deal can be reached based on transparent information flow andgood-faith commercially motivated discussions, only then might a company slide intobankruptcy or liquidation. These are probably the companies that should be allowed to fail.Others can be given a new lease of life, facilitating optimal market-based restructuring in theeconomy and maximising returns from troubled loans to the banks.
在世界各地的成熟經(jīng)濟(jì)體中，債務(wù)重組是各方獨(dú)立自主依據(jù)商業(yè)條款協(xié)商達(dá)成的。如果按照信息透明原則、出于商業(yè)動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行誠信的協(xié)商還無法達(dá)成協(xié)議，那時(shí)一家公司才會(huì)陷入破產(chǎn)或者清算的境地。這些公司很可能應(yīng)該被允許破產(chǎn)。其他公司則可以被賦予新生，以促成經(jīng)濟(jì)中最優(yōu)的市場化重組，最大化銀行從不良貸款中獲得的回報(bào)。
Permitting Chinese commercial banks to hold equity stakes in their borrowers is an importantand necessary step on the long and winding path toward sorting out the country’s multibillionrenminbi non-performing loan problem. Policymakers should provide this essentialinstrument for the banks’ tool kits and, to paraphrase Mr Li again, allow market forces to playa decisive role.
解決中國巨額不良貸款問題需要經(jīng)歷一個(gè)漫長而曲折的過程，允許中國商業(yè)銀行持有借款人的股份是這個(gè)過程中重要和必要的一步。政策制定者應(yīng)該在銀行的工具箱中加入這個(gè)基本手段，而且——再轉(zhuǎn)述一句李克強(qiáng)的話——要讓市場力量發(fā)揮決定性的作用。
