將未來(lái)抵押的世界

Those who can’t lead, borrow. The American, Chinese and Indian governments boast of the strength of their economies, yet they are also borrowing intensely. Such a situation is not only contradictory, it will also prove harmful to their chances at global leadership in the future.

那些不能成為全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的國(guó)家，借貸吧。美國(guó)、中國(guó)和印度政府吹噓自己經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力強(qiáng)勁，但它們也在大舉借貸。這不僅與它們的說(shuō)法自相矛盾，而且也會(huì)損害它們未來(lái)充當(dāng)全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的機(jī)會(huì)。

A strong economy means government should spend less and not need to borrow at all. In all three countries, policymakers appear oblivious to the consequences of failure on this score. Will the US or China lead in coming decades? When will India become a global challenger? The answers may be neither and never. Instead the world could see a slow slide into a long stagnation.

經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)勁意味著政府應(yīng)該能減少支出，而且完全不需要借錢(qián)。在這三個(gè)國(guó)家中，決策者似乎都沒(méi)有注意到未能做到這一點(diǎn)的后果。美國(guó)或中國(guó)會(huì)在今后幾十年處于全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位嗎?印度什么時(shí)候會(huì)成為全球挑戰(zhàn)者?答案或許是中美都不會(huì)成為全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，印度也永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)成為全球挑戰(zhàn)者。實(shí)際上，世界可能會(huì)緩慢滑入長(zhǎng)期停滯狀態(tài)。

Few people consider India a truly global actor but, within the next 20 years, it will have both the world’s largest population and largest labour force. It will be difficult in 2040 for the global economy to be healthy if the Indian economy is not. There is obviously a long way to go before then, and India is not going in the right direction. The government of Narendra Modi, prime minister, is obsessed with the title of “fastest-growing major economy” and insists India will reclaim that spot in 2018 or 2019.

很少有人認(rèn)為印度是一個(gè)真正的全球性角色，但在今后20年里，它將擁有世界上最多的人口和最大規(guī)模的勞動(dòng)力。到2040年時(shí)，如果印度經(jīng)濟(jì)不健康，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)就很難保持健康。顯然在那之前還有很長(zhǎng)的路要走，而目前印度并沒(méi)有朝著正確的方向前進(jìn)。印度總理納倫德拉•莫迪(Narendra Modi)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的政府癡迷于“增長(zhǎng)最快的主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體”稱號(hào)，并堅(jiān)稱印度會(huì)在2018年或2019年重新獲得這一地位。

Yet central government borrowing will rise this year as a share of GDP, from an already excessive figure. The core of the higher deficit is a jump in the simple revenue shortfall, which overwhelms one-time accounting tricks used by politicians everywhere to dress up ugly budgets. In addition, Indian states borrow even more intensively than the national government.

然而，今年印度中央政府借款占GDP的比例將會(huì)在本已過(guò)高的基礎(chǔ)上再次上升。赤字增加的要點(diǎn)就是收入缺口大幅擴(kuò)大，它的影響是各地政客用來(lái)粉飾糟糕預(yù)算的一次性會(huì)計(jì)伎倆所彌補(bǔ)不了的。此外，印度各州的借款力度比中央政府還大。

A country growing rapidly with a young workforce should not need to do this. More important, a poor country which seeks at least a full generation of such growth should not borrow against that future. India is showing neither the vision nor will to become an economic leader.

一個(gè)擁有年輕勞動(dòng)力、快速增長(zhǎng)的國(guó)家應(yīng)該不需要這樣做。更重要的是，一個(gè)尋求在至少一代人時(shí)間里取得快速增長(zhǎng)的窮國(guó)不應(yīng)該拿未來(lái)作抵押借貸。印度沒(méi)有表現(xiàn)出成為經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的愿景和意志。

Many would claim China already is such a leader. It qualifies in terms of size and no shortage of people tout its performance. They acknowledge that Chinese GDP growth, for instance, has slowed by half in the past 10 years, but point out this is natural as the size of GDP expands.

許多人會(huì)說(shuō)，中國(guó)已經(jīng)是一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。它在規(guī)模上符合，并且不乏人吹捧其表現(xiàn)。他們承認(rèn)，比如中國(guó)GDP增速在過(guò)去10年中減緩一半，但他們指出，隨著GDP規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大，這是很自然的事情。

What is not natural is China’s bad track record on debt: according to the Bank of International Settlements, every measure of debt — consumer, government and corporate — has risen as a share of GDP for the past decade. China went from a low-leverage country in 2007 to having a worse debt position than the US in 2017, despite the fact that the US itself has borrowed heavily.

不自然的，是中國(guó)在債務(wù)方面的不良記錄：根據(jù)國(guó)際清算銀行(BIS)的數(shù)據(jù)，在過(guò)去十年間，每一項(xiàng)債務(wù)指標(biāo)——消費(fèi)者、政府和企業(yè)所背負(fù)的債務(wù)——與GDP的比例都有所上升。中國(guó)在2007年還是一個(gè)低杠桿國(guó)家，但到了2017年，債務(wù)狀況比美國(guó)還要糟糕，盡管美國(guó)自己也大舉借貸。

The bulk of Chinese debt is corporate, not explicitly government. But the bulk of corporate debt has been incurred by state-owned enterprises and underwritten by central and local government, as these firms borrow almost entirely from state-owned banks. It is thus China’s central government which has authorised a decade-long explosion in debt accumulation, even while trying to convince the world it offers a superior model of development.

中國(guó)的大部分債務(wù)是企業(yè)債務(wù)，而不是明確的政府債務(wù)。但大部分企業(yè)債務(wù)是國(guó)有企業(yè)借的，并由中央和地方政府兜底，因?yàn)檫@些企業(yè)幾乎全部從國(guó)有銀行借款。因此，正是中國(guó)的中央政府授權(quán)了長(zhǎng)達(dá)十年的債務(wù)規(guī)模爆炸式增長(zhǎng)，盡管它試圖讓世界相信，它提供了一種優(yōu)越的發(fā)展模式。

Those who favour US global leadership can be reassured by China’s poor choices. But America’s own choices are disturbing. The US already faces enormous spending obligations in the form of entitlement programmes. Combined national government spending on healthcare hit $1tn in 2015 and social security spending is projected to hit an additional $1tn this year.

那些支持美國(guó)擔(dān)任全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的人可能對(duì)中國(guó)糟糕的選擇感到慶幸。但是美國(guó)自己的選擇同樣令人不安。美國(guó)已經(jīng)因社會(huì)福利項(xiàng)目面臨巨大的支出義務(wù)。2015年，全國(guó)政府醫(yī)療保健支出合計(jì)達(dá)到1萬(wàn)億美元，今年的社會(huì)保障支出預(yù)計(jì)也將達(dá)到1萬(wàn)億美元。

The 2017 federal budget deficit was $650bn and expected to rise over time as the country ages. Now, enter the tax cut. Congress and the administration had reason to cut corporate tax rates, but they did so by $1.5tn and with no offsetting tax increase elsewhere. The recent spending bill adds $300bn to that.

2017年聯(lián)邦預(yù)算赤字為6500億美元，而且預(yù)計(jì)隨著美國(guó)步入老齡化還會(huì)不斷增加。再來(lái)看減稅。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)和政府有理由削減企業(yè)稅率，但他們要減少1.5萬(wàn)億美元的稅收，而且沒(méi)有其他地方的稅收增長(zhǎng)來(lái)抵消減稅的影響。最近的支出法案又讓美國(guó)多了3000億美元的支出。

The federal deficit could thus reach $1tn in 2018 and, if not this year, then next. This is not happening during a crisis like the one in 2008. While there are problems with labour force participation and inequality, unemployment is 4.1 per cent and the US economy added $7tn in wealth over the most recent 12 months. Yet national debt is set to soar.

2018年聯(lián)邦赤字可能達(dá)到1萬(wàn)億美元，如果今年達(dá)不到，那就是下一年。就算是在2008年這樣的危機(jī)時(shí)期都沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)1萬(wàn)億美元的赤字。雖然存在勞動(dòng)力參與和不平等問(wèn)題，失業(yè)率也達(dá)到了4.1%，但美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)在最近12個(gè)月里增加了7萬(wàn)億美元的財(cái)富。不過(guò)，美國(guó)國(guó)家債務(wù)即將飆升。

US federal borrowing has no justification. If China is telling the truth about its economy, it has no excuse for its corporate debt. If India wants a bright future, it cannot mortgage it now. No country has ever prospered from heavy government borrowing when times are good. Yet this is what the world’s economic leaders have to offer. They are walking into quicksand and could drag everyone else with them.

美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府沒(méi)有理由借貸。如果中國(guó)沒(méi)有隱瞞自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)真相，那么它的企業(yè)債務(wù)就沒(méi)有理由。如果印度想要一個(gè)光明的未來(lái)，它現(xiàn)在就不能拿未來(lái)作抵押。從來(lái)沒(méi)有一個(gè)國(guó)家在形勢(shì)大好之時(shí)靠巨額政府借貸實(shí)現(xiàn)繁榮昌盛。然而，債務(wù)正是當(dāng)今世界經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者所提供的。它們正在走進(jìn)流沙之中，最終可能拖累所有人。

Derek Scissors is resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, focusing on the Chinese and Indian economies and their relations with the US. He is concurrently chief economist at China Beige Book.

本文作者是美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所(American Enterprise Institute)常駐學(xué)者，主要研究中國(guó)和印度經(jīng)濟(jì)以及它們與美國(guó)的關(guān)系。他同時(shí)還擔(dān)任《中國(guó)黃皮書(shū)》(China Beige Book)首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家