關塔那摩監(jiān)獄終將退出歷史舞臺

The Path to Closing Guantánamo

關塔那摩監(jiān)獄終將退出歷史舞臺

WHEN I began as the State Department’s envoy for closing the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, many people advised me that progress was impossible. They were wrong.

當我開始擔任國務院(State Department)特使，負責關閉古巴關塔那摩監(jiān)獄(Guantánamo Bay)事宜時，很多人都勸告我，稱不可能取得進展。他們錯了。

In the two years before I started, on July 1, 2013, only four people were transferred from Guantánamo. Over the past 18 months, we moved 39 people out of there, and more transfers are coming. The population at Guantánamo — 127 — is at its lowest level since the facility opened in January 2002. We also worked with Congress to remove unnecessary obstacles to foreign transfers. We began an administrative process to review the status of detainees not yet approved for transfer or formally charged with crimes.

我從2013年7月1日開始從事這項工作，在這之前的兩年時間里，只有四人被轉移出關塔那摩監(jiān)獄。在過去18個月中，我們轉出39人，并且還有更多人會被轉走。關塔那摩現(xiàn)在關押了127名囚犯，這是自該監(jiān)獄于2002年1月啟用以來的最低水平。我們還與國會(Congress)合作，清除阻礙海外轉移工作的不必要的障礙。我們開啟了一個行政程序，評估那些尚未獲得轉移批準或遭到犯罪指控的囚犯的情況。

While there have been zigs and zags, we have made great progress. The path to closing Guantánamo during the Obama administration is clear, but it will take intense and sustained action to finish the job. The government must continue and accelerate the transfers of those approved for release. Administrative review of those not approved for transfer must be expedited. The absolute and irrational ban on transfers to the United States for any purpose, including detention and prosecution, must be changed as the population is reduced to a small core of detainees who cannot safely be transferred overseas. (Ten detainees, for example, face criminal charges before the military commissions that Congress set up in lieu of regular courts.)

雖然一路曲折，但我們取得了重大進展。在奧巴馬政府執(zhí)政期間關閉關塔那摩監(jiān)獄的路線已經非常清晰，但需要大力開展持續(xù)行動，才能完成工作。政府必須繼續(xù)并加快轉移那些獲準釋放的在押人員。必須加快對那些沒有獲得轉移批準的在押人員的行政評估。必須更改禁止出于任何目的——包括關押和起訴——將在押人員轉移到美國的荒謬禁令，因為在押人員不斷減少，只剩下少數無法安全轉移到海外的囚犯。(例如那十名遭到犯罪指控的囚犯，審判他們的將會是國會設立的代替普通法院的軍事委員會)。

The reasons for closing Guantánamo are more compelling than ever. As a high-ranking security official from one of our staunchest allies on counterterrorism (not from Europe) once told me, “The greatest single action the United States can take to fight terrorism is to close Guantánamo.” I have seen firsthand the way in which Guantánamo frays and damages vitally important security relationships with countries around the world. The eye-popping cost — around $3 million per detainee last year, compared with roughly $75,000 at a “supermax” prison in the United States — drains vital resources.

關閉關塔那摩監(jiān)獄的理由比以往任何時候都更充分。就像一個非常忠實的反恐盟國(不是歐洲國家)的高層安全官員告訴我的那樣，“美國在反恐方面能夠采取的最重大的單邊行動就是關閉關塔那摩監(jiān)獄。”我親眼目睹了關塔那摩監(jiān)獄是如何破壞、損害美國與世界各國之間重要的安全關系的。其巨額成本——去年每名在押人員耗費的資金大約為300萬美元(約合1865萬元人民幣)，而美國“超高安全級別”監(jiān)獄的費用約為每人7.5萬美元——耗費了重要資源。

Americans from across the spectrum agree on closing Guantánamo. President George W. Bush called it “a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our allies.” Kenneth L. Wainstein, who advised Mr. Bush on homeland security, said keeping the facility open was not “sustainable.”

美國人普遍同意關閉該監(jiān)獄 。喬治·W·布什(George W. Bush)總統(tǒng)曾稱它是“敵人的宣傳工具，令我們的盟友感到心煩”。布什總統(tǒng)的國土安全顧問肯尼斯·L·韋恩斯坦(Kenneth L. Wainstein)表示，保留關塔那摩監(jiān)獄不是“長久之計”。

In 18 months at the State Department, I was sometimes frustrated by opposition to closing the facility in Congress and some corners of Washington. It reflects three fundamental misconceptions that have impeded the process.

在國務院工作的18個月里，國會及華盛頓某些角落發(fā)出的反對關閉關塔那摩監(jiān)獄的聲音有時讓我感到很沮喪。這反映出阻礙進程的三大根本誤解。

First, not every person at Guantánamo is a continuing danger. Of the 127 individuals there (from a peak of close to 800), 59 have been “approved for transfer.” This means that six agencies — the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice and State, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of national intelligence — have unanimously approved the person for release based on everything known about the individual and the risk he presents. For most of those approved, this rigorous decision was made half a decade ago. Almost 90 percent of those approved are from Yemen, where the security situation is perilous. They are not “the worst of the worst,” but rather people with the worst luck. (We recently resettled several Yemenis in other countries, the first time any Yemeni had been transferred from Guantánamo in more than four years.)

第一，并非所有在押人員都會繼續(xù)帶來危險。在127名在押人員(最多的時候達到800名)中，有59人“獲準轉移”。這意味著，六大部門——國防部 (Departments of Defense)、國土安全部(Homeland Security)、司法部和國務院，以及參謀長聯(lián)席會議(Joint Chiefs of Staff)和國家情報總監(jiān)辦公室——根據關于在押人員的所有信息及他們的風險程度，一致批準釋放這些人。從大多數獲準釋放的在押人員來看，這種縝密的決定都是在五年前做出的。將近90%的獲準轉移的在押人員來自也門，也門的安全形勢非常危險。他們并不是“惡人中的惡人”，只是運氣很差。(我們最近讓幾名也門人遷居至其他國家，這是在四年多的時間里，也門人首次被轉移出關塔那摩監(jiān)獄。)

Second, opponents of closing Guantánamo — including former Vice President Dick Cheney — cite a 30 percent recidivism rate among former detainees. This assertion is deeply flawed. It combines those “confirmed” of having engaged in hostile activities with those “suspected.” Focusing on the “confirmed” slashes the percentage nearly in half. Moreover, many of the “confirmed” have been killed or recaptured.

第二，包括迪克·切尼(Dick Cheney)在內的反對關閉關塔那摩監(jiān)獄的人士聲稱，前囚犯的再犯罪率達到了30%。這種說法存在巨大缺陷。他們將“已經證實”參與敵對活動的人與那些 “涉嫌”參與的人混為一談。如果只看那些“已經證實”參與敵對活動的人，再犯罪率就只有他們所說的一半。而且，其中很多人已經死亡或再次被捕。

Most important, there is a vast difference between those transferred before 2009, when President Obama ordered the intensive review process by the six agencies, and those transferred after that review. Of the detainees transferred during this administration, more than 90 percent have not been suspected, much less confirmed, of committing any hostile activities after their release. The percentage of detainees who were transferred after the Obama-era review and then found to have engaged in terrorist or insurgent activities is 6.8 percent. While we want that number to be zero, that small percentage does not justify holding in perpetuity the overwhelming majority of detainees, who do not subsequently engage in wrongdoing.

最重要的是，在2009年奧巴馬命令六大部門開展集中評估前后獲得轉移的在押人員之間存在巨大差異。在奧巴馬執(zhí)政期間獲得轉移的在押人員中，逾 90%的人獲釋后沒有實施敵對活動的嫌疑，更不用說被證實開展這類活動。在奧巴馬下令進行評估后獲得轉移，然后又被發(fā)現(xiàn)參與恐怖或叛亂行動的人員占了 6.8%。雖然我們希望這個比例為零，但這么小的比例無法成為永久關押絕大多數囚犯的正當理由，畢竟這些人之后不會參與不法活動。

Third, a common impression is that we cannot find countries that will accept detainees from Guantánamo. One of the happiest surprises of my tenure was that this is not the case. Many countries, from Slovakia and Georgia to Uruguay, have been willing to provide homes for individuals who cannot return to their own countries. Support from the Organization of American States, the Vatican and other religious and human rights organizations has also been helpful.

第三，大家普遍認為，我們無法找到能夠接收關塔那摩監(jiān)獄囚犯的國家。但情況并非如此，這是我擔任特使期間發(fā)現(xiàn)的最大驚喜之一。很多國家——從斯洛伐克到格魯吉亞，再到烏拉圭，都愿意為那些無法回到祖國的囚犯提供居所。美洲國家組織(Organization of American States)、梵蒂岡，以及其他宗教、人權組織的支持也頗有幫助。

I don’t question the motives of those who oppose the efforts to close Guantánamo. Some are constrained by an overabundance of caution, refusing to trust the extensive security reviews that are in place. Others are hampered by an outdated view of the risk posed by many of the remaining detainees. A third group fails to recognize that the deep stain on our standing in the world is more dangerous than any individual approved for transfer. These concerns, however well-intentioned, collapse in the glare of a careful examination of the facts.

我不質疑那些反對關閉關塔那摩監(jiān)獄的人士的動機。一些人過于謹慎，拒絕相信已經開展的大規(guī)模安全評估的結果。其他人則持有陳舊觀點，認為剩下的囚犯中有很多人會帶來危險。還有一群人沒能認識到，如果我們在世界上的形象蒙上污點，這比獲準轉移的在押人員更危險。這些擔憂雖然是出于好意，但仔細核查事實就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，它們并不成立。