美國(guó)冷淡回應(yīng)朝鮮釋放美國(guó)公民

U.S. Gives North Korea the Silent Treatment

美國(guó)冷淡回應(yīng)朝鮮釋放美國(guó)公民

WASHINGTON — President Obama took the unusual step of sending the nation’s top spy, instead of a senior diplomat, to win the release of two American prisoners in North Korea, administration officials said Sunday, specifically to signal that he would not reward the North with sanctions relief or a new round of negotiations in return for the freedom of the latest Americans to be locked up during visits to the isolated nation.

華盛頓——奧巴馬總統(tǒng)采取了不同尋常的做法，派出美國(guó)最高情報(bào)官員，而不是資深外交官，讓朝鮮釋放了它關(guān)押的兩名美國(guó)人。奧巴馬政府官員上周日表示，這是一個(gè)具體的信號(hào)，顯示出他不會(huì)為美國(guó)人重獲自由一事，通過(guò)放寬對(duì)朝鮮的制裁，或通過(guò)啟動(dòng)新一輪談判，向朝鮮給予回報(bào)。這兩名美國(guó)人在朝鮮期間遭到了關(guān)押。

“It was not to pursue any diplomatic opening,” a senior administration official said aboard Air Force One as Mr. Obama departed for China, and as the two Americans sentenced to hard labor in the North, Kenneth Bae and Matthew Todd Miller, were landing near Seattle.

“此行不是要尋求任何外交機(jī)會(huì)，”空軍一號(hào)(Air Force One)上的一位高級(jí)政府官員在奧巴馬啟程前往中國(guó)時(shí)說(shuō)。當(dāng)時(shí)，這兩名在朝鮮被判處苦役的美國(guó)人，肯尼斯·裴(Kenneth Bae)和馬修·托德·米勒(Matthew Todd Miller)，正要在西雅圖附近降落。

The official said the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., was dispatched in response to the North’s request, made in backchannel communications with the administration, for a senior official of the United States government to oversee the release. But Mr. Clapper, a retired general whose career has spanned many conflicts with three generations of North Korean leaders, never met Kim Jong-un, the young dictator whose health, hold on power and progress in developing a deliverable nuclear weapon have all been sources of intense scrutiny to American intelligence officials.

該名官員表示，朝鮮通過(guò)秘密渠道與奧巴馬政府取得聯(lián)系，要求美國(guó)政府派出一名高級(jí)官員，來(lái)監(jiān)督兩人的釋放，于是總統(tǒng)將國(guó)家情報(bào)總監(jiān)小詹姆斯·R·克拉珀(James R. Clapper Jr.)派往朝鮮。克拉珀是一位退役將領(lǐng)，其職業(yè)生涯中經(jīng)歷了美國(guó)與三代朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的多次沖突，但他從來(lái)沒(méi)有見(jiàn)過(guò)金正恩。這個(gè)年輕獨(dú)裁者的健康、掌權(quán)狀況，以及可投放的核武器的研發(fā)進(jìn)展，都是美國(guó)情報(bào)官員密切關(guān)注的問(wèn)題。

As a matter of diplomatic tactics, the gambit worked: Mr. Bae, a 46-year-old missionary who had been held for two years, and Mr. Miller, 25, were reunited with their families at an Air Force base. But as a matter of strategy, it is unclear that Mr. Clapper made any progress: His message was that for a resumption of relations with the United States, North Korea had to deliver on its past promises to dismantle a nuclear program now believed to have six to a dozen weapons.

從外交手法來(lái)看，此舉效果不錯(cuò)：46歲的傳教士肯尼斯·裴已被關(guān)押了兩年，他和25歲米勒已經(jīng)在一座空軍基地與各自的家人團(tuán)聚了。但從策略層面來(lái)看，目前還不清楚克拉珀是否取得了進(jìn)展：他傳達(dá)的信息是，要想恢復(fù)與美國(guó)的關(guān)系，朝鮮必須履行早前的承諾，解除核計(jì)劃。據(jù)信該國(guó)已經(jīng)擁有六到十二件核武器。

That question has frozen North Korea’s discussions with the United States for six years, and all the indications are that the North is accelerating its nuclear and missile programs, rather than backing off.

這個(gè)問(wèn)題，已經(jīng)讓朝鮮與美國(guó)之間的談判凍結(jié)了六年之久，所有的跡象都表明，朝鮮正在加速推進(jìn)其核計(jì)劃和導(dǎo)彈計(jì)劃，而不是退讓。

It is extraordinarily rare for a president to send one of his most senior intelligence officials into the capital of a declared American adversary, so the choice of Mr. Clapper, probably the most hardened veteran of the Cold War now serving in Mr. Obama’s inner circle, was a surprise. It may have also been welcome. “In a national security state like North Korea, they got someone who they think runs the country,” said Christopher Hill, who ran the last set of serious negotiations with North Korea, an experience of frustration and deception that he described in a memoir, “Outpost.”

總統(tǒng)派出最高級(jí)別的情報(bào)官員，前往美國(guó)公開(kāi)宣稱的敵對(duì)國(guó)家的首都，這樣的情況非常罕見(jiàn)，所以?shī)W巴馬的小圈子里閱歷最豐富的冷戰(zhàn)老手克拉珀被選中執(zhí)行這個(gè)任務(wù)，不免令人驚訝。此舉也可能會(huì)受到歡迎。“在朝鮮那種國(guó)家安全體制下，他們認(rèn)為是這樣的人在掌管國(guó)家，”克里斯托弗·希爾 (Christopher Hill)說(shuō)。他參與了與朝鮮最后幾次的重要談判，還在回憶錄《前哨》(Outpost)中講述了那期間經(jīng)歷的挫折和欺騙。

“My sense of the Obama administration is that they are less averse to talking to the North Koreans” than the Bush administration was, he said, “but are pretty convinced there is nothing there to talk about.”

“我對(duì)奧巴馬政府的感覺(jué)是，與布什政府相比，他們沒(méi)那么反感與朝鮮會(huì)談，”他說(shuō)，“不過(guò)他們堅(jiān)信，與朝鮮無(wú)話可談。”

The White House’s handling of the North Korean prisoner release and its negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program are a study in contrast. Mr. Clapper traveled to North Korea with a brief letter from the president stating that the intelligence chief was his designated representative to retrieve the Americans. It had none of the specifics or the outlook contained in his recent letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader.

在對(duì)待朝鮮釋放囚犯和伊朗核談判時(shí)，白宮的態(tài)度形成了對(duì)比?？死昵巴r時(shí)，帶著總統(tǒng)寫的一份簡(jiǎn)短信函，稱委派這名情報(bào)主管為代表，負(fù)責(zé)接回美國(guó)人。奧巴馬最近給伊朗最高領(lǐng)袖阿亞圖拉阿里·哈梅內(nèi)伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)寫的信里，則沒(méi)有闡述這樣具體的細(xì)節(jié)和意圖。

The difference in approach reveals much about how Mr. Obama views the threats posed by the two adversaries, and the strategies needed to counter them.

這種差異傳達(dá)出了很多信息，有助于理解奧巴馬如何看待這兩個(gè)對(duì)手構(gòu)成的威脅，以及需要用什么策略來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)。

If Iran got nuclear weapons, Mr. Obama has often told his aides, a “containment” policy would not work; Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-dominated Arab states would rush to do the same. A regional arms race would ensue, he has said, in one of the most volatile corners of the earth. North Korea, much further along than Iran, has already detonated three nuclear tests.

如果伊朗擁有了核武器，奧巴馬經(jīng)常告訴他的助手們，“遏制”政策是行不通的;沙特阿拉伯等遜尼派主導(dǎo)的阿拉伯國(guó)家，也會(huì)急于取得核武器。他說(shuō)，隨之而來(lái)的情景是，地球上最動(dòng)蕩的地區(qū)之一出現(xiàn)軍備競(jìng)賽。朝鮮已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了三次核試驗(yàn)，在這方面遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)領(lǐng)先于伊朗。

But in Mr. Obama’s view, the country can be contained: China is already a nuclear power, and Japan and South Korea are treaty allies with the United States, meaning that the United States would be legally bound to act as their ultimate protector against the North.

但在奧巴馬看來(lái)，朝鮮是可以遏制的：中國(guó)已經(jīng)是一個(gè)有核國(guó)家，而日本和韓國(guó)是美國(guó)的盟友且簽訂了條約，這意味著在兩國(guó)受到朝鮮威脅時(shí)，美國(guó)有保護(hù)它們的法律義務(wù)。

So Mr. Obama has reacted mildly to many types of North Korean provocation: The seizing of American tourists, the launching of missiles and nuclear tests. The warning about broken promises that Robert M. Gates described as defense secretary — “I am tired of buying the same horse twice” — has outlasted his tenure. There appears to be no enthusiasm in Washington for resuming the “Six Party Talks” with the North — the Asian equivalent of the multination negotiations now underway with Iran — until Pyongyang begins to dismantle nuclear facilities it has promised to take apart.

所以，面對(duì)朝鮮關(guān)押美國(guó)游客、試射導(dǎo)彈、開(kāi)展核試驗(yàn)等諸多挑釁行為，奧巴馬的反應(yīng)比較溫和。羅伯特·M·蓋茨(Robert M. Gates)擔(dān)任國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)時(shí)，曾警告朝鮮不要違背承諾，他說(shuō)“我厭倦了兩次購(gòu)買同一匹馬”。盡管蓋茨已經(jīng)卸任，但這番話的效果仍在持續(xù)。華盛頓對(duì)于重啟 “六方會(huì)談”毫無(wú)熱情，除非平壤開(kāi)始兌現(xiàn)承諾，拆除核設(shè)施。“六方會(huì)談”是亞洲舉行的多邊談判，類似于目前正在進(jìn)行的伊朗核談判。

So while Mr. Obama could have sent a looming political figure like former President Bill Clinton, who negotiated a previous prisoner release, his decision to turn to Mr. Clapper was rooted in the conclusion that entering a negotiation now would ultimately violate the Gates rule.

因此，盡管奧巴馬可以派出有影響的政治人物，比如前總統(tǒng)比爾·克林頓(Bill Clinton)，但是他這次決定派出克拉珀，是因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在舉行談判就會(huì)最終背離蓋茨的原則?？肆诸D曾通過(guò)談判贏得了上一次囚徒釋放。

But it also raises the question of whether the United States is missing Mr. Kim’s first real effort to signal that he wants to resume some kind of dialogue.

但這也提出了一個(gè)問(wèn)題：美國(guó)是否錯(cuò)過(guò)了金正恩首次真正想要恢復(fù)某種對(duì)話的努力。

There are several theories in Washington about why the North Korean leader would make that attempt now.

至于朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人為什么會(huì)作出這種嘗試，華盛頓有幾種說(shuō)法。

One is economic. There are recent indications that the North is concluding that China may not be its supplier, buyer and protector forever. Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute, who has followed North Korea’s economic, demographic and political strategies for several decades, noted in a recent essay that there are reports that a military academy near Pyongyang is “displaying placards calling China a ‘turncoat and our enemy,’ ” and that the state-run news services criticized China for its condemnation of recent missile tests. That comes at a time when the North Korean economy, he notes, is more dependent on China than ever before.

一種說(shuō)法是經(jīng)濟(jì)。最近的跡象顯示，朝鮮越來(lái)越覺(jué)得中國(guó)可能不會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)充當(dāng)它的買家、保護(hù)國(guó)和資源供應(yīng)國(guó)。美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特(Nicholas Eberstadt)關(guān)注朝鮮的經(jīng)濟(jì)、人口狀況和政治戰(zhàn)略已經(jīng)有幾十年之久，他在最近的一篇文章中寫道，有報(bào)道稱，平壤附近的一所軍事院校“打出標(biāo)語(yǔ)，說(shuō)中國(guó)是‘叛徒和我們的敵人’，”而且中國(guó)對(duì)其最近的導(dǎo)彈試射給予了譴責(zé)，也因此遭到了朝鮮官方新聞機(jī)構(gòu)的批評(píng)。他又指出，發(fā)生這種情況之時(shí)，朝鮮經(jīng)濟(jì)比以往任何時(shí)候都更加依賴中國(guó)。