關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄終將退出歷史舞臺

The Path to Closing Guantánamo

關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄終將退出歷史舞臺

WHEN I began as the State Department’s envoy for closing the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, many people advised me that progress was impossible. They were wrong.

當(dāng)我開始擔(dān)任國務(wù)院(State Department)特使，負(fù)責(zé)關(guān)閉古巴關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄(Guantánamo Bay)事宜時(shí)，很多人都勸告我，稱不可能取得進(jìn)展。他們錯(cuò)了。

In the two years before I started, on July 1, 2013, only four people were transferred from Guantánamo. Over the past 18 months, we moved 39 people out of there, and more transfers are coming. The population at Guantánamo — 127 — is at its lowest level since the facility opened in January 2002. We also worked with Congress to remove unnecessary obstacles to foreign transfers. We began an administrative process to review the status of detainees not yet approved for transfer or formally charged with crimes.

我從2013年7月1日開始從事這項(xiàng)工作，在這之前的兩年時(shí)間里，只有四人被轉(zhuǎn)移出關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄。在過去18個(gè)月中，我們轉(zhuǎn)出39人，并且還有更多人會被轉(zhuǎn)走。關(guān)塔那摩現(xiàn)在關(guān)押了127名囚犯，這是自該監(jiān)獄于2002年1月啟用以來的最低水平。我們還與國會(Congress)合作，清除阻礙海外轉(zhuǎn)移工作的不必要的障礙。我們開啟了一個(gè)行政程序，評估那些尚未獲得轉(zhuǎn)移批準(zhǔn)或遭到犯罪指控的囚犯的情況。

While there have been zigs and zags, we have made great progress. The path to closing Guantánamo during the Obama administration is clear, but it will take intense and sustained action to finish the job. The government must continue and accelerate the transfers of those approved for release. Administrative review of those not approved for transfer must be expedited. The absolute and irrational ban on transfers to the United States for any purpose, including detention and prosecution, must be changed as the population is reduced to a small core of detainees who cannot safely be transferred overseas. (Ten detainees, for example, face criminal charges before the military commissions that Congress set up in lieu of regular courts.)

雖然一路曲折，但我們?nèi)〉昧酥卮筮M(jìn)展。在奧巴馬政府執(zhí)政期間關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄的路線已經(jīng)非常清晰，但需要大力開展持續(xù)行動，才能完成工作。政府必須繼續(xù)并加快轉(zhuǎn)移那些獲準(zhǔn)釋放的在押人員。必須加快對那些沒有獲得轉(zhuǎn)移批準(zhǔn)的在押人員的行政評估。必須更改禁止出于任何目的——包括關(guān)押和起訴——將在押人員轉(zhuǎn)移到美國的荒謬禁令，因?yàn)樵谘喝藛T不斷減少，只剩下少數(shù)無法安全轉(zhuǎn)移到海外的囚犯。(例如那十名遭到犯罪指控的囚犯，審判他們的將會是國會設(shè)立的代替普通法院的軍事委員會)。

The reasons for closing Guantánamo are more compelling than ever. As a high-ranking security official from one of our staunchest allies on counterterrorism (not from Europe) once told me, “The greatest single action the United States can take to fight terrorism is to close Guantánamo.” I have seen firsthand the way in which Guantánamo frays and damages vitally important security relationships with countries around the world. The eye-popping cost — around $3 million per detainee last year, compared with roughly $75,000 at a “supermax” prison in the United States — drains vital resources.

關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄的理由比以往任何時(shí)候都更充分。就像一個(gè)非常忠實(shí)的反恐盟國(不是歐洲國家)的高層安全官員告訴我的那樣，“美國在反恐方面能夠采取的最重大的單邊行動就是關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄。”我親眼目睹了關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄是如何破壞、損害美國與世界各國之間重要的安全關(guān)系的。其巨額成本——去年每名在押人員耗費(fèi)的資金大約為300萬美元(約合1865萬元人民幣)，而美國“超高安全級別”監(jiān)獄的費(fèi)用約為每人7.5萬美元——耗費(fèi)了重要資源。

Americans from across the spectrum agree on closing Guantánamo. President George W. Bush called it “a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our allies.” Kenneth L. Wainstein, who advised Mr. Bush on homeland security, said keeping the facility open was not “sustainable.”

美國人普遍同意關(guān)閉該監(jiān)獄 。喬治·W·布什(George W. Bush)總統(tǒng)曾稱它是“敵人的宣傳工具，令我們的盟友感到心煩”。布什總統(tǒng)的國土安全顧問肯尼斯·L·韋恩斯坦(Kenneth L. Wainstein)表示，保留關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄不是“長久之計(jì)”。

In 18 months at the State Department, I was sometimes frustrated by opposition to closing the facility in Congress and some corners of Washington. It reflects three fundamental misconceptions that have impeded the process.

在國務(wù)院工作的18個(gè)月里，國會及華盛頓某些角落發(fā)出的反對關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄的聲音有時(shí)讓我感到很沮喪。這反映出阻礙進(jìn)程的三大根本誤解。

First, not every person at Guantánamo is a continuing danger. Of the 127 individuals there (from a peak of close to 800), 59 have been “approved for transfer.” This means that six agencies — the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice and State, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of national intelligence — have unanimously approved the person for release based on everything known about the individual and the risk he presents. For most of those approved, this rigorous decision was made half a decade ago. Almost 90 percent of those approved are from Yemen, where the security situation is perilous. They are not “the worst of the worst,” but rather people with the worst luck. (We recently resettled several Yemenis in other countries, the first time any Yemeni had been transferred from Guantánamo in more than four years.)

第一，并非所有在押人員都會繼續(xù)帶來危險(xiǎn)。在127名在押人員(最多的時(shí)候達(dá)到800名)中，有59人“獲準(zhǔn)轉(zhuǎn)移”。這意味著，六大部門——國防部 (Departments of Defense)、國土安全部(Homeland Security)、司法部和國務(wù)院，以及參謀長聯(lián)席會議(Joint Chiefs of Staff)和國家情報(bào)總監(jiān)辦公室——根據(jù)關(guān)于在押人員的所有信息及他們的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)程度，一致批準(zhǔn)釋放這些人。從大多數(shù)獲準(zhǔn)釋放的在押人員來看，這種縝密的決定都是在五年前做出的。將近90%的獲準(zhǔn)轉(zhuǎn)移的在押人員來自也門，也門的安全形勢非常危險(xiǎn)。他們并不是“惡人中的惡人”，只是運(yùn)氣很差。(我們最近讓幾名也門人遷居至其他國家，這是在四年多的時(shí)間里，也門人首次被轉(zhuǎn)移出關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄。)

Second, opponents of closing Guantánamo — including former Vice President Dick Cheney — cite a 30 percent recidivism rate among former detainees. This assertion is deeply flawed. It combines those “confirmed” of having engaged in hostile activities with those “suspected.” Focusing on the “confirmed” slashes the percentage nearly in half. Moreover, many of the “confirmed” have been killed or recaptured.

第二，包括迪克·切尼(Dick Cheney)在內(nèi)的反對關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄的人士聲稱，前囚犯的再犯罪率達(dá)到了30%。這種說法存在巨大缺陷。他們將“已經(jīng)證實(shí)”參與敵對活動的人與那些 “涉嫌”參與的人混為一談。如果只看那些“已經(jīng)證實(shí)”參與敵對活動的人，再犯罪率就只有他們所說的一半。而且，其中很多人已經(jīng)死亡或再次被捕。

Most important, there is a vast difference between those transferred before 2009, when President Obama ordered the intensive review process by the six agencies, and those transferred after that review. Of the detainees transferred during this administration, more than 90 percent have not been suspected, much less confirmed, of committing any hostile activities after their release. The percentage of detainees who were transferred after the Obama-era review and then found to have engaged in terrorist or insurgent activities is 6.8 percent. While we want that number to be zero, that small percentage does not justify holding in perpetuity the overwhelming majority of detainees, who do not subsequently engage in wrongdoing.

最重要的是，在2009年奧巴馬命令六大部門開展集中評估前后獲得轉(zhuǎn)移的在押人員之間存在巨大差異。在奧巴馬執(zhí)政期間獲得轉(zhuǎn)移的在押人員中，逾 90%的人獲釋后沒有實(shí)施敵對活動的嫌疑，更不用說被證實(shí)開展這類活動。在奧巴馬下令進(jìn)行評估后獲得轉(zhuǎn)移，然后又被發(fā)現(xiàn)參與恐怖或叛亂行動的人員占了 6.8%。雖然我們希望這個(gè)比例為零，但這么小的比例無法成為永久關(guān)押絕大多數(shù)囚犯的正當(dāng)理由，畢竟這些人之后不會參與不法活動。

Third, a common impression is that we cannot find countries that will accept detainees from Guantánamo. One of the happiest surprises of my tenure was that this is not the case. Many countries, from Slovakia and Georgia to Uruguay, have been willing to provide homes for individuals who cannot return to their own countries. Support from the Organization of American States, the Vatican and other religious and human rights organizations has also been helpful.

第三，大家普遍認(rèn)為，我們無法找到能夠接收關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄囚犯的國家。但情況并非如此，這是我擔(dān)任特使期間發(fā)現(xiàn)的最大驚喜之一。很多國家——從斯洛伐克到格魯吉亞，再到烏拉圭，都愿意為那些無法回到祖國的囚犯提供居所。美洲國家組織(Organization of American States)、梵蒂岡，以及其他宗教、人權(quán)組織的支持也頗有幫助。

I don’t question the motives of those who oppose the efforts to close Guantánamo. Some are constrained by an overabundance of caution, refusing to trust the extensive security reviews that are in place. Others are hampered by an outdated view of the risk posed by many of the remaining detainees. A third group fails to recognize that the deep stain on our standing in the world is more dangerous than any individual approved for transfer. These concerns, however well-intentioned, collapse in the glare of a careful examination of the facts.

我不質(zhì)疑那些反對關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄的人士的動機(jī)。一些人過于謹(jǐn)慎，拒絕相信已經(jīng)開展的大規(guī)模安全評估的結(jié)果。其他人則持有陳舊觀點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為剩下的囚犯中有很多人會帶來危險(xiǎn)。還有一群人沒能認(rèn)識到，如果我們在世界上的形象蒙上污點(diǎn)，這比獲準(zhǔn)轉(zhuǎn)移的在押人員更危險(xiǎn)。這些擔(dān)憂雖然是出于好意，但仔細(xì)核查事實(shí)就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，它們并不成立。