歐洲央行應(yīng)堅(jiān)持啟動(dòng)量寬

These are exciting times in European central banking.Last Thursday the Swiss National Bank suddenlyterminated its successful peg to the euro. This weekthe European Central Bank is expected to announceits programme of quantitative easing. The SNB hasembraced the risk of deflation from which the ECBwishes to escape.

歐洲的中央銀行業(yè)迎來了激動(dòng)人心的時(shí)刻。上周四瑞士央行(Swiss National Bank)突然取消了瑞士法郎兌歐元匯率上限這一成功的政策。本周歐洲央行(ECB)預(yù)計(jì)將宣布量化寬松計(jì)劃。瑞士央行已經(jīng)接受了歐洲央行希望逃脫的通縮風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

 

 

The SNB’s decision was motivated, at least in part, by aversion to being caught up in theECB’s QE programme. For Mario Draghi, the ECB president, the SNB’s decision is even helpful,since it weakens the euro. For many in northern Europe, however, the Swiss decision will bepainful. It will remind them that they no longer enjoy the pleasures (and pains) of a strongcurrency. The Swiss can readily stop shadowing the euro; the Germans have been imprisoned init.

瑞士央行作此決定的動(dòng)機(jī)，至少有一部分是因?yàn)椴辉副痪砣霘W洲央行的量化寬松政策。對于歐洲央行行長馬里奧•德拉吉(Mario Draghi)來說，瑞士央行這一決定其實(shí)更有幫助，因?yàn)樗鼤?huì)削弱歐元。然而對于許多北歐人來說，瑞士的決定將為他們帶來痛苦。他們將需要謹(jǐn)記自己不再享受強(qiáng)勢貨幣帶來的愉悅(以及痛苦)。瑞士可以隨時(shí)停止追隨歐元，而德國已深陷歐元的囹圄之中。

The surprise decision created turmoil. By January 20, the Swiss franc had appreciated by 18per cent against the euro, the currency of its principal trading partner. With core inflationnear zero, deflation in Switzerland seems inevitable. So does a recession.

這一令人震驚的決定引起了市場動(dòng)蕩。到1月20日，瑞郎對歐元已經(jīng)升值了18%，而歐元是瑞士主要貿(mào)易伙伴使用的貨幣。由于瑞士的核心通脹接近于零，瑞士發(fā)生通縮似乎已不可避免。還有一個(gè)不可避免的，是瑞士的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。

Why end a policy that had delivered such enviable stability? The obvious answer is that theSNB feared huge inflation if it remained pegged to the euro, particularly after QE began — andbigger losses on foreign currency assets the later the peg was dropped. Neither fear iscompelling, as Willem Buiter, Citigroup chief economist, argues. It is possible to hold down thevalue of a currency one creates oneself forever. It is true that the SNB’s balance sheet isalready large, at about 85 per cent of gross domestic product. But it had stabilised, and as MrBuiter notes: “There is no technical limit on the size of the central bank’s balance sheet, inabsolute terms or relative to GDP.”

瑞士央行的匯率上限政策已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)了令人羨慕的穩(wěn)定，為什么要結(jié)束呢?顯而易見的答案是，瑞士央行擔(dān)心如果仍保持瑞郎兌歐元匯率上限，可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致高通脹，尤其是量化寬松啟動(dòng)以后，它還擔(dān)心越晚取消匯率上限，外匯資產(chǎn)損失越大?；ㄆ旒瘓F(tuán)(Citigroup)首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家威廉姆•比特(Willem Buiter)認(rèn)為，這兩種擔(dān)憂都缺乏說服力。一種貨幣永遠(yuǎn)可以隨時(shí)壓低自己設(shè)置的匯率。的確，瑞士央行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表規(guī)模已經(jīng)非常大，大約相當(dāng)于國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的85%。但它已經(jīng)穩(wěn)定下來，而且比特指出：“從技術(shù)層面而言，無論是絕對規(guī)模，還是與GDP相比的相對規(guī)模，央行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表都不存在限制。”

Furthermore, the Swiss could have curbed inflationary dangers without abandoning the peg, forinstance by increasing reserve requirements on banks. A sovereign wealth fund could havebeen set up to manage huge holdings of foreign assets.

而且瑞士原本無須放棄匯率上限就能遏制通脹危險(xiǎn)，比如提高銀行存款準(zhǔn)備金率，或者可以建立一個(gè)主權(quán)財(cái)富基金來管理所持有的巨額外匯資產(chǎn)。

Even if a peg to the euro was no longer thought to be desirable, it could have been given upwithout going cold turkey. The government could instead have pegged the franc to a basket ofcurrencies, which would have anchored its purchasing power while allowing it to move morefreely against the euro.

即便瑞士央行認(rèn)為兌歐元匯率上限不再可取，也不必突然徹底放棄。瑞士政府本可以代之以瑞郎盯住一籃子貨幣，這樣在提高瑞郎兌歐元匯率自由度的同時(shí)，還穩(wěn)定了其購買力。